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HISTORY OF PIEDMONT.

BY

ANTONIO GALLENGA.

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HISTORY OF PIEDMONT.

CHAPTER I.

RECONSTRUCTION OF PIEDMONT.

THE history of Piedmont begins where the history of Italy terminates. At the Peace of Château-Cambresis, in 1559, Piedmont was born again.

Under Amadeus VIII. Savoy bade fair to become a State of the very first order. In the course of a century it had sunk to a third-rate power; not only because the State itself had gone to ruin, but because the neighbouring monarchies had recovered from organic diseases, which had hitherto impeded their growth, and suddenly and simultaneously attained full development.

Piedmont, utterly prostrated by five-and-twenty years of foreign occupation, laid waste by the trampling of all the armies of Europe, required now the work of a constructive genius, and Emanuel Philibert was providentially fitted for the task. No man could

better afford to be pacific than the conqueror of St. Quintin. As modern sculpture represents him, he was yet a warrior cased in full panoply, and exhibited as much firm resolution as calm dignity, in the very act of sheathing his sword. The very men who profited by his distress and drove a hard bargain with him, took good care not to push him to extremities, and treated him with respect.

It is related of this prince, that he was born so weak that it was necessary for several hours to infuse life into him by breathing into his mouth.* He was thus at a very early period of his existence made aware of the importance of keeping soul and body together. He preserved his State by a process analogous to that by which his nurses had saved his life. Those possessions which he had so signally won back by his valour and adventure, he contrived to secure by the humbler but far more difficult virtues of prudence and forbearance.

After the battle of St. Quintin, Emanuel Philibert had France at his discretion. Had his counsels been instantly followed, the Spanish army would have dictated its own terms before or within the walls of Paris. But the narrow and pusillanimous mind of Philip II. partly frustrated the victory, and the great opportunity was lost. It is well known that when Charles V. received the first tidings of the glorious battle, in his retirement at Yuste, he made up his mind that his son must be in full march upon Paris; and when fallen

* Boldù, Relazione, Albèri, Rel. Venete, iii. 420.

from his expectation, he sank into one of his fits of deep gloom, and refused to open further despatches.*

The reconciliation of France with the hero who had alarmed and humbled her, seemed nevertheless to be sincere. Henry II. was struck with the unassuming demeanour of his conqueror, and had him always near his person. The peace was to be sealed by two marriages: that of Elizabeth, the King's daughter, with Philip of Spain; and that of the King's sister, Margaret of Valois, Duchess of Berry, with the Duke of Savoy. The King of Spain had his own part of the ceremony performed by proxy; but Emanuel Philibert was at Paris, and signed his own marriage deed, on the 27th of June, 1559. Only two days later, in the midst of the sumptuous festivities of the approaching nuptials, Henry II. was wounded in the eye by the splinter of a lance in a tilting encounter with Montgomery, and only survived till the 10th of the ensuing July. He insisted however on attending his sister's wedding in the royal chapel; and his new brother-in-law continued, by the request of the dying king, in constant waiting at his bedside to the last moment.

It was only six months after his marriage that Emanuel Philibert tore himself from the trammels of the French and Spanish courts. He entered his states at Bourg-en-Bresse, on the 11th of November, 1559; he thence proceeded to Lyons, and descended the Rhone to Marseilles, where his galleys were waiting to convey him to Nice. He reached Nice on the 3rd

* Stirling, Cloister Life of Charles V., p. 121.

of December; but soon crossed the mountains, to cheer by his presence the towns of Cuneo and Fossano, which had held up the drooping banner of Savoy in time of adversity. He was again at Nice from January to November, 1560; but towards the end of that year he travelled to Piedmont, and established his residence at Montcalieri, at the Valentino, and at Vercelli; till, upon the evacuation of Turin by the French, on the 12th of December, 1562, the Duke suddenly appeared among his people on the 14th, postponing however till the 7th of the ensuing February, 1563, his solemn entrance with the Duchess into that city, which was on that occasion formally acknowledged as the capital of the State.

It is important to examine the causes which thus retarded for several years the complete restoration of the Duke of Savoy to his rights. By the terms of Château-Cambresis, France had engaged to give back all the possessions of Savoy that were then in her hands; but she excepted Turin, Chieri, Chivasso, Pinerolo, and Villanova d'Asti, with part of their territories: these were to be occupied for three years, or until the settlement of the differences between the two Courts, chiefly with regard to the dowry of Louisa of Savoy, mother of Francis I., the original cause of dispute; some assert, even until the birth of an heir to Emanuel Philibert. And as Margaret of Valois was thirty-six years old at her marriage, it is suggested that France calculated on the probable unfruitfulness of that union, though it is difficult to see how such a

contingency could advance any lawful claims of France on Savoy. Even when the heir, Charles Emanuel, was born, January 12th, 1562, some vain and unworthy efforts were made to prove him a supposititious child.*

So long as France insisted on keeping the five above-mentioned places, Spain was also empowered to retain Asti and Vercelli. Philip II. however, who was not without regard for the Prince who had built up his throne, and who knew Vercelli to have been the residence of several Savoy princes, and the last abode of Charles III., gave it up to Emanuel Philibert, and contented himself with the occupation of Asti and Santià.

The differences with France were long pending. A conference was held at Lyons, from December, 1560, to January, 1561, conducted for the French king by Renato di Birago, a member of one of those Milanese families who followed the fortunes of France. This Renato had been President of the Turin Parliament during the French occupation, and rose afterwards to high though unenviable distinction as Keeper of the Seals and Chancellor of France. The Lyons Conference led to no results; and it was after the expiration of the appointed three years (August 8th, 1562) that a convention was signed at Blois, by which France restored the places she still occupied in Savoy.

Even yet the French insisted on retaining Savigliano, as well as Pinerolo, Perosa, and its valley (Val Chiusone), alleging a necessity on their part of thus

* Costa de Beauregard, Maison de Savoie, ii. 46.

securing their own province of Saluzzo, and keeping up with it an easier communication than those which were open to them through the valleys of the marquisate.

Twelve years later, on the death of Charles IX. (May 30th, 1574), Henry III., who hastened from the throne of Poland to that of France, was met at Venice by Emanuel Philibert, who obtained for him a safe passage through Lombardy, entertained him for twelve days at Turin (with such splendour that a single collation cost him one hundred thousand crowns), and thence escorted him with a large force to Lyons, through roads which the Huguenot bands in possession of the Alpine defiles would otherwise have rendered unsafe to the King. During this visit, either out of gratitude for the Duke's services, or of deference to the Duchess, his own aunt, Henry III. promised the restitution of the places still retained by France; and this was at last settled by the Treaty of Turin, December 15th, 1574.* As the French marched out of Savigliano and Pinerolo, the Spaniards also gave up Asti and Santià, and Emanuel Philibert found himself in possession of all his Subalpine dominions.

No words can describe the meanness and arrogance by which the French aggravated this prolonged usurpation of their neighbour's territories. They clung to Piedmont, urging their own convenience as an unanswerable right. Birago unblushingly said to Emanuel

* Traités Publics de la Maison de Savoie, i. 110.

Philibert that his royal master "must needs" have a footing south of the Alps, and the Duke was at the greatest pains to assure the King that "he could always tread upon himself (*luy passer sur le ventre*) whenever he had a mind to enter Italy."*

Immediately after his marriage Emanuel Philibert had sent agents to recover his States,—the Count of Chaland to Savoy, Francis de la Balme to Bresse, and Amadeus Valperga, Count of Masino, to Piedmont. The Transalpine countries were given up without chicane; but in Piedmont, Marshal Brissac, who had so long lorded it over the land, for four months resisted the positive orders and urgent entreaties of his king. In the same manner, when the Treaty of Blois was communicated to Imbert de la Platière, Marshal of Bourdillon, he disregarded the injunctions of the Court; and it was only by a personal bribe that Emanuel Philibert drove him out of Turin, after four months' delay. Even as he yielded to necessity, the Marshal carried away all the artillery and ammunition of the strong places, compelled the Duke to supply provisions and means of conveyance—and thus to lend a hand to his own spoliation—demanded 100,000 crowns to pay the arrears of the French garrisons, extorting also a promise that Emanuel Philibert would never importune the Queen Regent for the repayment of 100,000 crowns and 4000 men, with which the Duke had accommodated her on a previous occasion.†

Whilst Emanuel Philibert so heroically submitted

* Guichenon, ii. 256. † Sismondi, Hist. des Français, xi. 254.

to all this provocation, he had also to resist temptations of a different nature. After the death of Henry II., this France, which was so insolent, had however ceased to be formidable. That king was succeeded by his three sons,—Francis II., aged sixteen, a weakly prince, who only reigned seventeen months; then Charles IX., a minor (December 5th, 1560); and Henry III., in 1574. Over these latter the influence of their mother, Catherine de' Medici, ruled supreme. Throughout that period, down to the death of Henry III. in 1589, to the accession of Henry IV. in 1593, and the promulgation of the Edict of Nantes in 1598, France was a prey to the factions of Catholics and Huguenots, which brought her to the very verge of self-destruction. The great work of centralization achieved by Louis XI. was all undone, and France had relapsed into the anarchy of a new feudalism. The remotest provinces, especially the southern lands of Provence, Languedoc, and Dauphiny, had thrown off all allegiance to the Court, and were in the hands of daring chiefs, half sectarians, half brigands, who unfurled the standard of rebellion. Protestantism, or rather religious disorder, (for hardly any man, no matter of what sect or confession, especially in the higher ranks, was in earnest,) had made rapid progress in these districts—once the hotbed of Albigensian heresies; and Dauphiny, with all the Alpine valleys adjoining Savoy, were the scene of endless riot and strife.

Had Emanuel Philibert put himself at the head of one of those factions, he might have paid back to

France the indignities he had had to endure; but his mission was the restoration of his own State, not the subjugation of his neighbour's. Not only did he never stray out of his way to make the best of the calamities of France, but he actually did all in his power to avert or to heal them.

One of the men who carried on a longer contest with the Court of Catherine de' Medici was Henry, Marshal Damville, of the House of Montmorency, who, from his government of Languedoc, laughed all the enmity of the Queen Mother to scorn. On the death of Charles IX., this nobleman, relying on the fair character hitherto displayed by Henry III., was desirous to come to a reconciliation with the Court. He threw himself into the way of the King, as he travelled through Turin, and solicited the intercession of the Duke and Duchess of Savoy. Henry granted the Marshal an interview, and seemed disposed to take him into his good graces; but presently secret instructions came from the Queen Mother, and the feeble monarch, adopting her views and despairing to lay hold of Damville, bade Emanuel Philibert arrest him. The Duke had great reason to wish to propitiate the King, as he was now suing for the restitution of Savigliano and Pinerolo; but he was not a man to break his pledged word. He ran the chance of the King's displeasure, warned his guest of the danger, conveyed him safely to Nice, and hence embarked him for his own province of Languedoc.*

* Sismondi, Hist. des Français, xii. 19.

Another great party leader, Roger de St. Lari, Marshal of Bellegarde, had withdrawn from France and settled in Saluzzo. This marquisate had been left to France at the peace, and was successively governed by Louis and Charles Birago, two brothers, cousins to Renato, the Chancellor of France. Charles Birago, who had succeeded his brother in December, 1572, had rendered himself obnoxious by his severity against religious dissenters; and Bellegarde, whom the Court, anxious to remove him from Paris, had appointed to the government of the strong places of Carmagnola and Revel, affected to befriend these sectaries. He allied himself with the heretic chiefs of Southern France, and especially with Lesdiguières, who was then rising to power and distinction in Dauphiny. He nevertheless kept up a friendly intercourse with the Court, and whilst he vied with it in intrigue and duplicity, he laid out his plan for the invasion of the marquisate. His wife was a lady of one of the collateral branches of the Marchional House of Saluzzo, and he seemed desirous of putting forth some claims in her name. His plans being matured, he drove Birago from the capital, and overran the land of the marquisate up to the mountain-crest (January, 1579).*

It has been confidently asserted that Bellegarde was abetted in his treason by Emanuel Philibert, and that both the Duke of Savoy and all those French rebels acted under the influence of the King of Spain,

* Tonso, Vit. Emanuel. Philib. p. 219.

anxious to wrest that last Subalpine possession from France.*

Most assuredly Emanuel Philibert could not have forgotten the claims his House had acquired over Saluzzo from earliest times down to the cession made to himself by John Louis, the last of the Marquises, in 1560. But Bellegarde's plot was fraught with the greatest danger to Savoy, and we know that nothing caused more constant uneasiness to the Duke than the attitude of the Huguenot chiefs of the adjoining French provinces; he always expected from them a sudden onset on Saluzzo or Pinerolo, from either of which point they would not have failed to throw Piedmont into as great a confusion as now reigned in all France.†

That Bellegarde was in frequent communication with the Duke is indeed unquestionable; but, notwithstanding the obscurity involving all those transactions, it is also very certain that Emanuel Philibert not only lent no material aid to the usurper, but exercised all his influence to detach the Marshal from his Huguenot connections, though it was impossible for him, as it was for the French Court, to control him by main force. Certainly the French Court never expressed any disapprobation, never evinced any suspicion, of the Duke's conduct; nay, when, unable to combat the Marshal by open means, they offered to come to terms with him, it was Emanuel Philibert who was solicited

* Videl, Hist. de Lesdiguières, p. 32.—Eandi, Saluzzo, ii. 417.—Sismondi, Hist. des Français, xii. 131.

† Molino, Relazione, Albèri, iv. 260.

to bring Bellegarde to an interview with the Queen Mother at Grenoble. The Marshal was not so rash as to venture into the power of such adversaries, and the meeting took place at Montluel, in Bresse, within the territories and under the safeguard of Savoy, October, 1579. Matters were compromised, and Bellegarde was empowered to retain Saluzzo as a lieutenant of the King. He went back to his Government towards the end of the year, but died only five days later, at Saluzzo, of poison, administered, it is supposed, by Catherine de' Medici, at Montluel.

Bellegarde was succeeded in the government by his son, Cæsar; but the officers in command of the strong places shook off their allegiance, so that his authority extended no further than the walls of his residence, Revel. The province would thus have been too easy a prey to Emanuel Philibert, had he been bent upon doing himself justice; but he had bound himself to a passive, defensive policy, and was not likely to depart from it now, when labouring under the symptoms of an infirmity which proved fatal in the course of the following year.

The same moderation and longanimity which enabled Emanuel Philibert to avoid a collision with France, because he deemed it unreasonable, equally distinguished him in his relations with his neighbours of Italy. There was now, alas! no Italy; the country had fallen a prey to the Spanish branch of the House of Austria, and the very existence of Mantua, Parma, Tuscany, etc., was at the mercy of Philip II. Not-

withstanding his family connection with that monarch and with the Emperors Ferdinand I. and Maximilian II., Emanuel Philibert was keenly alive to the cruel wrongs his house had to endure at the hands of Austria, no less than of France, and cherished an equally just and unquenchable resentment against both;* but he felt the precariousness of his situation, and without sacrificing either his dignity or his rights and interests, he was wise enough to bow to necessity and to adjourn their vindication. He contented himself with urging before the Imperial Chamber those claims of his House over Montferrat, which Charles V. had set aside in 1536, to favour the pretensions of Gonzaga of Mantua; and submitted to the loss of that territory, which, encompassed as it was by the Savoy dominions on three sides, and moreover separated from the Duchy of Mantua by the Milanese province of Alessandria, might have been overrun by Savoy in three days.

Notwithstanding all this self-denial, this "most able and most honest of all the princes of his line"† was fully aware of the importance of his position as the "bulwark of Italy," and felt that on his existence hung the fate of such states in the Peninsula as still aspired to independence. "I know full well," he said in a moment of cordial expansion,‡ "that these foreigners are all bent on the utter destruction of Italy, and that

* See his letter to his agent in Spain, July 10th, 1565.

† Stirling, Cloister Life of Charles V., p. 29.

‡ Boldù, Relazione, Albèri, iii. 464.

I may be the first immolated; but my fall can be indifferent to no Italian state, and least of all to Venice."

Full of these thoughts, he was unwearied in his endeavours to secure the friendship of that republic, and eager to waive, for its sake, those fatal claims of his house on Cyprus, which were never brought forward except when Providence had blinded the Princes of Savoy to their true interests. Not only did he, in 1560, decline the advances of Solyman, who offered to help him to the possession of that island; but when at last, in 1571, the Turks, under Selim II., achieved the conquest of Cyprus, Emanuel Philibert was one of the Christian potentates who strove, though in vain, to avert that calamity.

Nearer home the Duke was not always on equally good terms with the Genoese; yet, even in that quarter, he knew how to resist the advances of the people of Savona, who, justly indignant at the tyranny of Genoa, which had deprived them of commerce by filling up their harbour, so as to render it unfit for any vessels but of the smallest craft, repeatedly tendered their allegiance to Savoy.*

After such signal proofs of self-denial it will hardly be surprising to hear that Emanuel Philibert renounced, in favour of Philip II. of Spain, such claims as might devolve upon him from his mother to the throne of Portugal, vacant by the death of King Sebastian and of his grand-uncle Cardinal Henry, in 1578 and 1580.

The same instinctive dread of the crushing ascend-

* Lippomano, Relazione, Albèri, iv. 216.

ency of Spain and France, which made Emanuel Philibert cling to the Venetian alliance, equally urged him to settle, no matter at what cost, the differences with the other old allies of his house—the Swiss.

The Pays de Vaud, Gex, Chablais, and Lower Valais were still in the power of the confederates; and it was not without a murmur that the Duke of Savoy could part with so fair a portion of his forefathers' inheritance; but it was not long ere he learnt to resign all hope of its recovery.

A new generation had sprung up in those provinces, amongst whom all loyalty to Savoy had died off. The Bernese had introduced the Reformation into the conquered lands; the people had been enriched with the spoils of the Church, as well as of the nobility, who had been all but annihilated in the contest. Political freedom went hand in hand with religious innovation; the people entered with eagerness into the new order of things, and were irrevocably committed to it.

Geneva was the very head-quarters of reform; it was proud of the appellation of the "Rome of Calvinism;" its party-name of *Eidgenots*, or Huguenots, had become the watchword of all the free religionists who spoke the French language. Nothing could equal the rapid increment of these countries; the population of the towns had been doubled by the immigration of religious and political refugees. In Lausanne alone, in thirty years (1544–1574), four hundred and thirty-eight families had been inscribed in the roll of its citizens, and of these three hundred were fugitives from

the Savoy provinces.* Together with these strangers the industry, the knowledge, the life of foreign countries, flowed into these districts. The balance of civilization, which only half a century before weighed, as we have seen, so gloriously in favour of Italy, had now been too rapidly and sadly reversed.

An attack upon such enemies presented no great chance of success, and it was not for more than one moment that Emanuel Philibert contemplated it.

The peace of Château-Cambresis was looked upon as a league of the Catholic powers against heresy. Emanuel Philibert came back a member of it; and his share of the war was the subjugation of the city of Geneva and the recovery of his own Helvetian lands.

He had some agents in Geneva,—two Neapolitan adventurers, Felix de Nola and Cæsar de Maggio,—who gave favourable reports of the disposition of part of the people, and of the feasibility of a sudden onset upon the place (1560); but Henry II. of France was no more; and his feeble and fickle successor, who was shifting his policy between the Catholics and Huguenots in his own kingdom, equally wavered in his foreign relations, and repeatedly countenanced both the Genevese and the Swiss reformers. Emanuel Philibert, ill-supported by Spain and thwarted by France, laid aside all ideas of an appeal to force, and trusted his cause to negotiation.

There was happily division in the enemy's camp; religious difference had set the old forest cantons

* Verdeil, Canton de Vaud, ii. 116.

into opposition with Berne and her Protestant associates. The Duke of Savoy made a treaty at Lucerne (November 11, 1560) with Schwytz, Uri, Unterwald, Zug, Lucerne, Soleure, and even Zurich; and these promised their good offices with their Protestant brethren, in behalf of Savoy. Lengthy and somewhat stormy conferences ensued, the result of which was the treaty of Lausanne (October 30, 1564); by the terms of which, Berne retained Vaud, and Friburg Romont, and Savoy only recovered Gex and Chablais. At a later period (March 4th, 1569) Valais also came to terms at Thonon; it gave up its own share of Chablais, but remained in possession of Lower Valais.*

By the recovery of Gex and Chablais Savoy now encompassed Geneva on all sides, and caused that town incessant uneasiness; but the Duke, although he was deeply wounded by the result of so losing a bargain, and although he highly blamed his agents and suspected them of treachery,† was, however, earnestly bent on peace, and he reassured the Genevese by new treaties, signed at Berne (May 5th, 1570), by which he engaged to give no molestation to Geneva.

These same treaties bound Savoy to allow freedom of conscience and worship to those of her subjects who had embraced Protestantism during the Swiss occupation; and we hear, in fact, of no persecutions in the provinces round the Leman in Emanuel Philibert's lifetime; but it is important to inquire how

* Traités Publics, i. 51, 65.—Verdeil, Canton de Vaud, ii. 131.

† Saluces, Hist. Milit. du Piémont, i. 143.

that Prince dealt in these matters with his subjects in general.

The disasters of the State of Savoy, under Charles III., were contemporaneous with the spread of reformed doctrines throughout Europe: the Church of Piedmont had fallen into as great a disorganization as the country itself. We hear from several authorities that "the Piedmontese were more than half Protestants." The Waldensian ministers reckoned their sectaries at the foot of the Alps at 800,000, whilst one of them cried exultingly at the stake that "Piedmont had not wood enough to burn all its heretics." The Reformers, we know from irrefragable evidence,* were numerous, not merely in the State, but even at Court.

Emanuel Philibert was a man of deep religious feeling. In his early Flemish campaigns of 1553, which led to the taking of Hesdin, one of his noblest exploits, it is related that, on the eve of departure for the camp, he stole out of his quarters, with a single attendant, and absented himself for the night. As he was young, and known for his partiality to the sex, it was surmised that he had gone out in pursuit of some gallant adventure; but his footsteps were traced to the chapel of a neighbouring convent, where he prepared himself for his warlike duties by a night of prayer and humiliation.†

* Boldù, Relazione, p. 435.—Morosini, p. 113.—Molino, p. 249.—Botta, Storia d'Italia, 1534-1789, ii. 421.

† Boldù, Relazione, Albèri, iii. 422.

In the following year Philip of Spain (it appears, though on somewhat questionable authority), on the occasion of his marriage with Queen Mary, was desirous of bringing about a union of Emanuel Philibert with the Princess Elizabeth. The idea was, it would further seem, even entertained at a later period, on Mary's decease; and matters went so far that a marriage deed was drawn up, and a gentleman appointed to wed the Princess by proxy;* but the hero of Hesdin could not overcome his repugnance to a heretic bride, and Elizabeth, for her own part, held out but little hope to those who designed by that match to win back both herself and her kingdom to the Catholic fold.

With all this strict orthodoxy, however, Emanuel Philibert was a brave man,—stern, but humane. He had no reason to be well pleased with the Reformers, who had made religion a pretext for political opposition at Geneva, in his father's lifetime. In all the disorders of French Huguenots he beheld hardly any earnest conviction, either on their side or on that of their opponents, but religion made a cloak for popular sedition or princely ambition. In later times, we are told,† some daring sectaries were guilty of repeated attempts against his person, and that of his only son and heir.

* Lippomano, Relazione, Albèri, iv. 215.—Adriani, Storia d'Italia, p. 1083.—Guichenon, Hist. Généalogique, ii. 272.

† Costa de Beauregard, Maison de Savoie, ii. 238.—Denina, Ital. Occident., iii. 97.

Independent however of the real disposition of his mind, the Duke was hardly a free agent. France and Spain bound him to the terms of Château-Cambresis; and the Holy Office, already installed under French rule, was empowered to act with or without his consent. The Papal Nuncio, Francis Bachod, Bishop of Geneva, and the Grand Inquisitor, Thomas Giacomello, were always by his side; and on the 15th of February, 1560, they extorted from him, at Nice, a first edict, aimed especially at the Waldenses.

It must not be forgotten that there were Waldenses all over the Western Alps, in the valleys of Dauphiny, Provence, and Saluzzo, as well as in those of Pinerolo. Of all these only the last-named belonged to Savoy, and they consisted of the valley of the Pelice, and part of that of the Chiusone, with its tributary, the Germanasca. The whole of this district, with the rest of Piedmont, had been under French sway from 1536 to 1559, and up to 1574 Pinerolo and Perosa, with Val Chiusone, had been withheld from the Duke of Savoy, so that his jurisdiction only extended over the Val Pelice or Val di Lucerna, with its minor glens of Val d'Angrogna and Rora, and the Val Germanasca, called also Valley of St. Martin. This constitutes, even at the present day, the Waldensian territory, properly so called.

Since the persecution of Charles I. of Savoy, in 1488, the Waldenses of this district had been allowed an edict of amnesty and toleration, and had lived for years ignored or forgotten; they had, perhaps, somewhat yielded to persuasion, and somewhat slackened

from their former severity, and complied with the forms of the dominant religion so far as to hear mass.* But matters greatly changed at the spread of the Swiss and German Reformation.

The Waldenses considered the prevalence of the new tenets as their own triumph. From 1526 to 1530 they entered into communication with the Reformers, and modified their own creed and worship in accordance with the new ideas, indentifying themselves especially with the disciples of Calvin. They held several conferences, and finally, at a general meeting, held in Val d'Angrogna, in 1532, which was attended by Swiss ministers, and presided over by Farel himself, they especially denounced their own hypocrisy for having hitherto gone to hear mass, and determined to discontine their attendance.† Their valleys became a refuge for all persecuted sectaries, amongst whom there were turbulent spirits, who stirred up those simple and loyal mountaineers to mutiny and revolt.

Although they thus called down upon themselves the enmity of all the foes to Protestantism, these valleys continued nevertheless to be looked upon as a privileged district, and their brethren of other provinces found there a safe haven from the storms which drove them from their homes.

In Saluzzo, for instance, mention of Waldenses occurs as early as the beginning of the fourteenth

* Bert, I Valdesi, p. 118.

† Bert, p. 132.—Muston, the Israel of the Alps, chap. vii.

century. The native rulers had always been lenient towards them; but towards the beginning of the sixteenth century the marquisate had fallen under the sway of Margaret of Anjou, a wicked Frenchwoman, the same we have seen successively waging war against all her sons, but who, like other wicked ones, affected great religious zeal, and erected Saluzzo into a bishopric in 1511. Margaret first reared up the inquisitorial tribunals, and condemned five heretics to the flames. These contrived to break from prison; but the Marchioness laid hold of three others, who had either been acquitted or pardoned, and made them bear the penalty of their fugitive brethren, and she looked out for two more to make up the original number; all these she burnt at Paesana, in Val di Po, May 2nd, 1510.* She followed up her cruel work by wholesale proscriptions; but the fugitives, who had taken shelter in the Pinerolo valleys, came back by might of arms, and the upper regions of Saluzzo were ravaged by civil wars, till a Pope—Leo X.—gave the signal for tolerance, and induced the Marchioness to publish an amnesty (June 8th, 1513).

During the French occupation, Saluzzo, no less than the Pinerolo valleys and all Piedmont, were subject to the frequent and sudden freaks of policy which characterized the French Court. Pressed by the Inquisitors, the Waldenses of the Pinerolo valleys sent a deputation to Francis I., urging the rights and privileges they had always enjoyed in their own districts.

* Muletti, Saluzzo, vi. 384.

They were drily answered by the King, that, "as he was at that very moment busy burning heretics at Paris, he was not likely to spare them in the Alps."* Notwithstanding the sharpness of these words, the valleys were still allowed a certain degree of impunity, not only during this reign, but also under Henry II., when the adjoining districts began to experience some severity.

A striking instance of this difference occurs in the case of Gioffredo Varaglia. He was a native of Busca, in the marquisate of Saluzzo, the son of a man who had distinguished himself in the anti-Waldensian crusade of 1488. Gioffredo was brought up under a strict religious discipline; he was a monk and a Capuchin; but in 1556, in his forty-ninth year, he passed over to Geneva, embraced the Reformed doctrines, and came back as a pastor to St. John of Lucerna. From this place a longing to visit his native town tempted him out of the charmed ground of the Pinerolo valleys, and upon setting foot in the marquisate he was arrested at Barge, conveyed before the Parliament at Turin, and there strangled and burnt (March 29th, 1558).†

There was, therefore, something like license, or else open defiance of the laws, in the Pinerolo valleys, even when these were subject to the sway of France, together with Saluzzo and all Piedmont. The refugees from France and other countries made it a focus of

* Leger, Églises Vaudoises, ii. 28.

† Perin, Hist. des Vaudois, p. 167.

sedition and open rebellion, as soon as it came into the possession of Emanuel Philibert in 1559; and the Duke was, from political motives, compelled to issue the edict of Nice, intended not so much to suppress heresy as to repress it.

The terms of the edict are significant. The Duke "forbade his subjects from going to hear the preachers in the valleys."* It did not proscribe or banish the preachers or their flock, but simply limited them to their own district, and strove to neutralize their influence upon his Catholic subjects, and perhaps to put a stop to the alarming influx of strangers, who, besides disturbing the peace of the state, exposed it to hostilities with its neighbours. It also bound the Waldenses to that outward observance of Roman Catholic rites to which they had raised no insurmountable objection in former times.

But the Waldenses were too far committed with the Reformers to go back to their undignified compliance of former times. They ventured upon firm, though humble, remonstrances with the Duke and petitions to the Duchess, who, like the other French Princess, Renée of Ferrara, was more than suspected of a leaning towards the views of the Reformers; and, on his own part, the Duke, unwilling to have recourse to extreme measures, sent Philip of Savoy, Count of Racconigi, to the valleys, charged with a mission of peace and conciliation. Philip of Racconigi, one of the illegitimate descendants of the Princes of Achaia, was a

* Muston, Israel of the Alps, chap. xiv.

man of gentle and affable disposition. Like several members of his family, no less than several of the Princes of Savoy, of the branches of Tenda and Nemours, flourishing at this time in France, Racconigi combined Catholic zeal with that worldly wisdom which made him aware of the inefficiency of fire and sword towards the extirpation of religious dissent. It is known that one of the Counts of Tenda, Honoré, Governor of Provence, was put to death by Charles IX. for his reluctance to follow up, in his province, the massacres of St. Bartholomew's Eve.*

Philip of Racconigi was aided by some of the Lords of Lucerna, a family possessing great influence in the valleys, its original seat, and always bent on befriending the Waldenses; and the conference that was held at Lucerna with some of the moderate pastors might have led to happy results, but the monks of the Abbey of Pinerolo and some of the Lords of the valley of St. Martin, impatient of delay, either laid hold of some Waldenses who ventured out of the privileged district, or attempted to suppress by violence the Protestant worship beyond its limits.

On the other hand, the Waldenses, incited by foreign refugees, and especially by some fanatic preachers, whom they were bidden to dismiss, assumed a mutinous attitude, applied for succour to the Huguenot chiefs of the French provinces,† and even made a

* Litta, Savoia, tav. xii.

† Gilles, Histoire des Églises Réformees des Vallées du Piémont, chap. xv.

covenant of mutual support with their brethren of Pragelato, that upper Val Chiusone, which always belonged to France.*

This must be accounted treason by the Sovereign of Savoy; and Emanuel Philibert, by whose order George Costa, Count of Trinità, had collected a force of four thousand foot and two hundred horse at the entrance of the valleys, now sent orders for the attack. The Count easily possessed himself of La Torre and Villar Bobbio, in Val Lucerna, as well as Perosa, and Perrero in Val St. Martin; but the Waldenses ran up to their mountain fastnesses, and especially to that natural bulwark at Pra del Tor, which had baffled their adversaries at the time of the Crusade of 1488. Repulsed after repeated onsets, La Trinità consented to a suspension of hostilities; this led to frequent but bootless conferences, which had no other effect than to add to the exasperation of both parties. A deputation of thirty-five pastors and other Waldensian chiefs to the Duke at Vercelli led to no better conclusion.

War broke out anew. Its horrors were aggravated by foreign combatants, as the ranks of La Trinità were swelled by both French and Spanish marauders; and the Huguenots of France, and even some Protestant volunteers from Germany, fought with the Waldenses. The wanton cruelties of the troops of La Trinità called forth reprisals on the part of the meek men of the Alps, or, more probably, of their less scrupulous

* Muston, Israël des Alpes, chap. xiv.

foreign auxiliaries. By the confession of their own historians, the Waldenses put not a few of their prisoners to death in cold blood.*

But it was not for the interest of the Duke of Savoy that his subjects should thus tear each other to pieces. After repeated checks La Trinità met with at the foot of the rock of Val d'Angrogna, Philip of Racconigi once more appeared as a bearer of peace, and a covenant was signed at Cavour on the 5th of June, 1561.

The Waldenses were allowed full amnesty and the free exercise of their worship within their own territory, specifying various districts in the valleys of Lucerna, Angrogna, Rora, St. Martin, and Perosa. Within those same boundaries they consented to the erection of Catholic churches, and bound themselves to a reciprocal toleration of Roman rites. They submitted to the expulsion of some of the most troublesome foreign divines, and acknowledged their sovereign's right to build fortresses in their country: finally, they promised to avoid discussion of, or unnecessary allusion to, religious topics in their intercourse with the other subjects of Savoy. The compact, in short, restored matters to their previous state, only exempting the sectaries from the obnoxious duty of hearing mass.†

Those who might feel inclined to judge with severity these half-measures of Emanuel Philibert, need only compare the Treaty of Cavour with the conduct of the

* Gilles, chap. xxiii.—Muston, chap. xiv.

† Leger, Églises Vaudoises, ii. 38.

Spanish Government in Calabria, where a Waldensian colony from the Alps had been established since the fourteenth century, and where, in this same year, 1561, the inquisitors, backed by the "secular arm," hunted them down like wild beasts, and exterminated them by an awful massacre, from which even unborn infants were not suffered to escape.*

The Treaty of Cavour satisfied neither party. It exposed the Duke to the loud reprimands of Rome, France, and Spain, no less than to the bitter invectives of all his clergy, who denounced him as a heretic and abettor of heretics; and, on the other hand, the Waldenses, either out of sympathy for their brethren of the French provinces, or of veneration for some of the proscribed ministers, or, finally, out of proselytizing zeal, again and again placed themselves in opposition to the authorities deputed to rule over them, especially to Colonel Castrocaro, a Tuscan in the service of Savoy, who was appointed governor in the valleys. Indeed all contemporaneous evidence forces upon us the conviction that Emanuel Philibert was the only liberal-minded man of his age, always labouring to check the rampant fanaticism of his own officers, always striving to resist the demands both of Catholic and Protestant powers,—Rome, France, Spain, the Elector Palatine, the Swiss,—who were all equally urging him to insane, inconsistent, impracticable measures, and exposing him to fresh commotions at home and contentions abroad. France especially, in posses-

* Botta, Storia d'Italia, ii. p. 433.

sion of Saluzzo and Pinerolo, in possession of Dauphiny and Val Pragelato, and, from 1563 to 1574, also of Perosa, but at no time able to establish a firm government in those distant provinces, vexed and perplexed Emanuel Philibert by its absurdly contradictory policy. In 1571 (September 28th), Charles IX., by an autograph letter, earnestly besought the Duke of Savoy to imitate his own example and show mercy to his erring subjects of the valleys, and only one year later he startled the world by the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Eve (August 23rd–24th, 1572). Orders for the rehearsal of such scenes as had stained the streets of Paris on that miserable night were forwarded to Saluzzo and to the other Subalpine French provinces. But Louis of Birago, the governor, unwilling to take upon himself the responsibility of such atrocious deeds, referred the matter to his council, where, by the advice of a priest, the archdeacon of the cathedral of Saluzzo, by name Samuel Vacca, it was resolved to postpone the execution of the royal mandate; and presently the Court was appalled at the sight of the blood that had flowed, and the mandate was revoked. But Louis of Birago died in December of the same year, and his brother Charles, after adopting harsh measures in Saluzzo, prepared to carry on his work of proscription in Val Pragelato. Emanuel Philibert, who had been the loudest of all the princes of Christendom* in his execration of the Parisian mas-

* Gilles, Églises des Alpes, chap. xxxvi.—Muston, Israel of the Alps, chap. xvi.

sacres, not only hastened to allay the consternation into which his own Protestant subjects had been thrown, by the threats of the fanatic Castrocaro, but allowed the Waldenses to offer an asylum and to extend their protection to the fugitives of Dauphiny and Provence, and even to bear arms in defence of their brethren of Pragelato and Perosa.*

By the Treaty of Cavour, Emanuel Philibert, who in many respects resembled Henry IV. of France, and may be looked upon as his precursor, had thus, by gentle means, and in less than eighteen months, settled in his States those religious differences to which that great and good king only put an end in his realm after half a century of bloodshed, by the Edict of Nantes of 1598.

Throughout the remaining states of Savoy the Inquisition did slowly and silently, but irresistibly, its work. So far as it was in the power of a prince situated as the Duke of Savoy then was, there is full evidence that he everywhere checked the severity of that odious tribunal, and showed the greatest reluctance to comply with the demands of Rome. As late as 1570 he was still battling with the Pope, and harbouring at his court a great number of Huguenots, and especially some ladies of rank, such as the Countess of Tenda and the Marechale de Leinì, who had found favour with the Duke himself, or with his half-Calvinist consort.†

* Muston, chaps. xvi. xxxiii.—Bert, I Valdesi, p. 157.

† Morosini, Relazione, Albèri, iv. 169, 175.

There are Protestant authorities who assure us, also, that Emanuel Philibert was liberal-minded enough to offer a chair in the University of Turin to a Protestant, Celio Secondo Curione, a native of that city, and a man of a brave, adventurous spirit, who after being driven from Pavia and Lucca, where he had successively founded Reformed churches, closed a long, honourable career at Basle, in 1569.*

With the exception of the Alpine districts, in short, we hear of no wholesale massacres or banishments in Piedmont; and yet, of the "swarms of sectaries" to which all contemporaneous writers bear witness, hardly a trace is found after the lapse of a few years, a proof, if any were needed, that in Piedmont as well as in other communities, whether monarchical or democratic, it was persuasion, example, and fashion, rather than force, that set the limits of the conflicting creeds, and the religion of the State was readily accepted as the religion of the people.

But in his leniency towards the sectaries of the valleys, Emanuel Philibert was actuated by other motives besides the promptings of a naturally generous soul. We have seen him smothering his just indignation and submitting to glaring injustice, to avoid collision with foreign powers. He showed an equal anxiety to put an end to civil strife. His great schemes for the regeneration of the country could only find their development in a few years of profound peace.

* M'Crie, Reformation in Italy, p. 399.

He found on his return perfect chaos. Of the institutions which Amadeus VIII. had endeavoured to reduce to system, hardly the vestiges remained. Whatever had survived the civil wars which distracted Savoy under the immediate successors of that wise ruler was utterly trampled down by the hasty tread of invaders. The people were no less demoralized than utterly crushed and ruined. All feelings of loyalty had died off amongst many Piedmontese nobles: that feeling originally so strong, that when, in 1539, the property of the State was put up to auction by the French, not a single purchaser was found willing to inflict, by bidding, pain upon his unfortunate Sovereign.* The wealthiest in the land had been so greatly impoverished, that from 2000 to 5000 crowns was considered a handsome income for a titled nobleman of the very first rank, whilst amongst the minor aristocracy the average revenue was between 1000 and 2000 crowns.† Notwithstanding their fallen fortunes, parties ran high amongst them. The names of Guelphs and Ghibelines had been revived: the former represented the partisans of France; the latter, the Imperialists, or favourers of Austria and Spain. With few honourable exceptions, the Piedmontese nobles had taken part with either power. They had borne arms for them; they had accepted office; even after the peace many received pensions and emoluments, many still wore the badges and colours of their employers

* Cibrario, Istituzioni della Monarchia di Savoia, p. 145.

† Costa de Beauregard, Maison de Savoie, ii. 247.

at the court of their restored Sovereign.* They looked upon each other with no goodwill. Indeed their animosity was so unbridled, that, on the Duke's entrance into Mondovì, they broke out into a brawl, and two thousand men of the ducal *ordonnance* almost came to blows in his very presence.† As it happens in all restorations, the few nobles who had continued faithful to their prince set no bounds to their claims upon his gratitude; whilst the others, whatever efforts might be made to reconcile them, showed an invincible jealousy of the favoured loyalists.

The people were exhausted and stupified. The republican spirit of the cities was long since broken: the vassal population had been ground to dust. Nothing so clearly results from all the accounts of the shrewd observers who resided at Emanuel Philibert's court at different epochs, than the utter "slothfulness, abjectness, and cowardice" into which the multitude had sunk on both sides of the Alps, but especially in Savoy, a country which had always been organized on feudal principles, and where the people were nothing without their nobles.‡ All these witnesses felt confident that the good intentions and devices of the prince would be frustrated by the unconquerable inertia and supineness of the subjects. Notwithstanding the brave deeds of loyalty at Cuneo and Nice, the towns had accustomed themselves to the foreign yoke, and in some

* Morosini, Relazione, p. 125.

† Boldù, Relazione, p. 434.

‡ Morosini, pp. 125, 130, 141, etc.—Molino, pp. 246, 249.

instances regretted it. The French, reluctant to part with Piedmont, had, in the latter years of their occupation, courted the people's goodwill. They had relieved the towns from taxation, and encouraged a certain degree of licentiousness.* The liveliness of the French garrisons was not without its charms amongst a people who still exhibited some marks of resemblance with them. Not only the King's officers and commanders of the towns, but the very minions of the Duchess's household, were loud in their dispraise of the House of Savoy, and even affected to treat its chief with contempt,—an insolence which Emanuel Philibert, conscious of the lesson he had given French arrogance at St. Quintin, was magnanimous enough to overlook.†

If we add to these disorders the national jealousy and antipathy of his Transalpine and Subalpine people, a jealousy aggravated on the part of the Savoyards by the resolution of the Duke to fix his residence in Piedmont, and by the apparent neglect with which the hereditary dominions of the House deemed themselves treated; if we remember that to so many causes of discontent religious dissent was added,—that the Church had usurped unlimited powers, and constituted almost a state within the state,—that the clergy were in possession of vast estates, and the country burdened with twenty different orders of monks, independent of the mendicant brotherhoods,—we may

* Boldù, p. 442.

† Saluces, Hist. Milit. i. 135.

easily conceive that a ruler, who came back with generous designs to do "all for the people," could cherish no great hope of achieving much "by the people."

Though eminently distinguished for justice and humanity, Emanuel Philibert was a man of stern, imperious character. There are early instances of his wilfulness and severity. At the taking of Bra, in 1552, in his first Italian campaigns, the young prince ordered all the Piedmontese soldiers of the garrison to be put to the sword; very justly looking upon them as traitors to their liege sovereign, his father. Not long after, in 1554, when he was commander-in-chief in Flanders, Count Waldeck, at the head of his regiment of four thousand *Reiter*, had gone out on a marauding expedition against the orders of his superior officer; being therefore severely reprimanded by Emanuel Philibert, the German nobleman carried his insubordination so far as to lay hand on his holster-pistol, whereupon the Duke fired his own at him with deadly effect. The desperate men whom Waldeck led into the field were awe-struck by the readiness of hand and by the resolute mien of the young hero, so that not a murmur was heard in the camp.* At a later period, in 1567, as he passed by the monument of the Count of Challand, in the church of Our Lady of Brou, at Bourg-en-Bresse, and read the epitaph, in which the deceased was described as "*haut et puissant*," he struck off those words with his dagger, observing that he would have in his state no other "high and mighty lord"

* Tonso, Vit. Eman. Phil. p. 102.

than himself.* He said repeatedly that kindness had been the cause of his father's ruin; that, after the example of Charles "the Good," it was idle for a prince to ground his throne on the people's love. He condemned that familiarity which breeds contempt; his subjects called him the "Iron-headed," and he was undoubtedly more feared than loved. His long intercourse with Charles V. and Philip II., his command of Spanish troops, had perhaps given him a touch of Castilian haughtiness. He remodelled his court after "Burgundian," that is Austrian, etiquette: coldness and distance rendered his manners as unpopular as his salutary but onerous financial and military measures. He never concealed his purpose, which was "to be master in deeds and not in words merely;" and although he gladly listened to competent advisers, although he has been supposed to have taken his whole scheme of government from the written admonitions of Niccolò Balbo, his father's chancellor, who died at the very outset of his own reign, in 1560,† still he invariably followed his own mind, and often astounded his councillors by acting in direct contradiction to the result of their grave deliberations. It is true, however, that he had scarcely any but men of unredeemed mediocrity about him: he was the best and soundest head in the State, and was well aware of his own worth. If proofs of the unfriendly feeling of his sub-

* Litta, Savoia, Tav. xiv.

† Cibrario, Mem. Cron. e Genealog. della Storia Nazionale, p. 63 —Istituzioni della Monarchia, p. 152.

jects ever reached him, he felt confident, in the uprightness of his intentions, that justice would be done to him in the end, and that the people would perceive that "all was done for their own good."*

Notwithstanding these unmistakable despotic tendencies, however, the restored Sovereign began by an appeal to the country. On the 4th of July, 1560, he summoned the States-General at Chambéry. But he was then unaware of the discordant elements which composed the nation. He immediately perceived that the assembly could only be a hindrance to his views; that in the present disorganization of the country parliamentary debate would have no better effect than to show forth the violence of hostile parties, and give vent to their evil passions. He dismissed the States, and silenced them for ever.† There was in his conduct no violation of statutes or national compacts, for we have seen there never had been stated periods for the convocation of the States; and the institution was not actually suppressed, but merely suffered to fall into desuetude. Still the people, especially in Savoy, long lamented the loss of their national representation, and as late as 1630, when Chambéry surrendered to the arms of Louis XIII., the citizens stipulated for the restoration of their ancient parliamentary franchises.‡

Strongly impressed with the disasters he had wit-

* Boldù, Relazione, p. 438.—Cavalli, Relaz. p. 31.—Morosini, p. 166.—Molino, p. 252.

† Sclopis, Stati Generali, p. 61.

‡ Morosini, p. 123.—Sclopis, p. 61.

nessed in his youth, the Duke attributed them to the right cause. Charles III. had fallen owing to his own weakness; Emanuel Philibert wished to arm both the country and the people.

Niccolò Balbo had early warned him that the State he had recovered by his valour could not hold out against any enemy for four-and-twenty hours. The peace of 1559 was hardly signed when the Duke sent orders for the fortification of Villafranca and of the castle of Nice, and erected besides a new fortress at Montalbano, a great mountain rock rising between the two places. In all these achievements he was undoubtedly actuated by a wish to indemnify Nice for the sufferings to which her devotion had exposed her. The standards taken at St. Quintin were laid on the main altar of its cathedral, the cannon were used for the armament of its bastions, and 500,000 crowns, the share of the commander-in-chief out of the ransom of prisoners, defrayed the expense of those warlike constructions. The works were made at the moment of need. The coasts of Nice and of all Italy were so utterly defenceless that, during the Duke's stay at Villafranca (June 1st, 1560), a band of African pirates, led by the famous Calabrian renegade Occhialì, effected a landing in the neighbouring peninsula of St. Ospizio; and as the hero of St. Quintin rather too rashly went forth to meet them, he had a few of his knights and courtiers killed or taken prisoners by his side, and himself ran imminent risk of his life or liberty.*

* Gioffredo, Alpi Marittime, Mon. Hist. Patr. ii. 1504.

Besides his anxiety to provide for the security of Nice, the Duke was also greatly interested in maritime affairs and eager to possess a naval establishment. He found on his arrival only three or four galleys, but was bent on raising their number to ten or twenty.* These he sent forth on long cruises against the Turks; he offered them to his allies in various encounters;—in 1564 to the Spaniards at Velez-Malaga; in the following year to the Knights of St. John at Malta; in 1571 to the Catholic allies at Lepanto, where his marines behaved with great gallantry, one of the Savoy vessels was sunk, the admiral, Andrea Provana, of Leinì, was wounded, and Francis of Savoy, one of the princes of the House of Racconigi, died of his wounds at Corfu, eight days after the action. It must be observed that Emanuel Philibert had been offered the command of the combined armament of all Catholic Christendom in that renowned expedition; but even love of glory could not remove him from the government of his States, and he yielded the honour of that greatest of naval exploits to Don John of Austria.

For the further increment of his marine, the Duke, in 1576, bought Oneglia from Girolamo Doria, whose family settled in Piedmont as Marquises of Ciriè. In later times (1578–1580) he obtained the county of Tenda from Henrietta and Renée, heiresses of the Savoy branch of Villars and Tenda. The head of that line, René, the "Grand Bâtard" of Savoy, had received the counties of Tenda and Ventimiglia as a

* Boldù, Relaz. p. 424.—Molino, 133.

dowry of Anne, last of the House of Lascaris, whom he married in 1501. That important acquisition established a direct communication between the maritime and the other possessions of Savoy.

It was in the power of Emanuel Philibert further to extend the line of his coast by the conquest of Savona; but, notwithstanding his differences with Genoa, and not unfrequent provocations on the part of that republic, the Duke of Savoy could not, as we have seen, be induced by any hope of aggrandisement to break peace with his neighbours.

Having thus secured his marine from aggression, the Duke was no less anxious to put his inland frontiers in a state of defence. West of the Alps he strengthened Montmeillan, the old bulwark of Savoy, against Dauphiny, and erected a new citadel at Bourg-en-Bresse and the Fort l'Annonciade, near Rumilly, a stronghold both against France and Geneva. He was at no slight pains to pacify France, always jealous of any works which might screen her neighbours from her encroachments, chiefly by representing those fortresses as raised not against France herself, but against those unruly Huguenot bands which endangered her own peace no less than that of Savoy.*

In Piedmont he restored Cuneo, Ceva, Mondovì, and other places, which had either been dismantled or disarmed by the French. He undertook extensive works at Savigliano, which he had to resign into the hands of the same people in 1563. He bought Bene

* Morosini, Relazione, p. 179.

from the Costa family, "because he would allow no man in his States to possess fortresses but himself."* He began very extensive works at Vercelli in 1561, and did as much for other places as soon as they came into his hands. The activity he displayed, the vast sums he lavished in these works, are truly astonishing. He had the designs of these citadels constantly before his eyes, and was in daily consultation with architects and engineers, whom he entertained at his Court at a high stipend, especially Francesco Pacciotto, of Urbino, one of the many Italian precursors of Vauban. In 1564 he laid the first stone of the citadel of Turin, intended as much for a curb as for a safeguard to that city, as the uninterrupted residence of the French for six-and-twenty years had perhaps estranged the Turinese from their lawful sovereign to a greater extent than any of their fellow-subjects.

Having reared up fortresses, Emanuel Philibert bethought himself how they could best be manned.

The bands, or *établies*, instituted by Amadeus VIII., chiefly for the garrison of strong places, had been long since utterly disorganized. The Duke reconstituted them, but these were intended merely for home service. Emanuel Philibert had conceived a far more comprehensive plan; he enlisted the whole nation into a permanent, efficient, movable militia.

The long contests between France and Austria had effected a complete revolution in the art of war. The Swiss, German, and Spanish infantry had asserted its

* Morosini, p. 121.

superiority over the "gendarmerie," or heavy cavalry of the Middle Ages. The nerve of the standing armies, without which states could no longer exist, lay henceforth in the foot-soldiery. Now all feudal service had been almost exclusively performed on horseback; it had therefore become necessary to substitute a national, or "royal," for the ancient "feudal" militia. For some time those countries which had been organized on strictly feudal principles, seemed unable to supply their rulers with a competent array of foot; and France, for instance, had, during the wars of Francis I. and Henry II., hardly any other infantry besides Swiss mercenaries. But the entertainment of hirelings was found onerous in time of peace; and provident governments, like Venice, had already found the expediency of arming their own people.

Impressed with the idea that military strength was the first condition of life for the state of Savoy, Emanuel Philibert resolved that every Piedmontese should be a soldier. He exempted the nobles from the duty of supplying the Sovereign with their contingents, and exonerated themselves from personal service. He took his soldiers directly from the people—from the whole people—and abolished the very last traces of feudal dependence and personal servitude.* Every man was bound to serve his country from his eighteenth to his fiftieth year. The enlisting of the militia devolved upon the municipal authorities, whom the Duke reconstituted, so as to render them better suited to this

* Edict of October 20th, 1561.

purpose; and the "comuni," or townships, defrayed the expenses of the army and equipment of the conscripts. Out of the mass of these troops the movable or active force was selected; but all of them were carefully drilled on Sundays and other festive days,—weekly by companies, monthly by regiments, etc.; and two grand reviews and field-days were held in the year—at Whitsuntide and Martinmas.

The population of Piedmont was, in 1574, 900,000 souls. In Savoy and other Transalpine districts it was reckoned at half a million.* Out of this it was expected that about 22,000 men could be drafted for the militia; but so great was the eagerness of the people, that its ranks were soon swelled to 36,000. This fact is readily explained by the privileges awarded to the defenders of the country. The soldier was exempted from imprisonment for debt, from the payment of tolls, from the game-laws, etc.; he was entitled to prompt and summary justice, almost entirely free of expense. After fifteen years' duty in the ranks he was empowered to wear sword and dagger,—a distinction which made him a gentleman for life.†

Having thus mustered the people into foot-battalions, Emanuel Philibert marshalled his nobles into squadrons of horse; but here also he had a regular, instead of a feudal, cavalry; the service was no longer temporary, but had become permanent. The Duke was most evidently bent on lowering the pride of his nobility; he abolished the bailiffs and châtelains of

* Molino, Relazione, p. 248. † Saluces, Hist. Milit. i. 173.

the ancient administration, because those offices were almost exclusively monopolized by the nobles, and invested them with a power which they could equally turn against the people and the Sovereign. He suppressed the dignity of Marshal of Savoy, after the death of René of Challant, in 1560. He limited the duties of the Admiral to the command of maritime forces; he appointed no "Chief of the Squadron of Savoy," no "Commander of the Piedmontese Nobility," and equally put an end to all military ranks pertaining to the old feudal system. He wished, in short, his nobles to sink to the condition of citizens, as he had freed the citizens from subjection to any person but himself. But, this object being attained, he was no less anxious to put the nobles to such uses as they might yet be fit for. He gave them commissions in the cavalry, and even overcame their repugnance to serve on foot; he gathered them round his throne, dazzled them by the glitter of his rather royal than ducal household. He lavished counties and marquisates—empty titles—upon them; he brushed up the chivalrous Orders of his House,—that of the Collar, founded by the Green Count in 1362, which had been renovated in 1518, by Charles III., under the title and insignia of "The Annonciade:" it was limited to fifteen knights; that of St. Maurice, which had almost fallen into oblivion since its first institution by Amadeus VIII. in 1434, and which was united to that of St. Lazarus in 1572. This latter, a charitable, half-monastic, half-military brotherhood, had risen in Pales-

tine, together with the Hospitallers and Templars. It had been driven from the East, and dispersed, at the fall of Acre, in 1291, and had been wandering ever since, and suffered to fall into neglect, till Gregory XIII., a Pope devoted to the interests of Emanuel Philibert, created him Grand Master, placed the order under his patronage, and trusted him with the management of the commanderies and estates which the fraternity still owned in various European countries.*

But for the furtherance of all these objects the Prince was in need of money, and it was by his exactions especially that Emanuel Philibert made himself obnoxious to his subjects. He levied a heavy duty on salt, an old tax, but discontinued by the French, so that it now seemed an innovation in the State of Savoy. He established a land-tax, and made his nobles pay rather dearly for their exemption from military duties. By similar means he so improved his finances, that, whilst the revenue of the State, even in palmy times under the Dukes, when Vaud and Lower Valais contributed to it, never exceeded 100,000 crowns, and under Charles III. it had sunk to 10,000 or 12,000; it had before 1574 risen to 800,000 gold crowns, and the Duke was supposed to have hoarded one million in gold.†

It may be said that Emanuel Philibert invented no-

* Cibrario, Studi Storici, ii. 308.

† Molino, Relazione, pp. 254, 255.—Cibrario (Istituzioni della Monarchia, p. 340) gives the revenue of the State in 1580 at about 1,203,000 lire, and the expenditure at 1,193,000. The *lira* or *livre* of Savoy at the time is reckoned at 2 francs 53 centimes.

thing. The germs of the strictly monarchic institutions, which he reduced to system, had, as we have seen, already been sown in Savoy by Amadeus VIII. at an earlier period than in any other country. The establishment of permanent armies engaged the attention of other rulers, both monarchic and republican, yet Emanuel Philibert employed six years in maturing his military scheme, and left it in a very imperfect state at his death.* The fact is, he had immense difficulties to contend with, and none so great as the lack of spirit and energy of his people. The Piedmontese —and still more the Savoyards—had to be made soldiers—that is, men—in spite of themselves. In Savoy the levy of the militia had repeatedly to be given up, from the impossibility of overcoming the sluggishness of that robust but inanimate population ;† yet we have seen the Transalpine provinces were once the nursery of the armies of Savoy. But the military superiority of those countries, like that of France, was grounded on feudal institutions ; and the new martial organization was essentially popular, and throve best where the people still preserved some traces of the vigour of democratic times,—in Switzerland, in the Netherlands, or finally even in Italy, where Spinola, even long after Emanuel Philibert's reign, was still able to recruit some of the most valiant infantry in Europe.

Savoy and old Piedmont, a feudal community from which the true spirit of feudalism had departed, sup-

* Saluces, Hist. Militaire, i. 154.

† Molino, Relazione, p. 246.

plied, therefore, but indifferent elements of a popular militia. Hard drill and discipline had to make up for want of inclination, and the military regulations of Piedmont were drawn up with true Draconic severity. Any breach of discipline in the camp, any outrage, even in the enemy's territory, were visited with capital punishment. Silence in the ranks, always to be established with difficulty amongst Italian soldiers, was enforced with equal strictness: any man uttering a cry in battle, were it even to call for ammunition, was to be put to death on the spot.*

It was necessary, in short, to give the Piedmontese a temper. The prince was bent on turning his country into a camp and a garrison; to hold his people in his grasp, tight and fast, as he held the hilt of his sword.

We would not make ourselves the panegyrists of absolute government in any shape, nor hold up the old military rule of Savoy as the pattern of social order for an enlightened modern community. But despotism towards the close of the sixteenth century had become the fate of Europe,—an irresistible evil, by which alone the consolidation and centralization of states could be effected. Emanuel Philibert, who had restored his country to an independent but precarious existence, who saw it exposed to the aggressions of enemies disposing of widely superior forces, could provide for the public security on no other terms.

Yet, though a despot by necessity as well as by

* Saluces, Hist. Milit. i. 175.

choice; he was one of those rare princes who curbed, without crushing, his people. Nothing can be more striking than the contrast between Piedmont and any other Italian State. At the time that the Duke of Savoy was achieving the regeneration of his people, William Gonzaga, Duke of Mantua, was carrying on a senseless, ruthless war against his own subjects of Montferrat. From 1564 to 1569 he had to quell rebellions and to defeat conspiracies at Casale, where the citizens made a brave stand for their liberties. He cut them down in the streets, fired grape-shot at them in the churches; nor would he have come off a conqueror, without that last argument of an Italian prince —the aid of a foreign power.* Nor was that an isolated fact. At Parma, at Ferrara, at Florence, both the nobles and the people were not tamed, but annihilated. Between the Italian and his ruler there was terror but no harmony, silence but no peace.

In Tuscany, for instance, at this same epoch in which Emanuel Philibert was training the Piedmontese to arms, Cosmo de' Medici was equally busy with his *Cerne*, or regular militia. But the Medici had entered Florence by might of arms—of foreign arms. A riotous republic was by Cosmo to be transformed into a narrow despotism. Between him and his subjects mistrust and unquenchable resentment existed. He had to break their spirit, to trample upon their long-cherished institutions. Hence his main strength lay in foreign hirelings. An armed force was for him

* Adriani, Storia d' Italia, lib. xviii.

a weapon to be used against his people—for their subjection, not for their protection.* Emanuel Philibert came back to his own: Piedmont was his by inheritance no less than by conquest. Monarchic institutions had already taken root in that country; but little of what remained of aristocratic privilege or municipal franchise had escaped the ravages of long-continued foreign occupation. The country lay before him a blank, a dead level; on mere ruins he could rear such an edifice as best suited the exigencies of times. He was hailed as a deliverer, a patriot prince. Whatever may be thought of the discontent to which his heavy taxes gave rise among the people, or his stern manners among the nobles, it is a beautiful, consoling fact, that the establishment of despotism in Piedmont did not cost a single drop of blood, that the prince subdued and disciplined his people by no other means than the firmness of his iron will. From the very beginning "he would have no other troops than such as could be levied amongst his own subjects, knowing that their very interest would bind them to the defence of their native sovereign no less than to the preservation of their country."† With the exception of a body-guard of one hundred men, whom he took in his pay out of compliment to the Swiss cantons, the army of Savoy was strictly national. The prince had no other means of coercion upon his people than the people themselves; he must needs rely

* Botta, Storia d' Italia, ii. 420.

† Edict of Vercelli, January 28th, 1561.

on their goodwill not only for the maintenance of order at home, but mainly also for any enterprise, whether of an aggressive or a defensive character, abroad.

Emanuel Philibert was too careful in avoiding all subjects of contention with his neighbours, to have opportunities for the display of his newly-created military power. By way however of training his militia by their participation in actual warfare, he sent five hundred horse to the aid of the Emperor Maximilian II. in his wars against the Turks, in 1566; and at different periods he also supplied both France and Spain with his battalions, which fought with distinguished valour especially at St. Denis and Moncontour.

But only a few years after Emanuel Philibert's death the bravery and devotion of his Piedmontese were put to a far more severe test; and during those incessant and sometimes insane wars of his successors, under the pressure of sore need and distress, it hardly ever happened that Piedmont expressed, or indeed harboured, any other will than that of its masters. Such, independent of mere political forms, charters, or statutes, will be the results of any government based on national principles.

But the army was the main, not the only, object of Emanuel Philibert's thoughts. Whilst he prepared himself for wars which he deemed inevitable, he cultivated the arts of peace. No man better deserved the titles of wise legislator and promoter of public welfare. He restocked the desolate lands of Piedmont with foreign labourers; he encouraged the plantation

of mulberries, opened silk factories, and induced able workmen from Flanders and Tuscany to settle in his States. He bestowed great cares on the mineral treasures of the country, particularly on the salt-mines of Tarentaise, which so largely contributed to swell up the public revenue. He made the Roman law the basis of his Codes, and established something like method and uniformity in that great chaos of feudal and municipal statutes; "respecting, however, such local ordinances as were conceived in a wise and righteous spirit and conducive to the greatest glory of God, but abolishing those which clashed with the administration of equal justice and were found incompatible with social order and public tranquillity."* He created a senate in Piedmont and one in Savoy, modelling them after the supreme courts, or parliaments, which had been established by Francis I. during the French occupation, and gave them the right of "interinamento," or registration of the laws, without which the sovereign's decrees were not considered valid—a last check upon the abuse of absolute power. He instituted new special officers, for the mint, for the army, for the waters; reformed the currency, etc. etc. Finally, he re-organized the university, opened lyceums and schools, and entrusted the Jesuits with the management of public instruction,—a very wise measure for those times, for the Jesuits were as yet a recent institution, and nothing was known about them except their enlightened zeal for the cause of religion, as well as their cul-

* Sclopis, Antica Legislazione del Piemonte, p. 379.

tivation of liberal studies; and their Order appeared to the greatest advantage by the side of the lazy and squalid Franciscans and sanguinary Dominicans. He adopted in his States the decrees of the Council of Trent; and by that and other measures he determined the unconditional subjection of Piedmont to Rome. The religious bias of his own mind, and the dread of political dissensions everywhere attendant on religious divisions, naturally dictated that step. Yet it must be observed "that the House of Savoy, whilst it always allowed the free publication of Papal bulls, always executed them as it best suited its own views."* He upheld with great firmness the privileges awarded by the Papal Court to his ancestors. He put a limit to the inheritances, acquisitions, and even to the actual possessions of monastic orders and other religious communities: he tempered the severity of ecclesiastical tribunals, and, as far as circumstances would allow, established religious freedom and tolerance in his States.

In all these measures the wise and provident intentions of the Prince were often, either in his own lifetime or under his successors, frustrated by the bigotry of the age, and by the tyranny of the Court of Rome, which profited by the distress of the House of Savoy to bend it to its own principles of intolerance and oppression. Still in religious as well as in civil and criminal matters, there is no doubt but anything that gives evidence of justice, wisdom, and humanity, in

* Litta, Savoia, tav. xiv.

the codes of Savoy and Piedmont, may be originally referred to the enactments of Emanuel Philibert.

He vied with the Italian princes of his age in their anxiety to secure the services of men distinguished for genius and learning. Several of the most distinguished scholars of the Tuscan and Lombard universities were thus induced to settle in Piedmont. At the same time, by a law which would clash with our ideas of personal freedom, he recalled all absentees under penalty of confiscation, lest the country should be deprived either of their military services or of the aid of their literary attainments.* He forbade his subjects entering into the service of any foreign government, and even opposed the marriage of feudal heiresses abroad.

Still the great work for which Piedmont will be eternally indebted to the memory of this great prince was the nationalization of the State. He established the seat of government at Turin, recalled to that city the senate which had been first convoked at Carignano, and the university which had been provisionally opened at Mondovì. Turin, whose bishop had been raised to metropolitan honours in 1515, had enjoyed comparative security under the French, who never lost possession of it from 1536 to 1562. It dates its real greatness and importance from Emanuel Philibert's reign, when the population, as we have seen, rose to 17,000 souls. The Duke substituted the Italian for the Latin language in public acts, only allowing

* Edict of January 31st, 1560.

the use of French in Savoy. He to whom French, German, Flemish, and Spanish were equally familiar, showed however a preference for the language of Italy in his familiar intercourse, and spoke it with great fluency and elegance.* From his first abandonment of his pretensions to Geneva, from his first domestication at Vercelli and Turin, he felt that he was an Italian prince, and Savoy an Italian state. To the suggestions of French and Spanish diplomatists, that dynastic considerations or family connections bound him either to the Court of Paris or to that of Madrid, he always answered that he would shape his course on independent principles, he would live and die an Italian.† It was not without great bitterness that the transalpine provinces of Savoy submitted to the change, and saw the dignity and ascendency of a sovereign state depart from them. It was in vain that the Prince treated his Savoyards with marked respect, and endeavoured to make amends for his long estrangement from the home of his ancestors by a show of greater friendliness and affability in his intercourse with them.‡ Savoy never recovered the blow. A country of mere herdsmen and miners, Savoy owed its well-being to its importance as the centre of government. Its impoverished nobility followed its sovereign to his new residence, and had scarcely any home except the camp, where its bravery won the highest

* Lippomano, Relazione, p. 198.

† Lippomano, p. 204.

‡ Boldù, Relazione, p. 440.—Morosini, p. 142.—Molino, p. 245.

ranks, or the Court, where it was always sure of favour and distinction.

The very household gods of Savoy accompanied the Prince in his migration.

The precious relic of the "Saint Suaire," or "Sacra Sindone," the winding-sheet of the Saviour, came from Savoy to Piedmont at this epoch. It had been brought from the East by a pious crusader, William of Villar-Sexel, and by him laid on the altar of the church of Lirey, in Champagne, in 1356. Margaret of Charny, last of the House of Villar-Sexel, had given it to Louis Duke of Savoy, in 1464. It had been for many years an object of worship at the church of St. Francis, and at the chapel in the castle of Chambéry. It had miraculously escaped the conflagration of the latter building, and of its iron chest, or shrine, in 1534, and remained untouched in its place. From that place, however, it was conveyed to Turin, for the accommodation of St. Charles Borromeo, who had quitted Milan on the 8th of October, 1578, to pay his devotion to the Savoy relic, and whom the Duke wished to spare the fatigue of a pilgrimage across the Alps. The Sudario, it is needless to add, never found its way back to its bereaved sanctuary at Chambéry. It lay in the cathedral of Turin, till a magnificent chapel of rich black marble was built for its reception, at an enormous expense, in the royal palace, from 1657 to 1694.*

Such was Emanuel Philibert, one of those grand,

* Cibrario, Torino, ii. 394.

heroic figures history loves to dwell upon; a man to whom history is all the more willing to do justice as he disdained to bribe it; and when Paolo Giovio offered him the tribute of his venal praises, which that historian so well knew how to render acceptable to all the other princes his contemporaries, the Duke answered with sublime dignity, "that he valued more the 'small, still voice within' than all the clamour of the world's applause."* His was a character almost without a flaw, unless it be his excessive tenderness for the fair sex, and his seven or eight natural children,—an "amiable weakness" as it was reckoned in that age, with a leniency which the world readily shows to one of his station even in more recent times. With that figure contemporary records have made us sufficiently familiar: his stature somewhat below the middle size, the broad shoulders, the naturally delicate frame inured to great hardships by early military training, the cold grey eye, the arched brow, the slightly protruding nether lip, the fair curly hair, the short thick beard, not streaked with silver in mature age, the small round head—the "Iron-head"—all is known to us, even to the nether limbs somewhat bent outwardly, "all' Ercolina" as the Italians have it, a blemish which he turned to good account, since "no man ever had a more firm or elegant seat on the saddle."

We are equally acquainted with his habits: regular, punctual; his strict and sparing distribution of time,

* Bertolotti, Istoria della R. Casa di Savoia, ii. 27.

† Tonso, Vit. Em. Philibert, p. 231.

the account he kept of it in a diary, the five hours he allowed himself for sleep, the few minutes at table, his hard fare, exclusively made up of strong meats and stronger Spanish wines; his way of transacting business, always standing; for ever pacing up and down his garden, always bareheaded, even in the sun, mist, or rain; always with his sword, not hanging by his side after the common fashion, but tight under his arm, ready for immediate use,* his sword, without which he never left his apartment. Then his manners, grave but courteous, "graceful beyond the common order of mankind;"† his quick, laconic answers; his sudden flashes of anger, always under control of a long-tried temper; his hatred of falsehood or pusillanimity; his horror of bloodshed or capital punishment; his strict fulfilment of his engagements; the sacredness of his word, which he pledged "as a gentleman, not as a courtier" (parola di cavaliere, non di cortigiano).‡

Then his unwearied energy and activity—activity of body, which could not be exhausted by six hours' play at ball, not by a nine hours' run after the stag in the woods and mountains of Bresse, where he was almost alone in at the death, having distanced the one hundred and fifty men of his retinue, and where, on putting up for the evening at a farm-house, he would snatch the hatchet from the good-man who was splitting wood for his supper, and bustle about till the

* Tonso, p. 229. † Lippomano, Relazione, p. 197.
‡ Boldù, Relazione, p. 464.

repast was ready, then, hardly allowing himself five minutes at table, he again sallied forth into the field, and beguiled the hours by shooting at a target, or by other manly games till late in the night, to the great wonder and dismay of the sleek, long-robed Venetian* who had scampered after him in the chace, and who, with all the rest of the company, was now hardly able to stand.

Again, his activity of mind, which found no sufficient employment in political or military studies, but was equally turned on mathematics, mechanics, the arts, alchemy; that activity which dispensed with the services of the three secretaries he had in his pay, and enabled him to carry on his correspondence almost unaided; partly owing, no doubt, to a certain fastidiousness which rarely satisfied him with any man's doings but his own, and also to that extreme cautiousness which prompted him to take no man into his intimacy, and on account of which he would suffer no valet about him who could read.†

Such was Emanuel Philibert,—the restorer, the second founder of the State of Piedmont.

Had fortune placed a vast empire under his control, he would have left the mark of his great character on his age far otherwise than the narrow-minded despot, Philip of Spain, from whom it took its name. Even as a ruler of the small duchy of Savoy, he might have raised it to a degree of security and importance which left little to envy, nothing to fear from the greatest

* Morosini, Relazione, p. 153. † Guichenon, ii. 271.

monarchies; but he was allowed nō time for the completion of his work. The energy of his soul wore out the body. Already, in 1570, weariness overcame him, and he meditated retirement, either to Ripaille or to the genial abode of his childhood, Nice.* Towards the close of his days he actually resigned his cares of state into the hands of his son, Charles Emanuel, then scarcely eighteen years old, and sought the solitude of the suburban castles of Lucento and Valentino. He died at Turin, on the 30th of August, 1580, at the age of fifty-two.

He left Piedmont in the hands of a high-spirited youth. But the wisdom of his mature mind, his experience of adverse fortune, had departed from the councils of Savoy. Like many a prudent ruler before and after him, after wasting his last breath in unavailing advice to his son, he might turn from him on his deathbed, and expire with the sad misgiving that "the rash boy would undo all his work" (*cet enfant gâtera tout*).

* Morosini, Relazione, p. 159.—Lippomano, p. 200.

CHAPTER II.

THE ORDEAL OF PIEDMONT.

From the death of Emanuel Philibert to the elevation of the House of Savoy to the royal dignity, five Princes successively occupied the throne.

The first part of this period is filled up by Emanuel Philibert's son and successor, Charles Emanuel I., whose reign embraces half a century (1580–1630). His son, Victor Amadeus I., only held the sceptre for seven years (1630–1637). He left, at his death, two infants: Francis Hyacinth, five years of age, who only survived a twelvemonth (1637–1638), and Charles Emanuel II., who succeeded in his fourth year. These Princes were under the guardianship of their mother, Christina of France, whose regency lasted from 1637 to 1648, and who besides contrived to rule by her ascendancy over her second son down almost to her death, in 1663. The reign of Charles Emanuel II. further extended to the year 1675. At his death his son, Victor Amadeus II., also a minor, nine years old, was placed under the guardianship of his mother, Joan

Baptiste, of Savoy-Nemours, from which he only emancipated himself in 1684, having attained his eighteenth year. Victor Amadeus II. closed the series of the Dukes of Savoy. By the treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, he was made King of Sicily, a kingdom which he had to exchange for that of Sardinia, by the terms of the Quadruple Alliance, in 1718. His reign of fifty-five years was terminated by abdication in 1730, an act which he yet survived for two years.

Emanuel Philibert left, at his death, a flourishing State, with the elements of a well-organized army and a full treasury. He had established a good understanding with all his neighbours, and pointed out a very clear line of policy. Placed between France and Spain, two colossal powers, to which he was infinitely inferior, he died at peace with both; closely connected by domestic ties and dynastic interests—yet with a good open subject of quarrel—with both. These quarrels he had deemed it necessary to adjourn, but he had by no means abandoned them; he deemed himself grievously wronged, and nothing but his short life prevented him from seeking an opportunity for revenge.

With France the subject at issue was the Marquisate of Saluzzo, to which he conceived himself entitled by a variety of reasons, but for the greatest of reasons, that he could not endure the presence of so formidable a neighbour as France south of the Alps, with the stronghold of Carmagnola hardly at one day's march from his own capital. The roll of the French

drum from that garrison, as his more impatient son fancied, allowed a Prince of Savoy no rest.

Against Spain and Austria he had to vindicate his rights on Montferrat. That marquisate had been given to the Gonzaga of Mantua, in 1536; it had been erected into a duchy by the Emperor, in 1573, in sheer contempt of all the remonstrances of the Duke of Savoy, who had in vain urged his various claims over the whole or part of it before the Imperial Chamber. The House of Mantua was clearly not in a situation to defend Montferrat against the attacks of Savoy, but reckoned on the support of the two kindred Austrian houses of Spain and Germany. Spain especially, in possession of the duchy of Milan and its dependencies of Novara, Alessandria, and Tortona, and sure of the allegiance of Genoa, encompassed the Italian possessions of Savoy on three sides.

The greatest chances of success undoubtedly presented themselves on the western side. The disorders of France had reached their height. After the massacre of St. Bartholomew's Eve, the Court, alarmed at the ascendancy of the Catholics, had retrieved its steps, allowed the Protestants to rally, and resumed its neutral position between the hostile parties; but the Catholics, headed by the House of Guise, were now too powerful; they mustered into a "Holy League," in 1577. The King, Henry III., was driven from Paris on the famous day of the barricades (May 13th, 1588). He rid himself of the Guise by a wholesale murder at Blois (December 23rd, 1588), but fell

himself by the hand of an assassin (August 4th, 1589). Henry of Navarre, for many years the leader of the French Huguenots, the heir-apparent since 1587, had joined the King shortly before his death (April 15th, 1589), and now assuming the royal title as Henry IV., engaged in a final struggle with the League. Notwithstanding signal victories, it was only after his abjuration of Calvinism (July 25th, 1593) that he succeeded in obtaining possession of his capital (March 29th, 1594), and not before 1598 that he reconciled religious factions at home by the edict of Nantes (April 13th), and came to terms with his foreign enemies at Vervins (May 2nd).

The distracted state of France had, as we have seen, thrown the distant provinces of the kingdom, and especially Saluzzo, into utter anarchy. After the death of Bellegarde, in 1580, the officers in command of its different places had treated the Court with contempt, and were countenanced in their insubordination by the Huguenot chiefs of Dauphiny and Provence.

Saluzzo was but too easy a prey for Savoy; yet we have seen Emanuel Philibert, not only hesitating to profit by the difficulties of the French Court, but actually extending his support to the Governors who were successively invested with royal authority.

Charles Emanuel I. was endowed with a vaster and keener intellect, and a more dashing bravery, than even his father; but he was deficient in the greatest of his virtues—moderation and uprightness. It was said of him that he "illustrated as well as vexed and worried

two centuries."* His ambition knew no bounds; his mind brooked no rest. He aspired, at different epochs in his life, to the crowns of Provence, Burgundy, and France, of Spain and Portugal, of Cyprus, of Lombardy, Liguria and Corsica, of the German Empire and Bohemia; finally, it would seem,† even to the Papacy. No disproportion of forces deterred him, and also no unfairness of means. He was as little moved by scruples as by fears. Never was there a more restless, desperate gambler on the throne, not even Charles XII. of Sweden, with whose character and fortunes the Savoyard bore, however, strong resemblance. He was deep even to astuteness, but impetuous to insanity. The headlong violence of his temper at every moment broke through the fine-spun webs of his subtle brain.

He was but eighteen years old at his accession, and began by surrounding himself with the best friends and advisers of his father; but he outdid even his father in wilfulness and self-reliance, and soon followed no counsel but his own.

He resolved on the conquest of Saluzzo. He had (March 10th, 1585) cemented his alliance with Spain by his marriage with Catherine of Austria, sister of Philip II., and had, on that occurrence,‡ obtained a promise of the King's support in his onset on the marquisate; at any rate, Spain, as well as Rome, were favourable to a scheme which would shut France

* Cibrario, Istituzioni della Monarchia di Savoia, p. 163.

† Saluces, Hist. Militaire du Piémont, iii. 320.

‡ Guichenon, ii. 287.

out of Italy, and, besides, put an end to the inroads of heresy from the adjoining French provinces.

The day of the barricades afforded the long wished-for opportunity. A few months after that event (September 28th, 1588), Charles Emanuel, in profound peace, invaded the marquisate. Saluzzo, the capital, opened its gates; Carmagnola, with its immense warlike stores, Centallo, and Castel Delfino, had to be taken by might of arms.

Elated by victory, the vain Prince added insult to injury. He struck a medal, in which he represented a centaur trampling a royal crown under his hoofs, with the motto, *Opportune!* Henry IV., not many years later, having humbled Savoy, retorted the taunt by another medal, in which the centaur was seen crushed under the club of Hercules, and the no less pithy inscription was *Opportunius!**

Charles Emanuel thought now he was committed to extreme hostilities; so, coming to open alliance with the League, and soliciting the aid of Spain, he engaged in a general war with all the Huguenots of southern France, and led considerable forces against Geneva and her Protestant allies.

It had been his father's policy, as we have seen, in his anxiety to secure friends against the two great powers which threatened him, to court the alliance of minor states. We know by what sacrifices he had made his terms with the Swiss confederates. His son was hardly on his throne when, in 1581, he had

* Costa de Beauregard, Maison de Savoie, ii. 11.

already formed designs on Geneva, and betrayed his intentions to win back from the Swiss, Vaud and all that had been lost by the unfortunate Charles III. in 1536. At the time of the taking of Saluzzo he was, therefore, already in more or less open war with the Protestant cantons, though, on the other hand, he relied on the co-operation of the Valaisans and of the minor Catholic communities. He now found himself at the head of a Catholic League, in which he had half France and half Switzerland on his side, against the French Court, its Huguenot partisans, and the Swiss Protestants.

Fortune favoured his arms so far, that, Henry III. having been compelled to withdraw his forces from Geneva, that city, ill-supported by her Swiss allies, and encompassed by Savoy on all sides, was reduced to extremities, when the adventurous duke was called away by the Catholic party in Provence, who, hard-pressed by the Huguenots, offered to acknowledge him as their Count, if he would bring them instant aid. Charles was not a man to resist temptation; he left what he deemed a sufficient force to continue the blockade of Geneva, placed his new acquisition of Saluzzo in a good state of defence, then crossing the Col di Tenda and the Var, he showed himself to his new subjects. He drove the Huguenots before him, compelled them to raise the siege of Aix, and was hailed Count of Provence (November 18th, 1590).

The enthusiasm of the Provençals for their new lord was however of no long duration. The aid of Rome

and Spain, who stirred him up to all these achievements, and proclaimed him the Champion of the Faith, always fell short of the promise. Charles had to sail to Spain, and brought back reinforcements, with which he was able to carry on the war in good earnest, not only in Provence and round Geneva, but along the Alps, on both sides, where however the Huguenot chiefs, and especially Lesdiguières, a man of rare abilities, the very genius for that kind of desultory mountain warfare, soon turned the scales against Savoy. Lesdiguières fell suddenly on Chambéry, compelled Don Amadeus of Savoy, a natural son of Emanuel Philibert, to fall back from Geneva, gave his troops and his Spanish allies a great battle at Pont-Charra, on the Isère, on the borders of Dauphiny (September 6th, 1591), and equally came off conqueror in a general encounter under the walls of Vinon, on the Verdun, near Aix (December 15th), notwithstanding the presence and the spirited conduct of Charles Emanuel himself. At the same time Lesdiguières, who seemed gifted with ubiquitous powers, favoured by the Waldenses, who opened their mountain-passes to him, and shook off their allegiance to Savoy, made frequent incursions into Piedmont, and gave a new turn to the fortunes of the war.

The war continued with but little interruption for above ten years, and for a succession of nine different campaigns. It was a mountain war, made up of skirmishes, surprises, and sudden assaults on fortresses, often aided, especially on the side of Savoy, by the

cowardice or arrant treachery of the defenders; hardly ever followed up according to any intelligible plan,—hardly ever attended with important, decisive results. Most of those Alpine strongholds, on either side, Exilles, Barcellonette, Mirabouc, as well as Cavour, Vigone and Bricherasio, lower on the plain, and Montmeillan, Echelles, and Pierrechâtel, by turns became the object of those warlike endeavours. Most of them were, by turns, taken and re-taken. Fort Barraux, built by Charles Emanuel on the Isère, near Pont-Charra, in 1597, with a view to threaten Grenoble and protect Chambéry, was taken (May 13th, 1598) by Lesdiguières, anxious to keep his word to his royal master, by whom he had been upbraided for his remissness in allowing such a fortress to be reared up in the presence of a French army, and to whom he had answered that the king needed just such a fortress to keep Montmeillan in check, to threaten Chambéry, and protect Grenoble, so that they should be thankful to Savoy, who was willing thus to build it for them.*

It is but justice to Charles Emanuel to assert that he displayed throughout an activity equal to his ambition; but that ambition could be satisfied neither with Saluzzo nor with Provence. Despising the policy of his father, who, turning all his attention to his Italian States, had renounced all hopes of aggrandisement beyond the Alps, Charles was not only bent on recovering all that had been lost to the Swiss in

* Costa de Beauregard, ii. 109.

the regions round Lake Leman, but aspired to the foundation of a vast kingdom on Burgundian ground. The Leaguers had promised him the tranquil possession of Provence, Dauphiny, and the Lyonnais; they even countenanced his pretensions to the throne of France, grounded on the rights of his mother, Marguerite of Valois, daughter of Francis I. His name was indeed put up as that of a candidate for the throne at the States of Paris, in 1593; and he had by turns a supporter and a competitor in another Savoy prince, Charles Emanuel, of the branch of Genevois and Nemours, who, like several other members of his family, played a conspicuous part in the wars of the League, and was Governor of Paris during its siege by Henry IV. But all hopes, aspirations, and intrigues were cut short by Henry himself, when that king came to a reconciliation with Rome, an act which won him the acknowledgment of many of the Catholic chiefs, of most of the provinces, and at last of the stubborn capital itself; whilst his Protestant chiefs either joined him in his conversion or were satisfied with the tolerance he established in the kingdom. By degrees the foreign enemies of France, and even Rome and Spain, were reconciled to a monarch who knew no less how to conquer than how to use his victory; and Charles Emanuel, who had committed himself so much further than any other,—who had not only been driven from Provence, but had besides lost Bresse, Bugey, Maurienne, and the Pinerolo valleys, was glad to be included in the Peace of Vervins (May 2nd,

1598), by which he recovered the invaded territories, and referred the question of Saluzzo to the Pope's arbitrament.

The Pope was unable or unwilling to find a solution to the intricate problem of the conflicting claims of France and Savoy on the marquisate. The Duke, who mistrusted the Pontiff, and relied on his uncommon powers of fascination, resolved upon discussing the matter personally with the King. He left Hautecombe (November, 1599) at the head of a more than royal retinue of twelve hundred horses, met Henry at Fontainebleau, and entered Paris with him on the 19th of that month.

The Duke could make but little way with the King, and still less with his stern minister, Sully; but, in spite of some slight deformity, which he inherited from his grandfather, Charles III., and which won him from French historians the appellation of 'Célèbre Bossu,'* such was his suppleness and address, so infinite the resources of his manners and versatility of his genius, that he often bent his worst enemies to his own will, and both Henry IV. and Richelieu dreaded any close encounter with this able negotiator, and shunned all personal intercourse with him. His various powers of fascination, and especially his largesses, were not lost upon the grandees of the French Court, amongst whom he found a large number of secret enemies of the King, bent on dethroning him and parcelling the kingdom amongst themselves. With these, and espe-

* Sismondi, Hist. des Français, xiii. 208.

cially with the Duke of Biron, it would seem Charles entered into a conspiracy, by the success of which he would have been made a winner to a greater amount than he ever anticipated in the brightest phases of the previous war. It was the same plot which cost Biron his head on the scaffold two years later (July 11th, 1602).

To what extent the Duke of Savoy was really implicated in these tenebrous machinations will remain for ever a matter of doubt and dispute. Strongly impressed with the idea that the monarchy of France was doomed to utter dissolution, and its destroyers were indissolubly bound to his own interests, relying also on the false hopes of support held out by the Count of Fuentes, the Spanish Governor of Milan, Charles came back with a determination to brave all the enmity of the French King.

The King had given Savoy three months to decide upon an exchange of Saluzzo against Bresse. He would now brook no further delay, but declared war (August 11th, 1600), and sent forward, besides Lesdiguières and Crequi, also that same Biron, on whose secret goodwill the Duke had placed his trust, but who deemed the present hour unseasonable for throwing off the mask, and did his soldier's duty by the King. Soon Montmeillan, Chambéry, Bresse, and Savoy yielded to the French armies. Charles, who had collected his forces at Aosta, was prevented by an extraordinary fall of snow from crossing the Alps. Disheartened by the feeble support, or rather barefaced treachery, of

the Spaniards, he bowed to his fate, and accepted the Treaty of Lyons (January 17th, 1601).

It was one of the most ruinous and humiliating Savoy ever had to subscribe. Saluzzo was preserved, but at the expense of Bresse, Bugey, Valromey, and Gex: fertile plains, somewhat emphatically called in ancient times the granary of France, had to be given up for the sake of narrow valleys and bleak mountains. The Duke "lost more gentlemen than he won peasants;"* yet that treaty had its great political advantages: it removed from the side of Savoy that French thorn which had been so galling to her for centuries. It limited the two States, as well as the two nations, at their natural frontier of the Alps (with the exception of the duchy of Savoy on one side and of Cesanne and Oulx, in the upper valley of the Dora Riparia, of the Pragelato or Upper Val Chiusone, and of Castel Delfino, in Val Varaita, claimed by France as the ancient possessions of the Dauphins since the twelfth century). By reducing the territory of Savoy west of the Alps to smaller proportions, the treaty would have compelled the Duke (had there been anything like wisdom or moderation in his counsels) to direct all his energies towards Italy; it would have given him unity of scope and action, and prescribed to him an exclusively Italian policy.

The Pope and some of the Italian potentates were thankful to Savoy for having, at her great cost, provided for their security against French invasions, whilst

* Costa, Maison de Savoie, ii. 102.

others again regretted an arrangement which threw them more helplessly than ever into the power of Spain.* But it was full time that Italy should be cured of her delusive hope of ousting one foreign enemy by the help of another; and if she had not in her own forces the means of securing her independence, it was even better for her to acknowledge one master than perpetually to waver between two, only to be the prey and victim of both. The French, for their own part, were far from pleased with a bargain by which they relinquished the hope of future conquest for the sake of present gain; they regretted the "footing" they had lost in Italy, and Lesdiguières rated the King, who had "haggled as a merchant, whilst the Duke treated as a King."†

Baffled in his designs upon France, Charles was still loath to give up the contest with the Swiss, and deemed the possession of Geneva as essential to the safety of the duchy of Savoy on the north, as Montmeillan guarded it on the south. He pretended that republic had not been included, at least nominally, in the Peace of Vervins; that no mention of it occurred in the Treaty of Lyons; he felt great bitterness at the outrageously hostile behaviour of that town with him during his late differences with France, when the whole Genevese population had come forth with great eagerness to assist in the demolition of the Fort of St. Catherine, which the Duke had himself built at great cost near the village of Luiset, about nine miles from

* Botta, Storia d' Italia, iii. 185. † Costa, ii. 123.

Geneva. He chose, in short, to consider himself at war with that city, and determined to fight out his quarrel without further notice.

The night of the 11th to the 12th of December, 1602, is for ever memorable in the annals of Geneva. 4000 Savoyards, aided by darkness, attempted the escalade of its walls; an unforeseen accident disconcerted them; the citizens exhibited the most heroic presence of mind; the ladders by which the aggressors ascended were shot down by a random cannon-ball; the troops outside fell into confusion, those who had already entered the town were either mowed down in fight or hung on the scaffold on the morrow; thus the whole enterprise miscarried. It was in vain that the Duke came forward with his whole host, and tried to prevail by open force where stratagem had failed. He was thwarted by the intervention of the French and Swiss, and compelled by their threats to sign the Treaty of St. Julien (July 21st, 1603), which secured the independence of the Genevese.* Charles nevertheless did not, to his last day, give up his designs upon that city.

He came back however for the present, and from sheer necessity, an Italian prince. His ambition was now turned upon Italy, and his resentment directed against Spain. One of the great objects of his House, ever since the days of Thomas I.—Saluzzo—had, no matter at what dreadful cost, been attained. The turn had now come for Montferrat. As France had in the

* Spon, Hist. de Genève, ii. 371-408.

first instance been a hindrance, so was now Spain in the way. He had serious and just subjects of grievance against that power. His wife's dowry had never been paid. He had always been indifferently seconded by Spain in his wars with France, which had been mainly undertaken at her instigation; his interests had been disregarded, and his quarrel left open at the Peace of Vervins, and he had been altogether forsaken and disavowed in his last breach of the peace after that treaty. Philip II. was dead, since 1598, and his successor was in the hands of crafty ministers, with whom the Duke of Savoy had been trying to cope in the art of deceit, and had been baffled. He longed for revenge; nor was he the only potentate in Europe who wished for the humiliation of the House of Austria both in Germany and in Spain.

Firmly seated on the throne of France, Henry IV. was bent upon restoring the monarchy to its lustre by the abasement of its Austrian rival. It is difficult to aver how far the reconciliation of France with Savoy was sincere. But the hero of Ivry had learnt to appreciate the talents of the foe he had twice subdued, and any want of cordial trust that might yet exist between them was made up for by community of views and interests.

On the 25th of April, 1610, a treaty was drawn up at Bruzolo, in Val Susa, between Lesdiguières and the Duke, by the terms of which the King, after promising the hand of his eldest daughter, Elizabeth, to Victor Amadeus, Prince of Piedmont, engaged to aid

Charles in the conquest of Lombardy. Lesdiguières was for that purpose to lead into Italy an army of 23,000 men, whom the Duke should accompany with 16,000 of his own troops. For his own part, the Duke, upon obtaining possession of the town and castle of Milan, consented to the demolition of Montmeillan, and probably stipulated for the eventual cession of Savoy to France. Henry equally hoped to attach Venice and other Italian states to his views, by the offer of a share in the spoils of Spain.

The most sanguine hopes of Amadeus VI. and VIII. were now to be realized. Savoy was about to found her "Kingdom of North Italy." Already the King, who took occasion of the disputed succession of the duchy of Cleves and Juliers, was preparing to open the war in the north, and had issued orders to Lesdiguières to move forward his army of Dauphiny, when his great scheme was cut short with his life by the dagger of Ravaillac, May 13th, 1610, only eighteen days after the signing of the convention at Bruzolo.

However overcome by this unforeseen reverse, Charles did not the less firmly abide by his hope of aggrandisement in Italy. If Lombardy eluded his grasp, Montferrat was yet within reach. If France could no longer back him, he would grapple with Spain single-handed.

William Gonzaga, Duke of Mantua and Montferrat, had died in 1587; his son Vincent, and his grandson Francis, followed him to the grave both in the same year, 1612. To the latter Charles Emanuel had given

his daughter, Margaret, in 1608. The only surviving issue of this marriage was a daughter, Mary. Francis had, indeed, two brothers,—the Cardinal Ferdinand, and Vincent; both of these successively obtained the duchy of Mantua, and both married, but neither of them had any prospect of male issue, and the succession, at least of Montferrat, which was a feminine fief, eventually devolved upon the Princess Mary. The Duke of Savoy, anxious to vindicate his manifold claims upon Montferrat, urged forward pretensions to the guardianship of the young heiress, and insisted upon having both the Princess and Margaret, her mother, in his own hands. Upon a denial of the Cardinal—now Duke of Mantua—he made a sudden inroad upon Montferrat (April 22nd, 1613), occupied Trino, Alba, Moncalvo, and nearly the whole territory, with the exception of Casale. This place was defended by Charles, a prince of that branch of the House of Gonzaga which had established itself in France in the previous century, and there risen to the dignity of Dukes of Rhêtel and Nevers.

France, Spain, and Rome stepped in as mediators, and the difference was referred to the Emperor's arbitrament. The Duke, however, who had secured the goodwill of Lesdiguières, on the side of France, and of Hinojosa, governor of Milan, on that of Spain, was unwilling to relinquish his prey, and disregarded the Imperial summons that he should fall back from the invaded province.

The Duke of Lerma, minister of Philip III., was

unwise enough to send peremptory orders to Charles Emanuel that "he should obey." No more was needed to goad so proud a spirit to madness. He tore the Order of the Golden Fleece from his breast, dismissed the Spanish ambassador from his court at twenty-four hours' notice, and a four years' war broke out, during which he was engaged hand to hand with all the might of Spain. The war was interrupted by hollow peaces, but only terminated by the Treaty of Pavia (October 9th, 1617). It was in vain that Charles looked for allies in France, Holland, and England; in vain that he made appeals to the Italian States, and especially to Venice and the Pope, inviting them to emancipate themselves from the galling foreign yoke. He was left alone in the fight. He was defeated on the hills near Asti (May 21st, 1615), at Villata, on the Sesia, and at Lucedio (September, 1616); he had to withstand the treachery of a prince of his own House, Henry of Savoy-Nemours, whom the Spaniards, masters of Franche Comté, aided and abetted in his attack upon Savoy. He was finally unable to defend Vercelli, which surrendered to the enemy on the 26th of July, 1617. Still he showed so good a countenance in this unequal struggle; he displayed such vast resources of military genius, so much readiness to repair his own errors and to profit by those of his adversaries, as to win the admiration, and at length the timely aid, of some of his French partisans, especially of Lesdiguières, and, at last, the avowed support of the French Government itself; so that, at the final peace,

he came off without any territorial loss, and with a prodigious increase of reputation. The example of a Prince of Savoy braving for four years all the efforts of the monarchy of Spain had a thrilling effect among the Italian people, and began to dispel the *prestige* of Spanish omnipotence.

From 1621 to 1626 war raged again in Italy from remote and unexpected sources. Valtellina, or the Valley of the Adda, had, in 1510, been detached from the duchy of Milan, and fallen into the hands of the Grisons. Religious differences between the subject people (Catholics) and the ruling nation (Protestants) led to a sanguinary insurrection in the valley. The movement had been stirred up by Austria, anxious to establish through that district the only land communication she could have between the German and the Spanish dominions of her House across the Alps. The Valtellins relied, therefore, on her aid, and, for analogous but opposite reasons, France, Venice, and Savoy, jealous of Austria, who was on the point of achieving the conquest of that valley, strengthened the Grisons with their alliance (February 7th, 1623). The Duke of Savoy, whilst he took an active part in the war of Lombardy, had however leisure to turn his arms against Genoa, who, together with Parma and Tuscany, sided with Spain. A conference had been held at Susa (in November, 1624), between the envoys of France, Savoy, and Venice, in which the subjugation and partition of Genoa was resolved upon, notwithstanding the firm protest of the third power, Venice,

who, to her eternal honour, would be no party to the destruction of the rival republic. France and Savoy did not the less persevere in their intent. The two great leaders, Charles and Lesdiguières, entered the Ligurian territory at Novi, gained the Apennine summit, and, routing the Genoese at Rossiglione, Gavi, and Voltaggio, had the proud capital at their discretion. The Duke however could not induce his wayward ally to follow him any further, and the certain prey, which he already in his imagination eagerly clutched, escaped him.

Presently the town received large subsidies from Spain, and the Duke of Feria advanced with a powerful Spanish and German host into Piedmont, where his march was only arrested by the stronghold of Verrua, on the Po. The war was now reduced to the walls of this important fortress, in the siege of which the Spaniard in vain wasted the lives of 20,000 of his combatants. Both parties now slackened in their endeavours. In the meantime the high conflicting powers, of France and Spain, came to a secret understanding, which led to the Treaty of Monçon, in Arragon (March 6th, 1626). Their disputes were settled with utter disregard, and to the exclusion of the minor potentates, especially of Savoy, in despite of the presence of the Prince of Piedmont, who had been sent to Paris purposely to watch the proceedings.

Thus it was that Savoy, to whose charge fickleness and faithlessness in her alliances have always been laid, was, however, abandoned and unscrupulously

sacrificed in all encounters. But Charles Emanuel was not a man to be behindhand in intrigue and perfidy, as he had no equal in pride and audacity. An opportunity soon offered, to vent his resentment against France. Yet there was always method and calculation even in the outbursts of his revenge. Italy and Europe were once more convulsed by the question of the succession of Mantua. Ferdinand and Vincent, the last dukes, died at little more than a twelvemonth's interval (1626–1627). That same Charles Gonzaga, of Rhêtel-Nevers, who had defended Casale in 1613, had married Mary, the heiress, five days before Vincent's death, and claimed the duchies of Mantua and Montferrat, both in his own and in her right. As a French prince he was supported by France in his pretensions; and he was, for the same reason, opposed by Austria and Spain, as also by Savoy, who, once more urged her old claims on the whole, or at least part, of Montferrat. Charles Emanuel began by seizing that portion of the duchy which he considered his due, and for the rest, whilst Spain and Austria undertook the reduction of Mantua and Casale, he offered the French his aid, on condition of a renewal of the Treaty of Bruzolo,—that is, provided France would help him to the crown of Lombardy, or even, at least, allow him to re-assert his sway over Geneva; at the same time he treated with the Spaniards, engaging to close the Alps against the French, provided they would allow and help him to extend his sovereignty over Genoa.*

* Botta, Storia d' Italia, iv. 100.

His longing for that fair city of the sea had never abated since the day that he had beheld it with covetous eyes from his camp on the heights of the Apennines. Unscrupulous as to means, he listened to the suggestions of a bold adventurer and most abandoned character, Julius Cæsar Vachero, who, profiting by the feuds between the old and new nobility, and by the ill-will of the people against both, had planned a massacre of the Doge and senators, and a reconstruction of the state under the patronage of Savoy. The plot was betrayed (April 1st, 1628), and the conspirators were put to death, notwithstanding the protests of Savoy, who threatened to send to the scaffold all the Genoese prisoners taken at Voltaggio whom he had still in his hands, and notwithstanding even the remonstrances of Spain, whose lieutenants in Italy took part with him.*

By their conduct during this melancholy episode, the Spaniards, who alienated the Genoese from their long allegiance to their country, and threw them into the alliance of France, hoped at least to win the ever-wavering Charles Emanuel to their interests, and they actually succeeded; but it was in an evil hour for him, and too fatally at his cost.

France, distracted by courtly factions during the regency of Mary de' Medici, and by religious dissensions, had but slackly interfered in the Italian dispute for the succession of Montferrat. Mantua and Casale were almost the only places that acknowledged the

* Sismondi, Hist. des Républiques Italiennes, viii. 414.

new duke, and the latter town, plied with siege by the Spaniards, was reduced to great distress. A French army of 12,000 infantry and 1500 horse, under the Marquis of Uxelles, marched across the Alps, on their own ground, through Barcellonette and Castel Delfino, to the release of the place; but it was met by Charles Emanuel near Sampeyre, in Val di Vraita (August 7th, 1628), and driven back in complete disorder. But in the meantime, Richelieu, having succeeded in securing the supreme power at court, and subdued the Huguenots by his grand exploits at La Rochelle (October 30th, 1628), was eager to re-assert the ascendency of France in Italy, and came, followed by the King, Louis XIII., and by the flower of the French nobility and army, to achieve what Uxelles had failed in; that is, to bring relief to Casale. He crossed Mont Genèvre, to Cesanne and Oulx, over French ground, and attacked the barricades, or entrenchments, which Charles Emanuel had hastily reared up, on three lines, in that narrow gorge between Exilles and Susa, which bears the name of *Comba di Susa*. The barricades were stoutly defended, and both the Duke and his son, the Prince of Piedmont, performed prodigies of valour. Savoy however was again alone in a strife undertaken in behalf of Spain, and the works were not of a nature to resist the vast superiority of numbers and the impetuosity of the headlong French chivalry who attacked them: the barricades were forced (March 6th, 1629). On the 11th, the French, by an armistice at Susa, had obtained the power to throw reinforcements into Casale.

Charles, pressed now by the French, ill-seconded by the Spaniards, was still steering his uncertain course between the two rival powers, and endeavouring to sell himself to the highest bidder. He still bargained with France for Genoa, at least for Susa; he threw obstacles in the way of the troops who were on their march to Casale, and was never ready with the provisions which he had engaged to throw into that place; but the arrogant Richelieu, breaking through all the wiles of the Savoyard, came back to Piedmont as commander-in-chief of the French forces (December 29, 1629), and pressed forward against Avigliana, where the Duke had taken up a strong position, and still disputed the pass to the French, anxious to proceed to Casale. Unable to overcome the obstacle by main force, the Cardinal had recourse to negotiation, during which he did not in his turn scruple to attempt to seize, by surprise, both the city of Turin and the persons of the Duke of Savoy and the Prince of Piedmont at Rivoli* (March 19th, 1630). The scheme was defeated, thanks to the timely warning Charles Emanuel received from the high-minded Montmorency.

Charles now, for the last time, was lashed into one of his fits of fury. He arrested all the French he could lay hold of, and again threw himself into the hands of the Spaniards. It availed him but little. Louis XIII. advanced, with a new French army, and overran Savoy, feebly opposed by one of the younger sons of Charles Emanuel, Thomas, Prince of Cari-

* Guichenon, ii. 430.

gnano, who fell back before him into Tarantasia, and across the Little St. Bernard into the Val d' Aosta, thus opening before the enemy the Pass of Mont Cenis. The French now forced Avigliana, on the 10th of July. The fall of Saluzzo followed ten days later. Pinerolo had been taken by Créqui three months previously. All Piedmont, no less than all North Italy, was ravaged both by French and by Germans and Spaniards; and more terrible by far than even those wild hordes, the plague—such a plague as had never before been witnessed—spread desolation, no less on the trampled people than on their destroyers.

Charles Emanuel gazed on the dread complication of horrors which, his conscience at last smote him, he had called down upon the country. He was still in arms on the Maira, and preparing for rescue, when his brave heart broke; he was borne down by a three days' illness, and died at Savigliano, on the 16th of July, 1630, in his sixty-eighth year.

Victor Amadeus I., his son, continued the unequal contest with various success; but already the intensity of the plague had snatched the sword from the hands of the combatants. The great powers came to a peace at Ratisbon (October 26th, 1630), and hostilities in Italy were brought to an end by the dexterity and presence of mind of Giulio Mazzarino, afterwards the cardinal-minister in France, who stepped in between the French and Spanish armies in the heat of an engagement at Casale. By the Treaties of Cherasco (April 6th, 1631) and of Millefiori (July 6th, 1632),

Mantua and Montferrat were adjudged to Gonzaga-Nevers, but Savoy obtained Trino, Alba, and other fractions of the latter duchy. Even these acquisitions were more than counterbalanced by the loss of Pinerolo, and Perosa, which Victor Amadeus was compelled to relinquish in the hands of the French.

Thus was the work of Charles Emanuel, in 1588, all undone; the French were once more established south of the Alps, and a Duke of Savoy had once more to sleep almost within reach of the roll of their drums.

Charles Emanuel was one of those heroes of whom the poet said that humanity "weeps over their cradles only to breathe again on their tombs." Pope Urban VIII. wrote, in 1627, "Conquiescere non sinit Italiam Sabaudiæ tubæ clangor." He came to the throne at a time when the real proportions between the great powers and the smaller states, at least for aggressive purposes, were not sufficiently defined. Conscious of great personal energies, he believed his people also equal to any exertions. There was no challenge he was unwilling to accept or to offer, against all odds. His father had been at great pains to patch him up a crown out of frail and ill-connected materials. Like Don Quixote with his pasteboard helmet, the son had no rest till he had put his head-piece to the test of the heaviest blows. The consequences were such as might have been anticipated. The crown of Savoy fell to fragments; and if the policy of the great Powers restored it, it was on an implied condition

that its wearer should fall from his overweening pretensions and resign himself to a subordinate post.

Yet rashness and violence were by no means the worst blemishes in the character of this singular Prince. His policy was as insane and short-sighted as it was crooked and profligate; his cunning perpetually overreached itself. Had there been in his course consistency and unity of purpose; had he, either immediately upon the taking of Saluzzo, in 1588, or else after the Peace of Vervins, in 1598, made definite terms with France, and turned all his thoughts upon Italy, no doubt he might have achieved much both towards the consolidation of his own power and the emancipation of the whole Peninsula. But he was, on the one hand, always hankering after Geneva, Vaud, and other Transalpine possessions irreparably lost to Savoy; on the other, even in Italy, notwithstanding his great flourishes of patriotism, he was only bent on the furtherance of his own selfish schemes,—always equally ready to make his progress at the expense of Spain or at that of his weaker Italian neighbours. Little did it matter to him whether his aggrandisement could be effected by the liberation of Milan or by the enslavement of Genoa.

Truly, he found ample excuse for his evil practices in the universal depravity of the age; for there is no doubt but France and Spain not only shrank from no unworthy devices to betray him, notwithstanding their vast superiority of forces, but even made themselves guilty of the basest criminal attempts both against his

liberty and his life;* but he had in his house, and in his own father, the standard of a higher morality; he might have learnt from him that the most straightforward policy is at all times the wisest and safest.

And yet, though it were easy for us to describe Charles Emanuel as the scourge of Piedmont and Italy, there is no doubt but no Prince of his age enjoyed a more extensive or more firm popularity at home or abroad. On the report having spread that the Duke had been assassinated by the French, the populace of Turin were worked into such ungovernable madness that they massacred as many of the French residents in their city as fell in their way (June 6th, 1611).† Tuscan and Roman bards were loud in their praises of a hero—himself no mean cultivator of Italian literature—who, no matter from what motive, sought his strength in an appeal to national feelings. They show yet, in the Royal Library at Paris, a manuscript discourse or address by no less a person than Thomas Campanella, the Calabrese monk and patriot, exhorting the Savoy Prince to drive the Spaniards from Italy; and, in reply, a *canzone* or ode by the Duke, in which he showed, in robust and manly verses, that his aspirations were of a nature to correspond with the faith and expectation his daring exploits had raised throughout the country. His commanding genius, the intrepidity with which he was seen, at Vinon, at Asti, in a hundred encounters, heading his columns, often on foot, armed with a pike, dazzled his

* Francesco Trucchi, Documenti, MS. † Botta, iii. 259.

companions in arms and called forth equal exertions on their part. He improved and completed the military organization projected by his father, and strengthened its discipline. He showed no mercy to cowardice or dereliction of duty. Having met the garrison of Pinerolo, who had surrendered the place, in March, 1630, at the very time he was hastening to its rescue, he turned his cannon against them, and bade his men "to fire on that pack of craven knaves."*

How a man who spent twenty-six out of the fifty years of his reign in open war, and the remainder in preparing for it, found leisure for literary pursuits, may be difficult to conceive; but it is nevertheless a fact that Tasso, in the period of his greatest distress, was an honoured guest, and Tassoni, Marini, Chiabrera, and Botero permanent residents, at his Court; and that the Duke kept up with some of them an interchange of verses, only a few of which are extant at the present day.† His writings of a more serious kind bear witness to his readiness of wit, soundness of judgment, and extensiveness of attainments. In his style of living, in his buildings, in his patronage of the arts, he was rather lavish than munificent; and it is pleasingly recorded of a man who, like Napoleon, only thought of his people as "food for the cannon," and boasted that he had "as many soldiers as he had subjects," that it was also his favourite saying, that the great luxury of royalty was "to give and to forgive."‡

* Costa, ii. 156. † Cibrario, Istituzioni, 172. ‡ Costa, ii. 163.

Victor Amadeus I. came to the throne in his forty-fifth year. He found himself utterly at the mercy of the French, now masters of Pinerolo, and seconded by Gonzaga in Mantua, who allowed them to garrison Casale. He had, in 1618, married Christina of France, a younger daughter of Henry IV., a marriage by which the French Court had hoped to bind Charles Emanuel to its interests; as if domestic ties had ever been more than mere cobwebs against the cupidity and strong will of the Princes of Savoy.

Richelieu now lorded it over France and its King. Free from all opposition at home, the scheming Cardinal had entered into the views of Henry IV., and was bent upon breaking the power of the House of Hapsburg. With that intent, he had already been favouring the German Protestants, deep in their Thirty Years' War against the Empire, and came at last to an open declaration of war, on the 26th of March, 1635. On the 11th of July, of the same year, he concluded, at Rivoli, a league with Savoy, Mantua, and Parma, against Spain. This Convention renewed in favour of Savoy the terms of the Treaty of Bruzolo; it held out, that is, to Victor Amadeus that glittering bauble of the Lombard diadem, which had had so powerful a fascination over his father. Victor, notwithstanding his declining health and the exhaustion of his State,—notwithstanding his just mistrust of and dissatisfaction with France,—notwithstanding the opposition he met with in the bosom of his own family, especially on the part of his brothers, Prince Thomas of Carignano and

Cardinal Maurice, who sided with Spain, and against whom, in a vain hope to clear himself from suspicion, he was compelled to issue decrees of banishment and confiscation,—took the field with that valour of which he had given splendid proofs during his father's campaigns, and made, together with the French Marshal Créqui, an attack upon the Spaniards of Lombardy. He was successful at Tornavento, on the Ticino (June 22nd, 1636), and again at Mombardone, on the Bormida (September 8th, 1637); but he was harassed by the bad faith and suspiciousness of the French Court, and by the jealousy and arrogance of the French Marshal; and died (October 7th, 1637), poisoned, as it was then strongly suspected,* by the agents of Richelieu, at a banquet given him by Créqui, at Vercelli.

After his death there was, for many years, no ruler in Piedmont. His widow, Christina of France, a Princess who prided herself on her personal likeness to her father, Henry IV., and had something of his brave spirit no less than of his amorous propensities, assumed the regency in the name of the infant heir, Francis Hyacinth, and on the death of this latter (October 4th, 1638), in behalf of her younger son, Charles Emanuel II. She was however opposed by her brothers-in-law, Thomas of Carignano and Cardinal Maurice, the same Princes, as we have seen, who followed a policy in opposition to that of the chief of their House, their brother, Victor Amadeus.

Here the vicissitudes of the Court of Savoy, during

* Muratori, Annal. xv. 281.—Denina, Ital. Occidentale, iii. 270.

the regency of Yolande of France, widow of Amadeus IX., force themselves upon our recollection, and all the following narrative might almost strike us as a re-perusal of the annals of that remote period.

Richelieu, whether or not he was the author of the death of Victor Amadeus, seemed determined to profit by it, and an attempt was made to secure the possession of Piedmont by the sudden occupation of Vercelli. This was baffled by the vigilance of the Piedmontese garrison; but the ascendancy of France was so great that Christina, who, though by birth a Frenchwoman, was a Piedmontese at heart, or at least was prompted by innate thirst of dominion to resist the encroachments of the French Court on her sovereign prerogative, was however fain to accede to a treaty at Turin (June 3rd, 1638), which bound her to a continuation of the war with Spain. This war had no important results besides the death of Marshal Créqui, at Breme, in Lomellina (March 17th, 1638), and the loss of Vercelli (July 5th of the same year), which remained to the Spaniards for twenty-two years.

The Princes of the blood, actuated by animosity against Christina, and determined either to deprive her of the Regency or to share it with her, accused her of sacrificing the interests of the country to those of her family, and, at the head of the Spaniards, made an invasion upon Piedmont. Prince Thomas reduced Chivasso, Biella, Ivrea, and Aosta; Cardinal Maurice gained possession of the county of Nice. The Piedmontese troops, together with the great mass of the

population, sided with their native Princes in opposition to the "foreign woman;"* and the French, under pretence of the wavering disposition of the native garrisons, threw their own troops into Carmagnola, Savigliano, and Cherasco. The civil war was thus carried on with equal ardour on both sides, a civil war in which one party only strove to deliver the country over to France, whilst the other equally played into the hands of Spain.

On the 27th of August, 1639, the Prince of Carignano, favoured by the people, occupied the city of Turin, compelled the Duchess to flight, and laid siege to the citadel, which was garrisoned by the French. The Duke of Harcourt, who had obtained a signal success over the Spanish general, Leganes, at Casale, marched now upon Turin, and encompassed the city with his French forces. These were soon, in their turn, surrounded by the Spaniards, who had rallied under Leganes. Thus did Turin exhibit a phenomenon unparalleled perhaps in the annals of human warfare—that of a quadruple siege; as the French garrison in the citadel was beset by the Piedmontese and Spanish forces under Prince Thomas, these by the French army of Harcourt, and these again by the Spanish troops of Leganes. This state of things lasted four months and a half. Thomas was admirably seconded by the townspeople, no less than five thousand of whom volunteered their services in behalf of what they deemed the national cause. He exhibited

* Sclopis, Documenti sul Principe Tommaso, p. 31.

throughout a valour worthy of his father, and made amends both for the check he met with in Savoy, in his father's time, in 1630, and the many reverses he had to endure towards the latter end of his chequered career. After sallying forth several times to meet the enemy in open space, he was at last compelled by famine to capitulate, and was allowed to quit the place with all military honours (September 22nd, 1640).*

The fall of Turin did not put an end to the civil war, but its main exploits were limited to the taking of Cuneo by Harcourt (September 15th, 1641), who would not allow that place to retain her proud title of "the Impregnable;" and of Revel, which was reduced by the Piedmontese troops who fought on the French side, and whose valour was requited by the Government of that jealous nation by the wanton demolition of that, to them, obnoxious stronghold.

In the meantime the Regent, no less than her opponents, began to grow weary of the burdensome protection of their respective allies.

Christina, who, after her escape from Turin, had taken refuge in Savoy, with her son, was summoned to Grenoble by the King, her brother, and needed the greatest dexterity and presence of mind to defeat the plots by which the King or his minister endeavoured to take both the young Duke and the fortress of Montmeillan out of her possession. On her return to Piedmont, after the fall of Turin, she found herself completely under control of the French Commander, Du

* Cibrario, Torino, i. 461.

Plessis-Praslin, who, by the basest treason, took from her her favourite courtier, Philip of Agliè, and had him conveyed to Vincennes, where he was shut up till after the death of Richelieu. She had equally to lament the loss of her confessor, Father Monod, an intriguing Jesuit, who had irritated the Cardinal Minister by his attachment to his mistress, and by a display in her behalf of an address by no means inferior to his own. The Duchess, indeed, refused to surrender Monod to the urgent demands of Richelieu, but, it appears,* she sacrificed him herself, yielding to the dark accusations of that wily statesman, and it was by her order that the Jesuit was doomed to perish in the dungeons of Montmeillan and Miolans.

For their own part the Princes, Thomas and Maurice, had but little reason to be satisfied with the Spaniards, who treated Piedmont as a conquered country, and took steps for its permanent occupation. Under such circumstances, a reconciliation between the hostile parties became practicable, and was indeed effected on the 24th of July, 1642. The Princes were admitted to a share of the Regent's power, and from that time they joined the French standard, and took from the Spaniards most of the places they had themselves placed in their hands.

The good understanding however, notwithstanding the marriage of Cardinal Maurice with his own niece, Louisa of Savoy, and the distant expeditions of Prince Thomas in the service of France, did not remove all

* Cibrario, Istituzioni, p. 176.

enmity between the parties; and the civil war left deep traces of its evil passions amongst the people, where men continued to call each other by the rancorous appellations of *Madamisti* and *Principisti* (partisans of *Madame Royale* or of the *Princes*) long after the persons by whom those factions were designated had all been removed by death.

In the meanwhile the great agitator of Europe, Richelieu, had died (1642), and had been followed by the King, Louis XIII., five months later. It was now the turn of France to be afflicted by a Regency, and weakened by the Court feuds and popular tumults of the celebrated period of the Fronde. Mazarin, the minister of the Regent, Anne of Austria, had not quite inherited the talents, such as they were, together with the ambitious and imperious temper, of Richelieu. He contrived however to hold both the Regent and the young King under his control until his death (1661); and it was not before this epoch that Louis XIV. properly began to wield the sovereign authority, and France to rise to that degree of power which was fraught with danger to all Europe.

The struggle between the two great rival powers, France and Spain, scarcely interrupted by the celebrated peace of Westphalia, which put an end to the Thirty Years' War in the North, in 1648, continued throughout the greatest part of this period; but the rapid decline of Spain, the factions of Alessio in Sicily and of Masaniello in Naples, as much paralysed the efforts of the Court of Madrid as the disorders of

the Fronde weakened that of Paris. The warlike operations in North Italy were languid and dull. The taking of Valenza by the French (September 3rd, 1656) is the greatest event on record, and even that void of results.

By the treaty of the Pyrenees (November 17th, 1659) Savoy was restored to her possessions, and Vercelli was evacuated by the Spaniards. The citadel of Turin had been given up by the French two years before, owing to the influence of Mazarin, who married on that occasion his niece Olimpia Mancini to Eugene Maurice, son of Thomas, Prince of Carignano, and first cousin to Charles Emanuel II. From that union, it is well known, was born in Paris, in 1663, Prince Eugene of Savoy. The French nation were highly displeased at the loss of the Turin citadel, and never forgave the Cardinal this mere act of just and tardy restitution. Pinerolo and Perosa however still remained in their hands, and placed the Court of Turin entirely at their discretion.

During all this lapse of years, and until the latter end of the century, the history of Piedmont presents but a melancholy blank.

Christina of France, who declared her son, Charles Emanuel II., to be of age, in 1648, removed him however from the cares of Government, and plunged him into dissipation and frivolous pleasures, which weakened his constitution and unnerved his mind. Even after his mother's death (December 27th, 1663), the Duke showed but little aptitude for command: he

was one of the very few Princes of his race, who never showed himself at the head of his troops in open campaign.

Left alone to the direction of State affairs, this Prince summed up in a few years the most baneful errors of his forefathers. Beyond the Alps he involved himself in difficulties with Geneva; nor was he without some designs against the liberties of that State, although he rejected the offers of Mazarin, who would have given him Geneva, but in exchange for the county of Nice.* On the Alps he waged two successive wars against the Waldensès, and, as we shall see, stained his memory by deeds of atrocity which he suffered to be perpetrated in his name. In Italy he quarrelled with Venice, insisting, as his father and his grandfather had done before him, on the absurd claims of the House of Savoy on the royal title of Cyprus, almost one hundred years after that island-kingdom had fallen under the sway of the Ottomans. He had however neither the energy nor the obstinacy of the Princes who preceded him, and his schemes were as readily abandoned as they were easily conceived. He made his peace with Geneva; he granted amnesties to his subjects of the valleys; and, coming to a reconciliation with Venice, he sent two of his best regiments to Candia, under the Marquis of Villa, who did excellent work in the terrible war the Republic had to sustain against the Turks (1666). It is too

* Spon. Hist. de Genève, i. 535.—Cibrario, Memorie Cronologiche, pp. 82, 83.

true however that he recalled them, from the same unworthy motives of his claims upon Cyprus, before the end of the war.*

Finally, faithful to the policy of his unprincipled grandfather, he made himself guilty of the most wanton outrages against Genoa. He found another Vachero in the person of Raphael della Torre, a Genoese patrician, proscribed in consequence of heinous crimes, but who described himself as a political exile, and pretended to have a strong band of patriots devoted to his cause. Actuated by these delusions as to the facility as well as justice of the enterprise, the Duke ventured—in profound peace, or at the utmost taking advantage of some trifling disputes between the peasantry of both countries on the frontier—on a desperate onset upon Genoa. The war was as unskilfully conducted as it was iniquitously undertaken. Several attacks on Savona and plots in the capital itself miscarried. The Piedmontese suffered a very disastrous defeat at Castelvecchio, near Oneglia (August 15th, 1672), and both that town and its valley were lost. Charles Emanuel listened to the calumnies of some of his minions against Count Catalano Alfieri, the Commander of that ill-fated expedition, who was brought before a court-martial; but the sense of his master's injustice so weighed on that high-souled officer, that he died of sorrow in his prison. The Marquis of Livorno, who was struck by the same sentence, made his escape to France.†

* Botta, Storia d' Italia, v. 57. † Botta, v. 124.

Louis XIV. now stepped in between the belligerents, and insisted on the matter being referred to his decision, adding, with that arrogance to which the world was now accustomed, that "he would not suffer a cannon to be fired in Italy, except at his own bidding." Peace was concluded, on equal terms, at St. Germain, January 18th, 1673.

Charles Emanuel employed the happiest days of his reign in magnificent buildings, for which he inherited a taste no less from his mother than from his ambitious grandsire. The Royal Palace, the Chapel of the *Sacra Sindone*, the Valentino, Rivoli, La Veneria, the porticoes of the Strada di Po and Piazza San Carlo, and most of the *baroque*, yet grand structures, conspicuous at the present day in Turin or its environs, date either from this reign or the preceding regency, being some of them raised from their very foundations, others restored and enlarged. Still the main achievement by which the genius of this Prince may be said to be in advance of his age, was the famous road and tunnel across the Pass of Les Échelles, between Pont-Beauvoisin and Chambéry (1670), a work only surpassed in more recent times by those of a man who disposed of the means not of a duchy, but of a vast empire.

It was perhaps owing to this love of splendour and display, which always dazzle the multitude, but still more to great courteousness and affability of manners, that Charles Emanuel II., notwithstanding his grievous political errors, gained that strong hold of his people's affections to which contemporaneous records bear evi-

dence.* The attachment was reciprocal to the last. As he felt his end drawing near, the Duke ordered the doors of his apartments to be thrown open, and lay there in state, as it were, ere the breath had departed, that the humblest of his subjects might witness the passing of his sovereign, and that he might die amongst them.† He was then (June 12th, 1675) three-and-forty years of age.

His successor, Victor Amadeus II., restored the fortunes of the monarchy.

Puny and sickly in infancy,—the same is said of nearly all the Princes of this singular race,—he so inured his frame to toils and hardships as to attain almost athletic strength and astonishing powers of endurance. He came to the throne in his ninth year, and was under the guardianship of his mother, the Duchess Joan Baptiste, last heiress of the branch of Savoy-Nemours, by a marriage with whom Charles Emanuel II. had reunited the appanage of Genevois and Faucigny to the domains of the crown. The regency of Joan Baptiste was peaceful and undisturbed by sinister events, with the exception of incipient riots in the districts of Mondovì, on account of the duty on salt, which, as we shall have occasion to record, broke out afresh at different periods during the ensuing reign.

The time prescribed by the laws of the monarchy for the nonage of Victor Amadeus had expired in 1680,

* Bellegno, Relazione, Cibr. Relazioni Venete, p. 82.

† Muratori, Annal. xv. 449.

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when that Prince attained his fourteenth year; but the Regent, though gentle and inoffensive, was loath to resign her power, and it was necessary for her son, notwithstanding his filial respect and tenderness, to dethrone his parent, an act which he accomplished by simply signifying to all the powers of the State that "it was his pleasure to take the reins of government into his own hands" (November 30th, 1684).*

An attempt had been made (1682) by the mother to remove the Duke from Piedmont by marrying him to the heiress presumptive of Portugal, her own niece, a union which, without depriving Victor Amadeus of his hereditary dominions, would however have necessitated his residence in Lisbon. France, always eager to profit by any event which might cause weakness and confusion in the State of Piedmont, powerfully seconded, if it did not originally suggest, this matrimonial scheme; but it was defeated by the devotion, or, we would rather say, by the independent spirit of the Piedmontese, who saw themselves by that arrangement reduced to the condition of a subject province to a distant realm; they broke out into threats and riots in Turin, till the clamours of the court, nobility, and people prevailed upon the Prince to remain amongst them.

No sooner had Victor taken the helm of public affairs into his own hands, than he exhibited great vigour in quelling the disturbances of the maddened peasantry of Mondovì, whose riots, however, again

* Denina, Hist. de Victor Amedée, ii. MS.

diverted his attention from more important cares in later times.

New days of trial and suffering had now come for Piedmont. After the Peace of Nimeguen (1679), the power and arrogance of Louis XIV. exceeded all limits, and his designs were especially directed against Italy, where he had signalized himself by his wanton bombardment of Genoa (1684), and insulted the Pope, from whom, by way of further aggravation, he seized the county of Avignon (1688).

In Piedmont, besides Pinerolo, he was now in possession of Casale, which had been basely sold to him by Charles Gonzaga, Duke of Mantua, in 1681. He thus held Victor completely in his grasp, and had a constant pretext for marching his troops all across Piedmont at will. He exacted from Savoy large subsidies in men, and already three Piedmontese regiments were fighting under French standards in Flanders. Finally, when the King filled the measure of his blind bigotry by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1585, October 2nd), he compelled the Duke of Savoy to follow his own policy, and adopt cruel measures, which led to the extermination or expulsion of his Protestant subjects of the Pinerolo valleys. The sentence pronounced against the unfortunate Waldenses had hardly been carried into execution (1686), when Victor Amadeus was already planning his escape from the ignominious thraldom to which the faults and calamities of his predecessors had doomed him.

Already in the same year (June 9th) William of

Orange had mustered Sweden, Holland, the Emperor, Saxony, Bavaria, and Spain, into the League of Augsburg, to which he added England, on his accession to that throne two years later. Victor came to a secret understanding with the allies at Venice (June 4th, 1690), and as Louis XIV. became outrageous in his demands, and even insisted upon the occupation of the citadel of Turin, the Duke ventured upon an open declaration of war, to Louis, at the time that the general of that great monarch, Catinat, still busy with his Anti-Waldensian crusade on the Alps, had the open plain of Piedmont at his mercy (June 10th).

The consequences of this memorable act of daring were grievously felt. The French general used his own advantage remorselessly, and it was not until August 18th, 1690, that Victor Amadeus had collected a large but ill-recruited force amongst his own subjects, with whom, and with the German troops led to his rescue by his cousin, Prince Eugene, he came on that day to a pitched battle at Staffarda, on the road between Cavour and Saluzzo, in which the army of Savoy and of his ally suffered a thorough defeat. The loss of Susa followed in the same year, and in the next Nice and Villafranca, Montmeillan, Avigliana, and Carmagnola, fell one after another into the power of the French. Cuneo alone repulsed the enemy, with a valour worthy of her ancient renown (1691).

A reversion of fortunes occurred in 1692, when King Louis was obliged to withdraw part of his troops for the Flemish wars. Catinat, with inferior forces,

was driven back to the Alps, and took up his position for a great part of the winter in that almost inaccessible mountain fastness above Fenestrelles, which is renowned in military annals as Catinat's Field (*Prè de Catinat*). During this and the ensuing campaigns, the lofty ridge between the valley of Chiusone and that of the Dora became a favourite encampment and battle-field both for the French and Piedmontese, who reared trenches almost on a level with the limit of perpetual snow, the remnants of which are discernible at the present day.

Profiting by the forced inaction of the French general, the two heroes of Savoy crossed the mountains, and carried war and destruction into the enemy's territory, down the valley of Barcellonette, as far as Guillestre, Embrun, and Gap. The Duke of Savoy was animated by a desire to retaliate upon the French the sufferings his own subjects had to endure; and the Prince was anxious to acquit himself of the ominous promise he had made to Louis, (upon quitting the French Court in early youth, his pride wounded by the taunts of the monarch and of Louvois, his minister, of whom the young Savoyard Abbé had asked for a regiment, and by whom he had been bidden to "Go and say mass,") that "he would never re-enter France except sword in hand." But at Embrun Victor Amadeus fell seriously ill of the small-pox, and the expedition proceeded no further.

Catinat recovered his ascendency in Piedmont in 1693, and delivered the country to the most brutal

military execution; to which the royal residences of Rivoli, La Veneria, etc., did not escape. It was the French mode of warfare at that epoch, and they only perpetrated in Italy the deeds of Vandalism which had four years before signalized their progress through the Palatinate. Catinat, whom French historians praise for his humanity, sickened at the cruel task that was imposed upon him, but dared not disobey the strict orders of the atrocious minister, Louvois.*

Again the Savoy Princes met the enemy in the open field on the river Chisola, between Orbassano and Marsaglia, and again they succumbed, owing to inferiority of numbers, in a murderous battle, in which they left more than 6000 men dead on the battle-field (October 4th, 1693).

The Duke of Savoy had but little inducement to cling to the allies, for whose sake his country was so barbarously treated. He saw himself more and more alone in the struggle, abandoned by their troops, whose only occupation seemed to be to inflict upon his States even worse evils than they had to endure at the hands of their declared French foes. With the single exception of England, who paid her subsidies with exemplary punctuality, none of his allies fulfilled the terms by which they were bound to him; he believed himself, therefore, justified in the desertion of their cause. But too sudden a change of policy was attended with great danger, and he felt the necessity of proceeding with the most consummate adroitness.

* Sismondi, Hist. des Français, xv. 403.—Botta, v. 281.

As early as 1690, it would seem,* he had come to some secret understanding with the French generals whom he was opposing on the battle-field. From the very outset the allies complained of slackness in his military operations; and it was in obedience to their pressing orders that, in 1595, June 25th, Victor undertook the siege of Casale with such vast superiority of forces as to deprive the French of all chances of resistance. After a short bombardment, he granted the garrison a capitulation (July 9th), upon the preconcerted condition that the fortifications of the place should be razed to the ground, so that Casale, as it ceased to be a fortress in the hands of the French, should likewise never become a stronghold in those of their Austrian enemies.

The Emperor, whom this manœuvre defrauded of the best prize of victory, set no limits to his reproaches and threats, and sent Victor a peremptory intimation to push on the war with the utmost vigour. The Duke however was suddenly reminded of a vow he had made four years before, at Embrun, to visit the shrine of Loreto, and, in sheer defiance of Leopold's wrath, he quitted the camp (February, 1696), and set out for his pilgrimage.† He was now exposed to all the revenge of the allies; but he had taken his measures with admirable precision. On the 30th of May, 1696, on his return from Loreto, he signed the preliminaries of a peace with France. These he kept still a secret, and engaged Catinat to come down upon Turin with

* Botta, v. 284. † Saluces, Hist. Milit. v. 91.

an irresistible host. In his pretended distress he made repeated but fruitless appeals to the confederates for aid, and affected to be at last driven by their dereliction to a month's truce with France (July 11th), which he managed to prolong till the 1st of September: by this time his plans were matured, and he threw off the mask. With the title of commander-in-chief of the French forces, he joined Catinat at Casale, whence their combined forces, 50,000 men strong, undertook, September 18th, the siege of Valenza.

His object was, however, not so much the substitution of French instead of Spanish or German preponderance in Italy, as the deliverance of his own States and of the whole country from both. On the 7th of October, at Vigevano, with the co-operation of the Roman and Venetian governments, whose agents he had secretly met at Loreto, he stipulated in behalf of Italy a compact of neutrality, to which France and Austria equally acceded, and by the terms of which the unhappy Italian peninsula was at last rid of the foreign armies by which it had been so long and so ruthlessly ravaged.

For himself, Victor had previously obtained from France the restitution of Pinerolo, Perosa, and Pragelato, after sixty-six years' occupation.

The defection of Savoy at such an emergency enabled France to employ elsewhere her armies of Italy; and this unforeseen movement, in which she had the start of her adversaries, was of such weight on the scales of the war, that it powerfully contributed to de-

termine the Peace of Ryswick (October 30th, 1697), which afforded a few years' rest to the world.

Neither France nor her opponents ever forgave the duplicity by which the Savoyard contrived so to dupe them all as to render himself master of the situation; though the only aim and result of all his intrigues was, besides the recovery of what was indisputably his own, the liberation of his country and the pacification of Europe. They never forgave, never forgot it: never afterwards gave Victor Amadeus or his descendants credit for common honesty and plain dealing. In all difficult combinations, in all delicate transactions, Savoy was always treated with outrageous mistrust; and as her neighbours always looked for deceit on her part, so they never scrupled to deceive her in their turn.

Time soon brought to maturity an event for which, during the last forty years, the monarchs of Europe had been anxiously preparing. The Spanish branch of the House of Austria was on the verge of extinction, and France and Germany, to say nothing of minor pretenders, disputed the succession.

Charles II. of Spain died without issue (November 1st, 1700), and bequeathed by a will his vast monarchy to the Duke of Anjou, a younger grandson of Louis XIV. of France. The young prince was hailed in Spain, as well as Italy, as King Philip V.

Long before the death of Charles, however, the European powers, France included, had agreed upon various treaties for the partition of the Spanish dominions; and the Emperor Leopold, who claimed the

whole Spanish heritage for himself, in behalf of his second son, the Archduke Charles, looked at least to Milan and the Two Sicilies as his own certain share in the spoils of Spain. As France, favoured by events, was now unwilling to hear of any partition of the rich inheritance, war was declared against her by the Emperor, who was joined by England, Holland, and Hanover, in a "Great Alliance" (September 7th, 1701).

Victor Amadeus was not without some claims to the Spanish succession. His object, however, would have been to secure for himself and for Italy the continuation of the neutrality which had been obtained through his influence in 1696. This was no longer possible, as the Emperor was now bent on driving from Italy the armies who still held Milan and Naples in the name of Spain. Compelled to take part with one of the contending parties, Victor would have been prompted by his interest to an alliance with Austria; but he was beset on all sides by the combined forces of France and Spain, and was all the more at their mercy as Louis XIV. had (April 5th, 1701) obtained from Ferdinand Gonzaga of Mantua permission to garrison his capital, in those days already one of the strongest places in Italy. The Duke of Savoy had already, in 1697, married his daughter, Adelaide, to one of Louis's grandsons, the Duke of Burgundy; he now gave his younger daughter, Mary Louise, to Burgundy's brother, the new King of Spain (September 11th, 1701), and took the field as French commander-in-chief.

He was opposed by his own cousin, Prince Eugene, at the head of the Imperial armies. The war in Lombardy was carried on with some remissness, partly owing to the natural repugnance or irresolution of the Duke of Savoy, partly to the suspicion with which, on that very account, he was looked upon by Catinat and Vaudemont, the French and Spanish commanders under him. The King, in an evil hour, removed his able marshal, Catinat, and substituted for him Villeroi, a carpet knight and court warrior, who committed one fault after another, allowed himself to be beaten by Eugene at Chiari (September 1st), and to be surprised and taken prisoner at Cremona (1702, January 21st), to the infinite relief of his troops. Vendôme restored the fortunes of the French, and a very brilliant but undecisive action was fought at Luzzara (August 15th), after which Prince Eugene was driven from the neighbourhood of Mantua, and fell back towards the mountains of Tyrol.

With the success of the French their arrogance increased, and with their arrogance the disgust and ill-will of Victor Amadeus. Catinat had offended him by his mistrust; Villeroi wounded him by his off-hand, uncourteous manner (he styled him *Monsieur de Savoie*, and familiarly thrust his fingers into the Duke's snuffbox), and by attributing to the ill-faith of the Duke the disasters caused by his own incapacity. At last Philip V. of Spain, who was sent to the camp in Italy by his grandfather, treated him with more than Castilian superciliousness, refused him—Victor, his

own father-in-law—his right hand, and a seat beside him in his carriage, or at table.* Victor Amadeus required no better pretext than this ill-treatment afforded, to separate his cause from that of a power which, had it succeeded in securing possession of Milan, would have him at discretion. As it always happened when he had any reason for discontent, Victor withdrew from the camp, and was absent at the time of the battle of Luzzara, where however his Piedmontese fought with more than their wonted bravery; and it was from this time that he began to listen to the offers of the members of the Great Alliance.

Report of the secret intercourse of the Duke with Austrian agents reached Louis XIV., who sent immediate orders to Vendôme to secure and disarm the Piedmontese soldiers (3800 to 6000 in number), who were fighting under French standards at Mantua. This was achieved by treachery, at San Benedetto, on the 29th of September, 1703. An attempt to seize the Duke himself, whilst hunting near Turin, miscarried. Savoy retaliated by the arrest of the French and Spanish ambassadors, and war was declared (October 5th).

The moment was ill-chosen. Victor had barely 4000 men under his orders. The whole of Savoy was instantly overrun; and in Piedmont Vercelli, Ivrea, Verrua, as well as Susa, Bard, and Pinerolo, and even Chivasso, fell into the enemy's hands during the cam-

* Costa de Beauregard, iii. 403.

paigns of 1704 and 1705. In the ensuing year the tide of invasion reached Nice and Villafranca; nothing was left to Victor Amadeus but Cuneo and Turin, and the victorious French armies appeared at last under the very walls of the capital (March, 1706).

The war had, however, been waged with different results beyond the Alps, where the allies had crushed the French at Blenheim (1704), and at Ramillies (1705). One of the heroes of those great achievements, Prince Eugene, now hastened to the rescue of his cousin. He met with a severe check at Cassano (August 16th, 1705), and again at Calcinato (April 19th, 1706); but his skilful antagonist, Vendôme, was called away to Flanders, and Prince Eugene so out-manœuvred his successors as to be able to join Victor at Turin.

The French had begun the siege of this place on the 13th of May, 1706. They had between 50,000 and 60,000 men, and 170 pieces of artillery with them; but all this force did not enable them completely to invest the town. The garrison consisted of twelve Piedmontese and seven foreign regiments, to whom eight legions of citizens, and even a band of 300 women, added themselves. The very poor from the almshouses and the convalescents from the hospitals came forward in the sorest need to man the bastions. Victor Amadeus threw himself into the place, and at the head of the *élite* of its troops again and again issued forth into the open country, ran all over Piedmont, and by a thousand devices hindered

the operations of the siege. The siege was however brought closer and closer, and the defenders' energies were tasked to the utmost by the dangers and sufferings to which they were exposed. The final day seemed even to have come, and they were only saved by one of those exploits that bear the stamp of the heroism of antiquity. The French had stealthily gained the moat, and overpowered the guard of a sally-port, which, through a subterranean gallery, led them to the square of the citadel; they were only parted from it by a door, which already yielded to the strokes of their axes; the gallery was mined under their feet, but no train was laid to the powder; two artillerymen were on duty on the spot, one of them, by name Pietro Micca, of Andorno, near Biella, aware of the urgency of the moment, determined by his certain death, in cold blood, to defeat the purpose of the enemy. He dismissed his companion; through him recommended his wife and children to the bounty of the governor of the place, and, waiting till he heard the last footfall of the retreating man, he fired the mine with his own hand; together with three companies of French grenadiers, and one of their batteries, Micca was blown into the air, but the citadel and city were preserved (August 25th).*

Only a few days later, on the night of the 3rd to the 4th of September, a beacon from Superga announced that rescue was at hand. The two Savoy princes surveyed from those summits the position of

* Solar de la Marguerite, Siége de Turin, p. 111.

the enemy's camp, and resolved to attack it. They were inferior in numbers, but the French marshals, La Feuillade and Marsin, in opposition to the wiser counsels of the Duke of Orléans, the nominal commander-in-chief, who wished to meet the Savoyards on the open plain, insisted on giving battle behind their entrenchments round the besieged town. They thus offered a line fifteen miles in length to their assailants, who broke through it (September 7th), and with the timely aid of the garrison, under the Marquis of Caraglio and of the Austrian, Daun, achieved the destruction of the French army. Its relics withdrew in awful disorder towards Pinerolo, pursued not only by the victorious troops but also by the peasantry, who, besides attachment to their princes, obeyed in this instance an instinct of revenge against the French, who had barbarously used them. Out of 50,000 or 60,000 men who had sat down before Turin in March, hardly 20,000 recrossed the Alps in September. Three of the French generals lay dead on the field; Marsin, mortally wounded, expired on the following day; the Duke of Orléans himself was disabled by wounds; six thousand prisoners were marched through the streets of the liberated town, and fifty-five French banners graced the main altar of its cathedral.

In the following year, Victor and Eugene, greatly against their inclination, were induced by the allies to undertake an expedition against Toulon, which, like all previous invasions of Provence, led to utter discomfiture, and the loss of 10,000 combatants (1707,

July 1st to September 1st). An attack upon Briançon, equally undertaken against the sound judgment of the Duke of Savoy, in 1708, led to no better results; but Savoy won back Exilles, Perosa, Fenestrelles, and, one by one, all the redoubts with which during those wars the Alps were bristling. The war slackened in Italy, and the fates of Europe were decided in the Netherlands, where the terrible losses of Oudenarde (1708), and Malplaquet (1709), had well-nigh brought France to extremities. The allies, elated by success, would have imposed unacceptable terms upon Louis XIV., but he resisted, and the fortunes of France were partly restored by Vendôme and Villars. In the meanwhile the Emperor Joseph died (April 17th, 1711), and was succeeded by his brother, Charles VI., the same who had been designated by Leopold for the Spanish succession, and who now reproduced his claims to it. The other members of the Great Alliance, who had been hitherto so greatly alarmed by the prospect of a combination of the two monarchies of Spain and France, were now no less terrified at the idea of a reunion of Spain and Germany under one crown. This inclined them to offer peace to Louis XIV. on more equitable conditions, and they signed with him the Treaty of Utrecht, on the 31st of March, 1713. The Emperor continued the war alone for a year, but was at last compelled to accede to the Utrecht treaty at Rastadt (March 6th, 1714).

By the Peace of Utrecht, France renounced to Savoy all the invaded territories, and, besides, the valleys of

Oulx, Cesanne, Bardonneche, and Castel Delfino, ancient possessions of Dauphiny, east of the Alps, from the twelfth century, whilst, for her own part, Savoy gave up the western valley of Barcellonette; thus the limits between the two nations (with the exception of Savoy and Nice) were at last fixed on the mountain-crest, at "the parting of the waters."

By virtue of an agreement signed with Austria, November 8th, 1703, the whole of Montferrat, as well as Alessandria, Valenza, Lomellina, and Val Sesia, dependencies of the duchy of Milan, and the imperial fiefs in the Langhe (province of Alba), were ceded to Savoy. Vigevano, which was equally promised at that period, was unjustly withheld at the peace. By the same Treaty of Utrecht Spain was finally secured to Philip V.

Anne of England, from personal regard to Victor Amadeus, for some time entertained very sanguine hopes of negotiating in his favour an exchange of his hereditary dominions against Spain and the Indies; and she had even induced France and Austria to fall in with her views.* But events, as we have seen, brought about a reaction in favour of Louis XIV. and Philip V., and all that could be obtained for Savoy was the reversion of the Spanish crown, in the event of the extinction of the Bourbon line.

Victor was not, however, defrauded of his long-coveted royal title.

* Sclopis, Relazioni tra la Dinastia di Savoia e il Governo Britannico, p. 41, 154.

Austria retained the ancient domains of the Spanish monarchy in Italy, Naples, Sardinia, and Milan; but the royal crown of Sicily was awarded to the Duke of Savoy, also with reversion to Spain, in the eventual cessation of the Savoy line.

The diadem however had hardly been laid on the brow of Victor Amadeus and of Anne of Orléans, his wife, at Palermo (December 21st, 1713), when, by the death of his daughter, the Queen of Spain, and by the second marriage of Philip with Elizabeth Farnese, the new acquisition of Savoy and the quiet of Europe were exposed to unexpected dangers.

The new Spanish Queen was under the influence of a man of a low birth, but of bold, scheming mind, who, by her favour, rose to the dignity of a Cardinal, and to the supreme management of affairs at Madrid. This man, the celebrated Alberoni, anxious to signalize his ministry by great exploits, attempted to win back to Spain all that had been ceded at Utrecht, at least in Italy.

Besides the restoration of the Spanish Monarchy to its former splendour, it would seem,* that Alberoni was influenced by a desire to secure the independence of Italy, and hoped to induce Victor Amadeus, who was already partly disgusted with his new realm, and justly apprehensive of some evil designs of the allies to his detriment—to renounce Sicily to Spain, and, by the help of this power, to drive the Austrians alto-

* Coxe, House of Austria, vol. ii. chap. 27, 28.—Lord John Russell's Europe from the Peace of Utrecht, ii. 112.

gether out of Italy, and secure Lombardy for himself. As the independence of the north would thus be provided for, the Cardinal equally hoped to be able to emancipate the south by erecting Naples and Sicily into an independent sovereignty, to be given as an appanage to one of the younger sons of Philip V. Alberoni's Italian instinct made him look with dismay on the strong position the German House of Austria had taken in the Italian peninsula, and the blow was mainly directed against that power. He began, nevertheless, by an attack on the two islands; and as Victor Amadeus did not fall in with his views with sufficient readiness, Alberoni ordered the occupation of Sicily soon after that of Sardinia (1717).

The times however were unfavourable to changes; and Alberoni, as a common peace-breaker, became the object of universal abhorrence, which survived him, and which is at this present day shared by his own countrymen, no less by the French, Austrians, and Spaniards.

All the great monarchs, no less than their people, were bent on the preservation of peace at any cost. A "Quadruple Alliance" was entered into, in London (August 2nd, 1718), by France, England, and Holland, which was joined by the Emperor, and the object of which was to thwart the Cardinal's projects. To these allied powers Victor Amadeus preferred his complaints for the loss of his new kingdom; but Queen Anne was no more, and Victor of Savoy had lost in her his strongest support, as a dynasty and a party inimical to his interests were now in power.

It appears by no means improbable that the members of the Alliance had contemplated his spoliation at a period anterior to Alberoni's move, as they were bent on satisfying the Emperor on any terms, and this monarch would not put up with the dismemberment of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. It is not unlikely, also, that they wished to show displeasure towards Victor Amadeus for his having, though it was only for one moment, listened to Alberoni's proposals; or perhaps they believed, or chose to believe, him deeper in the Cardinal's intrigues than would have beseemed an injured party.

However this may be, his interests, and those of Italy, were sacrificed, as the cause of the weak always will be by the powerful.

On the 8th of November, 1718, in London, Victor Amadeus had to accept Sardinia, with the royal title; a poor return for his renunciation of Sicily, which, together with Naples, fell under subjection to Austria.

CHAPTER III.

THE DISCIPLINE OF PIEDMONT.

By the final arrangements of the Quadruple Alliance of 1720, all Italy was delivered over to Austria. The kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the duchy of Milan —to which, by forfeiture of the last Gonzaga, the duchy of Mantua was now added—had passed from the hands of the feeble and distant Spanish monarchs into those of the adjoining rulers of the puissant German Empire. The Medici of Tuscany and the Farnese of Parma were on the eve of extinction; and although the ambitious Elizabeth Farnese had succeeded in securing the inheritance both of her own and of the Tuscan House for her son, Don Carlos,—although Parma and Piacenza had been a dependency on the Roman See since Julius II.; and Tuscany ranked amongst independent States,—yet the Emperors had been, during the recent vicissitudes, enabled to reassert their titles of suzerainty over both; and it would have been difficult, even for a Spanish Infante, to uphold an independent rank in opposition to all the forces of Ger-

many. No crowned head, in the early part of the eighteenth century, could aspire to any greater dignity than that of a mere Austrian lieutenancy; the Pope himself, worsted in a hundred encounters, had everywhere to yield the ground before Imperial arrogance; and the maritime republics, Venice and Genoa, reaped now, in sorrow and humiliation, the fruit of the pusillanimous neutrality which they had followed with sufficient consistency from the very outbreak of the wars, and which, without saving them from outrage and injury, deprived them of a voice in the councils of the great arbiters of European destinies.

Beyond the Alps no true Italian should, at any time, look for a rescue; but at the period now referred to it was impossible, even for the most sanguine, to cherish the faintest illusion. France lay in utter exhaustion, the result of the mad wars of Louis XIV., and of the troubles arising from the minority of his successor. Spain had now visibly sunk to a second-rate power; and the great maritime communities of Holland and England estranged themselves from a country which blindness to their own interest had sacrificed. All Italy was thoroughly and hopelessly prostrated; Piedmont alone stood still upright.

Safe—for the first time since the days of Amadeus VIII.—completely and definitively safe on the side of France, the representative of the House of Savoy, the new King of Sardinia, his back securely resting against the Alps, now faced his only remaining adversary, his old hereditary enemy of the House of Hapsburg.

From him, no less than from France, his skill and valour had contrived, during the late turmoils, to snatch a part of the spoils of victory; a trifling share truly for a descendant of Princes who had, for the last three centuries, aspired to the crown of the whole of North Italy; but times had greatly changed since the era of Amadeus VI. and VIII., and Victor had recognized the wisdom of that celebrated saying—if indeed it did not originate with himself at this very emergency*—"that Lombardy was an artichoke which the House of Savoy was to have leaf by leaf."

The States of Europe had found their level at Utrecht, and Piedmont had taken its place amongst them. So long as Austria, and after her France, aspired to universal monarchy, the little intermediate State, destined by nature perpetually to vibrate between the two giant powers, either of which, often both of which, threatened it with instant annihilation, was moreover flung now against the one, now against the other, by the rashness of its rulers, who acted as if bent on dashing their own heads against stone walls. The peculiar difficulty and precariousness of their position drove these Princes to the most desperate shifts of policy, for "geography hardly allowed them to behave like honest men."†, But the great danger was at last over. Piedmont had come out of that 140 years' war with renovated vitality. Every one of the great Powers, which had repeatedly trodden it down, and

* Costa de Beauregard, Maison de Savoie, iii. 99.

† Prince de Ligne, Mélanges, v. 29.

found it incompressible, was equally interested in its preservation. That position, which had hitherto been the weakness of Piedmont, became now its strength.

Piedmont however did not exclusively or entirely rely for safety on mere geographical advantages. It was a State that stood upright by its own virtue, that had powers of action and reaction; it was the only State in Italy that showed fight. Tuscany, Parma, and Mantua had long since resigned themselves to a subordinate, Venice and Genoa to a neutral part. The largest and most compact division of the country, Naples, could at any time—as events had shown in 1707—be overrun by a mere handful of men, almost without striking a blow; and its frequent riots, aimless and senseless, blew over, of themselves, without pressure from without.

The reasons of this difference are obvious. All Italians have, at all times, equally shown great and strong love of country, but they hardly ever knew what or where their country was. Patriotism was limited to the walls of a town, often to a faction within those walls. The units into which the country had been parcelled in the Middle Ages, clustered together here and there under the sceptre of Visconti and Medici, etc. But the duchies of Milan or Tuscany were hardly the result of the valour or wisdom of their founders; they owed their origin or their increment to extraneous influences, and the usurpers, no less than their successors, with hardly an exception, were as remarkable for cowardice and imbecility as for

loathsome profligacy and villany. They were strong enough to break the individuality of the free communities which came under their sway, but not to give unity and consistency to the State they built on their ruins. Even Venetian patriotism did not extend far beyond the Lagoons; the provinces of the mainland only bore the rule of St. Mark as the least of evils; it was not by their aid, but by that of Slavonian mercenaries, that the land-battles of the republic were fought. As to Milan or Naples, no enthusiasm could be expected from them in behalf of a fatherland which had its head at Madrid or Vienna. In Piedmont, on the contrary, as in the great monarchies of France or England, nationality had in the dynasty a rallying point, a banner, a visible symbol of its own. At Turin, at Cuneo, at Asti, the people had acknowledged the same rulers for centuries; for the last three hundred years the Savoy Princes had settled amongst them, had become part of them. Piedmontese devotion, even at the present day, appears as the offspring of time and habit. It is strongest in old Piedmont; it loses its intensity as we proceed to the east of the Sesia and Bormida; it almost ceases altogether south of the Apennines. The soil is most probably the same everywhere; but loyalty is a plant of slow growth; its rise aboveground is proportionate to the depth of the root.

On the other hand, the affection of the subject was in this State fully reciprocated by the sovereign. However unjust or false to their neighbours, however

ready to make even national feeling a stepping-stone to their ambition, there is no doubt that the Princes of Savoy were, if not Italians, at least Piedmontese at heart. Even in the worst devices of their crooked policy, they could always say with Emanuel Philibert, that, "after all, everything was intended and done for the people's own sake." It was a beautiful reproach conveyed against the memory of Victor Amadeus I. by his courtiers, "that he was as niggardly to his servants as he was lavish to his people." Nothing, as we have seen, would satisfy Charles Emanuel II. but he must gather the whole population of Turin round his death-bed, that he might expire "at home" amongst them. Victor Amadeus emptied his purse amongst the wretched peasantry driven from their roofs by the French, in 1691, and broke the collar of the Order of the Annonciade into fragments, which he distributed amongst them; and, as he descried from afar the flames which consumed his villa at Rivoli, he exclaimed, "Would to Heaven I saw all my castles in ashes, so the enemy would only spare the huts of the poor!"

Truly this Prince found the Piedmontese such as they had been described to him at the outset of his career, when one of his nobles dissuaded him from sailing for his projected marriage in Portugal, by saying with great ingenuousness: "What new subjects would you be looking for? such *good-natured* people as we are" (the original phrase was not choice, but expressive) "you will find in no part of the world."*

* Balbo, Storia d'Italia, p. 298.

Compelled to league with monarchs who deceived and deserted them, to take the field with troops who treated them with disrespect, the Princes of Savoy leant on their people as their best and only permanent support. The assertion of Charles Emanuel I. that "he could rely on as many soldiers as he numbered subjects," was no idle vaunt; and Victor Amadeus II. was also borne out by events in his emphatic answer to the agents of Louis XIV., who, in 1691, urged the deplorable state of his army as an argument against all his hopes of further resistance: "I shall stamp with my foot on the ground of my country, and it will yield me soldiers on every side." Three regiments of foot which had been lent to Louis before the declaration of war at that epoch, spurned all entreaties and bribes of the King, who wished to retain them under his banners, and every man obeyed his master's call, notwithstanding the hardships they had to endure on their march. In the same manner the troops who were treacherously disarmed by Vendôme, near Mantua, in 1702, and incorporated with various French regiments, made their escape one by one, in despite of the danger incurred by their breach of discipline, and the Duke of Savoy was soon able to muster them against the enemy, who, by an unworthy device, had hoped to use them to his injury.

It is, however, important to observe that the attachment and devotion of the Piedmontese, no less than their courage and steadiness in the field, were by no means innate virtues, but, on the contrary, they were

gradually developed during that long period of probation of which we have rapidly sketched the outlines in the foregoing chapter, and had only reached their climax at the final campaign under the walls of the capital. The Piedmontese people are not—any more than other Italians—born, but must needs be made, soldiers. The wisdom and firmness of Emanuel Philibert had scarcely sufficient time to heal the wounds of the country, and to establish those rules of discipline which were to subdue, to level, no less than regenerate the people. Charles Emanuel I. found the reforms incomplete, and was too hasty and violent to follow it up. He went to work with an imperfect instrument, and, no wonder, it broke in his hands. With all his brilliant talents and unwearied exertions, there is no doubt that his first ten years' campaign was but a series of sorrowful defeats. Montmeillan, Exilles, Pinerolo, all his forts fell one by one, and, too often, less by the valour of the assailants than by the cowardice or treachery of the defenders. The Piedmontese were, as yet, indifferent soldiers. They were twice beaten in pitched battles beyond the Alps; the escalade of Geneva was an egregious failure; in Italy, in the wars of Montferrat, they saved little more than their honour; and in his last contest with France, Charles Emanuel was only able to guard the Alps in one instance, but he allowed Richelieu to break through them at the Barricades of Susa, and all his efforts to recover from that blow proved unavailing.

The military training of the nation suffered unavoid-

able interruption during the dissensions which agitated the regency of Christina of France; for, on the one hand, the courtly factions which contended for the supreme power, sought their strength in the armies of foreign rulers; and these latter were only bent on turning the disorders of Savoy to their own advantage, and showed no other anxiety than to snatch the sword from the hands of the Piedmontese, so as to bring all the military resources of the country under their own control.

The wars of Victor Amadeus II. gave at first full evidence of this decline of warlike spirit amongst the people. Staffarda and Marsaglia were grievous losses; Luzzara a drawn game. The soldiers certainly held their ground with credit; but Savoy fought either France or Spain at a great disadvantage, not merely because numerically the odds were against her, but because her princes had no means adequate to the maintenance of large standing armies; they had, in most instances, to gather them together at a moment's notice, and their raw recruits—as it happened at Staffarda—could be no match for the veterans which the great powers kept in high training by the constant practice of open warfare.

We have seen that Victor Amadeus II. had only 4000 men under his colours at the outbreak of hostilities with France, in 1702. The regular army of the State, in time of peace, did not for a long time ever exceed that number; but stress of war compelled both that Prince, and Charles Emanuel I. before him, to

swell the ranks to 30,000, and even 35,000, of their own combatants. The endeavours of these two princes seemed always to turn upon two points,—how they could make a soldier out of every man born under their dominion, and how they could dispense with the services of any but the native soldiery. Their first care, as soon as they were allowed to breathe, was to dismiss and disband foreign hirelings and to improve home recruitment. Like the Prussian kings after them, the Savoy princes were by choice and from necessity drill sergeants: they came, in time, to be little else.

All the writers who have busied themselves with the history of Savoy* are struck by the change wrought upon the people by the long season of trial ushered in by Charles Emanuel I. in 1588, and ending with the success of Victor Amadeus II. in 1706.

The Piedmontese character was then formed. The people were in every respect such as their rulers would have them. Placed on the extreme borders of two distinct and incompatible races, the Savoyards and Piedmontese never decidedly belonged to either of them. They were always something better—and something worse—than either French or Italians. It would be vain to look amongst them for that wild and wayward gallantry which gave lustre to the chivalry of the first-named nation; vain also to seek for that riotous but laborious energy which called forth such an exuberance of life in the Lombard and Tuscan cities; nor do we even meet in the annals of this Alpine people

* Costa, Maison de Savoie, ii. 230.

with frequent instances of that sturdy love of freedom which gave a few ill-armed Swiss or Tyrolese villagers all the firmness of a rock against the ocean might of whole Imperial hosts.

The Piedmontese were rather distinguished by negative qualities. They were always an army rather than a nation; less a community than a garrison; and, though unquestionably brave, still military rather than warlike. But little of the dashing, chivalrous spirit of a true martial race was discernible here. Like the English, whom, by their earnestness and soberness, they somewhat resemble, they are led by a sense of duty rather than by love of glory. After the first all but insane experiments, of which the last Chapter contains a narrative, they were hardly ever called upon to do war on their own account, hardly expected to engage single-handed, either for offensive or defensive purposes; they were, in consequence, gradually fitted for a subordinate, auxiliary service. Anything like vastness of conception, anything like transcendent devotion, was seldom exacted on their part; but rare appeals were made to their dearest, holiest feelings. Their leaders found it convenient to use them for plodding, plausible, positive work. The severe chastisements with which the headlong daring of Charles Emanuel I. was repeatedly visited, called forth all the native wariness of his successors. Henceforth they knew how and when to commit themselves: their most selfish or most generous feelings were equally under control. Victor Amadeus II., who may, in this

respect, be taken as the most perfect specimen of his race, deemed himself perfectly justified in treating apart from his allies with the foe he was combating; in dealing with a friend as if in expectation that he would become an enemy, and using toward an adversary the regard due to one who might eventually turn out a confederate. Matters went so far that Savoy made, as we shall see, her alliance conditional upon her own convenience; she stipulated, that is, for express permission to break from her engagements whenever she might hope to obtain better terms from the adverse party.

Such looseness of principle and conduct on the part of the rulers could not be without influence on the morals of the people. Sluggish, impassive warriors, all intent upon watching the great game of European politics, unmoved till they could see what the chances of war would turn up for themselves, the Princes of Savoy bade their people lie still, like a sword in its sheath, only to be drawn and thrown into the scales when the force of circumstances should give it a weight not its own.

A people that was constantly to be put to such uses could not, it is clear, be plied with those great movers of human action, love or hatred; since the position of the present moment might be instantly reversed, and the allies of today become the enemies of tomorrow. The very elation of success or the courage of despair would be equally visited with the frown of a cold calculator, into whose plans defeat might enter as well

as victory; whose elevation must, at any rate, be unobtrusive; who would, in most instances, rather trust to timely compromise than to strenuous, hopeless resistance.

There is however, we have before hinted, something very like civilization in this direct, soldierly training. The dressing up and drilling of mere boors, the habits imparted to them of order, cleanliness, and punctuality, if carried on to a great extent amongst a whole population, will infallibly be attended with signal social and moral results. Those men of the Alps and Apennines were by disposition a hardy, frugal, long-enduring race. Much of their native ardour might be put down by a narrow, martinet discipline; but from the very uniformity a new character arose,—the regiment became the soldier's country, in the same measure as the country was organized into a vast regiment. Military devotion superseded local patriotism: loyalty to a leader supplied the want of the more natural ties of blood and language; and the soldiers of Savoy hardly ever had any other leader than their Prince, hardly could have wished for a better one; for, with rare exceptions, those Princes were not only good generals and soldiers, but, once in the field, they did their duty as such. Whatever political considerations might sway their councils, none ever interfered with their military operations. When Victor Amadeus II. found it convenient to be beaten he absented himself from the field. For the rest, care was taken that his loss should bring no stain upon the shield of Savoy, for,

even if bent upon selling himself to the highest bidder, he could perceive that his services would be valued according to their efficiency, and that even an enemy would grant the best terms to the warrior that contrived most soundly to beat him.

Even loyalty, in such a singular community, must needs be, if not lukewarm, at least undemonstrative; the Princes of Savoy must needs have a horror of enthusiasm, albeit in their own cause; however deeply moved, for instance, Charles Emanuel I. might be, by the terrible outbreak of popular fury, arising from a report of his assassination by the French, in 1611, he could not dismiss the thought that he was on terms of the greatest intimacy with those same French in the previous year, and that another year would not elapse ere he would have to sue for their amity and support in his designs against Montferrat.

Loyalty however existed in Piedmont, even if it was not noisy or obtrusive. Strong appeals were made to it occasionally, and loud and effectual was the answer given in every instance. The dignified attitude of the people at the time of the disputed regency of Christina of France deserves the highest encomiums. Every man in Piedmont at that juncture took the part which his conscience taught him would best promote the interests of the dynasty and vindicate the laws of the State: every man was equally anxious to foil the attempts of foreign Powers to profit by their intestine divisions, and Richelieu was warned by his agent, Cardinal La Valette, that no Piedmontese could, by

any offer of gold, honours, or dignities, be bribed into compliance with his treasonable designs against their country.*

The Piedmontese had learnt to value their national existence above all worldly advantages, and must not shrink from the sacrifices which, from their smallness of territory and the peculiarity of their position, that most inestimable of all blessings necessarily entailed upon them.

Military service could not but prove onerous amongst a peasantry not naturally adventurous or combative; and the necessity for a disproportionate war establishment caused a constant drain on the people's resources; nay, so heavily did the taxes weigh upon the people, that it is shown, by official documents, that, during the wars of Charles Emanuel I., "many landowners were compelled to give up their property, as the burdens upon it too greatly exceeded the income."† But they felt that, lying as they did in the way of all European armies, they must, under any circumstances, submit to be trampled upon, and that their best safeguard lay in the assumption of a firm, imposing attitude. They therefore willingly lent their co-operation to the Princes who contrived to indemnify them for their losses by levying a toll on those who trampled upon them, by laying hold of the spoils of such as fainted in the march or were worsted in the fight. Their chieftains, for the most part, knew how to pro-

* Sclopis, Documenti sul Principe Tommaso, pp. 23, 24.

† Cibrario, Istituzioni, pp. 297, 319.

fess the strongest zeal for peace and to maintain the air of being dragged into hostilities in their own despite. We have seen how perfectly in the dark the people were left as to the intrigues by which Victor Amadeus II. called down upon them, as well as upon himself, the vengeance of Louis XIV., in 1702. They knew, and they would believe, nothing but what fell under their senses, viz. the disarmament of their soldiers at Mantua, which they looked upon as an unprovoked, wanton outrage. The enthusiasm of the Piedmontese was commensurate with their indignation, nor did it ever belie itself during that long series of calamities which only ended with the triumph at Turin. It would not indeed have been easy, even for a far less ingenuous people, to admit the guilt of a sovereign who, like most Princes of his House, was always, throughout that campaign and siege, at the post of honour, and who, being requested by the French to point out to them his head-quarters, that he might be spared by their bombs, answered, that "he had no fixed abode, but was always to be found where need and danger called him."

Thus it happened in all other occurrences. The Prince never asked for sacrifices in which he was not willing to bear a part; never wished them to incur a danger which he did not share with them; and the people could not for very shame be behindhand with him. Charles Emanuel I., in 1616, called upon his people to "stand up for the defence of the State, as well as for the property and the ANCIENT FREEDOM

of his beloved subjects, for which both himself and the Princes, his sons, were compelled to gird on a sword, to march to the frontier, and to expose their own lives.'* For a plainly defensive warfare the most ample supplies were sure to be cheerfully yielded; and so long as temporary sufferings were recompensed by ultimate success, it probably would not, in the end, signify much whether the Sovereign had taken the field on warrantable grounds or was engaged in a quarrel of his own seeking.

Conspiracy or rebellion never, therefore, could be rife in this community, and seldom even murmur or discontent. The disturbances, to which we must now turn our attention, are of a nature to illustrate the relations between the Savoy Princes and their people, and we give them as exceptions which prove the correctness of our assertions.

From 1679 to 1699 there were riots in Mondovì. That province had been for many years exempt from taxation by the terms of its act of spontaneous dedition in 1347. The necessities of the public treasury however weighed hard upon the State, and, from the time of Emanuel Philibert, efforts had been made to equalize the public burdens, and distribute them without distinction of ranks, classes, or localities. The clergy of Mondovì had attempted resistance in 1674,† and, after vain appeals to the Pope, they had roused the passions of the multitude by spreading a report that the Government harboured the intention of levying the

* Edict of September 3, 1619. † Cibrario, Cronologia, p. 83.

salt duty on the province. This tax, the most obnoxious to the lower classes throughout Piedmont, was particularly dreaded in Mondovì, where the peasantry took advantage of their exemption and of their situation on the frontier of Genoa to carry on an extensive contraband trade, to the great detriment of the ducal revenue.

Tumults arose in 1679, on the occasion of some dispute between the municipal authorities and one of the feudal lords, the Count of Villanova, in which it seemed as if the Government countenanced the pretensions of this nobleman, who resisted taxation on the ground of aristocratic privilege; and the whole population rose in arms.

The supreme power was at this time in the hands of the Regent, Joan Baptiste, who contributed to aggravate the evil by irresolute and yet vexatious measures and by the character of the officers charged with their execution. A large force (two thousand foot and five hundred horse) was sent into the province, under Don Gabriel, of Savoy, one of the natural sons of Charles Emanuel I. The towns in the plain submitted, but the mountaineers of the upper districts of Montaldo, Frabosa, Monastero, etc., the most fierce as well as the most intrepid race in all Piedmont, offered a very obstinate resistance, and Montaldo especially was sooner destroyed than subdued.

The Government too soon flattered themselves that order was restored; the ducal forces were partly withdrawn, and the long-dreaded duty on salt was actually imposed.

War broke out anew. A fort which had been built as a check on the rebels at Vico was stormed and demolished; a body of 350 men, with whom the governor of the province marched against that place, were surrounded by the insurgents and cut to pieces. It was in vain that Don Gabriel once more cleared the lower grounds with his soldiery, and even reduced one by one the most refractory villages on the mountains; the wild population of these places fell back on their inaccessible Apennine fastnesses, where, aided by their confederates of the adjoining Genoese territory, they kept up a party warfare which was marked by deeds of ferocity on either side. The unpopularity of the salt-tax not only drove many of the inhabitants of the plain to join the outlaws on the hills, but it also led to fresh outbreaks, in 1682, which spread to the neighbouring districts of Ceva and the Langhe.

Two years later, however, Victor Amadeus II. took the government into his own hands, and his first anxiety was to extinguish a spark which threatened a general conflagration. He marched into Mondovì with a large body of troops, and, both by gentle and by cogent means, he restored the country to its wonted calmness; but the sore subject of the salt-tax was dropped.

After the Peace of Ryswick, in 1698, Victor Amadeus himself, profiting by the repose that short respite afforded, and anxious to organize his State on the principles of an equal, uniform policy, was tempted to reimpose the odious tax on the stubborn Mondovites,

and a new revolt was the consequence. But the Duke was resolved that the experiment should be final and decisive. He invaded Mondovì with an irresistible army, of which he gave the command to Des Hayes. Fire and the sword consumed the bandits' nests; several scores of them suffered on the scaffold, and Victor, following the example of the Romans, who, as we have seen, pacified some of the most riotous Ligurian districts by carrying away the population into captivity to far-off lands, transported four hundred and fifty families of Mondovì into the territory of Vercelli, where he indemnified them for their losses by grants of land equal in value to those they left behind. Not a few of the most implacable rebels relieved the country by their voluntary emigration.*

And yet this ungovernable race, who deemed themselves justified in vindicating their old privileges against their lawful sovereign, and were instigated and abetted in their rebellion both by Genoa and France,† were unquestionably most loyal subjects to Savoy, and gave proofs of their devotion not only before and after, but even during their differences with the Government; they signalized themselves in the wars of Genoa, of 1671, and at the different periods of the struggle with France, especially in the defence of Cuneo, in 1691.

The same beautiful devotion to the cause of their country and of their sovereign was exhibited by another

* Botta, Storia d'Italia, v. 178, 313.

† Sismondi, Hist. des Franç. xv. 296.

tribe of the subjects of Savoy, whose vicissitudes constitute a longer and a far more affecting episode in the history of the country: we mean the Waldenses.

The Protestant people of the Pinerolo valleys enjoyed in their own districts such toleration as had been awarded to them by the Edict of Cavour, of 1561. Charles Emanuel I. displayed towards them, and towards all the Protestant subjects in his states, humane and liberal feelings, to which even the most violent partisans of the Waldenses are fain to do justice. He endeavoured to win over his subjects to Catholicism by the establishment of missions, which were crowned with eminent success, especially in Chablais and other provinces in Savoy, into which the reform had been introduced during the Swiss occupation of 1536, but where it had probably struck no very deep roots, as the Protestants numbered no more than four churches in all Chablais.* He was aided in this pious work by Francis de Sales, a man of mild and conciliating manners, no less than of great zeal and earnest convictions, who occupied the see of Geneva, or of Annecy, from 1602 to 1622.

The same means proved inefficient in the Pinerolo valleys, and for many reasons.

The district of the Waldenses, as we have seen, bordered not only on the French province of Dauphiny but also on the marquisate of Saluzzo and on the valleys of Pragelato, of Cesanne, and Oulx, which at different periods belonged to France. The disorders of

* Costa, Maison de Savoie, ii. 113, 256.

the French monarchy during the wars of the League had thrown these remote districts into utter anarchy, and we have seen that it was under the pretence of screening his own states from political no less than from religious disorders that Charles Emanuel seized upon Saluzzo, in 1588. Since that time, and after the conversion of Henry IV. and the promulgation of the Edict of Nantes, order was restored in France; but, notwithstanding the full toleration established by that edict, Catholicism became the King's and the state religion; the great Huguenot chiefs—Lesdiguières first and foremost—became converts, and Protestantism was discountenanced. In the same measure as the Reformers lost ground in France they were driven to their ancient refuge of the Pinerolo valleys, and Torre, the most important village in the valley of Lucerna, was distinguished with the proud appellation of the "Geneva of Italy."

Such a title had an ominous and an unwelcome sound in the ears of a Savoy prince, for it is impossible to deny that in the French districts of Switzerland, as well as throughout all the countries where French was spoken, religious reform had become synonymous with political rebellion, and matters of faith had but little weight with many of the people of either persuasion, and still less with their leaders. In the course of the wars consequent upon the occupation of Saluzzo, the Waldenses had, it would seem,* been too eager to welcome Lesdiguières in their valleys, in 1592, hailing

* Sismondi, Hist. des Français, xiii. 20.

him as the chief and champion of the true faith, and, falling off from allegiance to their rulers, to acknowledge the supremacy of France. That treason they had, however, expiated by appearing before their lord, after their subjugation in 1594, with halters round their necks and in the garb and bearing of suppliants.* The reconciliation was sincere and lasting, and Charles Emanuel, in repeated occurrences, assured his Protestant subjects that mere religious dissent would expose them to no evil, and that he would suffer no compulsion on conscience. Gratified by the results of his missions in Chablais, and urged on by the Pope to extend his experiments on the valleys, he not only attempted the conversion of this portion of his subjects by the same means, but he called the pastors of the Waldensian churches to a conference in Turin, with a view to bring about a compromise between the two churches. Such a step could of course lead to no results; but even then the liberal-minded prince dismissed the obdurate dissenters with the best assurances of his goodwill, and again promised to screen them from harm.†

But Charles died, and circumstances were greatly changed during the following reigns. By the terms of the Cavour Edict of 1561, the toleration of the Protestant worship was limited to the valleys of Lucerna, Angrogna, Rora, and St. Martin, and the Waldenses were bound both to tolerate the celebration of Catholic rites within their district, and to dismiss the foreign

* Bert, I Valdesi, p. 170. † Leger, Églises Vaudoises, ii. 50.

ministers, who were supposed, not perhaps very unjustly, to instigate them to rebellion. The terrible pestilence which ravaged all Northern Italy in 1631 was, however, most fatal amongst the the native pastors, or *barbe*, of the valleys, and their ranks had from sheer necessity to be filled up with French preachers from Geneva or Lausanne,* who not only brought their own language into the church and into the schools of the country, but gave, or were at least accused of giving, to a peaceful and submissive population that intolerant, insubordinate spirit which characterized their republican, Calvinistic communities.

The suppression of Protestantism in Saluzzo after its conquest by Savoy, and the rigours exercised against the Huguenots by Richelieu, had a tendency to crowd the privileged spot of the Pinerolo valleys with fugitives, and so rapidly to increase its population as to compel it to break the bonds of the Cavour decree. The boundaries assigned to them by that edict were, it appears, imperfectly traced, and gave rise to the most loose interpretation. The Waldenses not only sought for employment in the adjoining villages, but bought lands, and settled, and even ventured to perform religious service, private or public, on forbidden ground.†

Further, the Edict of Cavour took, of course, the Catholic population of the Waldensian district under its protection, and stipulated for the toleration of the

* Muston, The Israel of the Alps, p. 113.

† Bert, I Valdesi, p. 153.

Catholic clergy on the part of the Protestants. The attempt of Charles Emanuel I. to use these priests for the conversion of heretics was renewed under his successors, and both the Pope and the Piedmontese bishops were unremitting in their zeal for the propaganda. The priests and monks—chiefly Jesuits—acting under their orders, set no limits to their indiscretion and insolence. They won over a few of the most disreputable characters by bribery, by seduction, by unworthy and scandalous devices, and contrived, by fair or foul means, to induce the Government to show all favour and patronage to the orthodox, especially to the new converts, with utter disregard of, sometimes even with grievous injury to, their dissenting fellow-citizens. One of the most galling subjects of grievance to the Waldenses was the right awarded to the Catholic clergy to secure the persons of such children of the Protestants as evinced any disposition to pass over to the Church of Rome, with the avowed object of removing them from the influence of their heretic parents. This practice, doubtless originating in flagrant abuse, received the sanction of a legal enactment by Victor Amadeus I., who ordered that no child could be taken from its parents before the age of ten or twelve, whereby that well-intentioned prince seemed to countenance the impressment of children, with a view to their conversion, beyond that age.

On the other hand the Waldenses, whose slightest attempts at proselytism were punishable with death, became justly alarmed at the warfare the rival church

was empowered to wage against them, and indignant at the unfair and outrageous weapons she was allowed to employ. It was most probably a deep design of the priests to provoke them by incessant aggravation, so as to bring them into collision with the civil authorities, and enlist these latter in their quarrel, nor can it be denied that they too frequently succeeded. There were turbulent fanatics amongst the Waldenses, chiefly among the foreign ministers and other refugees, to whom the presence of the monks, and their performance of Catholic ceremonies within their own boundaries, were intolerable. As early as 1628 they had opposed, at Bobbio, in Val Lucerna, the celebration of the mass.* In March, 1653, the people of Villar-Bobbio drove the Capuchin monks from the village and burnt down their convent. The wife of the pastor, Mondet, was the instigator of the deed.†

There had been previously great exasperation on both sides, as the Government had repeatedly, but vainly, endeavoured to carry into execution an edict of Charles Emanuel I. (February 1st, 1602), by which the Waldenses were prohibited from settling on the right bank of the Pellice, at Fenile, Bibiana, Campiglione, and other villages below Lucerna. In the month of January, 1655, the Government, extremely shocked at the murder of the parish priest of Fenile, which was attributed to the Waldenses, and to the pastor, Leger,—and at some mummery, by which the populace of Torre had profaned the rites of the domi-

* Muston, pp. 109, 110. † Bert, p. 174.—Botta, iv. 356.

nant religion, on Christmas-day,—had ordered the forcible expulsion of the dissenters from the above-named villages. The ejectment had been effected with great harshness, and the houseless exiles had been exposed to manifold sufferings.

Charles Emanuel II., or rather his mother, Christina of France, reigned then at Turin; and, on the report reaching the Court that the expelled Waldenses had returned to the forbidden villages, orders were issued to carry havoc and destruction into the devoted district.

We shall not attempt a description of the horrors which left on that occurrence such an indelible stain on the shield of Savoy. They have been registered with a minute and painful diligence by Jean Leger, one of the ministers, and the great agitator of the Waldensian movement in those days, who dwelt upon the grievances of his people with something like a gloating and ferocious relish, and who, not satisfied with drawing up the most harrowing and revolting narrative of those cannibal scenes, brings up the horrid picture under our eyes by a series of vignettes, of which the repulsiveness amounts to positive obscenity.*

Neither shall we waste words in extenuation of those deeds, nor, with Botta,† impute the worst of them to the deliberate falsehood or wilful exaggeration of the same Leger, though his testimony is certainly weakened by the fierce temper he exhibits in

* Leger, Églises Vaudoises, ii. 116–130. † Botta, iv. 367.

his writings, as he did throughout his actions. We know of what excesses a wild soldiery, let loose on a defenceless population, may be capable; and the seventeenth century is particularly marked out by transcendent outrages of that nature. The massacres in the valleys are not to be supposed to bear any comparison with the bloody scenes which signalized the taking of Mantua by the Germans of Kolalto, in 1630, or the storming of Magdeburg by Tilly, in 1631; although the troops that perpetrated such atrocities were neither prompted by religious animosity nor had a band of cowled fiends, like the Pinerolo monks, with them, to rouse the worst passions in their bosoms, or to hold out heaven as a reward for the most hideous deeds.

Nor are the Piedmontese people to be exempt from blame any more than their rulers, because Christina employed Bavarian, Hungarian, Irish, and even French and Spanish troops, for the submission of the valleys. There were native soldiers in sufficient number in those disgraceful affrays, and the commanders, the Marquis of Pianezza, Rorengo of Lucerna, and others, were Piedmontese; and it cannot be proved, even by Botta, that they, in all instances, exerted themselves to allay the fury of their followers.

The hunted-down Waldenses flew to arms, and their resistance was such as might be expected of a brave people driven to despair. Led by two of their native warriors, Janavel and Jahier, and later by French and Swiss adventurers, they showed themselves ani-

mated by a spirit which appeared supernatural to their adversaries, and struck a superstitious panic amongst them. They vied with them in cruelty, unfortunately, no less than in valour, and their most zealous advocates are not unwilling to admit that their leaders slaughtered their prisoners by wholesale, as Janavel did at San Secondo, and did not spare the very lives of women and children.*

The strife and the butchery went on without intermission during the whole of the spring and summer of 1655, till the tidings of the savage deeds that were perpetrated raised a cry of horror and execration throughout Europe. The Protestants of Holland, Germany, and Switzerland strongly remonstrated with Charles Emanuel. The Protector of England, Oliver Cromwell, endeavoured, by several autograph letters, and at last by a verbal message, through Sir Samuel Morland, to intercede in behalf of his fellow-believers on the Alps, at the same time that he addressed earnest entreaties to the French Government to co-operate with him in their behalf. Sir Samuel addressed, in Turin, a Latin oration to Charles Emanuel II., which was answered by the Duke's mother.† The Court of Turin denied the charges of unnecessary severity, which had been preferred against their troops, and, for the rest, showed themselves disposed to come to such terms with their rebel-subjects as might appear equitable to their Protestant supporters.

Under the supreme arbitration of the French am-

* Muston, p. 157.—Botta, iv. 362. † Muston, p. 167.

bassador, Servient, and with the intervention of the representatives of the Protestant Powers—with the exception of Sir Samuel Morland, who had absented himself—a conference was held at Pinerolo, which ended in a convention, or "Patent of Grace" (August 18th, 1655), confirming the Waldenses in the rights and privileges awarded to them by previous edicts.

This amnesty however left ample ground for future contention. The Duke had erected a fort at Torre, against which the Waldenses protested, as being intended as a means of coercion against them; they complained also, with more justice, that its garrison, recruited amongst bandits and the scum of European armies, had become a very scourge to the district. It had been settled by a clause in the "Patent of Grace" that the Waldenses should be allowed to inhabit San Giovanni, a village with mixed population, at the entrance of the Valley of Lucerna, but on condition that no public religious service or instruction should be held there. This clause, the Waldenses thought, could never be meant to oppose private meetings, and Leger especially chose that particular spot for the discharge of his ministerial duties. The Government once more proceeded to harsh measures, and found an active instrument of its severity in the Count of Bagnolo, who was appointed to the government of the district. The turbulent Leger, with a few others, was proscribed and condemned to death by default. The exiles came back with arms in their hands. The Government sent a large force to oppose

them, and the massacres, the cruelties, as well as the deeds of heroism, on the part of the Waldenses, which had been witnessed in 1655, were reproduced in 1663. Again the Protestant Powers put forth their powerful mediation; again Cromwell's voice was heard, and this time in a more wrathful, menacing tone. The matter was again referred to French arbitration, and a new amnesty (February 3rd, 1664) brought back a few years' peace to the distracted population of the valleys. Charles Emanuel II., who had but lately emancipated himself from the influence of his mother, sent the Count of Brichanteau to the government of the province. The rule of this wise and good nobleman prevented any breach of the peace till the year 1686.*

On that year, as we have said, Victor Amadeus II. was compelled by Louis XIV. to issue a decree analogous to the one by which the French King had annulled the Edict of Nantes. Louis, who had been prevailed upon by his mistress to visit his own sins upon his Protestant subjects, who had depopulated, by his *dragonnades*, the most thriving provinces of his kingdom, would not allow Savoy to open to the French fugitives their well-known asylum on the Alps. After repeated intimations to the young Duke that he should banish all heresy from his States by the same means by which the Great Monarch had secured the triumph of orthodoxy in his own kingdom, the King, indignant at the demur of Victor Amadeus, broke out into open threats, that he would himself clear the val-

* Bert, p. 188.—Botta, iv. 367.—Cibrario, Cronologia, p. 85.

leys by his own troops, if the Piedmontese were slack in their work.* Victor deemed it expedient to comply with the King's wishes by the decree of the 31st of January, 1686, which offered the Waldenses the alternative between abjuration of their faith and death or expatriation. The Waldenses flew to arms, but the Duke was too glad to leave the most burdensome part of the execution to the French troops.† These, under the guidance of Catinat, invaded the valleys of Perosa and St. Martin, whilst Don Gabriel of Savoy assailed the valley of Lucerna. The struggle was short, but terrific. The Duke of Savoy carried on the war with reluctance, and left the brunt of it to Catinat, and to the lieutenants of this latter, Feuquières and Vieufville, who acquitted themselves of their task with consummate barbarity.‡ The Waldenses were less overwhelmed by numbers than weakened by dissensions and by a panic, which seized them on the approach of their enemies. Fourteen thousand of them laid down their arms, and were thrown into dungeons, which, we are told, less than three thousand quitted to wander forth as exiles.

They crossed Mont Cenis in the heart of winter, and reached Geneva towards the middle of December, 1686. Great were the sufferings they had to endure, both as captives and as emigrants; but there are certain proofs that the Duke of Savoy, who acted through-

* Beattie, the Waldenses, p. 106.

† Sismondi, Hist. des Français, xv. 385–395.

‡ Sismondi, xv. 395, 441.

out on compulsion, made every effort in his power to alleviate their fate.*

Removed from Geneva and from the borders of France and Savoy, the unhappy exiles found but an indifferent welcome amongst the Protestants of Switzerland and Germany,† as, for instance, the Lutherans of Würtemberg objected to their Calvinist tenets, scarcely less than their Catholic persecutors.‡ The difficulty of obtaining means of subsistence, and an unquenchable longing for their native valleys, inspired them with the almost insane project of forcing their way back to their desert homes.

Their thirty days' march through Savoy and the Alps is, unquestionably, the most epic achievement of modern times; and the narrative which has been left to us by their leader, the Pastor Arnaud, a native of Die, in Dauphiny, or by some one writing under his dictation, due allowance being made for disparity of numbers, might well surpass in interest anything we read of, either with respect to the Ten Thousand of Xenophon, or to the five hundred thousand of Napoleon.§

The Waldenses were but eight or nine hundred. They had been twice thwarted in their attempts by the Bernese Government, unwilling to commit itself to hostilities with France and Savoy, and moreover to give free scope to an enterprise which seemed

* Litta, Savoia, tav. xviii.—Botta, v. 206.

† Muston, Israel of the Alps, p. 208.

‡ Beattie, Waldenses, p. 116.

§ Arnaud, Hist. de la Rentrée des Vaudois dans leurs Vallées, etc.

fraught with certain destruction to all who engaged in it. But at last, on the 16th of August, 1689, they assembled from distant parts of Switzerland and Germany, eluding the vigilance of their hosts, and embarked at Nyon, on the Leman.

They crossed the lake with success, and landed on the opposite, or Savoy side, near Yvoire. Hence they marched across Chablais and Faucigny, and from the valley of the Arve into that of the Isère, and again into that of the Arc, always near the crest of the great mountains, over the passes of Haute-Luce, of Bonhomme, the Col d'Iseran, and the Little Mont Cenis, till they came down by Giaglione into the valley of the Dora, between Oulx and Exilles.

They had marched through Savoy as enemies, but met with little resistance, either because both the Government and the population were unprepared for their movement, or, more probably, because the Duke of Savoy was secretly willing to favour, even though afraid openly to countenance it. It must be confessed that these doubts and misgivings of Victor Amadeus caused great inconsistency in his conduct, and puzzled the officers acting under his orders.*

As soon however as the exiles touched upon French ground in the valley of Oulx, there was an end to all uncertainty. The exiles found that the report of their march had preceded them, and that a force of 2500 Frenchmen were posted on the bridge of Salabertrand, to dispute the passage of the Dora. Notwithstanding

* Botta, v. 271.

the immense disproportion of numbers (the Waldenses were but eight hundred), and the position of the French at the head of the bridge, the former cut their way through the enemy's ranks (August 24), and crossing the mountain-ridge which separates the waters of the Dora from those of the Chiusone, they descended into the Pragelato, came over the Col del Pis, and stood at last upon their own ground at Balsille, on the top of the valley of St. Martin.

This miraculous march and splendid victory had, however, by no means brought to an end the sorrows of these fugitives. For the whole of that summer and winter they had to withstand the repeated onsets of a French army, with which the Piedmontese troops, however unwillingly, were forced to co-operate: they had also to face all the horrors of famine, and the inclemencies of a severe season. Here again their historians regret to have to state that their noblest deeds of arms were often darkened by bloody executions, from which the very women did not escape, and which could not even be justified as reprisals, as the Piedmontese, in this present struggle, treated their captives with humanity.*

In the meantime the plans of Victor Amadeus were mature; war was declared against France, and the Piedmontese troops, which had shunned close encounters with their restored brethren of the valleys, now joined them in their contest against the foreign foe. The Duke of Savoy was at last able to give free vent

* Arnaud, Hist. de la Glorieuse Rentrée, etc., p. 298.

to his pent-up feelings: "You have only," he proclaimed, "one God and one Prince: serve them both according to the dictates of your conscience. Your calamities have been the work of strangers" (*d'autres ont été la cause de vos malheurs*), "but if, as your duty dictates, you expose your lives for me, I in like manner will give mine for you; and while I have a morsel of bread, you shall have your own share."

Never was nobler compact between a sovereign and his subjects more nobly maintained. The edict of reconciliation was issued on the 18th of June, 1690, and from that time Savoy had no braver or truer soldiers than the Protestants of the valleys. With the single exception of their friendly reception of Lesdiguières, in 1592, not only is there no instance in which that good people called upon foreign powers for protection against the cruelties they had to endure at the hands of their master's agents, but they always avoided mixing up political opposition with their religious differences; and the soldiers who were sent either to reinforce or to victual the fort of Mirabouc against the French, never suffered any molestation in the valleys, though their way lay through the midst of a population armed in vindication of their sacred rights against their sovereign.

Nor is it less remarkable that both the rebels of Mondovì and those of the Waldensian district—both of them with an open quarrel with the Government—not only supported the same Government against its foreign enemies, of France or Genoa, but actually

contributed with mutual zeal to each other's subjugation;* so true it was that each party, only bent on the enforcement of what they deemed their just demands, shrank from all complicity with any other opposition, which might have impaired and compromised, even though it aided, their cause.

But when at last the subject at issue between the Waldenses and their Prince was removed, when the former perceived that their ruler was also the defender of their faith, and that on the results of the war with France depended that freedom of conscience which had been lately extended to them, they set no limits to their gratitude, and stood up for their country with such valour as patriotism itself will hardly inspire, unless blended with religious enthusiasm. There is hardly an encounter, either on the Italian or French side of the Alps, and in all the ensuing wars, in which the *Barbets*, or Waldenses, do not play a prominent part. The heroic leader of the exiles, Arnaud, was raised by Victor to the rank of a colonel, and William III. of England commissioned him to raise amongst the people of the valleys a regiment who should be in the pay of England, but should serve under the Savoy standard.†

Victor Amadeus was, however, driven to a shift in his policy, in 1696, and having come to terms with Louis XIV., was compelled to sacrifice to that bigoted monarch not indeed his own subjects, but the French refugees who had settled amongst them during the

* Muston, p. 189. † Muston, p. 217.

war. Arnaud, with 3000 of his countrymen, had to quit the valleys at this juncture. The King also stipulated, at the moment that he gave up Pinerolo, as well as Perosa and Pragelato to Savoy, that Protestantism should not be tolerated in these districts, and that freedom of conscience should not extend beyond the old limits of the Waldensian valleys.

Notwithstanding this severe blow, the Waldenses seemed aware that their Prince only yielded to the sway of ineluctable circumstances, and they persevered in their allegiance; nor was the time far distant when the policy of Savoy should undergo a new modification, and the Piedmontese arms again be turned against the French. At the time of the siege of Turin, in 1706, as Victor Amadeus endeavoured by a desultory campaign in the open field to call away the besiegers from the walls of the capital, he was driven by a superior French force to run for safety to the valleys, the inhabitants of which not only aided him to repulse the enemy, but mustered in large numbers under his standard, and shared all the vicissitudes of that glorious contest. After the victory of Turin they showed a most unwearied alacrity in the pursuit and destruction of the French army, and followed their Prince into Provence and Dauphiny, calling upon the Protestants of those provinces to join them against the oppressor of their religion.*

Such deeds of heroic devotion as the Waldenses performed could not be expected of a people who did

* Sismondi, xvi. 64.

not put equal trust in the loyalty of their sovereign; and we take the constant proofs of attachment given at all times by the Waldenses to the House of Savoy as a sufficient evidence of their intimate conviction—as expressed in the Preface to their Catechism—that "their Princes were not willingly harsh to them, but had to yield to the overbearing force of foreign powers,"* and that such tolerance as was awarded to them, notwithstanding the ungenerous conditions attached to it, was a boon and a benefit only to be valued by a comparison of their own position with that of their fellow-sectarians in fickle and turbulent France, or in the lands crushed under the truculent, iron sceptre of Spain.

Nor, had they gone further, would they have found more just or generous feelings even amongst those nations and under those governments which shared their own opinions—as we have seen their own experience taught them both in Würtemberg and Brandenburg; nor is it to be supposed that they would have fared better even in England, for—to use the words of an Englishman, a Protestant, and one of their staunchest friends†—"while William III., the hero of the Revolution, was sending out subsidies and remonstrating with the Court of Turin against the inhuman treatment of its persecuted subjects, the Waldenses, he was signing those very orders by which his own subjects—the inhabitants of Glencoe—were massacred in the dead of night, their helpless wives and orphans driven to perish in the snow, their ha-

* Beattie, Waldenses, p. 211. † Beattie, p. 101.

bitations reduced to ashes, their property confiscated, and their very names pronounced as a watchword for extermination. The Court of Turin had the sanction, nay, the express command, of the Church to extirpate heresy, and in doing so believed it did God most acceptable service; but the ministers of William professed a religion which commanded them to 'abstain from persecution,' but which they determined to violate in its most fundamental principles, and by the act evinced as thorough a contempt for the Divine oracles as they had for the common dictates of humanity."

That all the Princes of Savoy without exception incurred, as we have seen Emanuel Philibert, the heavy displeasure of the Church by their leniency to their Protestant subjects, is a fact in support of which we could bring the most unanswerable documents. Suffice it that the final act by which Victor Amadeus, on the 23rd of May, 1694, not only granted the Waldenses the free exercise of their own religion, but also allowed the recantation of such as had been converted to Catholicism, either by seduction or on compulsion, called forth the most virulent protests, not so much indeed of Pope Innocent XII., who from political motives was speedily appeased, but of the Office of the Inquisition, which pronounced the dispositions of the ducal edict to be "most enormous, impious, and detestable." Victor referred the matter to the Senate of Turin, who had sufficient independence to forbid the publication of the decree of the Holy Office, under penalty of capital punishment.*

* Cibrario, Cronologia, p. 87.

This was however by no means the only point on which the House of Savoy, and especially Victor Amadeus II., had to battle with Rome.

We have seen that by the concordat of Amadeus VIII. with the bishops of his own dioceses, in 1430, and by the concessions which, after his renunciation of the pontificate, he obtained from Nicholas V. in 1451, he had secured in behalf of his son and descendants that most important privilege, that no person could be appointed to an archbishopric, bishopric, abbey, or any consistorial benefice in the States of Savoy, without the previous "intention and consent" of the sovereign. That concession, or "indult," was in later times impugned, limited, and otherwise frustrated either by the arrogant denials or by the equivocations of the Roman pontiffs, especially during the reigns of the weakest princes, or the long and stormy regencies of the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. It had however been strenuously vindicated by such sovereigns as Emanuel Philibert, Charles Emanuel, and by no one more resolutely than by the strong-willed Victor Amadeus II.* These same princes, as we have repeatedly stated, were bent upon bringing the whole authority of the State into their own hands, and upon establishing their rule upon the terms of as perfect an equality and uniformity as the slowly-receding waves of the old feudal chaos would allow. Their path was consequently crossed at every step by the ecclesiastical power, which, in Piedmont as else-

* Sclopis, Legislazione del Piemonte, p. 461.

where, constituted a State within the State, and which, whilst it had the strongest hold of all the ranks and orders in the country, was always at the beck of an irresponsible foreign potentate.

There were lands and townships, such as Feletto, Lombardore, and Montanaro, dependent on the Abbey of St. Benigno of Fruttuaria, in Canavese; Cortanze, Cortanzone, Montafia, and others belonging to the diocese of Asti, and Masserano and Crevacuore in that of Vercelli, which were looked upon as fiefs and direct dependencies on the see of Rome, but upon which the House of Savoy claimed the right of supreme jurisdiction, by virtue of the authority delegated to them by the Emperors, together with the title of imperial vicars. All these lands enjoyed the right of asylum, which they freely extended to malefactors of the worst description, and especially to smugglers, by whom the purpose of the duty on salt, upon which Savoy laid so much stress, was defeated. The smugglers and poachers of the lands of St. Benigno carried on their depredations to the very walls of Turin.*

The whole clerical body, besides, was under the protection of the royal immunity, which screened not only the church but also their own private property from taxation, and by which, it was reckoned, one-fourth at least of the real estate was unproductive to the public revenue. Another controverted point lay in the administration of vacant benefices and the management of their incomes, which from the earliest

* Botta, Storia d'Italia, vi. 209.

feudal times Savoy had claimed as an essential part of the royal prerogative, but upon which the Papal Court was perpetually attempting to trespass.*

But still greater confusion and conflict of powers arose in matters of jurisdiction, as the clergy were only amenable to their ecclesiastical tribunals, and especially to the Court of the Nuncio, which was established at Turin ever since the time that Savoy was "honoured" with the presence of a papal representative, in 1560. The arrogance of this functionary (who even in some instances played the part of a spy and traitor, joining the bishops of the State in their clandestine correspondence with powers actually at war with their sovereign,) became so intolerable that, upon the decease of Monsignor Sforza, in 1701, Victor Amadeus II. signified to the Pope that the presence of a successor to that Legate would be undesirable; and soon afterwards, for the third or fourth time within half a century, the minister of Savoy was recalled from the Court of the Vatican.†

It had also been stipulated, at the time of the establishment of the Inquisition in the State of Savoy, that a layman, a crown officer, should always sit by right amongst the members of that dread tribunal. The practice was suffered to fall into desuetude, and a return to it never failed to give rise to fresh contentions.

We are far from asserting that in all these interminable debates the Princes of Savoy were always in the right.

* Sclopis, Legislazione, p. 469. † Cibrario, Istituzioni, p. 400.

The Popes reasonably complained that the richest benefices were too often disposed of in favour of the various members of the reigning House—legitimate or otherwise—and of their minions and dependants: that Don Antonio of Savoy, a natural son of Charles Emanuel I., was possessed of five wealthy abbeys, and at his death, in 1688, Victor Amadeus II. called upon the Pope to confer those benefices—together with the rank of a superior in a nunnery*—upon his cousin, Prince Eugene; so that, in reality, the effigy of the great Imperial general, with bristling upper lip and all booted and spurred, takes its place among the sleek, shaven portraits of the Abbots of St. Michael della Chiusa. They complained that the Senate of Nice, in 1699, presumed to annul the decree of excommunication issued against the parish priest of Roccasterone; and that that of Savoy pronounced in 1701 a sentence in favour of the church of Tarentaise and in opposition to the decree of the Nuncio; finally, they complained of Victor Amadeus himself, who, provoked by the insolence of two French Carmelite monks, in 1689, forbade all religious communities in the State from obeying the orders of foreign superiors, all which were undoubtedly encroachments of the temporal upon the attributes of the spiritual power.

On the other hand, it was urged by the Court of Turin that the ecclesiastical tribunals had been the first to interfere in matters of purely temporal juris-

* Moreno, Relazioni della Corte di Savoia colla Corte di Roma, i. 726.

diction, as, for instance, in the case of Monsignor Vizia, Bishop of Vercelli, who was charged with high treason against Charles Emanuel I., in 1594, and whom the Nuncio, Acquaviva, wished to bring before his own court—an abuse of power which that irascible prince chastised by obtaining from the Pope the immediate recall of his legate; and also in the other case of the monk Giovanni di Santo Stefano, in 1648, who was sentenced to death for having practised sorcery and attempted poisoning against Charles Emanuel II., and whom the Nuncio endeavoured, though in vain, to withdraw from the capital punishment awarded to him by the ordinary magistrates.

Besides these matters of substantial interest, and in which the sovereign prerogative of the Crown was really at stake, there were other points at issue which more particularly engaged the vanity and punctiliousness of the Savoy princes.

Their ministers at Rome were in vain suing for the titles and honours of *royal* envoys, notwithstanding their old claims on the kingdom of Cyprus, and although such distinctions were freely allowed to them at the Courts of Paris, Madrid, and Vienna, probably in consideration of their frequent intermarriages with all the royal and imperial families. What was especially galling in this marked uncourteousness of Rome was, that the Venetian ambassadors obtained those very honours which were denied to the Piedmontese agents, as if it were thereby meant to countenance the pretensions of Venice on Cyprus, and thus give sen-

tence in a quarrel which Savoy was most anxious to leave open.

Victor Amadeus I. revenged himself upon the Papal Court by denying to the Cardinals the titles of *Eminence*, by which the Pope designated them, in 1630, and insisted upon addressing them by their old title "Most Illustrious," so long as his envoys were only received in Rome as *ducal* representatives. The Pope still hesitated to acknowledge the royal rank of Savoy after the accession of Victor Amadeus II. to Sicily, and subsequently to Sardinia; but at that time the war between Rome and Turin was at its height, and the mutual animosity was aggravated by the right of investiture successively claimed by Rome over both those kingdoms.

Victor Amadeus found an open quarrel between Church and State in Sicily, at the epoch of his coronation, in 1713.

There had been in that island, since 1098, a magistracy known as "Tribunal of the Monarchy," which took cognizance of ecclesiastical affairs, and enjoyed the supremacy over all other clerical jurisdiction. It was an old privilege granted by Pope Urban II. to Roger, the Norman founder of the State, in remuneration for his exertions in rescuing that island from the Saracens. In consequence of some worthless dispute, the Bishop of Lipari had, in 1711, challenged the authority of the tribunal, and had been abetted in his rebellion by several of his fellow-prelates, and by the Pontiff himself. The Pope, Clement XI., one of

the most arrogant that ever sat on the Roman chair, deemed the accession of Victor—the ruler of a comparatively small state—a fit opportunity to re-assert the rights of the Holy See alienated by his predecessor, Urban II., and declared the grant of this latter to be null and void. The parties warmed in the contest in proportion to the interest and expectation it aroused throughout Europe. The Pope laid the island under the ban of the Church: the Bulls, of which the King had forbidden the publication under the heaviest penalties, were smuggled in, concealed in fifty wine-bottles,* and clandestinely stuck to the doors of the churches. The King proscribed, imprisoned, banished, monks and nuns, priests and laymen, all who sided with the Pontiff, or obeyed his decrees of excommunication and interdict.

Victor Amadeus, however, did not carry the contest to a decisive issue. He quitted the island in September, 1714, scarcely a year after his first landing at Palermo, and left the government in the hands of Maffei, the viceroy, who held his ground against Rome with great firmness, till, in 1718, the island was invaded by the Spaniards, and finally made over to the Emperor, in 1720. This latter obtained a complete victory over the Pope, in his final arrangement of 1728.

Victor Amadeus had quarrels of his own to fight out with Rome in his hereditary States. His agents had repeatedly "violated the sanctuary,"—torn, that is,

* Botta, Storia d'Italia, vi. 216.

the ribalds and outlaws from the church-lands of St. Benigno, which gave them shelter, and proceeded with vigour and violence against such as made themselves instrumental in the publication of the Papal censure, or in the observance of the interdict. All diplomatic intercourse between Rome and Turin was at an end, since 1711. The ecclesiastical power was everywhere invaded, and nearly all the sees, both of Piedmont and Sardinia, were left vacant.

It was, nevertheless, for the interest of neither party that matters should continue in this state of utter confusion.

The Court of Rome had at all times showed great deference towards Savoy. Deprived of all real strength and independence as a temporal power, hemmed in by Spain, and subsequently by Austria, on the side of Lombardy as well as of Naples, Rome was aware of the precariousness of her position, and looked to Savoy as the only Italian state which could yet hold out a protecting hand. Schemes of an Italian League had at all times since Charles V. been formed and discussed in Rome, in all of which the Pope was always intended to be the head, Savoy and Venice the arms. Notwithstanding the personal dislike of Urban VIII. to Charles Emanuel I., that Pope was struck with admiration for the spirited resistance of the Duke against Spain, and was heard to say, in 1628, that "he alone could save Italy."* The projected league

* Cibrario, Cronologia, pp. 73, 74.—Boggio, La Chiesa e lo Stato in Piemonte, i. 101.

was again mooted at the time of Victor Amadeus I., in 1634; but it was proposed by Mazarin, whose contrivances could only have withdrawn Italy from Spanish subjection to deliver it up to French ascendency, and who therefore found no favourable hearing at the Court of Turin. After the death of Victor Amadeus, Savoy was utterly at the mercy of France, till it was restored to its importance by the successes of Victor Amadeus II., in 1696 and 1706. After the Treaties of Utrecht and of London, the omnipotence of Austria in Italy caused Clement XI. the greatest uneasiness; and, as Venice had at this time ceased from all active contest, that Pope could not but regret his dissensions with Savoy, the only Potentate he saw coming out of all those long European struggles with an increase of rank, power, and importance. No satisfactory arrangement could indeed be concluded with that hot-headed and stubborn priest during his long pontificate (1700–1721); but after a short reign of his immediate successor, a mild and amiable Pontiff, Benedict XIII. came to the throne, and the differences with Savoy were, in 1727, settled by a concordat, which admitted the justice of nearly all the demands of the King, and set at rest questions which had agitated the country for centuries. The validity of that act was indeed questioned by Clement XII., but new negotiations were commenced under the auspices of Benedict XIV., and this Pope not only confirmed the previous concordat, but signed a new

one, in 1741, in which he added ample concessions in favour of Savoy.*

For their own part, the Savoy Princes, although very jealous of their dignity and very absolute in the assertion of their prerogatives, were also anxious to avoid unnecessary collision, and to maintain the best understanding with Rome. Whilst their avowed diplomatic ministers were instructed to hold the loftiest language, and to make a great display of inflexibility of purpose, they had also secret agents, through whom they endeavoured to win over some of the most influential members of the Sacred College, so as to convey to the Pope their readiness for all reasonable concession and compromise;† for, independent of real religious tendencies, those Princes looked upon the Church as a great political engine, which they were indeed determined, at any cost, to bring into their own hands, but which they were equally anxious not to deprive of its efficiency.

The only members of the Church whom Victor Amadeus II. found unmanageable were the Jesuits, and, as he could not bend, he determined to break them.

He had found them his most virulent opponents in his controversy with the Roman See in Sicily, and had banished them from the island in 1714. At home however he had no good cause of offence, and could or would not proceed too arbitrarily and pointedly

* Cibrario, Istituzioni, p. 403.

† Botta, vi. 208, 214.—Boggio, La Chiesa e lo Stato, i. 66, 146; ii. 208, 209.

against them. But he was then giving full development to his magnificent schemes for the reconstitution of the University, and for a thorough system of popular education; and he issued an edict depriving the regular clergy of all share in public instruction. As the Jesuits were very nearly the only monks who kept schools, the blow was solely aimed at them; it threw them out of employment, and deprived them of that hold of the most ingenuous and impressionable part of the population, upon which their sway was everywhere grounded.

It was the first permanent check the Society met with in any country,* and Victor Amadeus, with no less calmness and moderation than firmness and consistency, anticipated by nearly half a century—and without the least disturbance—a revolution which the other states of Europe only achieved by violent means —by means too sure to lead to reaction.

From the year 1718 to 1730 Victor aspired to the glory of a pacific Prince, and evinced even a more uncommon genius for the arts of peace than he had exhibited in the conduct of military and diplomatic transactions. He had taken with him some distinguished men, on his return from Sicily,—Pensabene and Aguirre,—and it was mainly by their advice and with their aid, as also with that of a Piedmontese, Caissotti, that he undertook the reform of the educational institutions of the country. The Turin university owed to him a new charter, no less than the

* Voltaire, Siècle de Louis XV., p. 251.

splendid edifice in which it still resides at the present day; and he raised that institution to so high a degree of renown, that the number of its students, which was only 800 in 1720, had increased to nearly 2000 in 1730. He made it what a university ought indeed to be—the centre and rule of all the colleges and preparatory schools in the State. He established thirty-two colleges in the various provinces, and founded, in 1729, the "College of the Provinces," an exclusively lay central institution, with endowment for a hundred scholarships, to be opened, by free competition, to the most deserving pupils from the provincial colleges. He published, in 1725, his "Royal Constitutions," a code of laws by which he reorganized the statutes of Amadeus VIII., and brought order and system into the chaos of subsequent legislation. This code was republished, with modifications, in 1729, and again in 1770.

He showed himself, in every respect, an able and provident ruler; but his aim, like that of the wisest of his predecessors, was to ground the royal authority on the basis of equal rights and uniform administration. Weak tyrants "divide, that they may rule;" the Savoy Princes attained the same end by levelling and uniting.

We shall have occasion to return to the measures initiated by Victor Amadeus, when we see them attain their full growth, and show forth their good or evil effects under his successors.

The career of this Prince had hitherto been one

of almost uninterrupted success; its later years had crowned it with unprecedented prosperity. Victor was now drawing near the close of a splendid day, but that day was destined to set in sorrow and gloom. He had beaten the best generals of his age in the field; he had baffled the craftiest statesmen in the closet; but he had not learnt to subdue his wayward impulses, morbid fancies, and strong passions.

The end of his career marks perhaps the darkest page in the history of his House; it constitutes one of the most affecting episodes in the annals of royalty.

He had, in 1715, on his return from his short reign in Sicily, lost his eldest son, Victor, Prince of Piedmont, a promising youth of sixteen, the pride of his parent. Domestic bereavements crowded upon him in that period, as his daughters, the Spanish Queen and the Dauphiness, had but lately preceded the Prince into the grave. The heir of Sardinia was now the King's second son, the Duke of Aosta, afterwards Charles Emanuel III., a Prince of a less prepossessing —nay of a decidedly ungainly—exterior, and to whose mental and moral qualities the King never did justice.

The Queen, Anne of Orléans, died in 1728, and Victor Amadeus was, in the following year (August 12th), married to Anna Teresa Canali, of Cumiana, widow of Count St. Sebastiano, a lady now in her forty-fifth year, to whom Victor had, as it was said, been attached previous to her marriage in early youth. This lady he presently raised to the rank of Marchioness of Spigno.

Weariness of the world and doting fondness for this new bride prompted the King with a resolution to abdicate. He observed with great minuteness all the forms and ceremonies established by the precedents of the Emperor Charles V. and of Philip V. of Spain; he called together his ministers and the chief officers of the Crown at the Castle of Rivoli (September 3rd, 1730), and ordered the Minister Del Borgo, as Crown Notary, to read aloud an Act, drawn up by himself, by which he resigned the supreme power into the hands of his son, and reserved for himself and his now-acknowledged wife a competent pension (50,000 crowns), to enable them to live in retirement at Chambéry.

The remonstrances of his loyal subjects, the tears and supplications, offered even on his knees, by his son, had no power to remove the King from his purpose.

This sudden and strange whim of a man of the character and temper of Victor Amadeus could not fail to give rise to the most sinister surmises. War was on the point of breaking out between France and Austria, and Victor had carried on his negotiations with those Powers with his wonted dexterity. It was therefore supposed that he had pushed his schemes too far,—that he had imprudently bound himself to both parties,—that he, at last, became aware of the impossibility of meeting his conflicting engagements with honour,—and that he thus withdrew himself from the worst consequences of his duplicity.

All historians have repeatedly brought the charge

against him, yet always with a declaration that it rests on no proofs and deserves no belief.*

Domesticated with his mature Marchioness, in the old castle of Chambéry, Victor Amadeus had not, it seems, sufficient valour to face *ennui*. Against that dread enemy he had no resource but the company of his lady, and he allowed her to gain, it is said, an overweening ascendency over his enfeebled mind. Victor had suffered from an attack of apoplexy during his sojourn at Chambéry, and his mental faculties had been at least temporarily affected. The Marchioness had set her heart on being a Queen, no less than a King's consort, and she had no rest till she had stirred him up to seize again the crown he had voluntarily laid aside.

The King, his son, twice visited Victor in his retirement; and in the second interview, which took place in the summer of 1731, as Charles Emanuel accompanied his Queen, Polyxena of Hesse, to the baths of Evian, he found his father querulous, captious, and dissatisfied with the policy pursued by the new Government. Like Charles V. at Yuste, and Amadeus VIII. at Ripaille, Victor directed from Chambéry the councils of his son, and he, apparently, complained both that his instructions had not been literally followed, and that during and after his illness the communications of the ministers with him had suffered interruption.

Charles Emanuel quitted his father after three days,

* Saluces, Hist. Militaire, v. 281.

and proceeded to Evian; but he had scarcely arrived at this place when a young Savoyard priest, by name Michon, announced to him that, having been admitted to view the royal apartments at Chambéry, he had, by the sheerest chance, overheard a conversation between the old King and the Marchioness, from which it was clear that they contemplated a journey to Turin, with a view to possess themselves of the royal authority.*

Charles Emanuel lost no time in crossing the Alps, and chose the less-frequented path of the Little St. Bernard to avoid an encounter with his father on Mont Cenis. Through this latter mountain, in fact, the old King had travelled with his best speed, but he nevertheless only reached Rivoli in time to hear the cannon announcing his son's arrival at the royal palace in the capital.

Charles did not fail to pay his respects to his father on the morrow, and the meeting, it may be imagined, was sufficiently awkward and constrained. Victor however pleaded, as a reason for his return, his desire to live in a more genial climate than that of Savoy; and the young King, who had in reality advised such a removal at the time of his stay in Chambéry, showed himself satisfied with his father's resolution, however sudden, and placed the Castle of Moncalieri at Victor's disposal.

At Moncalieri the old King received the homage of his son's ministers, and gave vent in their presence to his ill-humour and dissatisfaction, and even allowed

* Costa de Beauregard, Maison de Savoie, iii. 143, 417.

himself some harsh and threatening expressions against them. The Marchioness, always by his side, gave herself queenly airs, and her demeanour to the young Queen, both at Chambéry and at her new residence, gave Charles Emanuel the first hint of his father's intentions, whilst at the same time it obliged him, were it only out of regard to the royal lady who shared his throne, to frustrate them.

On the 25th of September, 1731, in the evening, Victor Amadeus sent for the Marquis del Borgo, and bade him deliver up the deed of abdication. The minister, in the greatest perplexity, gave some evasive answer, and hastened to convey to the King the unexpected demand.

Charles Emanuel was a modest, submissive son; a man of upright, pious, generous character. His first impulse was, it seems, compliance with his father's wishes. Awakened from his sleep by Del Borgo, he summoned his ministers around him, and with them the Archbishop of Turin, Charles Arboreo of Gattinara, and other conspicuous personages. To these he communicated his father's desires, adding that he was ready for his own part to give his assent, but that he did not deem himself authorized to divest himself of the royal dignity without at least the knowledge of those in whose presence he had solemnly accepted it.

The King's lay advisers, not unmindful of Victor's threats, were terrified at the prospect of his return to power; they dared not nevertheless too openly to propose a son's rebellion against his father, and none

of them ventured to break silence. The churchman, finally, was less scrupulous.

The Archbishop, Gattinara, strongly and at full length demonstrated the unreasonableness of Victor's pretensions; when, at his persuasion, it was unanimously resolved that the tranquillity of the country did not admit of a repeal of that King's Act of Abdication. The apprehension of Victor Amadeus was next moved.

Whilst they were yet deliberating, a note was handed to the King, by which the Baron of St. Remy, Commander of the Citadel of Turin, announced that at midnight Victor had come from Moncalieri, on horseback, followed by a single aide-de-camp, and asked for admittance into the fortress. The commander had firmly but respectfully answered that the gates of the citadel could not be opened without an order from the King, whereupon the old King, in a towering passion, had turned his horse's head back to Moncalieri.

This last proof of Victor's readiness to resort to extreme measures determined the still-wavering minds in the King's Council. An order of arrest against Victor was drawn up, which Charles Emanuel signed with trembling hand, with tears in his eyes.

The Marquis of Ormea, who had been raised to power by the father, who now conducted the affairs of the son, and was more than any man implicated in these fatal differences between them, took the warrant from Charles's reluctant hands, and on the night of the 27th to the 28th of September, repaired to Moncalieri.

He had encompassed the castle with troops, summoned from the neighbourhood of the capital, and charged four colonels with the conduct of the dangerous expedition.

These walked, without resistance, into the old King's apartments, where he was found plunged in one of his fits of sound, lethargic sleep, by the side of the woman who had wrought all the misery that awaited him. The Marchioness awoke and bounded up with a scream, but she was hurried away in her scanty night attire, and conveyed first to a nunnery at Carignano, then to a state prison, at the Castle of Ceva. Not a few of her relatives and partisans were arrested in the course of the same night.

The chevalier Solaro, one of the colonels, next proceeded to possess himself of the King's sword, which lay on a table by his bedside, and at length succeeded, not without great difficulty, in breaking the King's heavy slumbers.

Victor sat up in his bed; he looked hard at the faces of his disturbers, and inquired on what errand they came: on hearing it, he burst into a paroxysm of fury; he refused to accompany them, to dress, to rise from his bed. They had to wrap him in his bedclothes, and thus to force him from the chamber.

It was a painful and an anxious moment. The soldiers had been chosen for their character of reliable steadiness and discipline, but were not proof against the passionate appeals of the man who had so often led them to victory. Murmurs were heard from the

midst of them, and a regiment of dragoons, addressed by Victor in the courtyard, gave signs of open mutiny. The Colonel, Count of Perosa, however, with great presence of mind, ordered silence, in the King's name, and under penalty of death, and drowned the old King's voice by a roll of the drums. They thus shut him up in one of the court carriages, into which he would admit no companion, and followed him, on horseback, with a large escort to the Castle of Rivoli.

Rivoli was for some time a very hard prison to Victor Amadeus, with bars at the windows, a strong guard at the doors, and unbroken silence and solitude within. His frequent fits of ungovernable rage made his keepers apprehensive that reason had forsaken him, and they treated him, though with marked respect, yet with untiring watchfulness, as a maniac. They show still—or at least they showed till lately—a marble table which the strong old man cracked with his doubled fist in one of his paroxysms of anguish and fury.* By degrees, however, loneliness and confinement did their work, and the storm of angry passions subsided into the calmness of deep-set melancholy. The rigour of his captivity slackened, though by no means the vigilance of his gaolers. He was allowed the use of books and papers, and intercourse with friends; presently, also, the soothing company of the Marchioness, the fair tempter who had wrought him all this woe. At his own request he was removed to Moncalieri, as he complained of the keen air of Rivoli;

* Costa de Beauregard, iii. 151.

but the infirmities from which he was suffering sprang from other sources than inclemency of sky or climate. His mind and body were equally shattered under the consequences of the violent scenes he had passed through. He now turned his thoughts to Heaven, and prepared for coming death. He wished for a reconciliation with his son, and, through the confessor that this latter had sent him, sued for an interview. Charles Emanuel instantly ordered his carriage to the palace door, and wished to hasten to his father's summons. But his ministers and the Queen had most probably a strong interest—and by their remonstrances they had the power—to prevent an encounter which might lead to disagreeable explanations. The carriage was countermanded. The King shed tears, but father and son never met again in this world.

Charles Emanuel never alluded to the final catastrophe of his father's life without visible signs of the most painful emotion. "A sad termination," says Balbo, "of one of the longest, greatest, happiest reigns for Piedmont; an ominous commencement of another, also long, and no less fortunate and illustrious reign!"*

Victor Amadeus, "the ablest, the most warlike, and the most ambitious monarch of his age,"† the greatest, after Emanuel Philibert, of his whole race, died at Moncalieri on the 31st of October, 1732. He was

* Balbo, Storia d'Italia, p. 326.

† Sismondi, Hist. des Franç. xvi. 373.

more than sixty-six years old. His son was aged twenty-nine at his accession.

Victor was buried at Superga, in the magnificent church built by him on the highest summit of the Turin *collina*, in fulfilment of a vow he had made, in 1706, as he stood on the spot beside Prince Eugène, and laid out the plan of operations for the rescue of his capital besieged by the French.

Superga became henceforth the burial-place for the Royal family, instead of the old Abbey of Hautecombe in Savoy. The Piedmontese rulers belonged now to Italy by their tombs no less than their cradles.

CHAPTER IV.

THE STAGNATION OF PIEDMONT.

The reign of Charles Emanuel III. embraces a period of three-and-forty years (1730–1773). That of his son and successor, Victor Amadeus III., further extends to the year 1796; its latter end coincides with the great events of the French revolution.

The wars for the succession of Poland (1733–1735) and for the Austrian succession (1740–1748) afforded full scope for the activity of Charles Emanuel at the outset of his career, but from 1748 to 1792 there was, both for Piedmont and Italy, a profound, uninterrupted peace, by far the longest the country had ever gone through.

Piedmont had, by Victor Amadeus II., been strongly organized for war. Saluzzo, Pinerolo, all the strongholds of the French east of the Alps, had at last been wrenched from them, and a long, unbroken, almost insurmountable barrier protected the land on this side. Montmeillan and the Castle of Nice had indeed fallen, and those fortresses, like Pinerolo, Casale, and Ver-

celli were, by an agreement with the great powers, never to rise from their ruins; but it had equally been stipulated that the King of Sardinia should, anywhere else, rear up such bulwarks as he might deem expedient, and Victor had not only put Exilles and Fenestrelles in the best state of defence, but had laid the foundations of a great citadel, on a mountain-rock near Susa, called La Brunetta, which was effectually to bar the main passes of Mont Cenis and Mont Genèvre.

That long line of mountain forts, closing every valley from the Maritime to the Pennine Alps, which we have designated as the "armour of Piedmont," was by this time complete, and Charles Emanuel III., not satisfied with this first line of defence, threw up vast entrenchments all along the very crest of the mountains, on those heights on which, in the preceding century, Lesdiguières, Catinat, and Prince Thomas of Carignano, had so often pitched their tents, almost above the region of the clouds.

The Transalpine possessions, the duchy of Savoy, and the county of Nice, were, indeed, open to French incursions; but, even at the time that the castles of Montmeillan and Nice were deemed impregnable, the defence of those provinces had been found impracticable. At the time that Victor Amadeus II. ventured upon hostilities with Louis XIV., both in 1690 and in 1704, he endeavoured to provide for the safety of Savoy by annexing, or "aggregating" it to the Swiss Cantons, so as to obtain an extension of their

privilege of neutrality in its behalf.* In case of a rupture with France, those provinces were almost considered as beyond the line of warlike operations, and the real military frontier was laid at the natural limit of the Alps.

On the Italian side, Savoy had not gone beyond the Sesia; but the whole of Montferrat was at length secured, and the position of Alessandria, at the confluence of the Tanaro and Bormida, offered a formidable point of resistance south of the Po.

At Milan and Mantua, no less than at Naples and in Sicily, Austria ruled uncontrolled; her imperial supremacy equally extended over Parma and Tuscany, whilst her power overawed Rome, Venice, and Genoa, and the minor states still rejoicing in the vain appellation of independent sovereignties.

The times, however, were mature for important changes. Spain, still under the influence of the ambitious Elizabeth Farnese, burnt with impatience to recover her lost ground in Italy, whilst France, sobered by the disasters of Louis XIV., was under the guidance of disinterested statesmen, who seemed only anxious to retrieve her honour in the Italian peninsula, and to mitigate the fate to which the defeats of the "Grand Monarch" had doomed it.†

In the meantime the long-contemplated extinction of the Houses of Parma and Tuscany was at hand.

Cosmo III. de' Medici had died at Florence, in

* Lamberti, Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire, etc., ii. 201.—Sclopis, Relazioni tra la Dinastia di Savoia e il Governo Britannico, p. 19.

† Flassan, Histoire de la Diplomatie Française, v. 77.

1723, and the throne was occupied by Gian-Gastone, a prince whom the shameful debaucheries of his youth had deprived of all hope of succession. Francis Farnese had also died childless at Parma, in 1727, and his brother, the obese Antonio, only survived him till 1731. The succession of those two States devolved on Don Carlos, son of Philip V. of Spain and of Elizabeth Farnese. This young prince was, in fact, acknowledged as his heir by Gian-Gastone, and both himself and a small Spanish army had been received, though not without great reluctance, in Tuscany, in December, 1731. In October of the ensuing year the Infant took possession of his States of Parma and Piacenza, evacuated by the Imperial troops, who had occupied them in his name upon the decease of the last Farnese.

Elizabeth however looked to Milan and the Two Sicilies as a fitter appanage for the younger son of a Spanish monarch, and remote events soon afforded her an opportunity of bringing to light her long-cherished designs.

Frederic Augustus of Saxony, King of Poland, died on the 1st of February, 1733. A disputed election agitated the country, whose votes were divided between the Elector of Saxony, Frederic Augustus, son of the deceased king, supported by Russia and Austria, and Stanislaus Leczinsky, who had already worn the Polish crown, and had been dethroned by Russia, but who had secured the interest of France by the marriage of his daughter with Louis XV.

Such a contest could by no direct means concern

either Piedmont or Italy; but Elizabeth of Spain was bent upon obtaining her revenge upon Austria, and Charles Emanuel of Sardinia was solicited by the two Bourbon Houses to join them in their war against the Emperor, both in Germany and Italy.

Hostilities had long been in contemplation, and, as we have seen, Victor Amadeus II. was tempted on either side,—by France, with the usual tender of the duchy of Milan, by Austria with her proffered help in the conquest of Dauphiny and Provence. Victor had listened to the proposals of both parties with great coolness and composure; he affected a wish for repose, and a leaning to a neutral policy, and instructed his diplomatists, previous to his abdication, and advised his son to his last day, to prolong negotiations and avoid coming to a conclusion.* Charles Emanuel followed the dictates of his parent with such consummate address that the duchy of Milan was all but conquered ere Austria had any intimation of his warlike preparations.

A treaty between Spain, France, and Sardinia was signed at Turin (September 26th, 1733), by which the Milanese territory was all to be given to Sardinia, whilst the Two Sicilies were to fall to Don Carlos of Spain. Sardinia declared war on the 29th of October; on the 3rd of November a French army of 40,000 men, under Marshal Villars, and 18,000 Piedmontese headed by their king, who had also the supreme command of the expedition, made their triumphant entry

* Saluces, Hist. Mil. du Piémont, v. 281.

into Milan. The castle of that city, and Pizzighettone, Novara, Tortona, etc., surrendered one after another, in the course of the winter, and the whole of the Austrian possessions in Lombardy, with the single exception of Mantua, had yielded to the efforts of the assailants.

The French marshal, Villars, an octogenarian warrior, wished to profit by so astounding a success, and close the valley of the Adige against the Austrians, ere spring allowed these to cross the Alps to the rescue.

There could be no doubt as to the military wisdom of such a movement, but Charles Emanuel was actuated by political motives. He could not forget the glaring faithlessness with which Sardinia had, in a hundred instances, been dealt with both by French and by Austrian allies. He was equally afraid of finding himself alone in Italy, at the mercy of either of them. Whilst the French and Sardinians achieved the conquest of Milan in the north, a single battle at Bitonto (May 26th, 1734) had delivered the kingdom of Naples to the Spaniards of Don Carlos, and his general, Montemar. Sicily was equally subdued before March of the following year. Had Austria been effectually shut out of Italy, Charles thought, and had France and Spain insisted on giving the Infante Milan as well as the Two Sicilies, what means had Savoy of resisting their injustice? Already Fleury, the French minister, had thrown out some hints, conveying his regret that the Treaty of Turin could not be strictly adhered to, and that Savoy ought to be satisfied with

a part, instead of the whole duchy of Milan.* Presently Montemar came back with his victorious troops from Naples, and he took no pains to conceal the intentions of Spain to achieve the conquest of the duchy, and achieve it for her own benefit.

All these reasons would only have added impulses to the energy of a truly great man. Charles Emanuel should from the very outset have maintained the *prestige* of his first rapid exploits. He should have pushed on his victories as far as circumstances allowed, regardless of consequences, and strong by the suffrage success is always sure to command. The Austrian yoke already weighed grievously upon Italy, and a bold conduct on his part might have aroused the Milanese, encouraged the Venetian government, and given rise to a national movement, which France, at this time, was not willing, Spain not able, to subdue.

But it was otherwise destined. Charles insisted upon taking a strong position in the country by the reduction of its strong places, and as he was unfortunately supported in the war-council by the young officers under Villars, he so completely outweighed the influence of the old veteran, that this latter, scouted as a dotard, withdrew from the army, and died of disappointment at Turin, on the 17th of June, 1734.

From his first occupation of the capital, Charles Emanuel had proclaimed himself Duke of Milan, and recalled the citizens (who, from fear of committing

* Costa de Beauregard, Maison de Savoie, iii. 163.

themselves with Austria, had fled at his approach), by threats of proscriptions and confiscations.*

From that very moment all was lost, and the war—which, in spite of his political blunders, he conducted with as great an ability and valour as a general may exhibit who is afraid of too complete a victory—loses its interest in our eyes.

In the spring of 1734, the Austrian general, Mercy, who had met no resistance at the foot of the Tyrolese mountains, led an army into the Lombard plain, and, crossing the Po at St. Benedetto, he entered the duchy of Parma, with a view to carry the war along the right bank of the great river into the Piedmontese territory. The King of Sardinia had been summoned to Turin by the illness of his wife, which proved fatal at no distant period. The army was now under the command of Marshal Coigny, who, against the King's orders, gave the Austrians, near Parma, a most sanguinary, yet undecisive, battle (June 29th, 1734), in which, however, the Imperial commander, Mercy, was slain, and the French and Piedmontese were left masters of the field. These latter now advanced into the Modenese territory, but were taken by surprise at Quistello, on the Secchia, by Mercy's successor, Königseck, and compelled to fall back upon Guastalla. Here another terrific conflict took place (September 19th), in which the King in person wielded the marshal's bâton, and gave proofs of that intrepidity in which so few of his race ever showed themselves defi-

* Cibrario, Cronologia, p. 98.

cient. He doffed the heavy cuirass, which was still worn by French field-officers at this time, and his "white satin waistcoat" was seen from morning till night in the thickest of the *mêlée*. His brave words and example restored the spirits of a French column which had already wavered in the fight.*

The results of this victory were as little to the advantage of the allies as the battle of Parma had been. The army, laid waste by disease, retired to winter-quarters, and at the opening of the next campaign it was joined by Montemar and the Spaniards, who, as we have said, evinced too open a disregard for the compact which had awarded Milan to Savoy as her share in the Austrian prey. Charles, seconded by the French generals, who were also hurt by the arrogance of the Spaniards, refused Montemar his co-operation, and this latter undertook, with his own unaided force, the reduction of Mantua and Mirandola, the only places that were still in the power of the Imperialists. The latter place surrendered, but a season was lost in the vain leaguer of the former.

On the 3rd of October of that same year (1735), France had signed preliminaries with Austria, which however led to a peace at Vienna, only on the 8th of November, 1738, as it was not without great reluctance that both Spain and Sardinia could be brought to accede to the terms imposed upon them.

By this treaty Stanislaus Leczinsky resigned his claims to the throne of Poland, receiving as a com-

* Costa, iii. 171.—Cibrario, Cronologia, p. 99.

pensation the duchy of Lorraine, with reversion of it to France after Stanislaus's death. In consideration of this eventual aggrandisement, France gave her acknowledgment to the "Pragmatic Sanction," an act by which the Emperor Charles VI. hoped to secure the Austrian inheritance to his daughter, Maria Theresa. The husband of this princess, Francis, Duke of Lorraine, received Tuscany in exchange for his own duchy, and took possession of his new state on the decease of Gian-Gastone, the last of the Medici, in 1737. In Italy, Don Carlos obtained Naples and Sicily; Austria added Parma and Piacenza to her former possessions of Milan and Mantua.

From the duchy of Milan, however, the towns and provinces of Novara and Tortona were detached and given to Savoy. Charles Emanuel obtained at the same juncture the sovereignty of some Imperial fiefs in the Langhe, a certain number of which had already fallen under the sceptre of his father, in 1703.

Italy had but little leisure to value the importance of the undeniable improvement which had already at this time taken place in her condition.

The Emperor Charles VI. died (October 20th, 1740), and a league was formed by Bavaria, France, and Spain, to deprive Maria Theresa of the Austrian succession. Prussia, Saxony, and Sardinia were soon numbered amongst her enemies; her hereditary domains were invaded, and the Elector of Bavaria was raised to the empire, as Charles VII. Maria Theresa fell back on the heroic loyalty of the Hungarians; she

made a temporary peace with Prussia, and obtained the support of England, by whose influence Sardinia was induced to declare in her favour.

The fear of the ascendency of the Bourbons in Italy seems to have exercised undue influence over the councils of Savoy. France acted throughout this war with an almost miraculous disinterestedness, and Spain, satisfied with the success of Don Carlos in the Two Sicilies, had no other aim than to secure such another sovereignty for the second son of Elizabeth Farnese, Don Philip, in Lombardy. Had Spain and France been successful, the gain was entirely in favour of these two infantes, whom France, through distance, and Spain, through exhaustion, would soon, in all probability, have left to their own resources.* A chance offered itself, in short, of ridding Italy of all foreigners, and of constituting Lombardy into as independent a state as Naples has been since that period. But Charles Emanuel, like all Italian statesmen of this period, was haunted by the old phantom of Spanish omnipotence, as well as by terror of the combination of the two branches of the Bourbon family. Like all the Princes of his House, he was also fatally bent rather on his own aggrandisement than on the real welfare of the country, and deemed the presence of the Austrians in Italy a political necessity, a condition of existence for himself. By a provisional convention (February 2nd, 1742), he bound himself to Austria, in opposition to Spain.

* Balbo, Storia d'Italia, p. 331.—Botta, vii. 145.

He opened the campaign (in 1742) by an attack upon the duchy of Modena, whose princes, the Este, sided with the Spaniards, and compelled the army of the latter to fall back before him. But he was suddenly called away to the defence of Savoy; Don Philip of Spain had led an army of 30,000 men across southern France, and overrun the duchy. Charles drove the Spaniards back as far as Montmeillan, but Philip, aided by the talents of Las Minas, so outmanœuvred the Piedmontese that these, after a disastrous retreat, had to relinquish that country to the discretion of the invaders, who held it till the end of the war.

The war had, as yet, hardly begun in earnest, as no declaration had taken place between France and Sardinia, though the former had allowed the Spanish army to march across her territory to the injury of the latter; and, on the other hand, the connection of Sardinia with Austria hung on a mere provisional arrangement, which Charles Emanuel, dissatisfied with the pretensions of Maria Theresa, threatened at every moment to break through. At last, through the good offices of England, a formal treaty was drawn up at Worms (September 13th, 1743), by which Savoy gave up her claims to Milan, in consideration of some districts of that duchy, of a portion of the duchy of Piacenza, and of a renunciation on the part of Austria of her imperial rights on the marquisate of Finale, in the western Riviera of Genoa.

By the terms of this treaty Savoy engaged to con-

tribute an army of 45,000 men, to whom Austria only added 30,000. England allowed Sardinia an annual subsidy of £200,000.* On the 30th of September of the same year, France declared war against Sardinia.

Relinquishing Savoy to her own fate, Charles Emanuel continued the war in the duchy of Modena, where his lieutenants had given a battle at Campo-Santo, on the Panaro (February 8th, 1743), and himself attended to the defence of his Subalpine territories.

Don Philip had, during the whole of that season, in vain endeavoured to force his way into Piedmont, and had even (October, 1743), suffered a severe repulse on the summit of the valley of Varaita, above Castel-Delfino. But he had by this time been joined by a French army under Conti, and, in the spring of 1744, their combined efforts were turned against Nice. The county was invaded, notwithstanding the brave defence of the castle of Montalbano, owing to the carelessness of the Marquis of Susa, a natural son of Victor Amadeus II., who fell a prisoner into the enemy's hands.

There was now a long conflict of opinion between the Spanish general, Las Minas, who wished to *turn* the Alps, that is, to push along the seashore into the Genoese territory, thence to cross the Apennines (over the passes that belonged to that republic above Gavi and Novi), into Piedmont, and the French commander,

* Sclopis, Relazioni tra la Dinastia di Savoia e il Governo Britannico, p. 59.

Conti, who was determined to carry the war directly across the Maritime Alps. The latter prevailed: he led his army across the Col d'Argentiera, and, by some fatal mischances, he overcame the resistance of the Barricades and Demonte, the mountain fastnesses of Val di Stura, and laid siege to Cuneo, at the entrance of that valley (September 13th, 1744).

Charles Emanuel, astonished at the rapid success by which the French had made their way through defiles deemed impregnable, hastened to arrest their further progress. He gave them battle at the Madonna dell' Olmo, near the besieged place, and suffered a defeat (September 30th). He succeeded nevertheless in throwing fresh troops and provisions into Cuneo, and, aided by the brave and devoted peasantry of those mountains, and especially by a band of the Waldenses, he so harassed his victors as to compel them, not only to raise the siege but also to begin a calamitous retreat across the mountains, which brought them back, with grievous losses, to the position they held at the opening of the campaign.

The French and Spaniards, however, repeated their attacks, with better success, in the following year (1745).

The Treaty of Worms had given serious offence to the republic of Genoa, as Maria Theresa had resigned her claims on Finale to the King of Sardinia, forgetting that that marquisate had been sold by the Emperor, her father, to the Genoese, in 1713. Charles Emanuel, besides, did not conceal his designs, not only

on Finale, but upon the whole Riviera and Genoa itself,—the old designs of his namesakes, Charles Emanuel I. and II.,—in which he was powerfully abetted by the English, either in consequence of their jealousy of all maritime power, or because even at that early period they wished to complete in Piedmont a barrier against the ambition of France, and thus remove one of the causes of European war. Both powers, at the same time, aided and abetted the Corsicans, now in open insurrection against the republic.* The Genoese well knew all they had to dread from the ambition of Savoy—that ambition to which they were ultimately to succumb—and were aware that the present king little scrupled to extend his sway over an Italian state which had given him no offence, and even, if unable to secure the whole of it to himself, was ready to negotiate a partition of it with Austria. They had, therefore, for some time, come to an understanding with the Bourbon Courts, and at last signed (May 1st, 1745) an alliance at Aranjuez, by which they allowed the French and Spanish troops a free passage through their territory, and engaged to furnish their own contingent of 10,000 men, with a good park of artillery. Maillebois had now the command of the French and Spanish armies at Nice. He formed a great plan of a simultaneous attack both on Piedmont and Lombardy, by making his way along and across the Genoese Apennines, thus turning the Alpine chain,

* Botta, vii. 148, 220, 274.—Sclopis, Relazioni tra la Dinastia di Savoia e il Governo Britannico, p. 73.

which Don Philip and Conti had twice been unable to overcome.

It was the plan sketched by Las Minas the year before; the plan followed by Bonaparte in his first Italian campaigns of 1794–6. Then, as in the present instance, Genoa, though not without provocation, opened the gates of Italy to an invader.

Across the Var, over the skirts of the Maritime Alps, at Turbia, the French Marshal led his army along the shore to Finale, and hence across the mountains into Upper Montferrat, whilst the Marquis of Gages, with an army of Spaniards and Neapolitans, joined him from the confines of Modena, across the Apennines of St. Pellegrino and Garfagnana, and all along the eastern Riviera. The combined forces came down upon the plain between the Tanaro and Bormida, and, by threatening at the same time Piedmont and Lombardy, they obtained their intent of dividing the forces of the Austro-Sardinians. Whilst Schulemburg, with his Germans, hastened to cover Milan, they overpowered Charles Emanuel at Bassignana, at the confluence of the Tanaro with the Po (September 27th), and swept over the plain with an impetuosity which their bewildered adversaries little knew how to resist. Milan, Pavia, Parma, Piacenza, no less than Alessandria, Tortona, Casale, and Asti,—nearly all the plain, —with the exception of Mantua, the Citadel of Alessandria, and the Castle of Milan,—was lost.

The season was meanwhile advanced; the warlike operations gave way to diplomatic negotiations.

By a most unusual clause in the Treaty of Worms, to which Austria had willingly agreed, Charles Emanuel, who justly feared the fortunes of war might declare against Maria Theresa, had reserved the power of treating with his enemies, and eventually withdrawing from his allies, on condition of giving two months' notice.

By virtue of this compact he opened conferences with France on the 26th of December, 1745, concluded an armistice at Paris (February 17th, 1746), and, after endless negotiations at Turin, a final meeting took place at Rivoli between Maillebois, the French Marshal's son, and Count Bogino, the able successor of the Marquis d'Ormea, as Prime Minister of Sardinia. The chivalrous spirit by which France was actuated at the opening of this war never belied itself to its close.*

It was now proposed, as usual, to unite the duchy of Milan to Piedmont, in favour of Charles Emanuel, to give Parma and Piacenza to Don Philip, and to make important additions to that duchy, as well as to Modena, Genoa, and Venice. Tuscany should be held as a separate sovereignty by Charles of Lorraine, brother of Francis, now Emperor of Germany; so that Austria should not possess an inch of ground in Italy. A league was, besides, to be formed between the Italian potentates, so as to secure the independence of all and each of them. It was one of the many chances that were offered to Italy for emancipation:

* D'Argenson, Mémoires, p. 372.

it failed, like all other combinations, as if to warn the too sanguine Italians* that freedom must, at all events, be the work of a nation's own hands and hearts; that what may be obtained by diplomacy and from the bounty of a foreign Power is always liable—indeed is but too sure—to be speedily lost from the same causes.

The good intentions of the French Government were in this instance frustrated, first by the strong opposition of the Queen of Spain, who was bent on securing Milan for her son, Don Philip, at any price; then, when means were found to obtain her acquiescence, by obstacles thrown in the way by Charles Emanuel, who could not divest himself of his mistrust of the French and of his fears of the Spaniards, and who, above all, wearied with the length to which Spain had drawn the negotiation,† broke through it by a sudden resumption of hostilities on the 5th of March, 1746.

The position of Austria had, in the meanwhile, greatly improved. The Bavarian Emperor, Charles VII., had died, and Maria Theresa's husband, Francis of Lorraine, or Tuscany, had been acknowledged Emperor in October, 1745. Peace had been concluded with Prussia and Poland in the ensuing December. The Empress and Queen was now able to turn all her attention to Italy, and a powerful German host joined the Sardinians in Lombardy. The sudden attack of

* Balbo, Storia d'Italia, p. 333.

† Flassan, Diplomatie, v. 316–334.

Charles Emanuel, who delivered Asti and Alessandria, and the strength of the Austrian forces, repaired the losses of the previous year. There was discord and confusion in the enemy's camp; and Maillebois, after a severe defeat at Piacenza (June 16th, 1746), was only by very able manœuvres enabled to collect his shattered forces at the Apennines, and to lead them back to Genoa. Even that city he abandoned to her fate, and retired along the shore to Provence.

Charles Emanuel, who might have cut off the retreat of the French and Spaniards, satisfied himself with following them step by step, harassing without crushing them in their toilsome march, so as not to give the Austrians too decisive an advantage, and to enable himself strongly to occupy the Western Riviera.

By the desire and with the co-operation of his English allies, and greatly against his sounder judgment, he now invaded Provence,—it was the third ill-advised expedition of that kind since the times of Charles Emanuel I., and the fifth since the wars of the Emperor Charles V.,—and the result had always been fatal. The King had however, in this instance, forced back the French as far as Fréjus, and Toulon would probably have yielded to his superior forces, had he not been arrested in his victorious career by the disasters of his ally.

Forsaken by the French and Spaniards, who had exacted the heaviest sacrifices from her, Genoa had fallen into the power of the Austrians, whom the Government of the Republic deemed itself unable to resist. The

Austrians were under the command of the Marquis Botta-Adorno, of Pavia, an Italian and half-Genoese,* but far more harsh, and arrogant, and brutal to his countrymen than even a German could have been, who said he would leave nothing to the Genoese "but eyes to weep." The townspeople were determined to show they had still hands left to fight. He had raised an enormously heavy contribution on the city; he proceeded to take the artillery from the arsenals, and compelled the citizens to remove them, adding ill-treatment and blows to those who showed reluctance or sluggishness in the work. The generous people were roused into frenzy; they fell upon the Germans with stones and knives; they fought them from street to street for five days (December 5th to 10th, 1746); they cut a great number of them to pieces, took four thousand prisoners, and drove Botta and his army across the Apennine pass of La Bocchetta to Gavi. The city had now to withstand a long siege by fresh Austrian and Piedmontese forces, aided by a powerful English armament. But the courage of the Genoese was proof against extreme hardships and sufferings, and the timely aid of the French crowned it at last with well-deserved success. The siege was raised on the 3rd of July, 1747.

In the meanwhile Charles Emanuel had fallen back from Provence, and had now to meet the French on his own ground. At the opening of the campaign of 1747 Marshal Belleisle had the command of the

* Botta, Storia d'Italia, vii. 217.

French, and resolved to enter Piedmont by an attack on the Cottian Alps. Desirous of avoiding the forts of Exilles and Fenestrelles, he directed the march of his troops between both, along the crest of that broad, lofty ridge which separates the valley of the Dora from that of the Chiusone, the same high region rendered famous in former-times by Catinat's exploits. Charles Emanuel however was already on his guard: he had thrown up an entrenched camp on the very summit of the ridge, on a spacious platform, which, from its configuration, received the name of "Col de l'Assiette."

The Chevalier Belleisle attacked this formidable position with thirty-eight battalions, the *élite* of the French army. Bricherasio defended it with fourteen Piedmontese battalions. It was by far the most heroic struggle in which the latter nation was ever engaged: they conquered. Five times did the storming parties come up to the onslaught; five times were they driven back in a hand-to-hand encounter. Belleisle, with a stand of colours in his hand, led his troops to a last attempt, and planted his banner on the very brow of the hill; but he fell, and with him 430 French officers and 5300 soldiers were strewn on the ground. The relics of the beaten army recrossed Mont Genèvre with a conviction that the sons of the Alps had learnt at last to guard them (July 19th, 1747).

The defeat of the French at the Col de l'Assiette, like their disaster under the walls of Turin in 1706, seemed to have a decisive effect on the fortunes of the war, so far, at least, as Italy was concerned. The fol-

lowing military operations were but of trifling importance. All the belligerent parties were overcome by weariness. Philip V. of Spain had died, and his successor, Ferdinand VI., born of the union of Philip with Maria Louisa of Savoy, gradually rid himself of the influence of his ambitious stepmother, Elizabeth Farnese, the main cause of the continuation of the war. Conferences were held at Breda; these led to the preliminaries (April 30th), and finally to the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (October 18th, 1748).

The rights of Maria Theresa to the Austrian succession were acknowledged; she retained in Italy the duchy of Milan, but allowed Sardinia the small fractions of the Upper Novarese (the county of Anghiera, Arona, and Val d'Ossola), as well as Vigevano and the Oltrepo Pavese (territory of Pavia, on the right bank of the Po), and the county of Bobbio. By this Austria only fulfilled part of her engagements of 1743; as she had promised at Worms also the cession of Piacenza and its territory, as far as the Nure (and this was now, together with Parma, given to Don Philip of Spain, securing in favour of Savoy only the reversion of Piacenza, in the event of the extinction of Don Philip's line), and she had besides guaranteed to Charles Emanuel the possession of the marquisate of Finale, which nevertheless was left to the Genoese.

Don Philip of Spain had, for the last five years, enjoyed undisturbed possession of Savoy, and aimed at securing for himself an independent sovereignty in that province. The French diplomatists at Aix-la-

Chapelle proposed to Charles Emanuel an exchange of that Transalpine territory for the duchy of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla. But Charles "refused to part with a country inhabited by brave and faithful subjects, and which he looked upon as the cradle of his dynasty," and the negotiation dropped.* The duchy of Parma, etc., came thus into the possession of Don Philip, and into that of his son, Don Ferdinand, down to the times of the French Revolution.

Don Philip's brother, Don Carlos, continued to reign at Naples till 1759, when, by the death of Ferdinand VI., he was called to the throne of Spain, and left the Two Sicilies, as a separate kingdom, to his younger son, Ferdinand, whose long reign reached, and even went beyond, the same revolutionary era.

Tuscany was governed by Richecourt, an imperial lieutenant of Francis I., of Austria-Lorraine, till 1765, when, by the death of that Emperor, it was given also as an independent state to Peter Leopold, the Emperor's second son, whilst the elder, Joseph II., inherited the German and Austrian throne. Both these Princes also witnessed the first outbreak of the great European convulsions of 1789.

It was not without long protests that Charles Emanuel of Sardinia resigned himself to the loss of Finale, or indeed gave up his hopes of adding the whole or part of the Genoese territory to his dominions; but Genoa had been, during the war, no less the object of the eager covetousness of Spain and Austria than of

* Sclopis, Relazioni, p. 92.

Sardinia; and in this conflict of ambition France (who, in the meanwhile, was about to secure Corsica for herself) had but little difficulty in extending to her heroic ally a protection which, for the third time, and for above half a century, baffled the long-headed ambition of the House of Savoy.

With the single exception of Milan and Mantua, therefore, all Italy either actually was or would soon become independent, at the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748; and nothing could be more striking than the contrast of this epoch with that of the Treaty of Utrecht, five-and-thirty years before. The largest division of the country, Naples and Sicily, had risen to new existence; Parma, Modena, and Tuscany were freed from the thraldom of imperial supremacy; and Piedmont, whose position was already sufficiently solid at Utrecht, had come out of the recent struggles, not indeed with all the success it might have attained, yet with an increase of territory, and still more of political importance.

But the spirit of the Italians was long since broken; the people had not only ceased to be, but even to know they ever had been, or to aspire ever to be, a united nation; nor were the Governments alive to the necessity of combination or alliance. No league, or common bond, diet, or confederacy was even projected by any of the Italian States, either at this or at any following juncture. Each State considered itself as a separate unit; the oldest and wisest, especially Venice, had long looked to utter inaction and complete iso-

lation, not only as the happiest, but, alas! the safest policy! The late wars—above all, the very latest—had been as barren of important results, it was thought,—though, as we have seen, this was by no means the case for Italy itself,—as they had been fruitful in heavy losses and tremendous sufferings. A just horror of war made the great monarchies, and still more the small states, over-anxious for peace; and in Italy, most unfortunately, the unusual continuation of peace had, it would seem, shaken the belief in the possibility of a renewal of hostilities, and unfitted both the people and their rulers for its contingencies.

Tuscany moreover, although politically independent, relied on Austrian support in any case of warlike outbreak; and the Bourbons of Parma and Naples sought, in 1761, their strength in a family compact which bound them to France and Spain. Thus did the principal Italian States not only not stand by their own forces, not only not join their forces for their common security, but each of them looked for its allies in a foreign camp,—each in a different, in a hostile camp; each shared the jealousies, the interests, the aspirations of its own protector; and, in the balance of European power, these States, arrayed against each other, neutralizing one another, absolutely counted as nothing. The consciousness of their own insignificance actually added to their impotence. They laid aside a sword, which they deemed to be of no weight in the scales of fate; and the cruel conviction sank

deep in their own and in the world's mind, that Italy was doomed to bear the cost of war, not to wage it.

Nevertheless all that long pacific interval between the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle and the French revolution is regarded as a period of improvement and progress for Italy; and so, in many respects, it certainly was. The first Bourbon Princes in Naples and Parma, and the two Austrian brothers of Tuscany and Milan, were men whose good intentions were borne out by highly-distinguished abilities. After two centuries and a half of the blindest, most bigoted, most improvident Spanish rule, Naples was born again under the guidance of its new King, Charles, and his able Minister, Tanucci. Don Philip, or his advisers, gave a new impulse to intellectual life at Parma; the lieutenants of Maria Theresa and of Joseph II. almost reconciled the Lombards to a foreign yoke; and the age of Peter Leopold at Florence ushered in a far happier existence than the country had enjoyed even in the proudest days of the Medici.

We must not however allow a pleasing illusion to carry us too far. What Italy really attained during the latter end of the eighteenth century was not happiness, but cessation from suffering; there was not actual progress in Italy, but only a stay in her decline.

The best-meaning of those Princes, the most sanguine and active of those Ministers, had no faith in the people: they never gave it a share, never asked for its co-operation in their work. Men of strong will and straightforward purpose, they demolished all that

remained of the old social fabric, rather with the intent of gaining elbow-room than with any well-settled plan of substituting any new construction of their own. Feudal privileges, ecclesiastical immunities, pontifical pretensions, Jesuits, Dominican Inquisitors, all were pulled down, not so much with a view to a reconstitution of society as for the purpose of rearing up the throne upon an isolated dead level. The grand idea of Joseph II. and of Peter Leopold—it is now clearly understood—was the establishment of an enlightened, beneficent, yet utterly unimpeded, unmitigated absolutism. We may grant that in Italy, or perhaps in continental Europe, no materials at that time offered themselves for a better structure; we may admit that no time was allowed to those excellent reformers for aught more than the mere preparatory work; and that their ultimate design was perhaps to trust their subjects with material securities for the perpetuation of the better order of things they had introduced, as Peter Leopold is said to have had a most liberal constitution ready for Tuscany, which he however locked up in his desk to his last day;* but no one will deny that the nonage of the people was indefinitely prolonged,—that the concurrence of the latter with the endeavours of the Princes was nowhere apparent,—and that consequently the new edifice soon proved to be built on sand; so that, for instance, the short respite afforded to the Neapolitans by the reign of Charles VII. and Tanucci, did not arm

* Botta, Storia d'Italia dal 1534 al 1789, viii. 174.

them against the aggravation of evil which Ferdinand IV., Caroline of Austria, and Acton, were soon to bring upon them; and the spirited stand of Don Philip of Parma against Papal arrogance, and the wise administration of the philosopher Du Tillot, did not prevent his subjects from again being delivered over to priestly rule, under his bigoted successor, Ferdinand "the Bellringer."

No permanent good can be wrought for the people, unless it be with—if not altogether by—the people themselves.

With the exception of the attempts to drain the Tuscan and Pontine marshes, in short, we are not aware of any lasting benefit for which Italy had to thank her Governments at that epoch. Pope Pius VI. deemed himself a Leo X. for his museums, cameos, and medals; and at Naples a munificent Prince dug up Pompeii and Herculaneum, as if he could give life to the country by a mere disinterment of the dead. Codes of law were certainly compiled, trade and industry encouraged, literature and the arts allowed to revive. All this however was but either a reminiscence of past Italian or an echo of present foreign life. A certain amount of prosperity, of social and intellectual activity, will always develope itself, in a country like Italy, during so long an interval of peace. A distinction must be drawn between the good the Princes could not prevent and that which they really did — and that which they actually omitted or impeded. Towards the establishment of solid government, towards

the development of liberal institutions, towards the regeneration of the national character, the elevation of the moral standard, or the free soaring of genius, they did nothing—they allowed their people to do nothing; nay, it is even questionable whether, by their too hasty demolition, they did not do away with the little good which might still be blended with the great evil of the old religious and social institutions—whether their all-sweeping, levelling, centralizing system had not its cramping, corrupting, deadening effects.

The work which the reformers of Milan, Naples, and Tuscany undertook, towards the middle of the eighteenth century, had begun in Piedmont at a far earlier epoch.

Absolutism, as we have said, had its great, important, sacred uses and purposes: its chief mission was to give a state strength and consistency, to bring something like order and uniformity out of the feudal chaos, to create a nation out of dissimilar, discordant elements. All this had been attempted in Piedmont by Amadeus VIII., and with greater success by Emanuel Philibert. The wars and disturbances which followed close upon the reigns of both those legislators somewhat loosened the bond of unity which had been their principal aim. Still Piedmont had, in the seventeenth century, gone through its long ordeal without alarming symptoms of dissolution; and Victor Amadeus II. had so tightened its discipline as to give it, at the time of his son's accession, as high a degree of compactness and cohesion as a well-meaning ruler could desire.

Charles Emanuel III. had, in 1748, definitively laid aside the sword. It was in vain that Frederic II. of Prussia, at the period of the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) pointed out the facility of the conquest of Milan. The ambition of Savoy rested upon principles of hereditary policy, and this was here at fault. France and Austria were now united, and the annals of Savoy offered no instance in which one of those great neighbours was not at least neutral, if not actually pitted against the other. It required no great self-denial on the part of Charles Emanuel to resist a temptation which would have exposed him to attacks both from the east and west. The spirit of Frederic II., or even of Charles Emanuel I., was not in him; he remained a passive spectator of the struggle, and his inaction prescribed a similar line of conduct to Naples and the other Italian Potentates. At the close of the war France and England referred their dispute to his friendly mediation.*

As the King of Sardinia took the lead in Italy, in military and political transactions, so the precedence in all the arts of peace, in the great work of civilization, would have become him. His subjects were, of all Italian people, the most unanimous and docile, the most thoroughly cast together and formed. Piedmont was a strongly, as well as harmoniously, organized body, such as a truly great sovereign would have easily animated. It was a willing, spirited steed, perfectly broken in, ready saddled and bridled, the pride

* Sclopis, Relazioni, etc., p. 100.

and love of a skilful rider. If ever there was in Europe, and particularly in Italy, a state suited for the experiment of free institutions, such was most undoubtedly Piedmont; and if ever there was a favourable moment, it was after the Peace of 1748. But the Princes of Savoy, with the exception of Amadeus VIII., Emanuel Philibert, and, in many respects, also Victor Amadeus II., seldom gave proofs of inventive genius; and innovation was especially out of keeping with the somewhat cold and formal, methodic, plodding disposition of Charles Emanuel III. He aimed at little more than the completion of his father's system; and it must be confessed that he rather exaggerated its faults than enhanced its merits. The absolutism of previous ages had only removed obstacles, it had cleared the ground for action; but Charles Emanuel forgot that the law of mankind is progress: he was anxious for repose, and doomed Piedmont to stagnation.

He renewed with Benedict XIV., in 1741, the concordat his father had made with Benedict XIII.; and by the addition of the title of Pontifical to that of Imperial Vicar, which had been for centuries hereditary in his family, he extended his sovereign sway over those episcopal or abbatial lands which had hitherto claimed exemptions or immunities. He equally obtained from the Bishops of Novara, Maurienne, Tarentaise, etc., the cession of such temporal authority as was still vested in their hands. He attempted the final abolition of personal servitude, especially in

Savoy, allowing fair compensation to those upon whose long-established rights his measures infringed. He extended the empire of the laws and the taxes to the duchy of Aosta, depriving it of its privileges and immunities, and even of its Chamber of Peers and other remnants of old parliamentary institutions. He republished, in 1770, under the title of "Royal Constitutions," the codes which had been compiled by Victor Amadeus in 1725–1729. He strove mightily to rescue the island of Sardinia from the more than half-savage state into which Aragonese and Spanish misrule, and the abuses of the narrowest feudalism, had plunged it for centuries; and to tame that fierce vindictive spirit, by which not only men, but the very women and maidens scoured the country, on horseback, armed to the teeth, bent on the perpetuation of their family feuds.* He sent an iron man, the Marquis of Rivarolo, into the most lawless districts, who ravaged and depopulated, in order to subdue them, and endeavoured, though only with partial success, in the island of St. Pietro, to civilize them by reconciliation. Charles Emanuel was a true benefactor to the island, and we may readily believe those† who assert that no part of Italy gave signs of more rapid advancement, for the great reason that none stood in greater need of it. He encouraged agriculture by his improvement of the "*Monti Frumentarii*,"—granaries, out of which corn was lent for seed, at little or no interest, to poor husbandmen; he

* Botta, vii. 73. † Balbo, Storia d'Italia, p. 347.

re-introduced the Italian language into the island, where it had been almost entirely superseded by the Catalonian and Aragonese; he promoted liberal studies by the foundation of universities at Cagliari and Sassari in 1764, 1765; and established a royal printing press at Cagliari in 1769. At the same time he spared no pains to give to the University of Turin all the lustre which, under the circumstances, it could attain.

But, even under his father, "liberal" studies in Piedmont very severely felt the "illiberality," both economical and political, of the Savoy Princes. The enormous sums employed by them in wars always disastrous in their phases, however fortunate in their final results, necessarily drove these Princes to retrenchment in their home expenditure. Notwithstanding the dazzling festivities of his coronation at Palermo, for instance, Victor Amadeus II. made himself unpopular in Sicily by financial schemes, the prudence of which was ascribed to avarice; and even his old subjects at Turin might murmur at the closeness by which that wise Prince endeavoured to heal the wounds inflicted on the treasury by the courtly lavishness of Christina of France and the building mania of Charles Emanuel II. In his eager desire to give a new impulse to literature and science, we are told,* Victor invited the most illustrious scholars and poets of the age—Apostolo Zeno, Scipione Maffei, Muratori, etc.—to aid him in his reconstruction of the University of

* Denina, Italia Occidentale, iv. 199.

Turin; but the emoluments he offered were not of a nature to tempt such eminent men from the offices they either occupied or hoped to obtain, under more munificent patrons. Gian Vincenzo Gravina, a nobleman in more affluent circumstances, had accepted the chair of canon-law at Turin, but he died as he was about to set out on his journey. Victor Amadeus had therefore to recruit his professors amongst men, if not of inferior abilities, at least of humbler pretensions, and his university, if it attained an equal degree of efficiency, did not however enjoy the extensive reputation of its rival of Pavia.

But Charles Emanuel III. pushed his parsimony somewhat further than his father. He was a most careful, assiduous, far-sighted administrator. His finances were conducted with consummate ability; and if Victor could boast that he had nearly doubled the expenditure without increase of the public burdens, Charles exulted at every impost his superior management enabled him to dispense with. The revenue of the kingdom was, under Victor Amadeus II., in 1700, about 9,000,000 *lire* (the lira of the value of 1 franc 15 centimes); it had risen to 13,000,000 in 1721; under Charles Emanuel III., from 15,000,000 in 1732, it rose to 25,000,000 in 1734; to 28,000,000 in 1742; and finally to 32,000,000 in 1746: after the peace it fell again to 25,000,000 in 1750; and at last to 21,000,000 in 1770. The expenditure, which had always nearly equalled, and in some instances even exceeded, the revenue, was, in 1770, reduced to about

19,000,000, leaving two clear millions surplus.* These economies were effected chiefly by the reduction of the army, beginning, in accordance with the practice of all the Princes of Savoy, by the dismissal of foreign hirelings; but the improvements Charles Emanuel introduced in every military department, especially in the artillery, which he brought to perfection, and the marvellous works he undertook to complete that chain of forts which was for ever to close the Alps against the French, would still have exceeded his means, without the large subsidies secretly paid to him by England, interested in the furtherance of those works, as the best security for the peace of Europe.† He was nevertheless compelled for several years to levy an extraordinary tax, of about 2,500,000; but when, finally, in 1763, he received from France an indemnity of nine millions for his renunciation of all claims on Piacenza, and was able to remove that last supplementary burden, he pronounced that day to have been the happiest in his life.‡

Prudence, however, may to some extent have degenerated into niggardliness. Victor Amadeus II. suffered the Emperor Charles VI., or his viceroy in Lombardy, Victor's own cousin, Prince Eugene, to secure the services of eminent men from other parts of Italy, for the academical institutions of Milan and Pavia. His son allowed—almost drove—the very

* Cibrario, Istituzioni della Monarchia, p. 340.

† Costa, Maison de Savoie, iii. 261.

‡ Costa, iii. 263.—Cibrario, Cronologia, p. 103.

natives of Piedmont to look elsewhere for that encouragement which they did not meet with on the part of their native sovereigns. Already, towards 1650, the astronomer Dominic Cassini had passed over to France, to illustrate that country with the achievements of a genius which became hereditary in his family. One century later, La Grange and Berthollet, distinguished in science; Alfieri, the poet; Baretti, the wit; Bodoni, the printer, and a crowd of minor intellects, wandered forth in quest of that "crust of bread and liberty," which is more than home and country to real genius. The good historian, Denina, who has given us a long list of those high-sounding names, was last, though not least, in this melancholy exodus.*

Nor was it mere want of profitable employment these great men went in quest of: they wanted free air to breathe.

The Princes of Savoy were provident, conscientious, righteous rulers; they prided themselves in the administration of equal, impassive, inflexible justice. Absolute as legislators, they were however by no means arbitrary as executors. They wished the law, such as they made it, to be binding on themselves as well as on their subjects. Charles Emanuel III., especially, was an inexorable disciplinarian; unbending, unexpansive, inaccessible: he introduced a strict and somewhat stern rule of morality into his court, and gave the first example of it in domestic life. He banished

* Denina, Italia Occidentale, iv. 205; v. 49.

court-mistresses, and put an end to that long series of illegitimate children which so enormously swell the genealogy of his House. The respectability the Court of Turin attained under him continued to distinguish it down to the extinction of the main line of Savoy in 1831. This rigid proscription of vice and profligacy under any shape, not only imposed a salutary restraint on the people, but made the Prince himself superior to those "weaknesses" which too often interfere with the rectitude of a sovereign's intentions.

It must, nevertheless, be allowed that there was more than strictness—there was narrow-mindedness—in the rule of these Princes.

They would have but one mind, one will in the State; they hardly allowed any latitude of creed or opinion. They brought the country into their own hands, as a father his family, or a steward his farm or household. Charles Emanuel III. especially prided himself upon this parental providence and foresight. No earthly ruler before or after him ever looked upon uniformity as the acme of all perfection; no one ever more loudly denounced distinction of rank, chartered rights or privileges, as obstructions to the exercise of sovereign authority. And yet the old institutions of Piedmont were very nearly reduced to a dead blank. All, or nearly all, temporal power had been wrested from the Church. The movement initiated by Victor Amadeus II. against the Jesuits in 1727, was followed by a general crusade against the order (1760–1768), which led at last to its suppression by Pope Clement

XIV. (July 20, 1773), soon after the death of Charles Emanuel III.

As the Princes of Savoy diminished the authority of the clergy, so they broke the spirit, they curtailed the rights and privileges of their nobility. They cheapened their rank by lavishing honours on mere upstarts, by choosing their servants, and sometimes their advisers (though always with a view to the promotion of real merit), from men of inferior birth, and even by the open sale of titles, as well as of dignities and offices—an immoral practice, which the example of Spain, France, and other great monarchies, had rendered prevalent in Italy, and which especially disgraced the reign of the lavish Charles Emanuel II., and even that of the high-minded Victor Amadeus II.*

But this latter, urged by the exigencies of an exhausted treasury, in 1720, aimed a far more terrible blow at his nobles. He summoned them—there were little less than 6000 Crown-vassals at this period†—before the Exchequer Court, to prove the validity of the titles by which they had come into the possession of any portion of the royal domains, demanding either the restitution or the redemption of such property as did not rest on the terms of feudal tenure—*onerous service*—a sweeping measure by which one-half of the noble families were ruined, and the State was thrown into great confusion, whilst the revenue was not thereby very materially improved.‡

* Costa de Beauregard, Maison de Savoie, ii. 23; iii. 112.

† Costa, iii. 112. ‡ Denina, Hist. de Vict. Amadée, MS. ii. 321.

The impoverished condition to which the Piedmontese nobility were thus reduced, and the almost exclusive attention they paid to the military profession—for it was to a great extent reputed a disgrace to a young nobleman to be seen in any other garb than a uniform —the Prince or country's livery,—unfitted them for the exercise of that patronage of literature, science, and art, by which the aristocracy of other Italian states, especially of Lombardy, highly distinguished themselves in the eighteenth century, joining together in learned academies, editing great historical works, founding colleges or libraries, and opening their houses for the genial intercourse of learned and accomplished men.

The Piedmontese nobles exhibited the main features of the character of their national Princes; they were proud, grave, reserved; thrifty, prudent, and unostentatious,—strangers to the corruption and profligacy which had disgraced the Courts of Este, Gonzaga, and Medici, to that dulness and inanity which Spanish influence had engendered in Naples and Lombardy, but also to that refinement, to that *dilettantism*, that dignified luxury and accomplished leisure, which had always distinguished the Venetian patricians, and which the new Houses of Lorraine and Bourbon had more lately brought into fashion at Milan and Florence, at Parma and Naples.

The Piedmontese went by the name of the "Macedonians of Italy." They were too thoroughly men of action to aspire to the boast of being men of taste.

Charles Emanuel III. had, by the express wish of his father, been deprived of the advantages of a classical education, as "Latin could be of no use, either for the conduct of an army, or for the management of a state." No wonder he spoke of poets as "makers of half-lines" —*scrittori delle mezze righe**—as if grudging the waste paper allowed for margin to the waywardness of metre. No wonder if the Academy of Science, which was founded as a private society in 1757, by La Grange, Saluzzo, and Cigna, was looked upon with mistrust and ill-will, till it found favour with the Prince of Piedmont, in 1762, who however only obtained toleration for it from his father, and who bestowed but little upon it himself, when he came to the throne—little beyond the barren title of "Royal" conferred upon it in 1783. No wonder the schools of painting and sculpture dating from Charles Emanuel II., proved for many years unsuccessful, and led to no great results even when re-constituted into an Academy of the Fine Arts, in 1778; no wonder if, till the same year, the Agrarian Society was merely a private undertaking, and the observatory, which was only constructed about this period, hardly attained any degree of useful activity. No wonder a learned lady, Pellegrina Amoretti, of Oneglia, was by the ungallant authorities of the Turin University denied the degree of LL.D., which was, however, with acclamation conferred upon her by the more liberal Pavia; no wonder, finally, if that very Prince of Piedmont, who had in his youth raised

* Denina, Italia Occidentale, iv. 206.

the most sanguine expectations as a lover of literature, declared, when he came to the throne as Victor Amadeus III., that "he valued one of his drummers at a higher rate than a whole pack of literati."* It is not to be supposed that the Savoy Princes were hostile to progress from any fear they entertained of its being turned into an instrument of power in the people's hands against themselves. All they deemed of practical utility to the country, or conducive to its material prosperity, or to its social and intellectual development, they very sedulously and intelligently laboured to promote. We hear, for instance, of elementary schools in every village instituted under Charles Emanuel II., in 1661; we hear of his edicts against mendicity (1664), against public lotteries—inefficient, as we may believe, since they were again, and still in vain, reinforced by Victor Amadeus II., in 1713; under this more active legislator we hear of a *cadastre*, or register of all landed property in Piedmont, in 1698, and in Savoy in 1728; we hear of letters-patent for a line of stage-coaches from Turin to Geneva, by the valley of Aosta (1691), of regulations for limiting the thickness and diameter of wheels (1686), for the lighting of streets in the winter season (1720), and for the whole year in 1782; of the institution of a Board of Health (1716), of a maritime consulate (1687), a commercial tribunal (1729), and a college of notaries (1696). We hear of roads, bridges, tunnels and dykes, of new towns,

* Botta, Storia d'Italia, dal 1534 al 1789, v. 24; dal 1789 al 1814, i. 32.—Cibrario, Istituzioni, p. 385.

such as Carouge, in 1774; of harbours on the sea and Lake Leman; of free ports, drainage of lands, silk and cloth manufactures, the importation of a fine breed of horses, etc. etc.

But these Princes wished everything to originate with themselves; they did not conceive the possibility of their subjects having wants or aspirations beyond their own capacity; since the days of Emanuel Philibert, they were too sure that Piedmont could have no head superior to that which the reigning prince carried on his shoulders. They allowed no progress of which the sovereign had not the initiative.

Thus they suffered the Inquisition to do its work amongst their people, so long as it did not interfere with their own prerogative.* The Austrian government at Milan showed not only greater munificence, but altogether more laudable tolerance towards the cultivators of literature. The Sicilian, D'Aguirre, whom Victor Amadeus had, with many others, brought from his native island in his royal suite, could obtain no permission to print his translation of Theocritus at Turin, and had therefore to send his manuscript beyond the Ticino, as the Piedmontese censorship would allow no heathen gods or goddesses, and was offended at the loves of Arcadian shepherds.† Hence did these Sicilians, as well as other native or foreign literary men, migrate, one by one, as we have said, under Charles Emanuel III. and his successor. One of them only

* Botta, Storia d'Italia, vi. 292.

† Denina, Italia Occidentale, iv. 206.

was retained, much against his inclination, and that was the unfortunate Neapolitan historian, Pietro Giannone.

We have thus come to the foulest blot upon the memory of an otherwise good and well-meaning prince, —indeed to one of the darkest pages in the history we are writing,—to a deed far more deserving unqualified condemnation than the worst atrocities of which Savoy was ever guilty against the Waldenses, as in these latter it is possible to plead, in extenuation, either the bigotry of the age or the ascendency of an overbearing foreign power, or the brutality of the soldiery, etc., but for Giannone's captivity Charles Emanuel alone has to answer.

That great and good historian had given offence to the Court of Rome by his fearless support of the rights of the State in opposition to those of the Church, and had been banished from the southern kingdom by the base obsequiousness of King Charles (Don Carlos), in whose interest he had mustered up his arguments.

Unable to find a permanent refuge at Vienna or Venice, Giannone had migrated to Geneva; he was decoyed by a treacherous friend into a village in Savoy, for the performance of his religious duties at Easter, and was here arrested, thrown into the castle of Miolans, hence conveyed to the State fortress at Ceva, and finally removed to the Turin citadel.

There he pined until death released him, in 1748, in his seventy-second year, after twelve years' captivity.

By a refinement of cruelty, as we must think, he was denied the comfort of his son's company.

The dispute between Rome and Savoy was then at its highest, and the unhappy recluse, hoping to soften the heart of his royal gaoler, wrote a dissertation in which the rights of the State of Savoy were luminously shown forth. Charles Emanuel read and approved the pamphlet, but it was not as a champion, rather as an expiatory victim, that its author could be of service to him. By the sacrifice of this man, who had given him no offence, who had broken none of his laws, Charles Emanuel made his peace with Rome. A pious monk, Father Prevera, either by arguments or else by fair promises, induced Giannone to abjure the doctrines obnoxious to the Church; but even recantation did not mitigate the historian's doom—his prison door remained inexorably closed. The Concordat was signed in 1741, and seven long years passed after that period and not a word of consolation or hope was conveyed to the captive, not a word, that we know of, was spoken at Rome in his behalf.* He was suffered to die forgotten. He was, it is true, at some time or other invited to busy himself with a history of the monarchy of Savoy, and the poor man, who had such good reasons for gratitude to that dynasty, did not however shrink from the task; but they laid in his hands only partial and garbled documents, and he had too lofty ideas of the dignity of his office to take up the pen where he was not allowed to write the whole

* Botta, vii. 71.

truth.* It has been urged that by his imprisonment Savoy provided for Giannone's safety, by the only means in her power, as the republic of Venice, under equal circumstances, could not, the world knows, screen Fra Paolo Sarpi from the dagger of the Roman Court. But we will venture to question whether, if the grey-headed historian had fallen into the power of the Pope himself, he could have met with worse treatment than he suffered at the hands of the unconcerned, unprovoked Court of Savoy. Surely never was there a more flagrant compromise with justice, never a more wanton dereliction of duty, never greater disregard of the common dictates of humanity, in the pursuance of selfish interest.

As a tardy atonement to the memory of Giannone, the Sardinian Government has lately allowed Professor Mancini, a refugee from Naples, belonging to the University of Turin, to collect the papers of his much-aggrieved countryman, which have lain in the royal archives since his death: they are, we understand, on the eve of publication.

Were it not for that shocking, though we really believe isolated fact, that speaks so highly to the disparagement of the House of Savoy, we should be willing to find many reasons to which the slow progress of civilization in Piedmont might be attributed.

That country could not, except geographically, be said properly to belong to Italy. The days of Emanuel Philibert and Charles Emanuel I. were gone by,

* Litta, Savoia, tav. xix.

and there was nothing Italian amongst their successors, beyond their equivocal policy. The first-named prince had fashioned his Court after Burgundian, that is Austro-Spanish, etiquette, and his son, following his example, had introduced the usages of the Courts of Mantua and Florence, which at this time were also entirely governed by the influence of that of Madrid. As a true Italian prince, Charles Emanuel I. welcomed poets and artists at his Court, and encouraged and cultivated Italian literature, giving it such leisure as his incessant wars and political schemes allowed. But soon after his death, Christina of France, and Joan Baptiste of Savoy-Nemours, and Anne of Orléans, Queen of Victor Amadeus II., for the course of nearly a century, gave their native language, manners, and tastes a preponderance, in a society in which the nobles of Savoy, of Aosta, and other French provinces, were still hardly in the minority. Down to the fall of Piedmontese royalty, in 1796, the Court of Turin was French, and with it all that portion of the population that breathed in its atmosphere. Italian literature could therefore only come in as a foreign luxury, and Alfieri, it is well known, when he ventured on his first attempts at tragic composition, had actually no alternative but to write his 'Filippo' in French, which was almost exclusively the language of the polished classes, or else in the vernacular dialect of the people.

By this time, unfortunately, the abandoned profligacy of the Court of Louis XV., and the cynicism and libertinism of the philosophical school to which it gave

birth, justly revolted and alarmed the Savoy princes, who began to direct against all French books both the vigilance of their own police and the rigours of the Inquisition. Piedmont, thus debarred, to a great extent, from intercourse with Italy, as well as from contact with France, cut off both from French enlightenment and Italian refinement, was condemned to an almost complete intellectual isolation, aggravated by the constant emigration of native talent.

Yet mere lack of intellectual movement is not very keenly felt by a people who cannot contrast its own with its neighbours' position; and that very isolation contributed, perhaps, to keep the mass of the Piedmontese population in its easy and silent, and, on the whole, contented state of supineness and stagnation.

The mainspring of action, a great capital, was wanting, and with it all the throb and pulsation of national life. Almost entirely an inland country, for it was separated from its only harbour of Nice by the great mountains, without any considerable activity of either trade or industry, the State, which at this epoch hardly reckoned two millions and a half of inhabitants, had nothing in it to redeem it from insignificance.* That cramped-up Turin, pent up within the narrow compass of less than two miles' circuit, scarcely numbering 40,000 souls in 1670,† and not quite 70,000 a century later,‡ was little more than a castle and barracks, a court and a garrison. Even at the present

* Cibrario, Istituzioni, p. 324. † Bellegno, Relazione, p. 296.
‡ Cibrario, Torino, i. 141.

day, notwithstanding her unrivalled site, her stupendous position as "Queen of the Alps," notwithstanding the glorious diadem of snowy mountains that encircles her brow on three sides, and the verdant hills that smile upon her from the fourth, and the 140,000 inhabitants that swarm through her streets, that fair Turin seems to possess but little attraction for foreign tourists, who hurry through Piedmont in quest of Italy, disappointed in this western country of the cloudless skies, balmy climate, wonders of art, aspects of universal neglect and decay, rubbish, noise, and dirt, with which all their ideas of Italian life are indissolubly associated. Those very straight streets, crossing at right angles, those grand but heavy and rustic and somewhat unfinished palaces, those public buildings, stately, orderly, but hardly magnificent or tasteful—the works of second-rate architects, such as the ambitious but fantastic Guarini, the sober but stiff Charles and Amadeus Castellamonte, and the Sicilian Juvara, the lover of circular and elliptical lines—hardly, it is true, belong to the Italy of Michael Angelo or Palladio, but they are a fair exponent of the social condition of the country in the times in which they rose, and especially in the palmy era of the cold, distant, and somewhat ungenial Charles Emanuel III., and his strictly respectable royal household. Seldom cheered by the presence of accomplished foreign visitors, Piedmont had at that time nothing for itself, it received but little from abroad to enliven its weary days of dull sameness; it was merely a passive, neutral, sta-

tionary nook of a province; a half-priestly, half-soldierly fraternity, a drumming, bell-ringing community. It had little of the pleasures, and less of the sins, of Paris or Florence, of Rome, Milan, or Venice.

But the day dawned for a general European awakening. The daring spirit of inquiry which the writers of the eighteenth century were evoking in France was responded to, on the part of Italy, by vague but earnest national aspirations. Both those distinct, but by no means incompatible, social movements were felt by the few generous minds in Piedmont, by those restless spirits, which, as we have seen, broke from confinement at home, and sought for a wider sphere of action abroad. Those held out their hands to their Italian brethren; they longed for their legitimate share in the little that might yet remain of Italian glory. They had too long and unsuccessfully been aping the French; they had too long been kept apart from their real countrymen; and they attributed to this estrangement, to this *denationalization* all that had been most unjustly laid to the charge of native sluggishness and obtuseness.

Notwithstanding the great obstacles they met with, there is no doubt but Italian literature and art were daily becoming acclimated to the latitude of Turin. Baretti, Denina, with many other voluntary exiles, revisited their native land at different intervals, and put it in communication with more favoured regions. The teeming seeds had fallen; they ripened in darkness and silence, but the strength of that generous Pied-

montese soil which received them was soon apparent, and its fertility was nowhere more powerfully exhibited than in the production of that stern, commanding genius, who may perhaps with equal truth be looked upon as the last, or the first, of the Italians—Alfieri.

If ever an individual deserved the distinction of standing forth as a "representative man," if ever a supreme intellect embodied all the character of a struggling, aspiring age and country, certainly Alfieri must be taken as a prototype of the Piedmontese at the particular period of his life (1749–1803).

Alfieri, who doffed with disdain his ensign's uniform—that "badge of his country's servitude," as he deemed it, who spurned the ignoble leisure and frivolous duties of courtly routine, vindicated his title to a man's dignity, and asserted his mastery over his thoughts and deeds, by the sacrifice of that patrimony which bound him to the land of his birth, at the same time that, for the sake of nationality, he submitted to an almost childish apprenticeship to the Tuscan dialects, and, in the prime of manhood, began a hero's mission by a schoolboy's toil and discipline.

Those strange contradictions and eccentricities, that war he waged against his own wayward fancies and impetuous passions, that character both morally and politically presenting the most singular phenomena, and liable to great misconception and misrepresentation, all seem to mark him out as the forerunner of a great, though as yet vague and objectless, transition.

He prided himself on cosmopolitan liberality, yet

he averred that "the plant Man grew nowhere so strong and healthy as on his own Italian soil," and, at the utmost, shared his predilections between England and Italy: "the former, because art (that is, industry) has come off a conqueror of all natural difficulties of soil and climate; the latter, because nature has always got the better of its often wretched, and always at least inactive, improvident governments."

He cried down the Roman patriciate, and every kind of nobility, so long as he thought the *best* classes to which he belonged, were made up of the *worst* individuals; yet he was an aristocrat at heart; he wished, that is, the real *best* men to be the *first*, and he dared to protest before an infuriated Parisian mob, who sang out its "*Les aristocrates à la lanterne*," that he was "*Count* Alfieri, an Italian and no Frenchman, a *nobleman* and no plebeian."

He railed and raved all his life against tyranny—by that name he affected to stigmatize all royalty; he conceived no image of liberty beyond what might be represented by the dagger of Brutus or the red cap of Icilius; but it is evident he thought Italian slothfulness required the stimulant of almost frantic exaggeration. He could not foresee that France was to send forth Brutuses and Iciliuses enough to disgust him with his age and bring him to despair of the human race; but, for the rest, at the time of the great overthrow of all European thrones, he was yet, at heart, Piedmontese enough to send a word of respect and sympathy to the fugitive dynasty of Savoy, those

princes whom he had always honoured in his heart of hearts, even whilst he ran away from them, when in the fulness of their power, but whom now adversity, and the experience of no less incapable but far more unprincipled rulers, had almost hallowed in his eyes.

We shall not attempt for a second time, having already given the subject our attention elsewhere,* a definition of the peculiarities of Alfieri's genius, nor of the influence which his deep concentrated energy exercised on the feelings and manners, no less than on the style and taste, of that and the following Italian generation. His was one of those minds whose length and breadth are not to be measured by the standard of common logic, or by the laws of general æsthetics. He may have been neither a tragic nor a lyric poet; not a classical, not a romantic writer. The mere materials of art were nothing to him; he looked to the result, and that was the regeneration of the very heart, body, and soul of his countrymen. If modern Italians ever come to look, think, and act like men, they will owe it—after Dante—to every line in the verse or prose works of Alfieri.

The same revulsion of feelings which first estranged Alfieri from his native home and the House of his sovereigns, and then brought him back to his allegiance, so that, in 1799, he expressed a wish that he might render his services acceptable to the exiled King, Charles Emanuel IV., at Florence, was exhibited by all the thinking part of the Piedmontese

* Mariotti, Italy Past and Present, i. 451.

population at the eventful period we are now approaching. Seduced by the speciousness of revolutionary theories, wearied with the perpetual nonage to which their jealous rulers doomed them, the Piedmontese departed from the dictates of that traditional, however artificial, patriotism, which, for so long a lapse of years, had made them one with their national dynasty. Eagerness for innovation made them less warm in a cause which it was in vain to represent as their own. For the first time they gave signs of political sympathies, and yearned for an experiment of the new Gallic democracy: their princes stood in their way. The Piedmontese did not, as we shall see, aid in the dethronement of those princes, but displayed little heroism to avert it; they seemed to view it with no overpowering regret.

The effects of all this are visible only at the close of the eighteenth century; but the causes must be sought in the previous compression, in the unnatural tension of men's minds. The Princes of Savoy slumbered in the distant roar of impending storms; they heeded neither the violent spirit which threatened subversion to the whole social order in France, nor even that milder, more rational movement which impelled benevolent men in Italy so eloquently to advocate the cause of humanity. Beccaria or Filangeri were as little listened to in Piedmont as Rousseau or Voltaire. The country remained behind all its neighbours. Charles Emanuel III. had heard so much of Tuscan and Lombard reforms, and of the mitigation of the

horrors of old penal codes, that he seems to have contemplated improvements in his own jurisdiction, beginning by the abolition of torture. But he was advanced in age—seventy-two years old—and hardened in the old ways, and he thought, very reasonably, that innovation might better befit the dawn of a new era, the commencement of his son's reign.*

Victor Amadeus III. came to the throne in his forty-seventh year (February 21st, 1773). He had been under the care of excellent instructors, and had won the reputation of being a liberal and accomplished prince. But he was neither the first nor last heir of a throne who disappointed expectation. Charles Emanuel III. had been, according to the judgment of a writer certainly not hostile to the House of Savoy,† a "good" prince; but he came in succession of a "great" one, and his age already showed signs of decline. He was now, in his turn, followed by a decidedly "inferior" sovereign, precisely at an epoch which would have called forth the exertions of the highest faculties, and required the strain of the most consummate sagacity.

All the finest qualities which, as we have seen, had been attributed to Victor Amadeus III., seemed to desert him on the throne. He began by the instant dismissal of his father's advisers, and called men of little capacity and less character into his council. It had been his father's and his grandfather's boast that their intuitive knowledge of men's worth had always

* Litta, Savoia, tav. xix. † Balbo, Storia d'Italia, p. 347.

enabled them to bestow their confidence on the most deserving subjects. Although the Princes of Savoy, like all able and active rulers jealous of their absolute authority, hardly ever gave up the post of honour, either at the head of their army or of their cabinet, and had therefore almost the exclusive credit of all that was achieved, either in peace or war, in their name, so that scarcely in the history of any country so rare a mention occurs of great warriors or influential statesmen, uncrowned, yet it is well known that Savoy had at all times brave generals and able ministers, however comparatively obscure; and unquestionably not a small share of the success of Victor Amadeus II. and Charles Emanuel III. was due to the transcendent, though latent skill of their prime ministers, the Marquis d'Ormea and Count Bogino. Where the talents of the subalterns were less eclipsed by the presence of the monarch—as in diplomatic transactions abroad—the Piedmontese agents appeared to better advantage, and the wisdom of the Savoy princes was especially manifest in the choice of their plenipotentiaries. Such were, for instance, the Marquis Annibale Maffei, of Verona, who represented Savoy in London at the Treaty of Utrecht, and the Chevalier D'Ossorio, a Sicilian, who resided at the same court during the Spanish succession. The tact, address, and polished manners of these and other Piedmontese envoys elicited the most flattering encomiums from such men as Montesquieu* and Chesterfield. "In all

* Costa, iii. 276.

courts and congresses," says the latter, "where there are various foreign ministers, those of the King of Sardinia are generally the ablest, the politest, and *les plus déliés.*"* A lustre was at this epoch thrown upon Piedmontese diplomacy, which has not utterly faded at the present day.

There was, however, decline in Piedmont under Victor Amadeus III. in every branch of the administration. A *mediocre* prince, he showed himself a lover of mediocrity. He looked for statesmen amongst court minions, and had often to change them, giving way before the outcry of popular indignation. The two sovereigns who preceded him had incurred the charge of avarice. Victor, praised in youth for his munificence, set no limits to his extravagance. He lavished in vain courtly display all the savings of his careful father, amounting, it is said, to twelve millions, and encumbered his State with debts which, before 1789, amounted to one hundred millions of *lire* (120,000,000 francs).† A great part of this vast sum was squandered in the maintenance of a vast army in the time of the most profound peace. Victor forgot, in his exaggerated love of tall soldiers and big battalions, that a disproportionate armament is as sure to exhaust and bear down a state as too heavy a suit of armour will encumber and crush the warrior frame it is meant to protect. The King had in early youth distinguished himself in some of his father's cam-

* Chesterfield's Letters, ii. 139.

† Botta, Storia d'Italia, dal 1789 al 1814, i. 32.

paigns, and his warlike ardour was further stirred up by the exploits of Frederic II. of Prussia, of which he never tired to hear the recital, and which allowed the vain prince no rest till he had thoroughly re-organized all his military establishment after the Prussian fashion, till he had himself adopted the garb, gait, and bearing of the great monarch, imitating even his characteristic bend of the head on the shoulder,—so that at a grand parade on the Turin *Place d'Armes* the King would be seen riding in front of his troops as if with a stiff neck, followed by a numerous staff, each member of which endeavoured, of course, to the best of his ability, to humour his sovereign by the same oblique stoop of the head on the shoulder.*

These are mere absurdities. But as if to diminish the efficiency of his troops at the very moment he so improvidently multiplied them, King Victor lost sight of the policy of his father, who, although he had the greatest faith in the virtue of "blood," and attached the utmost importance to secure the services of his gallant nobility, had however limited to two-thirds the commissions of which he disposed in their favour, allowing the remainder to be given in remuneration of the merit and valour of men risen from the people, and that, even to the very highest nobles, he would allow no other rank at the outset than that of ensign; and because such an arrangement seemed to wound the vanity of the grandees of the kingdom, he silenced all discontent by entering his own son, the hereditary

* Botta, Storia d'Italia (1534–1789), viii. 106.—Litta, Savoia, t. xx.

prince, into the corps of the cadets.* All these salutary lessons were lost upon Victor Amadeus III., who, exclusively governed by Prussian notions, suffered favour, caprice, and aristocratic prerogative to make free with all military, no less than civil and ecclesiastical, preferment.

For the rest, with the exception of his hunting establishment, which was made one of the gravest matters of State, and of courtly receptions and festivities, in which his more than royal munificence had open field for display, and in which he emulated the mad extravagance, though, happily, not the profligacy, of the French Court, now more closely than ever connected with Savoy, Victor Amadeus showed but little aptitude or inclination for public affairs. He delighted, it is said, in the society of learned and accomplished men, and showed no unfriendly countenance to the various academic institutions which had come into being under the two previous reigns. But he felt great anxiety to avoid collision with Rome, and allowed the priesthood and the inquisition an almost uncontrolled sway over his people. Piedmontese subjects were forbidden to frequent the University of Pavia, which, in consequence of its advocacy of the reforming measures of Joseph II., was by the good King denounced as a hotbed of impiety, equally inimical to throne and altar.† Piedmontese authors

* Costa de Beauregard, Maison de Savoie, iii. 215.—Litta, Savoia, tav. xix.

† Botta, Storia d'Italia, dal 1789 al 1814, i. 32.

were not allowed to publish their writings abroad without previous permission of their censorship at home. The sphere of ideas became daily more contracted; the intercourse of the people of Piedmont with more enlightened neighbours suffered greater and greater hindrance. All progress was stubbornly opposed; the views and wants of the age were scouted without discrimination. The rack and the concomitant horrors of old-fashioned criminal jurisdiction remained a dark blot in the codes of Savoy, till they were rather omitted than deliberately expunged in the re-enactment of the old laws, at the restoration of 1814.* The *Viglietti Reali*, a kind of *lettres de cachet*, by which the Princes of Savoy, like the French Monarchs, had it in their power to stay the course of justice or give a summary termination to a long suit, and by which the wilful and hot-headed though right-minded Victor Amadeus II. often arbitrarily corrected the abuses of a too lenient magistracy, were never more freely used than by Victor Amadeus III., who issued them chiefly for the purpose of screening his nobles from the importunity of their creditors, and putting an end to the proceedings of these latter for the recovery of their due.†

There was, otherwise, great calmness and leisure, both for the King and his subjects. No new book or pamphlet, especially of a grave political tendency, was allowed to stir up the passions of the middle-classes.

* Cibrario, Istituzioni della Monarchia di Savoia, p. 251.

† Cibrario, Istituzioni, p. 252.—Litta, Savoia, tav. xx.

The nobles breathed no air but that of the Court; the people were utterly prostrate; the King paid but little attention to business. Little was done at home, and less abroad.* Those who deem peace the highest happiness, and silence the most profound peace; who think "that is the most enviable State whose annals are the most perfect blank;" might envy Victor and his advisers, who slept in thorough security, devised every day new pastimes, in the pleasing delusion that the State, as well as the world, had reached a haven of endless tranquillity; and armies were no longer to answer any purpose but that of vain parades and mock fights.

* Yet even this comparatively inactive Prince was by no means unmindful of what he owed to the traditional policy of his House. Instinctive jealousy of Austria made him apprehensive of Russia. From documents lately published it results that the Court of Sardinia was, even at this time, the first to be alarmed at the rapid growth and towering ambition of Russia. King Victor's instructions, countersigned by his minister, Count Perrone, to his agents, Count Scarnafiggi, in Paris, and Count Fontana, in Berlin (January 4th and September 29th, 1783), show how anxious Savoy was to call the attention of those Courts to the designs of Russia and Austria against Turkey, and to the great danger accruing to all Europe were this last Power to succumb, urging the necessity of a great combination in its defence, and offering to take the field in such an enterprise with 25,000 men. These warnings could not have failed to be taken into serious consideration, had not the great revolutionary vicissitudes soon following given the general European policy a new and unexpected turn. Savoy has nevertheless the merit of anticipating events by seventy-two years; and when, in 1855, she joined France and England in their efforts against Russia, she only acted in consistency with a policy originally her own, and lent her aid in the execution of a plan, in a great measure, of her own suggestion.—*Il Piemonte*, No. 210 (Turin, September 5, 1855).

The ties with the House of Bourbon had been again and again riveted. Victor's daughters were married to the Count of Provence and the Count of Artois (afterwards Louis XVIII. and Charles X.). The King himself had been wedded to a Spanish Princess since 1750; and, in 1775, he chose for his son, the hereditary Prince, again a bride amongst the daughters of France.

By the intertwining of all the respective branches of the two Houses, the throne of Savoy might be said to rest on as solid a rock as that of St. Louis.

With this flattering conviction, with this heedless confidence, Victor Amadeus III. prepared to meet 1789.

CHAPTER V.

THE ECLIPSE OF PIEDMONT.

THE absolutism which, towards 1789, had been thoroughly established in Piedmont and Italy, was equally predominant in France. Under the same forms however the Government of the two countries was of a far different nature.

Italy was, at this time, in the hands of intelligent and conscientious rulers, not more eager in the attainment of unlimited power than anxious to put it to the best uses. There may have been in their conduct error of judgment or infirmity of purpose, jealousy of all encroachment upon their authority, and a tendency to over-legislation; but a deep, earnest interest for the public welfare was everywhere apparent, and at Milan, at Florence and Naples, at least, a tolerably free utterance was given to the voice of wise, gradual, temperate reform.

In France, on the other hand, there was despotism without a despot. Tyranny went hand-in-hand with anarchy. The great levelling, crushing work, which

began under Richelieu and was completed under Louis XIV., led to nothing but political dissolution and social demoralization. Louis XIV. himself was only a grand Monarch—not great—not even in the sense of a "King by the Grace of God." He was rather arrogant and imperious, than tenacious in usurpation; violent and arbitrary, but neither deep nor methodical in the exercise of sovereign authority. He seemed nevertheless to love power for its own sake; he played the King admirably, and gave his reign a *prestige* of military and literary glory which dazzled his people, and blinded them to the havoc of his destructive rule.

But, after his reign, the sceptre fell into the hands of a man who valued unlimited power solely as a license for unbridled indulgence. Louis XIV. had governed by fits and starts, Louis XV. governed not at all; he was a mere impersonation of vice on the throne; under no earthly ruler has there been greater abuse of favouritism, greater confusion of powers, greater instability, improvidence, and neglect; never a more general extinction of all sense of duty. Rank had no longer any claim upon its holder; wealth became only a means of enjoyment; the noble forsook his castle and estates, the Bishop his diocese; there was but one universal rush to that frantic, hideous carnival of Paris or Versailles. The provinces were left, not indeed to themselves, but to the discretion of royal, feudal, and clerical underlings, who ground, plundered, and besotted them. France was a vast

farm, abandoned to the merciless stewards of its absentee landlords.

With all these evils however there was still a nation in France—one nation. There was a great mass of people, whom want or obscurity kept aloof from those loathsome orgies of its King and Court. Although inert for so many centuries, that mass was yet uncompressed—incompressible. The last links that bound it to its rulers were severed; it stood up arrayed against them; it awaited them at their waking from that long drunkenness, silent, expectant, but firmly resolved to call them to account.

And the day of reckoning came. The necessity of meeting the exigencies of an empty treasury, drove the meek, well-meaning Louis XVI. to a convocation of the States-General, an institution of which, after 175 years, well-nigh the very memory was lost in the country (May 5th, 1789). From that day the nation took the power into its own hands; it formed itself into a Constituent Assembly (June 16th); it swept away all aristocratic and ecclesiastical privileges; it abolished the nobility and clergy, the worship of God, and God himself: it stormed the state-prison of La Bastille, and the King's Castle at Versailles; it led royalty captive, loaded it with ignominy, and finally brought it to the scaffold (January 21st, 1793).

But long before it had come to the consummation of that last outrage at home, the French nation had assumed an aggressive attitude abroad. Propagandism was everywhere at work, the forerunner of con-

quest. Revolutionary agents were particularly active in Italy, and signally successful in Savoy. Insurrections in Chambéry, in 1791–2, had to be suppressed by violent means. But the French Republic undertook the advocacy of the oppressed, the vindication of the "Rights of Men" all over the world, and a large French army was drawn up on the borders of Savoy and Nice.

The position of Victor Amadeus III., at this emergency, was fraught with grave difficulties. His State was deep in debt; his army, though but too numerous, was, as we have seen, wretchedly organized. The soldiers had seen no fire for five-and-forty years; the officers were young nobles, who thought they could make up by arrogance and presumption for want of talent and experience. The King himself, with all his admiration for Frederic of Prussia, was only a soldier on the parade ground. None of his five grown-up sons—all of them raised to high military rank—seemed endowed with transcendent abilities. Almost for the first time in the history of Savoy, the whole dynasty gave up the post of honour in the field. After short, unsatisfactory experiments, and as soon as the war began in good earnest, all hope of a national leader was abandoned, and the armies of Savoy were entrusted to the guidance of an Austrian, Devins, and of Colli, a native of Vigevano, who had borne arms and attained the rank of a General in the Austrian service.*

* Costa de Beauregard, Maison de Savoie, iii. 315.

If no great reliance could be placed on an army so constituted, it was equally impossible to expect proofs of enthusiastic devotion on the people's part. Discontent was not greatly rife in Piedmont itself; and truly the great events following each other with so great a rapidity in France, had rather raised wonder and bewilderment than sympathy in Italy. The arrival at Turin, before the end of 1789, of the fugitive Count of Artois, brother of the French King, and Victor's son-in-law, with a whole host of emigrant nobles and priests from the revolutionized country, could not fail to spread alarm in a society where the clergy and aristocracy still possessed considerable ascendency. A certain degree of agitation, sheer curiosity, and vague longing for innovation, were discernible here and there in the middle ranks. We hear, in the course of 1791, of student-rows at the University of Turin;* but Piedmont—we have described it—was a dull, stationary, orderly community. Its moral population was soon startled and shocked by the report of revolutionary excesses: it is evident that it would never have stirred by its own impulse, never even yielded to the treasonable suggestions of revolutionary emissaries.

Unfortunately, as Victor Amadeus became convinced of the necessity of preparing for impending struggles, he added not a little to the existing causes of incipient ferment.

He was about to enter into a war with a hundred and twenty millions of debt, and could not be very

* Denina, Italia Occidentale, v. 117.

scrupulous as to the means of raising supplies. Taxes were soon doubled and trebled, but afforded little relief to the shattered finances. In progress of time the King exacted from the wealthiest classes the sacrifice of their gold and silver plate; he took down the bells from the church-steeples, and melted them into cannon. He obtained the Pope's warrant for the suppression of convents and nunneries, and for the confiscation of their goods. As need urged, he raised in two years (1793–5) to eighty-five millions the state-paper in circulation; finally, he issued a very large amount of bad coin,—several millions of *lire* and half-*lire*, of the respective intrinsic value of eight and four *sous*, which the people were to take for twenty and ten *sous*. The pieces struck at this period, reduced to their lawful value and known as *mute* and *mezze-mute*, constitute nearly the whole of the small change in circulation in the Sardinian States at the present day.*

Whilst such desperate measures were adopted to ward off an enemy, which seemed perhaps less heinous to the people than to the Prince, unnecessary severity was displayed towards those who might be suspected of a leaning towards the democratic doctrines, wherein lay the main strength of that enemy. As the French armies advanced, and the fortunes of the monarchy hung on the issues of combat, edicts came out for the dispersion even of accidental popular assemblages; for the discontinuation of meetings, even

* Costa de Beauregard, iii. 440.—Cibrario, Cronologia, pp. 105–107.

of literary men—even of Arcadian poets; for the closing* of the University, of the College of Provinces, —as well as of clubs and "circles,"—even of harmless whist-players. Presently also the general disarmament of the people was strictly enforced.

Love or fear thus secured the allegiance of Piedmont; but it was otherwise in Savoy, a country which had at last found out its identity of language and nature with France, and whose connections, especially with the Lyons manufactories, made it throb with the new life which thrilled through the great mass of the revolutionized nation. The troops sent for the repression of that province, on the first outbreak of its turbulent spirit at Chambéry, Montmeillan, and Thonon, in 1791, only added exasperation to the malcontents, and swelled their numbers. The French, who were already in great force on the frontier, made the severe measures adopted by the Sardinian Government against the Savoyards one of the many pretexts for hostilities. An army, under Montesquiou, suddenly invaded Savoy, in 1792 (September 21st). Towards the end of the same month the county of Nice was overpowered by General Anselme.

The fortresses of those two provinces had long since been levelled with the ground. About ten thousand men, quartered here and there at random, were trusted with the defence of each. They had been hastily sent from Piedmont, and had scarcely time to take up their position; but the resistance they offered was even

* Denina, Italia Occidentale, vi. 16.

feebler than might have been expected from such scanty means and under all circumstances. Their leaders gave proof of helpless imbecility, and not even the honour of the troops was saved. The consciousness that they stood on treacherous ground, and that the country around and behind them was yearning for their opponents, gave rise to a panic amongst the Piedmontese, which brought the struggle to a speedy issue.*

There was, subsequent to the invasion, a few days' raving and revelling at Chambéry, with patriotic songs, red caps and banners, and trees of liberty, and all that mad gear with which the Revolution decked itself at that strange period. The Savoyards, who at all times seem disposed to quarrel with their own name, and style themselves "Savoisiens," resumed at this juncture their classical appellation of "Allobroges;" they called together an assembly and a convention, sent "fraternizing" deputations to Paris, rid themselves of monks and nuns, and declared the forfeiture (*déchéance*) of the dynasty to which they had given name. Finally, they broke into the royal chapel and castle; they attacked the Abbey of Hautecombe, violated its sepulchral vaults, and scattered the ashes of the Savoy Princes to the winds.† Weariness of independence soon however overcame them. The Allobrogic tribe merged into the great Gallic nation; Savoy was annexed to France, as the department of Mont Blanc (November 27th, 1792). On the 7th of December of

* Botta, Storia d'Italia, 1789–1814, i. 64.

† Litta, Savoia, tav. xx.

the same year the county of Nice, after passing through the same phases, was also incorporated with France as the department of the Maritime Alps.

All the subjects of Victor Amadeus did not with equal levity hail foreign invasion as an auspicious event; but those who gave proofs of fidelity were indiscreet in their zeal. As the French proceeded with their conquests, the town and garrison of Oneglia fired on a French boat, which approached their shore under a flag of truce,—a disgraceful violation of international law, which the French admiral, Truguet, justly punished by the bombardment and destruction of the place (October 10th, 1792). The same admiral next proceeded to Sardinia, and there also sent an officer in a boat to Cagliari, to call upon the town to surrender. The officer and his crew again fell under a volley of musketry. The troops and people of the Sardinian capital, after their dastardly slaughter of defenceless people, sailing under a symbol respected by all civilized nations, atoned to some extent for the deed by a gallant resistance. The fire from the French ships was returned with great spirit by the land batteries; the landing parties were overpowered both by the troops and people from the town, and by the mountaineers descending on all sides to their aid. After a few days' disastrous struggle (January 24th to 31st, 1793), the French fleet, dispersed by storms, was compelled to repair to Toulon.*

But the Sardinian people had no sooner distin-

* Botta, i. 63, 90.

guished themselves by such exploits than they solicited their reward. A revolutionary spirit had reached even that half-civilized island, but its ideas of freedom were strangely at variance with those which France had now rendered so popular throughout Europe. The Sardinians asked for a restitution of their ancient *Stamenti*, or Cortes, after the Aragonese model, a constitution which rested on strictly feudal principles, and had been suppressed by Charles Emanuel III., as a mere remnant of mediæval barbarism. On a refusal of their demands on the part of the Turin Government, the Sardinians broke out into the most direful excesses; they murdered the Intendant-general or Governor, Pitzolu, and the commander of the forces, Marquis Della Planargia (July, 1793); they expelled all the Piedmontese, with the exception of the priesthood, and became a prey to rabid factions, which could only be reconciled by Papal mediation, and by undignified and imprudent concessions of the Government, in 1796.

Victor Amadeus had thus lost in Savoy and Nice one-fourth of his territory before he was fully aware that he was at war, and he saw how little support could be expected even from his most devoted adherents.

But he had foreseen the storms from afar, and from the first Parisian outbreak of 1789 he had endeavoured to strengthen himself by foreign alliances.

A generous instinct had prompted him to appeal to the neighbouring states of Italy for a combined

effort against a common foe, and the formation of a national league; but forty-five years of profound peace had utterly enervated the Italians and their rulers. Those benevolent Governments of Tuscany and Lombardy, whose wisdom and kindness of heart have been so freely extolled, had only thought of the happiness, by no means of the safety, of their subjects: they had cultivated their intelligence, promoted their industry, but imparted no manliness to them; nay, by too lenient laws, by the bountiful supply of cheap pleasures, by the encouragement of frivolous amusements, by a half-priestly education, by a base, grovelling religion, they had fostered the emasculate habits to which southern people are but too naturally prone. The Italians love life, but they are not constitutionally cowards. Only for the last three hundred years all Governments, but one, have conspired to make them so, by adding fresh, easy enjoyments to a life that has already too many charms for them, and by breaking that active spirit, that strong feeling of honour, that stubborn sense of duty, which enhance the value of sacrifice by the amount of its cost. With the exception of Piedmont, all the Italian Governments of the eighteenth century affected a contempt for military training, and their people were but too willing to be looked upon as a privileged people, allowed to dance and fiddle at pleasure, and never expected to fight. The soldier's business was at Milan and Naples the Spaniard's, and more lately the German's; at Rome the Swiss's; at Venice the Slavonian's. There

were no Italian fighting men but in Piedmont, and, for nearly half a century, their exploits had been limited to their sham battles on the Turin *Place d'Armes*.

The treacherous security into which the people had so long been lulled could not be dispelled even by the astounding tidings of the French victories on the Rhine and at the foot of the Alps. As danger drew near, the blind, overweening confidence was succeeded by blank, supine consternation. The dastards of the Venetian Senate answered Victor's advances by a resolution of "unarmed neutrality." Tuscany never was at war, and yet was the first of European States to sue for peace and recognize the French Republic. The Pope and other Italian Princes were paralyzed by ill-grounded fear of their subjects; the Genoese patricians evinced no confidence in their own people —a people which had however given such splendid proofs of valour and devotion less than half a century before; they listened besides to feelings of jealousy and rancour, for which the aggressive conduct of Savoy in previous occurrences had, no doubt, given sufficient ground. Genoa embraced the neutral policy of Venice, and thus contributed to the downfall of Piedmont—and her own.

Sardinia was therefore, from sheer necessity, thrown into the hands of foreign powers.

The Count of Artois, and other members of the French royal family, from their first arrival at Turin in 1789, had spared no pains to excite the interest of Victor Amadeus in favour of a cause which ties of

blood made indisputably his own. The same appeal, it is well known, was made at the time to all the European Courts, and from the very first danger of Louis XVI. attempts were made to effect an alliance between those Courts, with a view to intimidate the demagogues who had now the upper hand in France, or at least to rescue the royal family from their hands. The Emperor Leopold II., who had succeeded his brother, Joseph II., in 1790, was urged by the imminent danger of his sister, Marie Antoinette, to the utmost exertions. Conferences were held, under his auspices, at Mantua, in March, 1791, and at Pavia in the ensuing July, in which Spain and Switzerland seem to have agreed to join Austria in an armed demonstration on the French frontiers. A treaty was subsequently signed at Pilnitz (August 27th, 1791) between Austria and Prussia, but the parties even yet proceeded with great caution, lest too open an interference in French matters might endanger those very royal lives it was so important to preserve; and no open attack was made on the French till July, 1792, full three months after their first unsuccessful aggression on Flanders.

Victor Amadeus was not only, like Joseph II., "a royalist by trade," but a violent hater of the new-fangled democracy and of the milk-and-water Tuscan and Austrian philanthropy which he thought had led to it. After wasting nearly his whole reign in the re-organization of a useless armament, it was natural he should long for an opportunity to test its efficiency. But

whatever may be said of his great ardour for war, before real danger drew near,* there is no doubt that he now considered the deplorable state of his finances; he espied the symptoms of partial disaffection in his subjects, and put off any rash step which might engage him, single-handed, in a struggle with France. He had, as we have seen, little reason to love or trust Austria, nor could he expect either fair-dealing or cordial support in that quarter. Those conferences of Mantua and Pavia are involved in hopeless mystery; nor is it clear to what extent Sardinia may have bound herself to their alleged conventions. It is asserted† that he refused, in 1791, to add his name to the signature of the Pilnitz Treaty, because he objected to a clause by which a partition of France was agreed upon, a measure which might have led to the sacrifice of his own interests; but one year later, and when the northern allies were irrevocably committed, he gave in his adhesion to the treaty (July 25th, 1792).‡

The French, for their own part, did not seem anxious to number Sardinia amongst their open enemies. They wished disorganization everywhere to precede the work of conquest, and the tumults of Savoy were not of a nature to raise very sanguine expectations. Those Savoy riots were, in fact, already suppressed, and the French army had long been stationed on the frontier of Savoy and Nice, when an envoy, Semonville, was directed to proceed from Genoa to Turin, the bearer

* Botta, i. 50. † Cibrario, Cronologia, p. 105.
‡ Sclopis, Relazioni, p. 103.

of a proposed alliance between France and Savoy, and of an offer, in behalf of this latter power, of the possession of all the Italian lands which might be conquered by the united armies of both states. Victor Amadeus always had an exaggerated dread of republican intrigues, and of the inflammable nature of his subjects' brains. His alarm at the reported plotting of Semonville, and the consciousness of the degree to which he was already committed with the northern allies, did not allow him to waver in his resolution; the envoy, who had already travelled as far as Alessandria, received peremptory orders to proceed no further.

The refusal to receive their ambassador, together with the hospitality granted to the French princes of the blood, and the measures adopted by the Sardinian Government to stifle the germs of insurrection amongst its Savoyard subjects, were the grounds upon which France based her declaration of war against Victor,* a circumstance which might lead to the supposition either that the French Government knew nothing of the King's accession to the alliance of Pilnitz, or that a vain hope was still entertained of inducing him to retrace his steps.

The French declaration of war bears the date of Paris, September 15th, 1792. Only six days later, we have seen, the territory of Savoy was invaded. The suddenness of the attack, without previous intimation, or only at so short a notice, must partly excuse the feebleness of the resistance; it has also been brought forward in extenuation of the inhuman outrage against

* Costa de Beauregard, iii. 437.

boats sailing under a flag of truce at Oneglia and Cagliari, for the French republicans were already looked upon as wild beasts, placed by their excesses without the pale of civilized nations; and their unexpected attack upon a neighbour with whom they could hardly be said to be at war, was already a breach of all international right and usages. Pusillanimity against an armed, and violence against a defenceless enemy, are however a poor prelude to fair, manly war, and the deeds of Oneglia and Cagliari must be put together with the murders of Duphot and Basseville at Rome: the ferocity of a people is too generally commensurate with their cowardice.

The disasters of Savoy and Nice, and the death of Louis XVI., ended all the irresolution of Victor Amadeus, who put himself completely into the hands of the allies, by an offensive and defensive treaty of the 7th of March, 1793, and on the 25th of the following April came to an agreement with England, engaging to take the field with 50,000 men, whilst England paid him £200,000 as a yearly subsidy. The latter power also guaranteed the integrity of the Sardinian territory, and bound herself to come to no agreement with the enemy except on the express condition of a restitution of the invaded provinces.*

Still the main support of Sardinia, at least by land, was Austria; and nothing was more natural than to suppose that this latter power felt a vital interest in the preservation of the neighbouring State, and saw

* Sclopis, Relazioni, p. 104.

that the Alps were hardly less a protection to Lombardy than to Piedmont itself. Austria however was, at this great juncture, under the influence of mean, selfish views. The fatal contempt of the revolutionary party in France, and the confidence that the slightest exertions would be sufficient to crush it, still blinded the greater number of European cabinets, and allowed them to wander about in pursuit of most chimerical schemes. The hope of aggrandisement in Italy was always very strong in the hearts of Austrian rulers, and of no one more so than of the young, infatuated Francis I., who had succeeded his father, Leopold II., in 1792. Even when Austria was worsted in the fields of the Netherlands, as late as 1794, an exchange of Flanders against Bavaria, or, more willingly, against some territory in Italy, was seriously contemplated at Vienna.* But the acquisition of new lands was not an object of so great an anxiety as the recovery of lost ground. At this early period of the struggle, Austria, under no apprehension of danger from France, had no other wish than to see Savoy brought to extremity, in order to sell her aid to the King at the cost of the Novarese, and other districts which had been detached from the Duchy of Milan, in 1703 and 1743. Notwithstanding the most honest and strenuous efforts of England to baffle Austria's designs, negotiations to that effect were carried on at Turin as early as 1792, and more actively during the whole of the eventful 1793, till they led, at last, in 1794 (May 23rd), to the Treaty

* Mémoires d'un Homme d'État, v. 539.

of Valenciennes, by which Sardinia was forced to consent to the ultimate restitution of the above Milanese districts, in consideration of a cession, on the part of Austria, of her own share of the eventual conquests that their united armies might accomplish in the south-eastern French provinces.*

In pursuance of such schemes, Austria, during the whole period of these transactions, purposely allowed Savoy to stand her own ground as she best could, with her unaided forces; nor was she very active in her support even after the attainment of her aim. The troops sent to co-operate with the Piedmontese were in small numbers and of an inferior description of raw recruits,† and she insisted upon her own generals always wielding the supreme command over the united armies, so that, when the fortunes of the war began clearly to turn against the allies, the Imperial generals, either from their blindness or from wilful treachery, abandoned the defence of the Alps, in an excessive anxiety to cover the Milanese.

It was thus destined that all should, deservedly, end in a common ruin.

Fortune had so far favoured the allies that, at the very time the French Convention bade them defiance by hurling at their feet the heads of Louis XVI. and his Queen, France was distracted by royalist factions, which had already raised a standard in La Vendée, and were now mustering strong in the south-eastern

* Sclopis, Relazioni, pp. 109, 172.

† Denina, Italia Occidentale, v. 129.

provinces, especially at Lyons, Marseilles, and Toulon. Outbreaks, indeed, occurred in the first-named city, in July, 1793, and the harbour and forts of Toulon were about the same time given up to the English and their Spanish, Neapolitan, and Sardinian allies.

Now or never was the time for Savoy to make up for her losses of 1792. The King had no less than 50,000 men under arms, and could dispose of 10,000 Austrian auxiliaries. Whatever might be the spirit by which the Piedmontese population was animated, there could be no doubt respecting the devotion and discipline of the troops. A Savoyard regiment—Maurienne—had, owing to some misunderstanding, been disbanded during the confusion attendant upon the loss of the Transalpine provinces, in 1792, and the soldiers were sent home on furlough. Orders were issued for their rendezvous at Susa, in May, 1793, and every man tore himself from the arms of his revolutionized countrymen, and appeared punctually at the appointed time and place.*

Nor, after their recovery from a first panic, had the King any reason for apprehension on the score of the bravery of those troops.

The republican armies had, in 1792, pushed their conquests to the foot of the Alps, and directed their well-combined attacks on those mountains in the ensuing spring (1793). They came up by the road of the Col di Tenda, as far as Saorgio, where that most forbidding of all Alpine passes barred the narrow de-

* Costa de Beauregard, iii. 317.

file against them. All along the uppermost crest the Piedmontese had, according to their wont, entrenched themselves, and, at all the main points, they had to sustain the furious onslaught of their foes. Great efforts were made by the French, especially at the Col di Raus, Lauthion, Mille-forche, in June, 1793, but they were everywhere driven back, and the post of Raus, above all, was held by the Piedmontese with a steadiness worthy of the sons of the heroes of Col de l'Assiette. The mountaineers of those Alps powerfully aided the efforts of the regular troops.*

The French had been reduced to their former position, and their ranks were presently thinned by a necessity to send reinforcements to the garrisons of their tumultuary southern cities.

Had the King been equal to the magnitude of the present emergency, had he collected all his forces for a mighty attempt upon any given point; had he, for instance, crossed the St. Bernard, and, joined by the Swiss who were ready to co-operate with him, marched down the Rhone to Lyons, there is no doubt that the presence of his army would not only have compelled the republicans to relinquish their hold of Savoy and Nice, but would also have exposed them to such a general onset of the Royalists, as might easily have wrenched the whole of the south-east of France from their sway.

It was the course followed by Charles Emanuel I. in 1590, under analogous circumstances, though with far more limited means.

* Costa, iii. 314.

But Victor Amadeus III. was incapable of a generous conception, and his Austrian adviser, Devins, would have thwarted it, had it even been entertained.

The King resolved on the employment of only part of his troops, deeming it imprudent to leave Turin and Piedmont in his rear without a sufficient force to keep the much-redoubted Jacobins in check; and he divided even such portion of his army as he fancied he could safely dispose of, so as to attempt a simultaneous recovery of both his lost provinces. The Duke of Montferrat, the third of his sons, was, nominally, trusted with the command of the Savoy expedition; the King himself, with his second son, the Duke of Aosta, assisted by the Austrian general, marched upon Nice.

It was but a feeble and a puny effort on either side. The Duke of Montferrat descended the valleys of the Arc, the Isère, and the Arve, meeting with little resistance on the part of the French, who expected an attack from widely-superior forces, and who had sent the *élite* of their troops to the siege of Lyons. But when these latter became aware that it was only an insignificant division of the Sardinian army they had to deal with, they immediately rallied, and, aided by fresh troops, which were instantly summoned from Lyons, they soon displayed a decided superiority over their assailants, who were forced to recross the mountains.

In the south, again, ephemeral success ended in ultimate disgrace.

The King only quitted Turin in August—having lost an incredible deal of precious time—full of hope and courage, and intimating by his war-cry, "Nice or Superga!" his determination to conquer or die. He joined his army at Ghiandola, below Tenda and Saorgio, whilst his divisions crossed the Col delle Finestre, and down the valleys of the Vesubia and Tinea, drove the French before them with a speed which, properly seconded, would have compelled them to fall back across the Var.

But the impetuosity of the Piedmontese soon slackened. They had Massena against them, a young, dashing warrior, a native of Nice, who had found in the republican armies that promotion from which his ignoble birth would have debarred him under his lawful sovereign. Massena soon perceived the inferiority of the numbers arrayed against him: he took up a strong position, which he held until reinforcements, recalled in great haste from Toulon, empowered him to meet the Sardinians in the open field. These latter sought the shelter of Saorgio, and the King re-entered Turin, on the 14th of November, with the bitter conviction that Nice was for ever lost to him, and his hour for Superga had not yet struck.

From that day Sardinia was reduced to a defensive war on the Alps. Her failure prevented any demonstration on the part of the Swiss, and carried dismay into the ranks of the Royalist party in France, especially of the defenders of Lyons and Toulon. The former city surrendered on the 9th of October, and

the latter was abandoned by the allies on the 19th of the ensuing December (1793).

Everything thus turned out in favour of the revolutionary Government. Equally successful against the Vendeans, and the foreign armies on the Rhine and in the Netherlands, the Convention, now at the height of its power, prepared for a great effort against Piedmont, and, at the opening of the campaign of 1794, no less than 75,000 combatants swelled the ranks of the army of the Alps.

On the Alps however the Piedmontese still showed a good countenance: the republican generals, not very sanguine of overcoming that terrible barrier of Saorgio and all the bristling crests of the maritime Alps, once more discussed the old plan conceived by Las Minas and Maillebois fifty years before—they proposed to turn the position they were unable to storm. The young hero of Toulon, Napoleon Bonaparte, was with them, and the thought probably originated with him.

It was necessary, for that purpose, that the French should march through part of the Genoese districts, thereby violating the neutrality of a non-combatant state; but the Convention contended, that Genoa had already suffered the English to break that neutrality by capturing a French frigate in her very harbour and under her own batteries, and was therefore no longer entitled to any regard on their own part. Their agents, besides, alarmed the Senate by imputing to the allies dark schemes of giving up Genoa to Savoy as a compensation for what she might have to resign

either to France or Austria. They thus roused the never-dormant suspicions of the Genoese, suspicions too truly justified by all the precedents of the last two centuries, and even, perhaps, by the negotiations actually pending.* The Genoese Senate, satisfied with a vain protest, winked at the invasion of its territory.

The French marched along-shore, across the little principality of Monaco, on to the Genoese lands of Ventimiglia and St. Remo; they next occupied the Sardinian districts of Oneglia and Loano, and hence ascending the valleys of Dolce Acqua, and Taggia, they crossed the Apennines into the valley of the Tanaro; hence they overcame the passes of Col Ardente and Briga, and thus came out in the rear of Saorgio. Massena was at their head, and with him Colonel Rusca, also a native of Piedmont, too well acquainted with all those mountain defiles. The generals at the head of the Sardinian forces were aware of the danger, and had warned their commander-in-chief, the Austrian, Devins, of the expediency of occupying the passes on the Genoese side. But Devins dwelt with blind confidence on the inviolability of a neutral territory, and would not commit himself to any act which might imply an infraction of international laws on his own side.† Whilst Saorgio was thus attacked in the rear, other French divisions, by simultaneous efforts, overpowered the Col di Raus, and other positions at the head of the valley of the Vesubia, whilst, again, others assailed the central fortress in front. Terror and con-

* Botta, i. 118. † Costa, iii. 441.

fusion were thus struck into the heart of its defenders, and with unnecessary hurry (as Victor Amadeus thought, who shot the commander, St. Amour, a Savoyard, for it), Saorgio surrendered on the 28th of April, 1794. Before the end of May the French had mastered all the passes of the maritime Alps, and had equally, though not without repeated repulses, ultimately overpowered the Piedmontese posts on the Little St. Bernard, Mont Cenis, and Mont Genèvre.

The Alps were thus won, but the invaders could not reach the plain without forcing their way across one of the lines of forts which barred the narrow defiles, as well as the entrance of each valley, on the Italian side. Bonaparte, in fact, strongly urged a descent into the valley of the Stura, upon Demonte and Cuneo; but France now trembled under the iron sceptre of Robespierre, who, intent upon other operations in the north, and even, as it seems, hopeful of an advantageous peace with Austria,* condemned his victorious troops in the south to inaction, during the best part of the summer months. Bonaparte had been called away from his camp on the Alps, and the remainder of this, and the best part of the next year, were spent by him in indigence and obscurity in Paris. Robespierre fell, and with him the Reign of Terror came to an end, on the 27th of July (9 Thermidor), 1794; but the confusion attendant upon these awful commotions paralyzed the operations of the republican generals, who received no orders from the metropolis. Late in the autumn,

* Mémoires d'un Homme d'État, iii. 7, 33.

however, they followed up their conquests along the Riviera and occupied Finale. Hence they ventured across the mountains, into the valley of the Bormida, as far as Dego, and threatened Acqui, Alba, and Mondovì. They met the Austrians at Dego towards the end of September, routed them, and forced them to fall back upon Acqui, but the season was now advanced, and the campaign came to a close.

The following year was more remarkable for peaceful than warlike operations. France had gradually fallen under the rule of more moderate men, and by the failure of the last insurrection, of the 5th of October (13th Vendémiaire), 1795, she was at last submitted by military force to a government which inspired greater confidence, and was more willing to come to terms with the enemies of the Republic. Tuscany, Prussia, Sweden, Holland, and Spain, had already accepted the proffered peace: Sardinia, Austria, and England, were left alone in the field.

The French, commanded by Kellerman, occupied the whole alpine crest, from the Little St. Bernard to Vado. Their numbers did not exceed 45,000. The Piedmontese defended all the valleys with 50,000 of their own combatants and 15,000 Austrians. The allies were now equal to an attack on the Apennines and the maritime Alps, and they attempted it. The French had to abandon Vado, Finale, Loano, and would have yielded the ground to the very borders of their country had it not been for the inexplicable sluggishness of the Austrian general, who wasted the best sum-

mer months in complete inaction near Savona, and gave the enemy time to send fresh troops from the Rhine and the Pyrenees.*

Scherer was now in command of the French, but Massena was at the vanguard, and it was he who not only won back all the lost ground, in the autumn, but gave the allies a great battle at Loano (November 23, 24), the most decisive encounter that had yet taken place in all the revolutionary wars, in which Massena, anticipating Napoleon's famous tactics, turned all his efforts upon one central point of the enemy's line, so as to break it, and then fall with overwhelming force successively on each of the severed wings.† This victory of the French did not bring them any nearer to the conquest of Piedmont, but laid the whole Riviera open before them, and secured their free communication with Genoa.

1796 came, and with it the fate of Piedmont and Italy. Vain attempts had been made to avoid a final struggle by peaceful negotiation between France and Sardinia, aided by Spanish mediation; but Victor perceived that all France wished was, by granting him a respite, to push on her conquests into Lombardy, after the achievement of which Piedmont must be utterly at her mercy. The alternative was however, at the utmost, a generous resistance; and the King's exertions could only have enabled him to meet with honour an almost inevitable fall.

* Jomini, Guerres de la Révolution, vii. 293–297.

† Alison, Europe, v. 54.

Bonaparte, whose famous "whiff of grape-shot" had, on the 13th Vendémiaire, put an end to the Revolution, took the command of the army of the Alps on the 27th of March, 1796. He was only twenty-seven years old, bold, serene, and confident of his fate. The army consisted of 42,000 men, and had greatly suffered from cold and want, but a new spirit was breathed into it by its young general; Massena, Augereau, Berthier, Serrurier, served under him, and also Lannes, at that time a young *chef de bataillon*. Napoleon's plan was long since formed. He determined to force his way into Piedmont, not through the valleys of the Stura or Tanaro, but through those of the Bormida; expecting to thrust himself between his Austrian and Sardinian opponents, to force them asunder, to beat them separately. It was the identical plan of Maillebois, in 1745; and was crowned with no less brilliant and more solid success.

The Austrians had substituted Beaulieu for Devins; the Piedmontese were led by Colli, and their combined army amounted to little less than 60,000 men.

The French general advanced along the shore as far as Savona; he then met his enemy at Montenotte (April 11th), and there, at the very first onset, he forced the Austrians down one of the valleys of the Bormida, at Dego; from which they continued their retreat towards Acqui and Alessandria. Meanwhile he turned his main efforts against the Piedmontese; he forced them from their posts at Millesimo, and successively at Cosseria; he drove them over the

heights of Montezemolo, into the valley of the Tanaro, and again beat them at La Corsaglia and Mondovì. In less than ten days all resistance was overcome, and the invaders stood on the plain (April 22nd). Thus had the conqueror redeemed the pledge he had given to his soldiers, as he stood on the heights of Montezemolo and pointed out to them, as the prize of valour, the land of promise, the verdant plain of Piedmont, and its fresh luxuriant valleys, and the formidable, but now unavailing, Alpine barrier,—an endless succession of brown rugged cliffs and glittering snowy summits,—majestically encircling it, and exclaimed with conscious pride, "That Hannibal's achievements had been successfully emulated,—that the Africans had forced the Alps, the French had turned them."*

The invaders stood on the plain, but their victory was not complete. The Austrians were all but unbroken; they had perceived their error, and were hastening to the rescue. Bonaparte had ventured across the mountains without heavy cannon, and Ceva, Cuneo, Alessandria, Tortona, Valenza, and Turin itself, stood before him,—strong places not to be overcome without tedious besieging operations.

Victor Amadeus was by far in a better situation than his forefathers, Charles Emanuel I. and Victor Amadeus II., had been in frequent instances, but he had not the heart of his forefathers. Bonaparte exaggerated, through his agents, the importance of his

* Thiers, Révolution Française, viii. 203.

first successes, and frightened the King by some paltry democratic movements, especially at Alba, where a Piedmontese emigrant, Bonafous, joined by a few hot-headed enthusiasts, and backed by a French column, under Laharpe, had raised a revolutionary standard.* The English and Austrian residents at Turin strove to hold up the sinking courage of the King, but they demanded that the fortresses of Tortona, Alessandria, and Valenza should be delivered up to Austrian garrisons, and Beaulieu, now in full retreat, even attempted to seize them by main force.† The King, justly indignant, and thinking that harder terms could scarcely be imposed by the victorious enemy himself, hastened to submit to the latter, and signed an armistice at Cherasco (April 27th), which received its confirmation at the Peace of Paris (May 15th).

More humbling or ruinous conditions had never been forced upon Savoy. Bonaparte, at Cherasco, demanded the fortresses of Ceva, Cuneo, and Tortona; at Paris the King relinquished also Alessandria and Valenza, and consented besides to the demolition of Susa, La Brunetta, Exilles, and all those mountain fortresses which had for centuries, and in so many wars, overawed the French in their aggressive career. Peace, this fatal, hasty, improvident peace, was fruitful of more important results to France than the most successful war would have been. Bonaparte was fully aware of the precariousness of his position, and was

* Botta, i. 207. † Alison's Europe, v. 185.

known to assert that the resistance of Piedmont for another fortnight would unavoidably have compelled him to a retrograde movement, and that, in the meantime, any freak of fortune, any untoward mischance, might have blasted his prospects for the future.* By the easy conquest of Alessandria and Tortona, he now stole a march on Beaulieu, whom he deceived by a feigned move upon Valenza, and crossed the Po at Piacenza, thus effecting his entrance into Lombardy without fear of enemies in the rear.

To this ignoble end did the Monarchy of Savoy come by its own weakness and imbecility. Deprived of his Transalpine possessions, of Savoy and Nice, of which a formal cession was exacted from him, and no less of Oneglia, Loano, and other possessions south of the Apennines, on the Riviera, compelled to allow a free passage, and even to supply provisions to the French troops, who now crossed his states in every direction,—Victor had, in reality, signed at Paris the downfall of his dynasty.

But he did not live to witness it; he died on the 16th of October, 1796, only five months after the conclusion of the Peace of Paris, not improbably sinking under the weight of sorrow and humiliation; the immediate cause of his death however was apoplexy, and he had reached his seventieth year, an age which the Princes of Savoy seldom exceeded, and hardly ever by more than one or two years.

He was survived by five sons, three of whom,

* Napoleon's Mémoires (Montholon et Gourgaud), iii. 151.

Charles Emanuel IV., Victor Emanuel I., and Charles Felix, successively inherited the throne. With the last-named the main line of Savoy ended in 1831.

The contest, which came to such a sorrowful close at Cherasco, had been carried on by the Piedmontese for above four years. With the exception of their over-hasty retreat from Savoy and Nice in 1792, it would be unjust to say that the soldiers had, in any manner, forfeited the reputation they had gained in more fortunate campaigns, at the beginning and in the middle of the century. The French republicans did not fail to do justice to the valour of these troops, and they evinced their estimation of them by the fact that, both in 1792, in 1795, and even during the negotiations for the Peace of Paris in 1796, they were still offering Lombardy to Victor Amadeus, if he would only join them in its conquest "with one column of his troops."* Even after the victory Bonaparte spoke of the Piedmontese with marked respect, and repeatedly assured the Directory "that one of the King's battalions or squadrons was sufficient for the overthrow of the whole Cisalpine republic."†

The pusillanimity of the King, at the head of such troops, was therefore no less inexplicable than unpardonable, nor can the disaffection of the people be accepted as an excuse for the precipitancy with which an almost unbroken Monarchy was bidden to lay down its arms. Piedmont gave at this time no alarm-

* Cibrario, Istituzioni della Monarchia, p. 208.

† Botta, ii. 206–209.

ing signs of defection. The conspiracy against the King's life, by the physician Barolo, an abandoned character, who, to save his worthless life, betrayed his accomplices and brought them to the scaffold in 1794, was an isolated fact, altogether unmeaning and aimless.* Nor had the graceless movement of Bonafous at Alba, notwithstanding the countenance of the French army, any consequence at the time. Bonaparte, a good judge of mankind, frankly avowed that there was, in Piedmont, no proper stuff for revolutionary attempts; even in more critical times, all the might of the French, masters of the whole of Italy, and all their diabolical intrigues, never gave rebellion the upper hand. Unlike Venice and Genoa, and all the other Italian States, Piedmont was not destined to fall by the hand of its own people.

But, if the soldiers of Piedmont only did half their duty, and its King and Princes fell so miserably short even of that, there is no doubt that the fall of its monarchy, and the consequent ruin of Italy, must also be attributed to other causes over which they had no control.

The dastardly neutrality of Venice, the helpless supineness of Tuscany, Rome, and Naples, and the deliberate defection of Genoa, left Piedmont almost alone in the struggle. Not a single Italian soldier fought with the Piedmontese. The King of Naples, who had promised a force of 20,000 men, merely sent 2000 horse, who only did garrison duty at Valenza. Hardly

* Denina, Italia Occidentale, v. 150.

any efficient support could be obtained even from Austria, who was throughout more anxious to profit by the calamities of Sardinia than to avert them. Her generals, too blindly trusted by Victor Amadeus, to the great disparagement and mortification of his own abler officers, were only a hindrance to Piedmont in its successes, and remorselessly abandoned it in its reverses. By a vain respect for the neutrality of Genoa, by a blind reliance on an equal regard for it on the part of the French, they decided the fall of Saorgio, and removed the war from the Alps, wherein lay Piedmont's strength, to the Apennines, which Genoa too readily delivered up to the foe.

Bitterly however had the Italian States and Austria to rue the fatal remissness, or want of good faith, by which they for so long a time either passively witnessed, or even artfully aided, the fall of the guardian of the Alps.

Bonaparte's success, in less than one year, transcended all the bounds of human foresight and credibility. He prostrated one after another the bewildered armies of Austria in Lombardy, and, carrying the war across the Julian Alps, into the heart of its hereditary domains, he compelled that Power to sue for peace at Leoben (April 17th) and Campoformio (October 17th, 1797). He gave craven Venice a prey to his humbled German foe, in exchange for Belgium and Milan; he made Parma, Tuscany, and Naples groan under the heavy terms upon which he allowed them yet a short span of inglorious existence. He showed even less

mercy to Modena and Rome, out of the fragments of whose States he built up his first ephemeral edifice, the Cispadane Republic, at Bologna (October 16th, 1796), followed at a later period by other upstart communities at Milan and Genoa (April and May, 1797), under the names of Cisalpine and Ligurian republics. He scarcely disguised his sovereign contempt for these democracies. He boasted in his proclamations that liberty was "a gift" to the Italians, but it was nevertheless sold to them at a terribly high rate, and no conquered land was treated with greater harshness than emancipated Italy; no less than one hundred and twenty-five millions of francs were laid in one year as a direct contribution upon the different states in the Peninsula, and at least three hundred millions more were exacted, by way of subsidies and supplies to the French armies, only from the northern division of the country;* whilst, the more deeply and wantonly to wound their national feelings, the miserable vaunt of their former excellence in art was wrested from the Italians; the wonders of genius, the dearest monuments and memorials of the past, all that might be of any worth in galleries, archives, and libraries, departed from a land that could not—would not—stand up for their defence; nay more, the illusion of that dearly-bought liberty was not allowed to soothe the sorrows of the plundered and outraged people, for the conqueror, unmindful of the blood that ran in his veins, called them "a base, superstitious,

* Jomini, Vie de Napoléon, i. 256.

abject set of cravens, totally unfit for freedom." He complained that he had not in his army, whilst the fate of Italy was at stake, "a single fighting Italian, for the fifteen hundred rascals, who had been taken out of the lazy rabble of the towns, were good for nothing but plunder."* He therefore compelled those flimsy republics to frame constitutions, and to alter them at his own stern dictation. He curtailed and rounded off their territories, to suit his own convenience or caprice, and even remorselessly delivered over his most ardent partisans—the Venetian democrats—to Austria, when the sacrifice of them could smooth down difficulties in the way of diplomatic arrangements.

Truly discord, infatuation, and cowardice had their reward. But Bonaparte, however ingenious and unscrupulous, however alone guilty of the cold-blooded murder of Venice, had, at least, great and generous aims. The evils he inflicted, the indignities he heaped upon the Italians, were partly the result of his position, of his compliance with the insatiable demands of the Directory. But he was called away from Italy, and succeeded by more ruthless, unsparing men. The revolution was fast spreading to Rome (1797, December 28th), which was converted into a Tiberine Republic (February 10th, 1798); it finally reached Naples (December 31st), which, basely deserted by its Bourbon Princes, surrendered to Championnet, after a desperate three days' fight by the Lazzaroni, and

* Correspondance confidentielle de Napoléon, iv. 206, v. 405.

was erected into a "Parthenopæan Republic" (January 23rd, 1799).

Precisely at the moment when these last phantoms of royalty, and the faintest shadow of independence, were utterly vanishing in Southern Italy, the Monarchy of Savoy came also to its end.

Charles Emanuel IV. was destined to drain the last drops of the bitterest cup of adversity.

He was still in the prime of manhood—forty-five years old—when he inherited the "crown of thorns," as he himself called it, from his father, in 1796; but he suffered severely from nervous affections, and his moral courage was greatly impaired by the condition of his shattered frame. He had not, during the wars, taken even the little part in military operations which his brothers of Aosta and Montferrat had played. His vote in his father's council had been given against the armistice of Cherasco; but, peace being concluded, his exalted ideas of honour and duty made him adhere faithfully to his engagements. He had been brought up according to the views of the meekest, narrowest piety; the first act of his reign was the repeal of an edict, by which his father, with the Pope's consent, had, in 1786, suppressed some of the absurdly numerous holidays and festivals of the Church, a measure to which the bigoted son ascribed all the subsequent calamities of the country.* For the rest he showed his wisdom by dismissing his father's ministers, either on account of their incapacity, or of their obnoxious-

* Cibrario, Cronologia, p. 105.—Litta, Savoia, tav. xxi.

ness to the French; and put an able man, Priocca, at the head of his council, at the same time that he sent Prospero Balbo, as his representative, to Paris.

The French Directory and Bonaparte showed for a long time great forbearance, and even respect, to the King: the former even gave him at his accession the most flattering assurance "that France never would forget what she owed to the moderation and fidelity of the Prince of Piedmont."* There was, apparently, helplessness and irresolution, no less than discord, in the counsels of the French Directory, and uneasiness in Bonaparte's mind, whilst the conflict with Austria was pending; and the King of Sardinia was not yet so thoroughly beaten, that it might not be worth while either to come to a compromise with him, or to propitiate him, at least, by specious offers and promises. Count Balbo was very active at Paris in behalf of his sovereign, and by his skill and eloquence, no less than by bribes,† he so far won over some of the members of the French Government to his interests, that the idea of an indemnity for the loss of Savoy and Nice, either in Lombardy, or at the expense of the republic of Genoa, or of the Duke of Parma, with an entire re-modelling of the map of Italy, was seriously entertained. Bonaparte, also, loathing the French and still more the Italian democrats, and flattered by the deference shown to him by the Duke of Aosta and some of the Piedmontese nobles, strongly advised the Directory

* Mémoires d'un Homme d'État, p. 772.

† Botta, Storia d' Italia, ii. 205.

to purchase, on any reasonable terms, the alliance of Savoy, whose excellent troops would be to him a great help in need; adding, at the same time, with characteristic bad faith, that even if the ruin of the King was eventually contemplated, nothing would be surer to undermine his throne than the association of the Piedmontese with the French soldiers, by which the former would be *democratized*, that is, demoralized.*

A treaty of offensive and defensive alliance was therefore eagerly solicited by the French; and the King only put off its acceptance lest he should league with a power in actual hostility with the Pontiff; but the latter having come to terms with the French at Tolentino, and the alliance being merely intended against the Emperor, Charles Emanuel put his signature to the treaty on the 5th of April, 1797. The Directory however had no sooner attained their end, than they repented. Popular commotions had broken the feeble sway of the Genoese aristocracy, and France ruled at Genoa, through the organ of the chiefs of the Ligurian republic. Bonaparte saw the horizon of his ambition expanding before him with every stroke of good fortune in his campaign, and, at a very early time, cherished the idea of leaving an imperishable monument of his achievements in Italy, by the erection of an independent state in Lombardy. In proportion as Charles Emanuel appeared less useful as an ally, and less formidable as an enemy, less regard was, of course, paid to him; the Directory, till October and

* Botta, ii. 209, 210.

November, refused to present the treaty of alliance to the legislative councils for ratification.* By this time Bonaparte was in hopes of bringing Austria to his own terms at Leoben, and France was therefore unwilling to publish an alliance with Savoy, the only object of which was war to the Emperor. During the whole interval elapsing between the preliminaries of Leoben and the definitive Peace of Campoformio, the fate of Sardinia hung in suspense. But, once at peace with Austria, France had no reason to spare her Sardinian ally, and the long-delayed blow was struck.

There would have been honesty on the part of France, had she at once resolved upon the employment of open violence; there would have been dignity in the King, had he, at an early period, foreseen his inevitable doom, and voluntarily withdrawn from the unequal contest; but the disgraceful farce of that mock alliance, of that sham independence, was played out to the last scene; and royalty tarried in Turin, till it was ignominiously dragged into the mire.

By the terms of the alliance, France was bound to warrant the integrity of the Sardinian territory, and engaged to defend it, both against foreign and internal enemies. She had, consequently, undertaken to suppress any movement of the revolutionary party; and yet her first attempts against Piedmont aimed at a revolution.

Notwithstanding the omnipresence of her armies, and the activity of her demagogues, who had their

* De Garden, Hist. des Traités de Paix, v. 403.

club at the French Embassy in Turin; notwithstanding the examples of base defection on the part of the subjects of other Italian sovereigns, notwithstanding the insolence, the treacherous devices, and open attacks of the neighbouring democrats of the Cisalpine and Ligurian republics, a revolution in Piedmont was still no easy matter, and the fidelity of the King's troops, no less than of the great mass of the people, was not to be readily shaken.

The country had nevertheless for several years been plunged into sore distress, owing to the expenses of a ruinous war, to the exactions of the French troops living almost at free quarters in Piedmont, and to a succession of failing crops, which greatly enhanced the scarcity consequent on the waste and havoc of those trampling armies. Starvation, at no time a slight cause of discontent, added no trifling weight to the arguments of the demagogues; and the severity with which the King's Government, rendered cruel by its exaggerated fears, prevented or punished any attempt at disturbance, was not calculated to allay the restless spirit undoubtedly at work, though latent, in the land.

Symptoms of dissatisfaction became gradually apparent, and even tumults broke out at Fossano, Racconigi, Carignano, Moretta, and Chieri. Revolt assumed a more serious aspect at Asti, Alba, Mondovì, and Biella; it reached at least Moncalieri, and approached thus the very walls of the capital; but the appearance of the soldiery everywhere dispersed the insurgents, and the peasantry showed itself but too

eager to take up the cause of the Sovereign. Bonaparte was, at this time, still in Lombardy, and, although he had at the outset stirred up the passions of the democrats, he now publicly disavowed and discountenanced them, and even threw Ranza, a rabid journalist, who had taken refuge at Milan, into prison. The Government of the King, as if drunk with success, used their advantage without discretion. Blood flowed too freely, both in the capital and in all the riotous towns. Some of the young victims, such as Boyer, Berteux, Govean, whose only guilt was misplaced enthusiasm, awakened general sympathy, and their fate was an outrage to the best feelings of the people. They equally brought Tenivelli, a distinguished historian and biographer, to the scaffold,—a meek and absent scholar, who had been by the mob of Moncalieri put at the head of their movement, and who acted throughout, and perished, in utter unconsciousness of offence.*

These atrocious deeds were followed by edicts of wholesale proscription and banishment. Thousands of Piedmontese democrats wandered abroad; and insurrection was now organized under shelter of the French, Cisalpine, and Ligurian republics. Bonaparte had in the meantime quitted Italy, and the charge of dealing the *coup-de-grâce* to Charles Emanuel devolved upon Brune, the commander of the French forces, upon Sottin, the French Envoy at Genoa, and more especially upon Ginguené, the *litterateur*, who resided at Turin as French Ambassador.

* Botta, ii. 216.

The Ligurian democrats, heirs to all the rancours and jealousies of their country against Savoy, were longing for a rupture with the King; nor was less animosity against him shown by the Cisalpines, who put forth their pretensions to Novara, Tortona, and all the towns and lands, which had for centuries been detached from their territory. The Piedmontese soldiery were however not to be trifled with; and the French Directory, anxious, to the last, to avoid any open declaration of hostility, still advised the employment of underhand machinations.

A band of one thousand Piedmontese refugees assembled at Carrosio, a Sardinian village on the Apennines, above Gavi, encompassed all round by the Genoese territory. They were joined by twice as many Ligurian adventurers, who quitted Genoa, in broad daylight, with rolling drums and flying tricolours. From this point, which could not be assailed without a violation of the Ligurian territory, they ventured upon incursions into the neighbouring Piedmontese lands, though they suffered a check at Serravalle, and wherever they came into collision with the royal troops. Simultaneous with this was another attack from the Cisalpine countries upon Pallanza, and all the Sardinian shore of Lake Maggiore, from which the insurgents pushed forward into the Val d'Ossola; and a third from France, over the Col d'Abries, into the Waldensian valleys, with a view to gain possession of Pinerolo. The invading bands however met with little encouragement from the population; they were

driven back from the Pinerolo valleys; they suffered a terrible defeat at Ornavasso, in Val d'Ossola; and, notwithstanding the warnings, protests, and threats of the French ambassador, the King overstepped the confines of the Ligurian republic, and forced the rebels from their last stronghold at Carrosio. War was now declared by Genoa; but the open enmity of the republicans caused far less uneasines than their hollow friendship. Unfortunately the victory of the royal troops at Ornavasso and elsewhere was stained with terrific executions; one hundred prisoners were slain in cold blood in Val d'Ossola, and no mercy was shown to some French democrats, who had marched at the head of the rebels and were taken with arms in their hands. And the King's Government was charged with perfidiousness no less than inhumanity; for even when a respite had been extorted from the King, care was taken that the bearer of the royal mandate should arrive too late to stop the effusion of blood at Casale.*

These fatal blunders of the King's Government gave the French agents an advantage by which they well knew how to profit. The Sardinian monarchy had already, in 1797, been remodelled after democratic views, especially by the abolition of private jurisdiction, of the rights of primogeniture, and other aristocratic prerogatives. But Ginguené now deprived the King of the last shadow of authority. He insisted upon a general amnesty, and the recall of all political

* Botta, iii. 23.

offenders; at the same time that he exacted the expulsion of all "French" refugees, though by that name he designated the natives of Savoy and Nice, some of whom were amongst the King's own servants and advisers. He equally demanded the dismissal of the King's ministers, and the recall of his ambassador. He terrified Charles Emanuel by the revelation of atrocious plots, aiming at the extermination of all the French in Piedmont, by the description of the thousands of daggers that had been whetted, of the wells that had been poisoned for their destruction; all the horrors of the Sicilian Vespers, he insisted, were about to be perpetrated in Turin, and the King could only provide for the safety of his guests, as well as of his own people, by surrendering the citadel of Turin into the hands of the French. To this last act of degradation Charles Emanuel submitted, on the 28th of June, 1798. He was now forsaken by the English and other foreign ambassadors, and left in the hands of Ginguené, who, as it was truly asserted, was the real and sole monarch in Piedmont.

A French garrison occupied the Turin citadel, on the 3rd of July. The French Government now had the King entirely in their power, and seemed to abate their rigour towards him. They compelled the Ligurian republic to a reconciliation with him; they rebuked the insolence both of the democrats of Milan and Genoa, and of the Piedmontese patriots abroad or at home;* finally, they allowed Balbo to continue a resident mi-

* De Garden, Traités de Paix, v. 77.

nister at Paris, and actually recalled Ginguené, whose zeal had somewhat outstepped their instructions.

The calm however could be of no long duration. A storm was gathering against France from the north. Russia and Austria were ready to join in a great effort against her, and the latter power had assembled a powerful armament on the Adige. The consciousness of the wrongs they had inflicted on the King of Sardinia smote the French Directors; they feared the day might come for his revenge, and determined to deprive him of the means to harm them.

He was now merely a prisoner in his palace, with a French guard at the door, and an escort of the same troops following all his movements. They spared him no insult, no contumely; the garrison from the citadel serenaded him with Jacobin airs and ribald songs; journals, pamphlets, obscene prints, squibs, and pasquinades,—all was studied to wound the King's feelings and provoke the indignation of his people. They longed for a popular disturbance, and had well-nigh obtained their intent. On the 16th of September, a masquerade issued from the citadel, exhibiting grotesque caricatures of the King, his family, and court. The Piedmontese troops and people fell enraged upon the offensive mummers, killed several of them, and a general slaughter was only prevented by General Ménard, who ordered the French officers guilty of that unseemly frolic, as well as all the troops of the garrison, to withdraw into the citadel.

The absurd charge of that long-meditated massacre

of all the French was now again trumped up; the King was accused of a clandestine correspondence with Vienna, to effect his escape. Under all these pretexts, care was taken to disarm before attacking him. By the treaty of alliance he was bound to furnish a contingent to the French republic; they therefore demanded that he should send 10,000 men to the defence of the Roman republic, at this moment threatened by the Neapolitans. They equally required that the royal arsenals should be placed at the disposal of the republican armies. The King hesitated, remonstrated; but the French affected to fear him, that they might have a reason to intimidate him; they bade both their own minister and the envoy of the Cisalpine republic to withdraw into the citadel, and ostentatiously levelled the cannon of that fortress against the palace and the city.

The French troops, under Joubert, now invaded Piedmont on all sides. By stratagem or surprise they gained an entrance into Novara, hence they advanced upon Vercelli and Chivasso, and stood at last upon the height of Superga, in sight of Turin. Other divisions had, by the same treacherous means, occupied Alessandria, Cuneo, Susa. The King's troops, however, fell back upon Turin, and mustered on the square of the palace with unshaken devotion. But the King had laid aside all idea of armed resistance. His minister, Priocca, drew up a proclamation, on the 7th of December, in which the conduct of the royal government, and its unswerving fidelity to engagements,

were firmly and worthily vindicated. Grouchy, the French commander of the citadel, forbade the publication of the manifesto, threatening to bombard the King in his palace if he insisted on his exculpation.* By the advice of faithful friends, the King at last yielded to brute force, and signed, on the 9th of December, 1798, an act by which he resigned the government of his continental states into the hands of the French. He then instantly quitted his capital, by torchlight, in a snow-storm, refusing to take with him the crown jewels, or to strip his royal residence of its precious ornaments. He left those valuable objects under the protection of seals, to which the French and other democrats paid but little respect. The royal family had scarcely reached Parma in their flight, when orders came from Paris to Joubert to secure their persons and convey them to France, where they would have graced a Jacobine triumph, and met with the martyrdom which the old Pontiff, Pius VI., already a fugitive in Tuscany, was at no very distant period to undergo at Valence. Talleyrand, however, minister for foreign affairs at Paris, had secretly given previous instructions to Grouchy and Clauzel to hasten the departure of the royal prisoners, so as to spare the republic this last act of gratuitous cruelty.† The Duke of Aosta, who, owing to a certain boldness and decision of character, was particularly dreaded by the French, and had been compelled to append his signature to the King's final act, made his escape with

* Mémoires d'un Homme d'État, vii. 117. † Botta, iii. 50.

greater difficulty. Clauzel, who held him as a hostage, had to be bribed by the Queen with the gift of one of Gerard Dow's masterpieces. When all these deeds of treachery and violence were consummated, the declaration of war by France to Sardinia, bearing date December 6th, arrived at Turin on the 12th.*

Charles Emanuel proceeded from Parma to Tuscany. He embarked at Leghorn, and arrived at Cagliari, in Sardinia, on the 3rd of February, 1799. At the moment of landing, he issued a solemn protest against the violence which had hurled him from the throne.

His most faithful attendants, and even his confessor, deserted him, yielding to the threats of the French, who confiscated all the goods of emigrants. The minister, Priocca, at Turin, and Balbo at Paris, were thrown into prison, and edicts were published in Piedmont denouncing pain of death against any one who might be found with arms or ammunition in his possession.

From the abdication of Charles Emanuel IV., in 1798, to the restoration of his brother, Victor Emanuel I., in 1814, the history of Piedmont is a mere blank; not so much because the royal family lived in obscure exile in the island of Sardinia or elsewhere, as because the very state and country of Piedmont was eclipsed. Its people, like all other people in Italy, seemed to have resigned all hope of having a hand in their own destinies: they watched the contest waged by foreign nations, before their eyes, on their

* Botta, iii. 52.—Garden, Traités de Paix, v. 77.

own ground,—a contest in which their own land, themselves and their families were at stake,—and, if we except a few unmeaning brawls among the peasantry, remained unmoved, helpless, reckless, passively submitting to the law of the strongest. Certainly nothing can weigh more painfully on the heart of an Italian than the utter disregard and contempt with which twenty millions of human beings were, during eighteen or twenty years, trampled upon, robbed, outraged, then disposed of, handed over from one to another, without their wishes or interests ever being consulted, or their feelings appealed to. Italy was a battle-field with fortresses, strategic lines of rivers and mountains, convenient quarters, plentiful stores, but no people, or only a lazy, discordant rabble, from which neither of the contending parties expected any material assistance, and which would be sure, at the utmost, to come forward at the end of the struggle, to swell the triumph of the conqueror, or to wreak its revenge on the fallen. Such, from 1530 to 1798, had, too truly, been the lot of the whole country, Piedmont excepted. This latter had, at least, under all circumstances, been "up and doing," but after 1798 Piedmont also renounced all action and will, and lay as supine and inanimate as the rest.

The victory of the French at Turin, at Rome and Naples, had been scarcely achieved, and nearly the whole peninsula was a prey to the democrats, when, early in the spring of 1799, Austria and Russia, allied with England, took the field against them.

Bonaparte and the flower of the French armies had sailed for Egypt (May, 1798). A man gifted with as much daring and impetuosity as Napoleon himself —Suvarrof—now gave a new turn to the European destinies. The French were overpowered in Switzerland, they yielded the whole plain of Lombardy and Piedmont, and, after terrific losses on the Adige and Adda, in April and May, 1799, on the Trebbia, in June, and at Novi, in August, the remnants of their routed armies were either driven to the shelter of the Apennines at Genoa, or assembled on the Var. With the help of the English, the Bourbons were restored at Naples, and the Pope and Grand Duke saw their government re-established at Rome and in Tuscany. Turin had been rid of the French on the 24th of May, its citadel yielded to the allies on the 20th of July, and all the fortresses of Piedmont, no less than Lombardy, had fallen into the same hands before the end of that year. The restoration of the lawful sovereign was solemnly announced, and the unhappy Charles Emanuel IV. had sailed from Sardinia and reached Florence in the month of September. But Austria harboured different designs, and the fugitive monarch received intimation to proceed no further.*

Always in pursuance of the most suicidal policy, Austria was now bent on frustrating the victory of the allies. The Russian Emperor, Paul, insisted on the restitution of Europe to its former conditions, and Austria was not only anxious to recover her ancient

* Denina, Italia Occidentale, v. 291, 265.

possession in Lombardy, but also to preserve her new acquisition of Venice, and secure, besides, the whole or the best part of Piedmont.* For all these purposes, she arrested Suvarrof in his victorious career; she threw away his and her own chance of invading France and dictating terms to her enemy before the very walls of Paris; she lost the powerful support of her northern confederate, wasted the summer of 1799 in the reduction of petty fortresses, and the following season of eight months in total inaction.

Meanwhile the wielder of fate, Bonaparte, on his return from Egypt, landed at Fréjus, on the 9th of October; he overthrew the Directory, and established the Consular Government, on the 9th of November (18th Brumaire); sole and absolute master of France at the opening of spring, in 1800, he assembled his hosts at the foot of the Alps, achieved the passage of the Great St. Bernard (May 20th), and obtained a decisive victory at Marengo (June 14th). This, and the splendid campaign of Moreau, north of the Alps, and his triumph at Hohenlinden, bowed Austria to the Peace of Lunéville (1801, February 9th), which brought Italy back to the conditions of the previous Treaty of Campoformio. Naples and Rome however contrived to make their private peace with the conqueror, and the House of Parma was called to reign in "Etruria," or Tuscany. The Cisalpine republic now gloried in the name of "Italian;" and when

* Vie de Souwaroff, par Lavergne, in De Maistre's Lettres, etc., i. 178.

France had raised her First Consul to the Imperial dignity, in 1804, the Italian republic was also erected into a kingdom, under the same ruler, in 1805. A new outbreak of hostilities in this same year led to the further humiliation of Austria, at Austerlitz, and to the Peace of Presburg (December 26th), by which Venice was, at last, withdrawn from the Austrian yoke and united to the kingdom of Italy. In the following year Naples was again lost to the Bourbons, and given to Joseph Bonaparte (1806), and then to Murat (1809). Before this latter year, the kingdom of Etruria, and what remained of the Papal States, had been united to France. Parma and Genoa had submitted to the same fate at a previous epoch.

The future of Piedmont was for a long time left undecided. Upon the departure of the King, in 1798, Joubert had appointed a provisional regency of fifteen democrats, whose number rose afterwards to twenty-five. The country remained a nameless, nondescript republic—though it was divided into four departments (Eridano, Sesia, Stura, and Tanaro), in the French style—till it fell into the hands of the Austro-Russians, in 1799. A conqueror at Marengo, Bonaparte for some time contemplated a restoration of the dynasty of Savoy, and had even some communication on the subject with Charles Emanuel, who lived at this time at Florence.* The King, at first, refused to treat without the knowledge and consent of his allies; he then repented, and sent the Count of St. Marsano

* Denina, It. Occident. v. 281, 283.

to Paris to open negotiations, but it was already too late. Austria was brought to extremities, and the First Consul perceived that all Italy was now at his discretion. Piedmont remained in a provisional state nevertheless, and only a committee of seven persons was appointed to govern in the name of the French republic. Later in the same year (1800, October 4th), General Jourdan was minister extraordinary in Piedmont, and a government commission of seven persons and an executive board of five, was nominated by him. Only on the 11th of September, 1802, Piedmont, in six departments—Po, Dora, Sesia, Marengo, Stura, and Tanaro—became formally and definitively an integrant part of the French territory. General Menou was now substituted for Jourdan. Long before this epoch, however (September and October, 1800), the provinces of Novara, Arona, Val Sesia, Ossola, Vigevano, and Lomellina, had been detached from the Piedmontese territory, and reunited to Milan as a part of the Cisalpine or Italian republic. In the same manner, Tortona, Voghera, Bobbio, and even Ceva and Acqui, were incorporated with the several departments of the Ligurian territory.

When the entire peninsula came at last into the power of Napoleon, it was thus divided into three great portions: the whole of Milan and Venice, with Bologna, the Legations, Romagna, and the Marches, belonged to the kingdom of Italy; Naples, as a separate kingdom, was governed by Murat; Piedmont as far as the Sesia, Genoa, Parma, Piacenza, Tuscany, and

Rome were merely departments of the French empire. Napoleon however sent several members of his family to the government of some of these French-Italian provinces; giving, for instance, to his sister Eliza first the principality of Piombino, then the duchy of Lucca, then the kingdom of Etruria. In the same manner he entrusted his brother, Louis, with the Government-General of Piedmont, in 1805, and upon the elevation of the latter to the throne of Holland in the following year, the same dignity was conferred upon Napoleon's brother-in-law, Prince Borghese. The French commander of the forces, however, continued to exercise great authority under the nominal auspices of the prince of the blood.

We find nowhere that the people of Piedmont, or of other parts of Italy, expressed, at this time, any very strong dissatisfaction at the arbitrary *fiat* of a despot, by whom they were bidden to cease to be Italians, and to become French. Nay, from the beginning, annexation to France was, it would seem,* proposed by several among the most distinguished Piedmontese, notwithstanding a certain murmur of the multitude. But after Marengo, the country seemed to have no vote, one way or another: we hear, at any rate, of no deputation, either from Turin, Genoa, or Parma, proceeding to Paris to pray that their lot might be cast together with that of their brethren of the Italian republic or kingdom. It is most probable, indeed, that their request would have

* Botta, iii. 97.

been disregarded; for Napoleon wished Italy to be made subservient to the great destinies of France, and, much as he affected to despise her people for cowardice, he dreaded too much at least their insubordination, to fancy that united Italy would long remain under the exercise of his overbearing control. Moreover, he placed the "natural" confines of France, not on the crest of the Alps, but at their foot,—much as the German "patriots" of the present day consider the Mincio or the Adige their "natural" frontier,—and Piedmont must therefore be French, whilst the annexation of Genoa was determined by the First Consul's anxiety to secure the services of her seamen for his impending maritime struggle with England.*

Italian nationality was then, as it ever would be, to be won at the sword's point; but it would still have been consoling to read, if not a manly protest, a petition, at least, however humble, of the Italians against those decrees which *aggregated* them, literally, that is, added them, like dumb cattle, to the French herd. It is true that Cisalpine, or Italian State was no less French than the Italian members of the empire; but it had a name, a banner, a language of its own, and such things have a meaning in men's destinies; and it is no less painfully true that Piedmont, Genoa, and Parma renounced such things without an attempt at resistance, without one word of remonstrance.

It was otherwise, alas! that Switzerland, a smaller state than many Italian,—Spain a no less effete—

* Bignon, France depuis le 18 Brumaire, v. 79.

Germany an equally divided—country,—upheld their dignity against their aggressor. The facility with which Napoleon was allowed to trample upon Italy, too easily convinced him that he could, with equal impunity, crush down all other nationalities; and in that sense perhaps it may be said that Italy was fatal to the conqueror. Accustomed to prompt success, opposition angered, disappointment maddened him; he hurried on from conquest to conquest, added violence to violence, till the very wrath of nature, no less than the vengeange of Europe, overtook him. Repulsed in Spain, prostrated in Russia, crushed in Germany, he was at last deserted by France herself. Her defection extorted from him the abdication of Fontainebleau (April 11th, 1814).

On the first reverses of the Russian or of the German campaigns, the Italians, whose faith in the destinies of the great man were unshaken, were rather stunned than either grieved or delighted. They might now consider themselves free from the French, free from all foreign nations. They had only to decide upon a speedy, clear, and unanimous course. The two lieutenants of Napoleon, Eugène Beauharnais at Milan, and Murat at Naples, as well as Lord William Bentinck, in the name of the allies, at Leghorn and Genoa, loudly called upon them to obtain the mastery over themselves. None of them acted sincerely, it is true, but they all gave Italy a chance to reveal her mind, to follow her own impulse. Had any of the three been heartily and instantly seconded by a na-

tional effort, the day had at last come for Italy. But, alas! Italy had no mind, no heart of her own. All that was wanted was decision, promptitude, concord; the Italians were, as usual, irresolute, divided, faint-hearted. Austria was hardly at the pains, indeed hardly in time, to conquer them. She did not combat Italy; she merely seized it. The Milanese vexed and worried Beauharnais; they plotted, they rose against him; they induced him, in a moment of spite, to give the Italian kingdom a defenceless prey to the invader. The Neapolitans deserted Murat; twice they fell from him, ignominiously, on the battle-field. The allies had thus the passive, helpless country once more at their discretion,—and they restored the ancient sovereigns.

The republics alone were immolated. Venice fell to Austria; Lucca to the Bourbons of Parma. The fate of Genoa, to whom Bentinck had promised independence, was not long left in abeyance.

The restitution of the continental states to the House of Savoy was resolved upon at an early period.

Charles Emanuel IV., sick with deferred hope and weary of the battle of life, soon after the Peace of Amiens abdicated the Crown at Naples, on the 4th of June, 1802, in behalf of his brother, the Duke of Aosta. The rest of his life was spent in easy obscurity, in religious retirement, at Rome, where he entered, as a novice, a Jesuit convent, in 1815, and died in 1819, in his sixty-eighth year.

The new King, Victor Emanuel I., was with his

brother at Rome until 1804; he tarried at Gaeta till 1806; when, on the 17th of February, he repaired to the last refuge of his house, the island of Sardinia. He had no ally left but England; but he upheld, with great dignity, his independence even of that power, which subsidized him, and when an English admiral offered to defend him from French invasion by the help of British garrisons, he answered haughtily, "Do you take me for one of your Indian Nabobs?" The example of Sicily was before him. He knew what price the weak must pay for the protection of the strong.*

We have seen that the idea of a restoration of Savoy to her rights was not, for some time, altogether abandoned,—neither by England and Russia, nor even by France herself. Napoleon did not, indeed, dwell on the project of a reconstruction of the State of Piedmont, for any length of time after Marengo. But he was still looking out for compensation or indemnity to Savoy, and during the negotiations of the Peace of Amiens, the contracting parties hoped to satisfy the King of Sardinia by a large share in those European lands which they meditated wresting from Turkey, and upon which the House of Savoy, both on account of her royal title to Cyprus, and as heiress to Achaia and Montferrat, might prefer some rather obsolete claims.† In 1807, at Tilsit, even an African

* Martini, Storia di Sardegna, p. 127.—Cibrario, Istituzioni, p. 210.

† Sclopis, Relazioni, p. 121.

kingdom was destined to Victor Emanuel. In progress of time, however, anxiety to retain possession of Malta induced England gradually to abate her zeal in the cause of her ally, so that no mention of Sardinia occurs in several of those lengthy and unavailing diplomatic transactions; still, not only was the thought of the necessity of liberating Italy from French thraldom, and replacing Savoy on her throne at Turin, ever uppermost in the mind of all generous English statesmen; but the greatest of them—William Pitt—as early as 1805, already thought that an increase of state to Piedmont, especially by the addition of Genoa and Dauphiny, was of material consequence to the security of Europe. The same ideas were again entertained by Russian and Prussian diplomatists, at Bartenstein, in 1807.*

The disasters of Napoleon were turned to the advantage of Victor Emanuel, and very early in the year 1814 a Piedmontese legion of three thousand men, in the pay of England, took the field in the service and under the flag of Savoy. There was however no struggle in Piedmont. The country was left by the French, and dropped, as it were, into the power of its Sovereign. By a declaration of the generals of the allied troops of the 15th of April, 1814, the Piedmontese were informed of their destination.

Victor Emanuel sailed from Cagliari, and landed at Genoa, on the 12th of May. He entered his capital on the 20th. The Treaty of Paris, which proclaimed

* Gervinus, Gesch. des Neunzehnten Jahr., i. 182.

the restoration of his dynasty, was only signed on the 30th.

The vessel that bore the King of Sardinia met on the high seas the ship in which the dethroned Emperor of France was conveyed to his new destination at Elba. The courtiers about the King pressed forward to obtain a near view of the fallen enemy, but Victor was sufficiently magnanimous to turn from his course, so as to avoid the encounter.*

The potentates who had broken Napoleon's sway were however not satisfied with the humiliation of France. They wished to gird her with a zone of minor states, each of which should be of sufficient moment to prevent her collision with her great rivals. With that view it was intended to give additional strength to the Netherlands, the petty German kingdoms, Switzerland, and Sardinia.

England, indeed, faithful to the original conceptions of Pitt, wished to realize the great idea held out by Henry IV. to Charles Emanuel I. at Brusolo. Lord Castlereagh, on his way to the Congress of Vienna, assured the Sardinian envoy, Count d'Agliè, in London, that he was instructed to propose the extension of the Piedmontese territory as far as the Adige.†

At Vienna however each of the contracting powers was animated by purely selfish objects. Alexander of Russia put forth his claims to the lion's share in Poland; he allowed and helped Austria in her turn to secure the lion's share in Italy: Austria retained Mi-

* Litta, Savoia, tav. xxi. † Sclopis, pp. 131, 173.

lan as well as Venice, and Savoy was reduced to her ancient limits on the Ticino. Nay, on the side of France, she had even to give up the Savoyard districts of Chambéry and Annecy.

From Elba Napoleon made his escape (March 1st, 1815), and for one hundred days more kept the world in suspense.

Sardinia, now at the head of her forces, seconded the allies by the invasion of Dauphiny and the occupation of Grenoble. By a new treaty of Vienna (November 20th, 1815), she recovered those Savoyard districts which had been ceded to France, and her territories were now, both on the east and west, very nearly the same as they were in January, 1792. They had however been increased in the south by the annexation of Genoa and the Riviera.

The accession of the whole or part of the territory of the republic to the Monarchy of Savoy, had, as we have seen, been favourably looked forward to by England on former occasions, and especially at the time of the wars for the Austrian succession. The events of the revolutionary struggle had given further evidence of the impossibility for Piedmont of holding the line of the Alps against the French, so long as an inlet was left open to the invader along the Ligurian seashore and across the Apennines.

The addition of Genoa to the Sardinian dominions was therefore contemplated and agreed upon by a secret article of the Treaty of Paris of May 30th, 1814.*

* Capefigue, Hist. des Cent Jours, i. 18, 19.

The British representative at Vienna, aware of the impossibility of carrying into effect his instructions with respect to Lombardy, insisted at least on the confirmation and execution of the secret convention of Paris. Austria and Russia had all a corresponding share in the spoils of "unrepresented nations;" and the extinction of Genoa was therefore readily consented to (December 10th, 1814).

The Genoese were, of all Italian people, the one to whom the inflammatory exhortation of Lord William Bentinck had been most pointedly addressed.* They had, on the 18th of April, 1814, raised their old Republican standard, and proclaimed the downfall of French tyranny, and the renovation of their ancient liberties. Bentinck stood by, and gave the deluded patriots the countenance of his own, and of all the allied Governments. The Genoese could not foresee that he would be disavowed, and charged with having exceeded his powers,—in fact with having, out of aversion to Savoy, betrayed his instructions. They had however apparently some misgivings of impending evil; they sent, as ambassadors, Pareto to London and Paris, and Brignole to Vienna, to avert it, but their fate was indeprecable.

The Regency, entrusted with the government of the Republic, sent forth a dignified but unavailing protest on the 26th of December; on the 7th of January, 1815, it resigned the powers it had received from the people.

* Lord W. Bentinck's Proclamation, Hans. Parl. Deb. xxx. 393.

The object pursued for above three centuries by the House of Savoy, and especially by Charles Emanuel I., II., and III., with such unwearied perseverance, and sometimes even by no honourable means, was at last attained. Genoa was in their power. The animosity mutually cherished for all that long period by the two states, bitterly exacerbated by the feuds between the Ligurian patriots and the Sardinian loyalists, during the late revolutionary wars, must needs have rendered the Act of Union particularly distasteful to the Genoese. The most honest and earnest amongst their patriots however were rather too hasty in their conclusion, that together with all the bright associations of their glorious past, also their present prosperity, and the prospects of future well-being, were for ever setting.

Undoubtedly the sacrifice of Genoa, like that of Venice, was in itself an act of glaring iniquity; yet, in the present condition of the European families, no separate, that is, isolated existence could so have favoured the energy of commercial and maritime enterprise at Genoa, as it was done by her much-lamented combination with Piedmont. Perhaps a connection with Lombardy—and that is, with Austria—might have been more conducive to her material advantages; but in that case commerce must be advanced at the expense of the noblest national feelings. Certainly, for the whole trade of the world, no good Genoese would wish to exchange the lot of his country for that which befell the sister Republic.

Truly the annals of Genoa, as an independent community, are at an end; but the real glory of a country can be dimmed by no lapse of time,—the past can be affected by no political change; nor is the field for present and future exertion closed against the Genoese in their new capacity of Sardinian subjects. Most assuredly the union of two or more of the old fractions of Italy into one *Italian* State, no matter from what motives, by what means, or under what circumstances it may be brought about, must ever be looked upon by true patriots as an event supremely auspicious, both to the annexed people and to the whole country.

By the Treaty of Vienna, Maria-Louisa, ex-Empress of France, obtained the sovereignty of Parma and Piacenza. The Bourbons of Parma were to reign at Lucca till the death of Maria Louisa; when, on the recovery of their heritage, they should give up Lucca to Tuscany. The reversion of Parma and Piacenza, in the event of the extinction of the Bourbons, was confirmed to Savoy.

CHAPTER VI.

THE NATURALIZATION OF PIEDMONT.

The French occupation, from 1798 to 1814, had been for the Piedmontese a long, bitter season of disappointment. It had been, on the part of the conquering nation, marked by glaring anachronism. They attempted, in the nineteenth century, what might barely have been practicable in the sixteenth. Milan and Venice were merely subjugated; but Piedmont was absorbed. No notice was taken of three hundred years' training,—none of recent, unmistakable aspirations. The Piedmontese were made French by one stroke of the pen; with what benefit to themselves or to their masters, the breathless rapidity of events hardly enabled the world to decide.

Yet the French left behind them, both in Piedmont and throughout Italy, the seeds of imperishable good.

They had striven to make the Italians men; they had associated them with their destinies, enlisted them in their ranks, disciplined them, broken through their lazy, frivolous habits, their lounging at the cafés, their

dangling about women; they had reorganized society on a footing of just equality, of private and public security; they had repaid their spoliation by splendid roads and magnificent bridges; they had atoned for their insolence by seeking out and rewarding men of genius; they had exhibited both great earnestness and discernment in the promotion of merit. They had rid the country of monks and Jesuits, thinned the intolerable number of idle priests, suppressed a great many useless bishoprics, done away with the endless church-festivals and holidays, emancipated the people from all temporal power of the clergy, withdrawn public education and literature, at least from ecclesiastical thraldom. They had created a new stir in the country; opened a wide field for private energy and aggregate enterprise. All the degree of liberty they deemed expedient for themselves, they freely awarded to the subject people.

Even for the cause of Italian nationality they did more than they were aware of—more than they intended.

They trod down local prejudices and municipal jealousies; they removed the landmarks of ancient states; reduced to three only the fifteen or twenty divisions of the country. To one, and the largest and richest of them, they gave a national appellation and standard. After eight hundred years, they revived the name of Italy. They unburied the Iron Crown from the Cathedral of Monza,—that crown which no Italian had worn since Arduino of Ivrea. They laid it on

the brows of a man, very nearly an Italian by birth, and most assuredly by blood. Truly the rule of that man allowed but little hope for freedom, and still less for independence. But the Italians might fain—and must needs—submit to a few years' apprenticeship. Unlike all other previous rulers, the French were willing to call forth their energies, to appeal to their feelings. They trained the Italians to fight for them: had the schooling been continued during a whole generation, their pupils might have learnt to fight out a just battle for emancipation against them.

Without so much as unsheathing a sword the Princes of Savoy now came back from their inglorious exile. It is needless to say that, like other Princes, they had taken no hint from misfortune, that they exhibited no consciousness of the altered state of affairs, that they took no notice of the new spirit that had sprung up amongst their subjects.

On the 20th of May, 1814, Victor Emanuel was welcomed at Turin with the same enthusiasm which had greeted Emanuel Philibert, at his restoration, in 1559. On the 21st he sent a chill through his people's hearts, by an edict which reinforced all the old laws of 1770. The hands of the state-clock were forced back four-and-twenty years at one sweep!

The King himself and the most discreet of his advisers were hardly aware of the consequences of that first unsparing edict. Victor Emanuel I. was a righteous, generous, ingenuous man. The most ardent liberals are willing to do justice to the honesty of his

intentions.* He wished, said he, to consider all that had taken place in his absence "as a long dream," and took great credit upon himself for generosity in allowing "bygones to be bygones." An old courtier, Count Cerruti, handed to him, on his arrival, Palmaverde's Almanack for 1798. That precious relic of the good old times became the royal standard both of measures and men. The reinstalment of ancient officers was effected with such hurried zeal that, in several instances, the Gazette announced the appointment of individuals who had long been mouldering in their graves.† Fidelity to the ancient *régime*, abhorrence of French rule, were the only acknowledged titles for preferment; and as the French, and especially Napoleon, had really always been extremely active in the encouragement of real talent, and even the most loyal and worthy subjects of Savoy had ended by accepting service under them, so now the devotion to the dynasty, and indiscriminate hatred of all innovation, upon which candidates grounded all their claims upon the King's bounty, was, in very many instances, tantamount to a patent of incapacity. For a time Piedmont was under the government of the "Seven Sleepers."

The second day of the restoration spread universal dismay. Attempts were made to give the Edict of the 21st of May a retrospective force, to appoint a day of strict reckoning and wholesale restitution.

* Brofferio, Storia del Piemonte dal 1814 ai giorni nostri, i. 44.

† Cibrario, Istituzioni della Monarchia, p. 211.

The whole social order was to undergo a thorough subversion,—the work of sixteen years to be all undone; purchasers of national or ecclesiastical goods were held in feverish suspense. The returning emigrants were clamorous for indemnities. It was even contemplated to bastardize children born in wedlock contracted in accordance with the French civil marriage law.

The Middle Ages came back with unmitigated horrors, with all the atrocities of a barbarous legislation; with flogging, confiscation, breaking on the wheel and quartering of criminals; with the absurd complication of fifteen courts of law, and a hopeless confusion of powers and attributions, with ecclesiastical tribunals, with secret inquisitorial proceedings. Even the "Viglietti Reali," or *lettres de cachet*, reappeared; and the royal authority was again put forward to interfere with the administration—such as it was—of justice; to invalidate contracts, mortgage deeds, any transaction, in fact, that bore date of that odious period of which the very memory was to be annihilated. The old aristocratic titles were, of course, revived; with them entails, rights of primogeniture, exclusive monopoly of all the greatest civil and military offices—and even an unblushing partiality, and exceptional laws, as it were, in their behalf.* Friars—black, white, and grey—again promenaded the streets, harbingers of the return of the age of darkness. The University and the College of Provinces, the masterpiece of the

* Cibrario, Missione a Carlo Alberto, p. 188; Istituzioni, p. 213.

constructive mind of Victor Amadeus II., were closed on the very eve of the King's entrance into his capital;* they were, at a later period, delivered over to the tender mercies of the Jesuits. Men of high attainment were set aside as Jacobins, whilst others, such as Valperga di Caluso, Alfieri's venerable friend, resigned their chair in disgust, resenting as an insult the clemency which saved them from the disgrace of their colleagues.

Nor was there lack of ludicrous incidents to set forth the sublimity of that all-sweeping, senseless reaction. Public officers were dismissed merely because a French instead of an Italian *r* (with the tail turned outwards, instead of inwards) occurred in their handwriting. Applications to royal bounty or clemency were rejected, simply because they were designated as "petitions,"—the word should have been "supplications." Hair-powder, pigtails, all the pre-revolutionary costume, became the rage; coaches, snuff-boxes, house furniture, social etiquette, everything bore the stamp of the most approved *rococo* style. No one who loved his King and his God spoke otherwise than through his nose, the nasal twang being, we know not on what ground, taken as evidence of loyal zeal and religious unction. What more! the predilection for the "old ways" was so strong that the thought of abandoning the splendid carriage-road of Mont Cenis was seriously entertained; and that great monument of Napoleon's genius was only preserved, owing to

* Cibrario, Istituzioni, p. 385.

the utter impracticability of the ancient steep path down the valley of the Novalaise.*

Such a state of absurd constraint could, naturally, be of no long duration. The Queen, Maria Theresa, an Austrian, in a fit of ill-humour, signified to Vallesa, the Prime Minister, that she looked upon his ministerial dignity merely as the place of a servant in the royal household; whereupon that proud though *retrogradist* nobleman resigned his office, and made room for men who better understood, and enabled the King to give in to, the spirit of the times. These were Prospero Balbo, San Marzano, Saluzzo, and Brignole, men of high practical abilities, formed in the school of Napoleon, and who only accepted office on condition that reform should be the order of the day. Their influence was immediately felt in every branch of civil and military administration; a real veil of oblivion was thrown on the past, anxiety was relieved, public confidence and security were restored, and Piedmont was allowed to be wafted along with the tide of human progress.

But these measures came late (1819), and were deemed insufficient. Balbo's vital schemes especially were looked upon at Court with mistrust and jealousy. Although amenable to reason in any matter connected with the material welfare, and even with the mental improvement, of the people, the King was obstinately bent on the maintenance of undiminished royal authority. He heard of the Constitutional Charter granted

* Brofferio, i. 30.

by Louis XVIII. to the French, and congatulated himself on "his being, at least, a King in earnest, a King indeed."

But now the people of Piedmont wished for something different from the old state of things; they aspired to better destinies, both for themselves and their King; they disdained to fall back into the inertia to which they had been compelled during the latter end of the past century, especially under the reign of Victor Amadeus III. Reunited to the dynasty of Savoy, by which all their energies had, for many generations, been so splendidly called forth, they longed for an open field of active life. They quarrelled with the old system, which had been revived in all its effete mechanism; they were anxious for a trial of strength and speed in the race of nations; they aspired to take the lead, at least in Italy; they fretted round the throne like the waves of an angry ocean, sure in the end either to force it along or to overwhelm it. Nor was it merely the new social life common to all Europe that was developing itself in Piedmont: the fever of Italian nationality, which ran throughout the veins of unhappy Italy, throbbed especially here, at the heart and temples. Piedmontese was rapidly merging into Italian patriotism. All that might still be hybrid and indefinite in the nature of the Subalpine people, added to their jealous anxiety to vindicate their birthright: because the French had so unfeelingly trodden upon it, because their neighbours were less willing to acknowledge it, they were all the more stoutly determined

to make good their Italian nationality, to claim their right to naturalization. The comparative youth and freshness, the wealth and prosperity of the country, gave Piedmont an earnestness and steadiness of endeavour which might be looked for in vain amidst the more weary and worn-out communities of the eastern and southern part of the peninsula.

But the Piedmontese must bring their King, no less than themselves, into the national covenant. The love of Italy never made them forgetful of what they owed to Savoy; their devotion gained in breadth without losing in depth. They wished to make of their country a model State, the influence of which should work beneficially on the other Italian communities. It was less for the sake of their own immediate advantage than for the effect they should have on their neighbours, that they wished for liberal measures. Piedmont was to have the *hegemonia* in Italy, whether for peace or war. Reform was to be the means, war with Austria the great end.

To this ultimate aim of all national efforts, neither the King nor his family, with the exception of the Queen, were supposed to be averse. Victor Emanuel I. was by no mean inaccessible either to the ambition or to the thirst for military glory, which had always been hereditary in his House. The designs on Milan, harboured in Savoyard breasts ever since Amadeus VI., in the fourteenth century, were now visibly advanced by the dissatisfaction of the Lombard subjects of Austria and by the general tendency of national aspirations.

The King also had not forgotten the equivocal, not to say positively perfidious conduct of the Austrian Ministers and Generals during the struggle which had proved so fatal to Savoy, from 1792 to 1796; nor the underhand intrigues, the shameless bad faith, by which Austrian diplomatists had contrived to secure an almost irresistible ascendency in Italy, as the main result of the interminable transactions of the Congress of Vienna of 1814. Victor Emanuel might be said to have three hundred years' scores to settle with Austria; and his subjects, whether by right or wrong, gave him credit for great eagerness to call her to account.*

A constitution was therefore looked upon by the Piedmontese patriots merely as a passport for their King into Italian favour. It little mattered whether it was modelled on a French charter or on English aristocratic traditions, or on the Spanish compact of 1812; nay, the movement almost exclusively originated with nobles and military officers of high rank, who were by no means partial to democracy. These wished, at the utmost, for a respectable statute which should put them in the van of Italian progress. For the rest, they had little inclination, and no leisure, to inquire into the merits of the representative institutions of other countries.

Unfortunately the movement came, at this time, from Spain; it was followed up at Naples (July 2nd, 1820), where the Spanish constitution of 1812 was

* Cibrario, Missione in Portogallo, p. 197; Istituzioni, p. 217.

proclaimed; and when the garrison of Alessandria, on the 11th of March, 1821, and that of the citadel of Turin on the night of the 12th to 13th, raised the standard of insurrection, they declared their object to be "the Spanish Constitution and War to Austria." All this was done in the King's name, and with loud acclamations of "Viva il Re!"

The King, however, either preferred losing his throne to holding it at the people's bidding, or else he had truly, as he asserted, pledged his irrevocable word to the sovereigns now assembled at Laybach; at any rate he declared he could append his signature to *no constitutional charter whatever*, and (March 13th) he abdicated the crown in favour of his brother, the Duke of Genevois, who succeeded as Charles Felix, but who was at this time at Modena. During the absence of the new sovereign, Victor Emanuel I. appointed Charles Albert, Prince of Carignano, to be regent of the realm.

Charles Albert was a lineal descendant, in the sixth generation, of Thomas of Carignano, son of Charles Emanuel I., the same who had disputed the supreme power against Christina of France, widow of Victor Amadeus I. The prince was born in 1798, on the 2nd of October, hardly two months before the royalty of Piedmont received its death-stroke from the hands of the French Directory. His parents, Charles Emanuel of Carignano and Mary Christina Albertina of Saxony, were allowed to reside in Turin for two years, during which the father, a Savoy prince, was com-

pelled to do duty as a national guardsman, and his royal lady, who visited him at the guard-rooms, did not disdain, if we may trust the tradition, to gratify the democrats of that civic militia by dancing the *Carmagnole* round the "tree of liberty."* In 1800 Charles Albert was conveyed to Paris; he was educated at public schools and colleges, and was even under the tuition of a Protestant divine at Geneva.† Napoleon gave him a lieutenant's commission in the eighth regiment of French dragoons.

He was sixteen years old at the restoration, and as Victor Emanuel had no male issue, and Charles Felix no children, Charles Albert was looked upon as the heir presumptive. The circumstances of his birth and education, his external appearance, manners, and habits, and more especially the generous sentiments he uttered, everything connected with him seemed calculated to raise the most sanguine expectations. The Savoyard prince and the Italian patriot were blended in his character; and every measure which could either throw lustre upon the King's throne, or commit him to a competition, if not to actual collision, with Austria, was sure of the Prince's strongest support. For the rest, he was a youth of shy, reserved disposition, endowed with great mastery over his feelings, and with almost precocious powers of dissimulation; he was studious, laborious, stoical, addicted to melancholy, fond of retirement.

* Litta, Savoia, tav. xxiii.

† Cibrario, Missione a Carlo Alberto, p. 187.

The men who were plotting in the King's name and for the King's benefit, had, at first, endeavoured to win General Gifflenga, one of Napoleon's bravest warriors, over to their views. But the general was cold and irresolute, and, upon his hesitation, all the hopes of the revolutionary party were centred in the youthful Prince. The enthusiasm, not merely of the Piedmontese but of all Italians in his favour, was at this moment unbounded. Monti, the old time-serving poet of the revolution, now an oracle of the studious youth at Milan, had hailed in Charles Albert the "Redeemer of Italy."

Left alone with the subjects of an absent sovereign, with such precedents and with such a character, the young and inexperienced Regent betrayed all the irresoluteness and perplexity which were at all times the besetting sin of an otherwise lofty and generous nature. The abdication of the King had already shaken the resolution of the most loyal, and roused the mistrust and ill-will of the most uncompromising liberals. The *Carbonari* especially, a sect which both here, at Naples, and throughout Italy, claimed the honour of initiating the movement, and presumed to guide and control it, were now loud in their outcry for the Spanish constitution; the riotous garrison from the citadel threatened bombardment, and Charles Albert, yielding, or pretending to yield, to compulsion, granted and proclaimed it from the balcony of his palace, in the evening of the same 13th of March, 1821. Only three days later, the King, Charles Felix, thundered

forth his manifesto from Modena, condemning all that had been done at Turin, and under menace of his own displeasure, and the vengeance of Austria, calling upon his people for immediate, unconditional submission.

Charles Albert had acted upon compulsion; he had concluded his proclamation with a proviso, that the constitution was granted in the King's name, and awaited therefore the King's approbation, without which it could have no validity. He had hitherto reconciled the inclinations of an Italian patriot with the duties of a Piedmontese subject and prince. He was now at the diverging point. He saw the aristocratic or loyal party turn pale at the hot denunciations of the King; he was alarmed and disgusted at the intemperate wrath of the Carbonari, who inveighed against the King as the country's enemy. On one side was rebellion, disorder, violence, weakness, hopeless division; on the other, legitimacy, the too great certainty of an easy victory, the prospect of a distant throne. Charles Albert's warmest panegyrists* avow that this last consideration had great influence upon his actions, but they add that the throne was for him a means no less than an end; that, as a private individual, he had but one sword to throw into the scale of Italian destinies, as a king he could bring the whole weight of an army of one hundred thousand combatants to bear upon them.

There are depths of the human heart into which no eye but God's can descend. That Charles Albert

* Cibrario, Missione, p. 191; Istituzioni, p. 219.

sacrificed everything to his chance of succession is unquestionable; whether his ultimate object was mere vulgar ambition, or generous patriotic aspiration, the world will never perhaps be able to judge, because there was a fate that drove him on with blind impetuosity, and there is hardly one deed in all his subsequent career which may be viewed as the result of his free agency.

At this first stage of his political life, his conduct was sufficiently plain before him, and his mind was made up from the very first moment. The uproar of the revolutionary party daunted him not: He cried out to the demagogue Crivelli, that he would die faithful to his trust, and "in defence of the rights of the sovereigns he represented."* His apparent irresolution, his dallying with the revolutionary party, his appointing a Carbonari ministry, arose, most probably, less from uncertainty as to what he should and would do, than from the extreme difficulty of extricating himself from his position. It was necessary for him to lull the suspicion and elude the vigilance of those who looked upon him as a hostage. His escape could only be effected clandestinely, by stratagem, and not without serious danger. He quitted Turin on the night between the 21st and 22nd of March. He travelled to Novara and Milan, where he was received with studied insults by the Austrian generals, and even scoffingly greeted as "King of Italy." He proceeded to Modena, where Charles Felix refused him an inter-

* Gualterio, Rivolgimenti Italiani, vol. iii. cap. xxxvii.

view, and found no resting-place but at Florence, where ties of blood—he had married Maria Theresa, the Grand Duke's daughter—secured him a friendly reception. Two years later he bore arms against the constitutional party in Spain, and distinguished himself by his valour, at the head of a column of French grenadiers, at the storming of the Trocadero, near Cadiz; he had there the unspeakable sorrow of meeting his old friends, the exiled Piedmontese patriots, face to face. Restored to his country and rank, but not to favour, he lived in retirement, chiefly at his country seat at Racconigi, till 1830.

The defection of the Regent in the meanwhile increased the consternation and the division amongst the partisans of the revolution at Turin. Those who, like the Prince of Carignano, had always blended loyal feelings with national aspirations, abandoned a cause which had been condemned by their princes, and not a few joined the royal standard, which had been raised by General La Tour, at Novara. But a few generous enthusiasts, such as Santa Rosa, Ansaldi, Regis, Moffa di Lisio, and others, whose names will for ever be sacred in Italy, persevered in their undertaking, and thought that their success would in the end reconcile the dynasty of Savoy to a movement which aimed at an extension of its dominions. The revolution at Naples was still successful, though King Ferdinand had given his people the slip, and an Austrian army was now in full march on the frontier of Abruzzo. The Lombard garrisons, it was supposed,

had been thinned by the necessity of fitting out that expedition, and the Piedmontese patriots flattered themselves by a sudden onset upon Lombardy not only to operate a diversion in favour of the Neapolitans, but also to give the signal for a universal rise, both at Milan and throughout Italy. On the eve of their departure, however, they received tidings of the defeat of the Neapolitans, under William Pepe, at Rieti, on the 7th of March, and of the consequent dispersion of their army, and the inglorious close of their revolution. This was a death-stroke to the hopes of the Piedmontese; but Santa Rosa felt it was now too late to desist from the attempt. He marched upon Novara, but had scarcely come in sight of the loyalist army under Latour, which was drawn up before that place, ere he became aware of his inferiority of numbers. His own troops were reduced to something less than 3000 foot and 1000 horse, yet his opponents avoided an engagement, and, by parleying, endeavoured to gain time to allow the Austrian divisions to come up. Perhaps they hoped by a display of irresistible forces to avoid the effusion of fraternal blood.* There was nevertheless a short but sharp struggle; some of the constitutional regiments behaved with honour (April 8th). Santa Rosa and his followers fell back from Novara, and were unable to rally at Alessandria, or even at Genoa. The most generous embarked at St. Pier d'Arena, and went in quest of a noble death in Spain, in Greece, wherever the standard of freedom

* Litta, Savoia, tav. xxi.

was unfurled. Exiles such as Piedmont sent forth at this period were never, before or afterwards, commended to the world's sympathy and respect.

Charles Felix re-entered his capital on the 18th of October, 1821. He had been preceded by the terrors of his extraordinary commissions, by wholesale proscriptions, by many capital sentences, though only by two actual executions. An amnesty, which had been promulgated on the 30th of September, was scarcely less severe than the verdict of his judges. There was silence and desolation—blank discouragement in Piedmont.

Yet the country could not be altogether turned aside from its object. By the constitutional outbreak of 1820–21 the Piedmontese, like the other Italians, had merely been feeling their way. The immediate event was such as the most wary could have anticipated, but the ultimate result immeasurably greater that the mere event portended. Less than a day had been sufficient to prove that Sardinia had ceased to be a free agent. The Princes had given way before the storm. Victor Emanuel resigned a sceptre which he could only hold either at the pleasure of his own subjects or at the beck of a foreign potentate. Charles Felix had chosen the latter alternative, and come back in the wake of Austrian bayonets. Savoy had fallen from her secure and self-standing, though isolated, position. The King of Piedmont was no better than any other Italian Prince; he had sunk to the rank of a mere Austrian lieutenant. The

Piedmontese felt confident that their Princes would feel the humiliation no less than themselves; they reckoned on their pride and indignation; they awaited the revulsion of their jealous, ambitious feelings.

Nothing indeed could be hoped for from that poor Charles Felix, and during his ten years' reign (1821–1831) thought was allowed no utterance. The reaction was long, blind, ruthless, insane. Balbo's reforms were at a dead standstill, and Piedmont was the real paradise of monks and Jesuits.

The King's character however was eminent for neither good nor evil; he was scarcely entitled even to the appellation of "Carlo Feroce," into which his subjects, struck by his severity at his accession, dignified the name of "Carlo Felice." He was a strange compound of gloomy indolence and sullen epicurism. He thought his kingly rank did not entitle people "to bore him"* (*Non sono Re per esser seccato*). Even the army, the favourite toy of all the Savoy Princes, had no attraction for him. He was seldom seen on horseback; hardly ever donned a uniform. He bestowed great care on the navy, and gave his sailors a good opportunity of earning distinction by the bombardment of Tripoli, in 1825. For the rest he was unnatural enough to say, that "Austria held half a million bayonets in her pay quite at his service, and he needed no other troops." Neither was he a great lover of priests or monks, though he was compelled to allow them an unbounded control over his subjects.

* Brofferio, Storia di Piemonte, ii. 107.

He had a taste for the drama and opera, and still more for ballets and pantomimes. Evening after evening he sat in his box, at Genoa or Nice, his favourite sojourns, leering at the dancing girls, munching *grissini*, — the famed Piedmontese crisp-baked bread,—and napping. A most ignoble type of a King! His nights he sulked away thus at the theatre; by day he hid himself in his palace, enjoying the stale fun of obscure favourites, who recommended themselves by their drollery.

Men are known by their works. In a country where the French had left behind the wonders of Mont Cenis and the Simplon, and the fine bridge over the Po at Turin, it was hardly possible to do less than throw bridges over the Dora, near the same town, and over the Ticino, at the frontier at Buffalora. But the real achievements of Charles Felix were, characteristically enough, a playhouse and a burial-place. He built the grand Teatro Carlo Felice, at Genoa, and restored the Abbey of Hautecombe and its sepulchral monuments, which had been ravaged by the Jacobins in 1792. His life was spent at the theatre; in death he wished to lie by the side of thirty-eight generations of that princely race, of the main line of which he was the last.

Yet flashes of a generous nature were not unfrequent in him, nor, with all his surliness and moroseness, was he altogether destitute of some of the most striking qualities of his family. There was the characteristic obstinacy and self-will, the reluctance to

give in to officious suggestions. He was significantly reminded by one of his courtiers, that a person upon whom he had just bestowed a pension was a relative of Laneri, an officer who had been put to death for high treason, after the events of 1821. "I had forgotten the circumstance," observed the King, "call the man back." The petitioner was recalled, and the pension was doubled. Charles Felix was no less remarkable for that truly religious observance of his word, which, since the days of Emanuel Philibert, prompted the Savoy Princes to make gentlemanly honour "at home" at their Court. At a time when Spanish and Neapolitan sovereigns seemed to play "ducks and drakes" with their royal oaths, and the Pope to sell "patents for perjury," Victor Emanuel I. had given the noble example of a king setting a higher value on his promise than on his throne. His brother and successor never forgave Charles X. of France the ordonnances of July, 1830, which doomed the main line of the Bourbons to a second exile. He said that "a king should, at least, be bound by his solemn engagements, if he bowed to no other authority." To grant a constitution was, in his opinion, an error, but to violate it a crime. To this sterling quality of her Princes—faithfulness to a promise given—Piedmont, it is well known, owes her constitutional franchises since 1849.

Nor was Charles Felix by any means unmindful of what he deemed due to the independence of his crown and the interests of his dynasty. When the

Emperor Francis received, in 1825, the homage of all the Italian Princes, at Milan, the sulky Sardinian King shunned that sovereign's encounter; and, although Francis so far waived ceremony as to pay Charles Felix a visit at Genoa, he found him little affected by the high honour conferred upon him. The Emperor's journey aimed at the establishment of an Italian league, of which Austria was to have the presidency; but the scheme foundered against the stubborn obstinacy and instinctive jealousy of the Savoyard.*

But Austria had far more serious designs upon Piedmont than the assertion of Imperial supremacy. The lineal dynasty of Savoy was near its extinction, and a hope was entertained to oust the lateral branch of Carignano. Already, in 1821, every effort had been made to commit Charles Albert to some irretrievable act of imprudence, to throw him completely into the toils of the Carbonari; and even when the instinct of self-preservation prompted his flight from Turin, obstacles were thrown into the way of his reconciliation with the King,—his guilt was exaggerated, his conduct grossly misrepresented, and proofs of his complicity with the Carbonari were sought amongst the victims of Milan, Venice, and Spielberg. Nay, we know with what eagerness Metternich himself questioned and cross-questioned Confalonieri, at Vienna, to extort from him a confession which might criminate Carignano.† Failing in this, the Austrians

* Brofferio, ii. 101.

† Gualterio, Rivolgimenti Italiani, i. 56.

endeavoured to goad the disgraced Prince into open rebellion by withering insults; and all his repentance, submission, and readiness to atone, were stigmatized as hypocrisy and simulation.

After his brave deeds at Trocadero, Charles Albert was admitted into Piedmont, but not into the royal good graces. The ex-King, Victor Emanuel I., died at Moncalieri, four years after his abdication (January 10th, 1824); but he was survived by his Austrian Queen, Maria Theresa, who hated the Prince of Carignano, as the author of a revolution which had hurled her, as well as her husband, from the throne. The daughters of this royal couple were given in marriage to Austrian, Sicilian, Lucchese, and Modenese Princes. To one of these, Francis IV., Duke of Modena, an Austrian archduke, the ex-Queen of Sardinia destined the fair inheritance of Savoy, to the exclusion of the Carignano line.

The Duke of Modena had, in 1821, shown himself by far the most hideous despot in all Italy; and the means his own State could supply were altogether inadequate to the end he had in view. But he had accumulated vast sums of money, and he relied, on the one side, on the material aid of Austria; on the other, on the moral support of some deluded Italian patriots, chiefly his own subjects,—Menotti, Misley, etc.—and trusted that, darkened as his own name was by bloody deeds, it could nevertheless successfully compete with that of the unhappy Charles Albert, execration of whose "treasons" was the theme of patriotic songs.

The French revolution of July, 1830, brought all these schemes to hasty maturity. Francis of Modena and his fellow conspirators fell out, in mutual mistrust and dislike. Maria Theresa attempted, indeed, with the aid of the Jesuits and by the basest intrigues, to bend Charles Felix to her views, and obtain from him a declaration in favour of her Modenese son-in-law; but the King, from a sheer spirit of contradiction, no less than from a high sense of duty, disdainfully rejected the proposal, instantly sent for the heir-presumptive, showed him every mark of affection and regard, and, by his demeanour, very clearly pointed out to the Piedmontese their future sovereign.*

In the month of February, 1831, Central Italy was convulsed with abortive insurrectionary attempts, and the very first throne overturned was that of that same Francis of Modena, who was plotting against the lawful rights of his neighbours. That ill-advised Italian rising was, indeed, speedily overpowered; the Austrians restored both the Duke of Modena and the Duchess of Parma, and the Papal throne was propped up by Austrian, and a twelvemonth later even by French, bayonets. But the conquerors had barely time to rest on their swords, and Francis IV. to sing a *Te Deum* in the Cathedral of Modena, for his easy victory, when Charles Felix of Sardinia fell ill and died, at Turin, on the 27th of April, 1831. The event found, therefore, Modena powerless and Austria unprepared. Charles

* Cibrario, Missione a Carlo Alberto, p. 204; Istituzioni, p. 218; Cronologia, p. 115.—Brofferio, ii. 143.

Albert lost not one moment in securing a succession which, he apprehended, such formidable competitors had secretly hoped to dispute.

The position of the new King, at his accession, was fraught with difficulties which baffle comprehension. He was aware of all the ill-will and tenebrous plotting of Austria, and felt that any false step on his part would be taken advantage of, to achieve by main force what fraud had failed to bring about. The Piedmontese army had fallen into the most lamentable neglect under Charles Felix; it was exclusively officered by young nobles, both unfit for their profession and attached to the ultra-retrogradist, Austrian party. The authors of the revolutionary attempts of Central Italy had shown even less understanding, less energy, less unanimity than the Carbonari of 1820. They had risen with an illusory reliance on French support, and on the principle of "non-intervention," which Louis Philippe's Government had emphatically proclaimed. They had laid down their arms, almost without one stroke, upon the first discovery of the quibbling duplicity of the Citizen-King. Ephemeral as that Italian insurrection had been, it was the cause of an immense influx of Austrian troops into Lombardy, so that the material strength of the foreigner was commensurate with the prostration of the national party. Charles Albert perceived that, had he ventured upon an open outbreak with Austria, he would have to contend against the most terrible odds. He looked for an ally in France, and sounded Louis Philippe as to

the support he might expect on his part, supposing he incurred the displeasure of Austria, by bestowing a constitution on his subjects. The wily King of the French made answer: "He was sufficiently plagued and worried with his own charter at home, without taking upon himself the championship of similar institutions abroad."* France, truly, as if utterly to undeceive the Italians, was at this very moment preparing its expedition to Ancona, in support of the Pope against his own subjects.

A truly bold and generous policy could, therefore, hardly be expected of any king seated on the throne of Piedmont under these circumstances. But Charles Albert's situation was rendered even more precarious by his natural indecision and timidity. He felt that the liberal party expected—he acknowledged their right to demand—much of him; and his reign was indeed ushered in as an era of reform; but the work of his predecessors was not to be readily set aside: reaction had done its utmost; the country had been forced back fully half a century: the supreme power was in the hands of the clergy and nobility, the schools under the guidance of the Jesuits: dumb despotism was centralized, systematized. Half-measures would satisfy no man, and yet any rash attempt at innovation must lead to civil collision and disorganization; and how could internal disorder afford the strength necessary to withstand external attack?

The ill-fated King attempted compromise: he tem-

* Brofferio, iii. 13.

porized. For more than fifteen years he played the part of an enlightened, tolerant, though hardly a liberal, and still less a national Prince. His foremost object was to reign: his first ambitious instinct was defensive. He was anxious to hold his sceptre firmly in his grasp, ere he attempted to make it instrumental in the attainment of further power and greatness. For this purpose he stepped in between past evil and future good. He attempted to carry into execution the best part of the reforming schemes of Prospero Balbo, which had been left in abeyance in the preceding reign; he wished, from the beginning, for a reconciliation of hostile factions; he attempted to found a compact state, a united people. But even the part of moderator and peacemaker was arduous and dangerous: the King hardly ever secured the attachment of either party; he lived in constant fear of both. His choice, as he expressed himself to the Duke d'Aumale, lay "between the dagger of the Carbonari and the *chocolate* of the Jesuits."*

To a man of this temper, and so situated, Mazzini thought it proper, almost immediately upon the King's accession, and before any clear course could be decided on, to send his thundering address from Marseilles in 1831.

This young enthusiast, whose theory was grounded on a conviction that the lower classes are alone incorrupt, disinterested, and capable of self-sacrifice, that a disorderly rabble is stronger than well-disciplined bat-

* Gualterio, Rivolgimenti, lib. iii. cap. xl.

talions, ideas more than a match for grape-shot and bayonets, and faith at any time able to move mountains, called upon Charles Albert to throw himself upon "God and the People," to hurl defiance to Austria, unless he wished to share the fate of the foreign oppressor, and be the first victim of national revenge. He bade him choose between the lot of "the first of men and that of the last of Italian tyrants."

There were good reasons—and we have stated them—why the King should at the time feel less sanguine about so decisive a step than the impatient exile. Charles Albert was not moved by Mazzini's exhortations, and the latter made him the object of the first attacks of the new association to which he had given the name of "Young Italy."

Mazzini was aware that it was idle to hope for sympathy amongst the aristocracy, who occupied nearly all the officers' ranks in the Piedmontese troops; and he succeeded to some extent in winning over a few malcontents, amongst the non-commissioned officers and privates, to his desperate schemes. His first step towards the emancipation of Italy was the utter demoralization of the only army which afforded a material means of resistance to the foreigner. Beyond a few lawyers, physicians, and young men of the middle classes, he made but few proselytes in Piedmont itself; at Genoa, some of the nobles, dissatisfied with the loss of their local independence, seem to have lent Mazzini, their townsman, a more favourable ear; but at Turin, even that most fiery democrat, Angelo Brof-

ferio, as he informs us,* refused to join either this or any other conspiracy, and warned Mazzini, through his secret agent, Jacopo Ruffini, of the impracticability of his schemes.

Meanwhile Mazzini's manœuvres were no secret to any man. The numbers of a monthly publication entitled 'La Giovine Italia' were embarked at Marseilles, landed at Monaco, and hence circulated with but little caution and discretion amongst the people, and more diligently amongst the troops. The King's government caught the alarm. Charles Albert, wounded in the tenderest part of a Savoy Prince's heart—his army, resorted to terrible means of repression. Courts-martial were erected at Chambéry, Turin, Alessandria, and elsewhere. Blood flowed copiously; and it was, with few exceptions, that of poor deluded subalterns, hardly conscious of offence, and whose most heinous crime amounted to the non-revelation of plots that had come to their knowledge, and to the possession or transmission of seditious writings. Cruel sentences were executed with brutal barbarity. The Governor of Alessandria, Galateri, rode on a cannon to the place of execution. He spurned with his foot Vochieri, one of his victims, punishing him for the exhibition of untamed courage; he dragged him along the streets of the town, purposely out of his way, that the mournful convoy should pass before the desolate home, in very sight of the mother, wife, and children of the doomed prisoner. The proceedings of the courts, the inquisi-

* Brofferio, iii. 37.

tion within the jails, the espionage out of doors, filled the country with horror and gloom. Jacopo Ruffini, Mazzini's friend, arrested at Genoa, fearful lest the harassing moral torture to which he was subjected might force from his lips a betrayal of his accomplices, resolved on self-destruction, and accomplished it in a savage manner, by tearing a rusty plate from the sheet-iron which lined his dungeon-door, whetting it on the granite of his window-sill, and drawing it across his throat.

Mazzini had, at this time, been expelled from France, and made Geneva the head-quarters of his threadbare conspiracies. He had about him some thousand between Italian, Polish, and other refugees, and by means of these he meditated an attack upon the lands of Savoy.

A young fanatic, weary of an exile's life, and nurtured in the classical ideas of Alfieri's patriotism, was with the chief of "Young Italy," when Ruffini's mother, after the bloody catastrophe at Genoa, together with her family, sought refuge in Switzerland. Affected by that exhibition of acute sorrow, the would-be Brutus and Timoleon offered to avenge that desolate mother by taking the tyrant's life. Supplied with a passport, money, and letters by Mazzini, he proceeded to Turin, in August, 1833, under the false name of Louis Mariotti. Mazzini's partisans at Turin had however either fled, or lived in fear and concealment. There was no one to give the stranger advice or direction, no one to furnish the means to carry his intent into effect, no one to take advantage of its pro-

bable issues. For nearly two months he watched for an opportunity to strike a blow. The attention of the police was at last awakened, and he was spirited away by a few friends, who had partly guessed his secret. Charles Albert hardly ever had a distinct idea of the designs that were harboured against his life; but as another emissary of Mazzini was soon after arrested, the bearer of a dagger with a hilt curiously wrought with precious stones in mosaic, which was identified as the personal property of the arch-conspirator, a vague impression remained, both in the King's own mind and in that of his most loyal subjects, that Mazzini did not shrink from the use of the assassin's knife. "*Ne vuole alla vita del Re!*" (He is aiming at the King's life)—such was the quaint expression used with respect to Mazzini, which might be heard from a hundred officers in the Piedmontese army, during the campaign of 1848.

All these secret attempts however were merely episodical to the attack on Savoy. Mazzini had planned his expedition for October, 1833; but it was put off till the end of January of the following year. The Genevese Government was aware of the refugees' plans, and opposed them; but the cantonal authorities were overruled by their own democrats, and compelled to wink at the armament which assembled before their very eyes.

A column of one thousand adventurers entered Savoy from Carouge, and marched upon St. Jullien: another detachment embarked at Nyon—the very spot,

the reader has not forgotten it, from which the Waldenses set out on their memorable enterprise of 1689; but it fell into the hands of Genevese cruisers, and was compelled to put back. The former column, under the command of Mazzini himself, and of Ramorino, a native of Nice, who had risen to distinction during the Polish insurrection of 1831, was disconcerted by the mishaps of its associates. It wandered, with hardly a settled plan, about Savoy. They had reached Annecy and occupied it, when they turned, and coasted the lake towards Thonon. Mazzini's proclamations, in the Italian language, and in behalf of Italian nationality, made but little impression on the unimaginative Savoyards. Mistrust of Ramorino, whom he ultimately charged with treason and embezzlement of the patriotic funds—but who, in his turn, complained that he had been made to rely upon a popular rising of which no symptom was perceptible—paralyzed Mazzini's energies, and perplexed his counsels. He was also labouring under bodily infirmity, aggravated by the intense severity of the season. A few shots were fired at random, at Carra, owing to a false alarm. Mazzini brandished his rifle to rush to the combat; but he instantly fell down in a fit, and in this fainting condition was conveyed safely across the borders. Ramorino soon followed with all his band, having hardly met an enemy face to face. Another troop of a hundred exiles had ventured into Savoy from Grenoble; they fell into an ambush at Échelles, and were compelled to take to flight. Two

of them, who fell into the hands of the Sardinian carabineers, were summarily shot at Chambéry.*

Thus ended the Savoy expedition. Mazzini, fallen in the estimation of his partisans, had soon to quit Geneva, and before long was obliged to leave Switzerland. For several years the great Italian agitator lived in comparative quiet and obscurity in London, and when he again ventured upon active operations, his attacks were directed against the Roman or Neapolitan States: his credit was too low, and his means altogether inadequate, to create even the slightest disturbance either in Piedmont or Lombardy.

Relieved from all immediate apprehension, it seemed but natural that Charles Albert should relent; but blood had been wantonly shed; the exercise of cruelty had disturbed the King's judgment, at the same time that it had roused the worst passions amongst the people. The ties of Sardinia with Austria, and all absolute governments, were cemented by a companionship of danger and the necessity of guarding against a common foe. The Jesuits gained a stronger ascendency over the King, and instigated him to the most atrocious measures; they domineered, in proportion as they committed him. Gendarmes, police agents, informers terrorized the land; and, for nearly ten years, Piedmont was plunged into unspeakable anguish and consternation.

Yet all this severity, although it elicited murmurs, was not sufficient to shake the fidelity of the bulk of

* Louis Blanc, Hist. de Dix Ans, ii. 83.

the Piedmontese people. They sought excuses for the King's conduct; and they found them in the enormity of the conspirator's guilt. Mazzini's subornation of ignorant soldiers, his endeavours to loosen the bond of military discipline, his surmised attempts at regicide, shocked all the sense of duty, all the traditional feeling of Subalpine loyalty. At Rome, Naples, or Tuscany, the end might justify all means; but at Turin, where a king had just stepped down from the throne out of scrupulous regard for his pledged word, Mazzini's subtleties about the conditional value of a soldier's oath seemed grounded upon principles of more than Jesuitical latitude. They, from the very first, strongly objected to that unprincipled manner of conspiracy; they next repudiated conspiracy altogether. Even in 1821, the Piedmontese Carbonari had only plotted for, and, as they believed, with, their King. They would not now plot—they would allow no man to plot—against him.

Conspiracy began to be considered in Italy as something out of date. Already, at a very early period, in 1816, Foscolo, the greatest of Italian patriots after Alfieri, had denounced sects, as the ruin of Italy. The idea prevailed at last that all secret plotting must have a demoralizing effect. Some of Mazzini's most trusted friends, such as Partesotti, of Mantua, were proved to have carried on for years the most infamous double treason. The ranks of "Young Italy" swarmed with Austrian spies. The sad tragedy of the brothers Bandiera, in 1844, had been mainly the work of a "traitor

in the camp." That, and several other miserable failures of the revolutionary party in Romagna and Calabria, forced at last upon the Italians a conviction that secret opposition to their governments was as hopeless as open war; conspiracy a two-edged tool, far more dangerous and no less insane than insurrection. A great change was effected in the patriots' tactics. They offered their governments "Peace and Reconciliation."

The innate loyalty and sound judgment of the Piedmontese made it very natural that they should take the initiative in this new movement. Notwithstanding great political compression, Western Italy had produced, since Alfieri and Botta, the most robust and original minds. Gioberti, a sufferer from political persecution in 1833, dared, however, in his work, "Il Primato," published in 1843, at Brussels, in the land of exile, to proclaim to the Italians that everything was to be gained by seconding, not by thwarting, their governments. He aspired at a regeneration of Italy, to which all its princes, priests, monks, and the very Pope, the Jesuits, and the Austrians, should bear a part. He put every class, order, and power in Italy to a terrible test; he laid upon them a responsibility, threw upon them a spell, which only the Jesuits and the Austrians attempted to resist. Gioberti himself repudiated the former, in his 'Prolegomeni;' Cesare Balbo, the son of the reforming minister under Victor Emanuel I., also put the Austrians out of the national pale, in his new work '*Delle Speranze d'Italia.*' The ideas of these writers, together with Mas-

simo d'Azeglio's (another Piedmontese) sublime invective against the Mazzini party, in his '*Ultimi Casi di Romagna*,' laid the basis of the new creed of Italian patriots. Its articles were, "Peace and goodwill to all that is national," implying a prospective "war against all that is foreign."

To these apparently harmless but ambitious ideas, Charles Albert allowed free utterance in his States. Balbo's work, which was printed at Capolago, in the Canton of Ticino, was publicly prohibited at Turin, but secretly distributed by the King's own friends.* His scheme of driving Austria out of Italy, by indemnifying her at the expense of Turkey in the Danubian Principalities, was especially consonant with the King's own conceptions, and the author was supposed to have drawn inspiration from the most exalted sources.

Already by this time men began to breathe more freely in Piedmont; the rigour of the Government abated, and the King went eagerly back to the ideas of reform which had ushered in his reign. Great was indeed at all times his vacillation, and serious were the obstacles he had to contend with. Still actual progress, at least in material affairs, had been uninterrupted, though the King would not be urged beyond the most cautious half-measures. Thus, instead of an open, general amnesty, Charles Albert granted secret, individual pardon. Instead of a Parliament, he called around him a Council of State; instead of a national assembly, he appointed municipal and provin-

* Brofferio, iii. 152.

cial councils. He did not trust his people with legislative powers, but he compiled a code of laws for them,—the work of able and conscientious jurists for several years. He allowed no free press, but encouraged, as we have seen in the case of Balbo, the circulation of books and pamphlets printed abroad; he tolerated the publication of the 'Messaggiere Torinese,' of Angelo Brofferio, and the 'Letture Popolari,' or 'Letture di Famiglia,' by Lorenzo Valerio. Education, trade, and industry, all the sources of popular well-being, flowed more freely. Savings-banks and infant asylums, model schools and model prisons, poor-houses, gas-lighting, and railways, were either introduced or at least freely discussed. Literature was gradually unfettered; the arts generously encouraged; the royal chapel of the *Sacra Sindone* was adorned with fine monuments in marble; on the square of St. Carlo rose Marochetti's famous equestrian bronze statue of Emanuel Philibert. The King established a Committee of Antiquities and the Fine Arts, organized an Agricultural Society, and founded a "Deputation of the History of the Country." He created a new chivalrous order of "Civil Merit." He was amongst the first Italian Princes to welcome in his States the "National Scientific Meetings," and to listen to the proposals of an "Italian Customs' League."

Beyond this it was supposed he could not venture, without too open a provocation to Austria; but towards the year 1846 subjects of dispute with Austria offered themselves, or were perhaps industriously

sought out. Austria complained, in April of that year, that the Swiss of Canton Ticino were allowed, through Piedmont, a free transit for the salt which they purchased in France,—a traffic which she regarded as a violation of the commercial compact existing between her and Sardinia, and dating from 1751. By way of retaliation, she laid an enormous duty on the wine, a large quantity of which was imported from Piedmont into Lombardy. Angry diplomatic notes were exchanged. Sardinia behaved with firm dignity. In October of that same year, the Scientific Congress held its meetings at Genoa; fiery words were spoken. In the ensuing December, both in that city and all over Piedmont and Italy, the centenary of the expulsion of the Austrians from Genoa was made the theme of almost frantic rejoicings.

There was thus an incurable breach between Austria and Sardinia. Charles Albert began to bid high for popularity, both amongst his own and the neighbouring people. Nevertheless there was still caution and method,—endless misgiving in his progress. Placed between his minister, Solaro della Margherita, a thorough friend of the Jesuits, and Villa Marina and Gallina, ancient patriots of 1821, he seemed perpetually to vibrate between their contradictory suggestions. His ties with Austria (he had, in 1842, married his eldest son, the Duke of Savoy, to Mary Adelaide, daughter of the Archduke Rainer) were not to be easily dissevered. In Spain, in Portugal, his diplomatic agents were ever in the ranks of the absolute

pretenders. In Switzerland he joined the Jesuit league who gave its support to the Sonderbund. Something enigmatic, inconsistent, nay, palpably false and deceitful, was apparent in all his actions. How could it, indeed, be otherwise? The old foes to all freedom, the reactionary leaders, the Jesuits, were still all-powerful in his cabinet. Who can say by how many iniquitous devices the sovereign's mind was perversely misunderstood and wilfully misinterpreted?

The effects of this long vacillation were greatly to the King's disparagement. Men feared that the Court of Turin would always seek her safety in an Austrian alliance; that the old maxims of caution, of subterfuge, on which the policy of Savoy had, almost from necessity, been grounded for centuries, could never be laid aside; that even the present difference of Sardinia with the Cabinet of Vienna had no other object than to set a high value on her alliance, and enable her to obtain the best terms for herself at the expense of those very patriots with whom she now coquetted.

They called Charles Albert "*Re Tentenna*" (King Shilly-shally), and they described his conduct as an undignified game of seesaw. With longing and misgiving the poor King looked upon the tremendous abyss he was urged to leap over. He waited, he prayed; he incessantly repeated, "The time is not yet come;" he wrote, "*J'attends mon astre*," the motto of Amadeus VI., the Green Count, on his shield,* and it

* Cibrario, Missione a Carlo Alberto, pp. 218, 248.

seemed as if nothing could induce him to depart from this expectant policy. He sought everywhere for arguments to force himself to what was, for him at any rate, an act of consummate temerity, only to be justified by success. It was his crown, his state, the independence, such as it was, of his people, he was tempted to stake against the hope of an Italian kingdom. It was expected, as in the days of Charles Emanuel I., that Savoy would dash single-handed against the whole might of an empire. He had not an ally in all Europe; and how far could he reckon on the power, and on the will, of the Italians to aid him?

Meanwhile priests and Jesuits were about him; they sat astride him, as well as astride his people.

By a strange turn of fortune, a priest came to relieve him from perplexity.

Pius IX. was raised to the Pontificate (June 16th, 1846). By his amnesty, one month later, he was thought to announce the alliance of the Catholic religion with the cause of Italian freedom and independence. A twelvemonth had scarcely elapsed, and Austria, which had in vain tried all underhand means, ventured upon a first act of open aggression against the Pope, by seizing the city of Ferrara (July 17th, 1847).

Charles Albert had, from the very first hint of the Pope's benevolent intentions, become a new man. He followed the bent of his most generous inclinations; he rivalled the Pontiff himself and all the other Italian Princes, both in the adoption of liberal measures and

the encouragement of patriotic feelings. He now stepped forward as a champion of Pius IX.; his courage was at the highest; he would fight for the Pope and Italy, *jusqu'à extinction.** Amongst the assembled members of the Scientific Congress, at Casale, a letter was circulated, in which the King expressed his hope, "soon to play, in Italy, the part at that moment so heroically performed by Schamyl in the Caucasus." †

Unfortunately, it was not at this juncture, nor on this ground, that hostilities were to commence. Austria backed out of that dangerous contest, and the Court of Rome accepted a compromise. Reforms proceeded now, at a very rapid rate, at Rome, Turin, and Florence. Civic guards, municipal institutions, liberal ministers, a free press, were granted. Such concessions were made in Piedmont on the 29th of October, 1847. Everything announced the long-sighed-for era of Italian regeneration. The Neapolitan Government, terrified by a revolutionary outbreak at Palermo, hastened to outbid all the Italian sovereigns in their strife for popularity by the grant of a constitution, on the 29th of January, 1848. Charles Albert could not remain behindhand. Piedmont had the fundamental articles of its own "*Statuto*" on the 8th of February. The example was followed by the Grand Duke of Tuscany on the 15th of the same month, and by the Pope on the 14th of March.

* Cibrario, Istituzioni, p. 228.

† Farini, Roman State, vol. i. book ii. chap. viii.

Thus had Italy proceeded at a fearfully rapid rate, but hitherto by her own impulse.

But on the 22nd of that very February Louis Philippe's throne was demolished, and a republic proclaimed in France. Prussia, the German States, and at last Austria, were reached by the revolutionary tide. In five days (18th to 23rd March) the Austrian sway was broken at Milan and Venice. On the 23rd Charles Albert gave out the proclamation of national war. On the 29th he crossed the Ticino, at the head of all his army. Tuscan, Roman, and Neapolitan troops, as well as thousands of volunteers from all parts of Italy, hastened forward to take part in the supreme struggle with the foreign dominator.

The hurry of our narrative scarcely keeps pace with the actual rapidity of those stunning events.

Not a man, at that fatal period, whether in or out of Italy, remained in his right senses, and no wonder Charles Albert's conduct was marked by a succession of irreparable military and political errors.

In the first place, his movement took place too late by five days. His declaration should have been dated from the moment the first tidings of an outbreak at Milan reached him; by the delay of four or five days, by the orders he issued for the arrest and disarmament of the volunteers who flocked from all parts of Piedmont and Genoa into Lombardy, he evinced fear and jealousy of the popular element; he incurred the blame of wilfully leaving the Milanese alone in their unequal struggle, so as to see them brought to extre-

mity, and forced to sue for his assistance on his own terms; he had the appearance of being dragged into action in spite of himself; his resolution was taken when the success of the insurgents was regarded as complete, when his aid was deemed needless, and only prompted by eagerness to secure for himself the prize of a victory which "the people" had won with their best blood.*

In sober earnest and at this distance of time we can better appreciate the force of circumstances. We may make allowance for the unprepared condition of the Piedmontese army, for the great danger attendant on a premature movement, on an inconsiderate declaration. We know that Radetzky and the Austrians were anything but thoroughly beaten, and the King must determine on a struggle of which no man could foresee the end. Still, that was a moment in which audacity was the best wisdom, and loss of time could only injure the King's cause at the outset.

In the second place, it was necessary to set out with a well-defined programme.

Two were the lines of conduct between which the alternative lay. The King might have announced his purpose to win "Italy for the Italians," made all political considerations subservient to the interests of the war, adjourned all controversies, silenced all parties, trodden down all local feelings and ambitions, and claimed the most absolute, universal dictatorial powers, engaging to make—it mattered not whether he was

* Mariotti, Italy in 1848, p. 167.

believed or not—after the victory, a fair and free appeal to popular suffrage, and to abide by its decision; or else he should have yielded to the Pope's anxious solicitations for a national league;* he should have inquired into the intentions, claims, and expectations of the Italian princes, and acceded to all their demands, well knowing that his first occupation of the country, his superior army, and the juxtaposition of his States to the revolutionized countries, made him, under all circumstances, "master of the situation."

But he followed neither course with consistency; he entered Lombardy, preceded by a generous proclamation of the 23rd of March, tendering to the Lombards and Venetians "that aid which brother expects from brother and friend from friend." He thus deprived himself of all control over those provisional or revolutionary governments, whom he should instantly have superseded by military commissioners; he allowed Lombardy, which he should have organized into a vast camp, to be converted into a demagogic club; he suffered faction to turn against himself those very weapons which he should and could, by main force, have enlisted in his service.

At the same time he deprecated, instead of strictly forbidding, stifling, and crushing, all political discussion; he referred the settlement of the national question to the will of the people, at the close of the war, —a proposition which would only have been just and reasonable if he had forced the people to contribute

* Farini, Roman State, ii. 61.

to its speedy issue; but, at the same time, he did not know how to resist the tender of allegiance of the people of Parma and Modena, in April and May, and allowed his partisans or his agents, especially the too-eloquent Gioberti, to put forth their plans of a *Fusione*, or union of all the revolutionized states with Piedmont, and of the formation of a North-Italian kingdom, of which not only Milan and Venice, and the duchies (all of which were actually annexed in June and July), but, as it was broadly hinted,* even Bologna and the Legations were to form a part. In the same manner, he was not, perhaps, sufficiently peremptory in his refusal of the crown of Sicily, which, on the 11th of July, was offered to his younger son, the Duke of Genoa. Alarm was thus, at a very early period and throughout the war, spread in all the Italian Courts; and this led to the Pope's defection and the treachery of the King of Naples, at the same time that it afforded Mazzini and the republican agitators a pretext for open opposition.

Truly we acknowledge in all this the impulse of irresistible events, for Piedmont could not take the field without greatly out-balancing all the other Italian States by her weight on the fortunes of the national war; nor could she have so decided a preponderance on the issues of the war without securing the largest share in the spoils of victory; nor could she carry off the best prize without arousing the envy, fear, and enmity of her reluctant allies. The annexation of all the emancipated countries, and the construction of a

* Farini, Roman State, ii. 128.

great northern kingdom of Italy, was for Piedmont no matter of choice, yet, on the other hand, it was possible to proceed with discretion and forbearance. The King should have shown greater regard to his original declaration; he should have silenced Gioberti and the other officious apostles of the *Fusione;* he should have put off, or even rejected, any dedition resulting from spontaneous acclamation; he should stoutly have opposed any premature appeal to popular vote; he should have refused his countenance to any political scheme interfering with the furtherance of military operations. Events were already pushing on his fortunes at too rapid a rate; he should have felt that every victory in the field secured him more votes than all the manœuvres of the most zealous intriguers.

Finally, it was of the utmost importance to Charles Albert fully to comprehend his new position. He should have sunk the "lawful king" into the revolutionary leader. His assumed championship of the national cause, he should have felt, put him out of the pale of diplomacy. He should have banished all foreign ministers from the camp; he should have listened to no suggestion, admitted no compromise; he should have entered into negotiation only the day after a final victory.

France, he should have expected, and we all now positively know,* was decidedly hostile to his undertaking. The French army assembled at the Alps at this juncture was "as much intended to screen Pied-

* Lamartine, Le Passé, le Présent, et l'Avenir de la République.

mont from Austrian invasion as to *protect Lombardy from Piedmontese ambition.*" The union of Italy, or even only of North Italy, into one State—the first generous aim of all true Italian patriots—must always reckon upon the ill-will of France, *under any Government;* it must always be carried in sheer opposition to Germany—to nearly all European Powers; it may nevertheless always be achieved—and might more easily, than ever in 1848—by great energy of action and unanimity of will, for France and Germany and all Europe had, at this time, their hands sufficiently full of other business; but it was, at any rate, as idle to look for the good offices of France in this scheme as for the acquiescence of Austria. England was indeed not positively averse, but she was only bent on a speedy termination of the contest and the avoidance of a general war. With this view she would allow Charles Albert to go as far as fate would lead him, and no further; she checked and hampered till she perfectly stultified him; she paralyzed his efforts by land and sea; she bade him beware how he provoked Germany by an attack on the Italian Tyrol, and by the bombardment or blockade of Trieste; she terrified him with the bugbears of republican France and despotic Russia; she made him feverish with her own anxiety for a speedy termination of hostilities, and pointed out many byeways out of a contest which could however have only one straight and honourable issue.*

* Correspondence on the Affairs of Italy, part ii. pp. 306, 307, 337.

But all political or diplomatic blunders could have found an easy remedy in a happy conduct of the war.

Charles Albert was at Pavia on the 29th of March; he proceeded without opposition to the Adda and the Oglio, and on the 8th to the 10th of April he forced the bridges of the Mincio, at Goito and Monzambano. He was now within the magic circle of those fortresses —of Peschiera, Mantua, Legnano, and Verona—which have so often decided the fate of Lombardy. The unhappy delusions of the complete victory of the Milanese, and of the utter demoralization of the Austrian troops, were now partly dispelled. Still the great fact that Radetzky was in no position to meet the King in the open field was undisputed. At the head of a compact and well-conducted army, Charles Albert was perfectly free in his movements. His great object clearly was, first, to reduce the fortresses in which the enemy had found his last refuge, and, secondly, to close the Alps against any new force which could march to his rescue.

This second aim should at all times, and would in ordinary circumstances, be considered as by far the more momentous; but at that time the Austrian empire was as utterly disorganized as Radetzky's army, and the King, no less than all Italy and Europe, too hastily concluded that Austria and Germany had hardly the means, or the power, to strike one blow for Italy; the whole war was to be waged against those miserable remnants of Radetzky's army; it would be reduced to the subjugation of those dispi-

rited garrisons. Charles Albert had, towards the middle of April, between 50,000 and 60,000 of his own troops; he could rely on the support of 5000 Tuscans, of 3000 Parmesans and Modenese, and of about 17,000 Romans, regular forces and volunteers: a more considerable force, under the command of General Pepe, was at this time in full march from Naples to the Po.*

Had he led all the nerve of his army to the defence of the valleys of the Adige, the Brenta, and the Piave, had he stretched forth his hand to the Venetians, and concerted with them a general plan for the protection of the whole frontier of the Alps and the Isonzo, and at the same time called upon his allies, on all the volunteers, and the people, to assemble in arms round the fortresses which threatened them, it seems probable that mere instinct of self-defence might have called forth such exertions on the part of the Italians as to enable them to keep those garrisons in check, till sheer famine, despair of a rescue, or further disorders and defections, compelled them to surrender. But Charles Albert trusted to chance for the defence of the Alps; his only purpose was, or seemed to be, the reduction of the fortresses, or rather the protection of the population immediately exposed to the attacks and depredations of their garrisons. He made a first attempt on Peschiera (April 18th), and one on Mantua (April 19th), before he could bring his heavy artillery to bear on their walls. He then turned all his efforts

* Custoza, Insurrection et Campagne de 1848, p. 42.

against the first-named place, and it was with a view to invest it that he occupied that range of hills which lie between the Lake of Garda and the Adige, by a series of combats which was crowned by the victory of Pastrengo, on the 30th of April. Even at this stage of the campaign, the loss of time was by no means irreparable, for the Adige and its plateau of Rivoli was before him; the King had it in his power to occupy it, and then to push on above Verona to Vicenza, and to hold the whole of Upper Lombardy and Venetia in his hands. But he yielded to the fancied necessity of watching Mantua, and, leaving the Brenta and Piave, as well as Friuli, to the care of the Venetians, Romans, and Neapolitans, he took up his position all along the line of the Mincio, between and all round the fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua, at the same time that he directed his main efforts against Verona. An attack upon that place, or rather on its suburbs, at St. Lucia, on the 6th of May, was attended with serious and unprofitable losses.

Radetzky had by this time received considerable reinforcements; he collected a force of 35,000 men at Verona and Mantua, sallied forth from the latter place, on the 29th of May, overpowered, though not without meeting heroic resistance, the Tuscans at Curtatone and Montanara, and gave battle to Charles Albert, at Goito, on the 30th. Though ill-prepared for the encounter, the Piedmontese held their ground with great bravery, and victory was as yet faithful to their standards. Radetzky's object was the release of Peschiera.

His defeat determined the fall of that place, which opened its gates to the Duke of Genoa on that same day.

This important advantage raised the most sanguine hopes of the Italians, and caused Charles Albert to be hailed "King of Italy" by his victorious troops in the camp, in the evening. But the King knew not how to turn success to the best account. He fell back into his wonted inaction, and the triumph at Goito was soon more than counterbalanced by irreparable disasters beyond the Adige.

The King of Naples, harassed by republican factions in his own capital, threatened with insurrections in Calabria, and despairing to bring Sicily back to its allegiance, accomplished, on the 15th of May, a bloody reaction, which he had, perhaps, long meditated.* He now recalled his troops from Lombardy,—those troops upon which all Italy mainly reckoned for the defence of the Venetian territory. With the exception of a few battalions, who continued their march across the Po under Pepe, the Bourbon's orders were too readily obeyed, and Venetia was only guarded by the Venetians themselves, by the few Neapolitans under Pepe, the Papal troops under Durando, and the Roman volunteers under General Ferrari.

Already, towards the middle of April, an Austrian force of 20,000 men, under Nugent, had crossed the frontier stream, the Isonzo; it had overpowered Udine, overrun all Friuli, and, scattering the Romans

* Massari, I Casi di Napoli, p. 121.

at Cornuda (May 8th and 9th), had reduced Feltre and Belluno, and appeared before Treviso and Vicenza. Another division, under Welden, 15,000 men strong, was, about the same time, crossing from Trento into the valley of the Brenta, and occupied Bassano, whence it also threatened Vicenza. After ineffectual efforts to hold the lines of the Piave and the Brenta, the Roman and Venetian forces had been concentrated on that all-important place, and the Austrians of Nugent had been most gallantly repulsed from its walls, in several encounters, from the 19th to the 24th of May. But, after the affair of Goito, Radetzky, in no way pursued or hindered by the victorious Charles Albert, assembled all the forces he had in Mantua, Verona, and Legnano, and brought against Vicenza an army which, with Nugent and Welden's divisions, by far exceeded 43,000 men. Vicenza—an open town—relied on the defence of 12,000, between regular troops and volunteers. The overwhelming force of the enemy precluded every chance of successful resistance. Yet Vicenza fought against hope, and with signal valour, but had to accept a capitulation, by which the Roman troops agreed to withdraw from the Lombard battle-fields (June 11th).

Charles Albert, bewildered, irresolute, had heard nothing of the bold movements of his adversary; he sat inactive before those almost defenceless fortresses; he allowed Radetzky, after several days' absence, to bring back his victorious troops to Verona, and extended further and further his line of operations,

which, after some new ephemeral successes, reached at last from the heights of Rivoli and La Corona, on the Adige, to Governolo on the Po.

The whole of Venetia, with the exception of the capital and its lagoons, and some Alpine strongholds, had bowed its head to the conqueror. Radetzky, free from enemies in the rear, summoned all his forces together for a great effort; he broke through the Piedmontese line at Somma Campagna (July 22nd), came to a decisive action at Custoza (July 25th), which terminated in a general rout of the Piedmontese; and as their army was already too severely tried by long inaction, weariness, want, and sickness, as well as demoralized by demagogic seduction, it was, with no great effort, driven back across the Mincio, across the Oglio, across the Adda, unable to rally at Cremona on the 30th of July, or at Codogno on the following day. The strategic line of retreat lay now for Charles Albert across the Po, into the duchies, and successively on Piacenza, Alessandria, and Genoa. But the King yielded to a chivalrous desire to defend Milan, and he brought to that town 25,000 men, the miserable relics of his army (August 3rd to 4th). The bravest youth of the town had quitted it, under Garibaldi, hastening to the defence of Brescia. Means of resistance there were almost none; the courage of despair could only have called down upon the city the ill-usage of a disorderly soldiery. The jaded Piedmontese troops gave battle to the Austrians outside the walls (August 4th), but with no success. The King signed, on the same

day, a capitulation with the enemy, which bound him to withdraw beyond the Ticino. The Milanese broke out into riots, and compelled Charles Albert to tear the agreement, and to promise he would bury himself under the ruins of their walls; but in the night (August 5th), the municipal authorities made their own terms with the Austrians, and the King departed at last from the devoted city: he quitted it, in the dark, by stealth, after having been exposed to the bitterest insults of the populace, and having with the greatest difficulty, and owing especially to the exertions of Alfonso La Marmora, escaped the fury of those who proclaimed him a "traitor," attempted to burn him in his palace, and to blow him up with gunpowder, and who actually fired shots at him and his sons as they passed.*

Thus ended the first Italian War of Independence. An armistice, signed by General Salasco on the 9th of August, screened Piedmont from invasion.

It was not in one day, nor in two, that the Italians could recover from the amazement and consternation consequent upon that sudden downfall of their hopes; nor could they immediately calculate all the enormity of their losses, or go back to their original causes, or provide the best means of retrieval.

Lombardy and the whole Venetian territory, with the exception of its capital, were in the hands of their ancient oppressors; the war of "the Peoples," which Mazzini had so loftily promulgated from Lugano im-

* Farini, ii. 287.

mediately on the King's downfall, was, notwithstanding some dashing feats of Garibaldi on the Lake Maggiore, immediately at an end; yet, after an inconsiderate attack by Welden on Bologna, where he was beaten, the Austrians did not seem disposed to push their victory beyond the limits of their own territory.

The Italians of Naples, Rome, Tuscany, and Piedmont were therefore left to settle matters with their princes.

Naples had taken its measures beforehand, and abided. Six thousand foreign mercenaries were sufficient to give the tone to the native soldiery, and bore out the Bourbon in his unnatural struggle, not only against his capital and continental provinces, but also against the more determined and implacable Sicilians.

But Rome and Tuscany never had any force, hardly any existence of their own. Without the *prestige* of Austria they could not stand a single day. That *prestige* was now, in spite of her recent victories, removed, and the fall of those governments was unavoidable. The subjects in Tuscany and Rome had only made peace with their princes in 1846. They had given the sore past to oblivion, only that the great national contest might be impeded by no domestic feuds; but those princes were deemed to have played false to the national cause, and their people looked upon them in a revengeful mood.

Rational men could have but little to hope from a renewal of the contest. But the Italians were mad, and clamoured for war. Their governments openly

resisted, or feebly seconded, this frantic outcry. They —at least those of the Pope and the Grand Duke— were overthrown.

Piedmont was left alone, with a scattered and discomfited army, an exhausted treasury, and a broken-hearted King.

Yet on that King and army the best hopes of Italy were centred. The King was as good as his word. "At the cost of putting on a *red cap*," he was heard to say, "he would attempt a rescue, he would have his revenge."* The high-minded from all parts of Italy rallied around him. Three hundred thousand fugitives had quitted Lombardy and the duchies, and by far the greatest number had sought shelter in Piedmont.† They mustered up in strong national associations. A Lombard *Consulta* and a Committee of Parma and Modena sat at Turin, in vindication of the act of the *Fusione*. Not a few of these had a seat in the Houses of the Piedmontese Parliament. A great scheme for a national confederacy, of which Gioberti was invited to put himself at the head, was the means of bringing together at Turin the most distinguished men from all parts of the peninsula.

Italy still showed a respectable front at Turin. A battle had been lost, but, for all that, the vanquished evinced no disposition to yield up their pretensions.

The question was now in abeyance; the national contest had been referred to a higher tribunal; king and country were in the hands of diplomacy.

* Brofferio, iv. 203. † Farini, iii. 106.

A well-meaning, honourable diplomacy! It wished for justice, but it showed itself far more anxious—over-anxious—for peace. It forgot that durable peace should be grounded on justice; that it can best be secured by him who sues for it showing all the time that he has means to enforce it.

Already, during the greatest heats of the Lombard campaign (May 23rd and June 3rd), Austria had repeatedly tempted Charles Albert with specious offers. She would give up Lombardy, as far as the Adige or the Mincio, and erect Venice into an independent State, under one of her Archdukes. English and French diplomacy had seized upon that offer, and the ensuing exchange of notes had perhaps not a little contributed to slacken the impetus of Charles Albert's military movements. They hoped now (after Custoza!) to make those same terms the basis of negotiation, and even called together a congress at Brussels for the purpose. Austria, which had most probably never been sincere, still seemed to listen to their proposals. But their eagerness for a pacific conclusion was so great as to defeat its purpose. England herself was put out by the ultra-peaceful attitude assumed by France. All threats of intervention on the part of the latter Power were abandoned for a vague scheme of unarmed intercession. But "to see an overbearing, powerful man giving in to peaceful remonstrance is rather an unheard-of than a rare thing." Austria, from the first, saw through the dignified, but undecided tone of those doctrinary negotiators. She per-

ceived that the shopkeepers of Louis Philippe had regained the upper hand at Paris, and that all they wished was "peace at any price." She resolved it should be on her own terms, and not otherwise.

Honour to Austria, were she a thousand times an enemy! She showed throughout the most magnanimous perseverance; she had many a storm to weather in the meantime. Twice and thrice was she brought to the brink of destruction. Germany was then wavering between stark anarchy and Prussian supremacy; Bohemia divided against itself; Hungary in open revolt; Vienna in complete insurrection; the Emperor fled,—dismay, utter confusion in his councils. Such was the situation of the Empire, especially in October, 1848; yet Austria endured and held up! and, strange to say, there was no Austria anywhere but in Italy. The army in that State has always been, and is now more than ever, a nation apart.* The officers of Radetzky, at Mantua or Verona—though most of them Hungarians, and at the time that their countrymen were in arms against Vienna,—declared that, even had the *madcaps* of the revolutionary Government at home been base enough to give up Italy, they yet would keep it on their own account! The old Marshal himself, as if bent on saving the Monarchy in spite of itself, would never, even in his worst straits, hear of the arrangements by which the Austrian Cabinet consented, or only seemed to consent, to the sur-

* Wrightson's Hist. of Modern Italy, p. 23.—Quarterly Review, July, 1853.

render of Lombardy. He was aware of the unsteadiness of purpose of the Italians, and had too good reasons to rely on their dissensions. He knew that France and England were hardly in earnest, and was, at any rate, determined to push on the contest with that obstinacy which is the destiny of brave men.

Charles Albert was daily throwing himself at the feet of stony-hearted diplomacy. Now or never, he urged, was the time for a second and final onset; but diplomacy still thundered its veto, its inexorable "At your peril!"

Charles Albert must either run all risks, not only single-handed, but against the advice, nay, under threat of the hot displeasure of his allies, or he must throw away his great, his only chance. The poor King champed upon the bit and drew in, and fretted his soul to death; and Austria had all the game to herself, for her game was to gain time.

Every day lost was a death-stroke for Sardinia. There was danger in war, it is true, and there was ruin in peace, but still the evil of evils was in the prolongation of that cruel suspense. The germs of dissolution were at work at Turin and Genoa, no less than at Florence or Rome. That unhappy Charles Albert could never wash himself clean of the inconsiderate sins of his youth. Every slight breath of calumny was sufficient to stagger his staunchest believers. His forced inaction, that unaccountable waste of time and disregard of golden opportunities, gave rise to the most sinister interpretations. Diplomacy

killed him by inches! He had only signed an armistice, it is true, not a peace, and that saved him from the immediate fate of the Pope and the Grand Duke; nay more, he had pledged his royal word to accept no peace except on terms consistent with the honour of Savoy and the independence of Italy. He solemnly and repeatedly vowed he would refer the matter to the "judgment of God," so soon as he could extricate himself from the officious meddling of friendly Powers. But all this would not do; it afforded him but a short reprieve; his fate was no less certain and imminent; he must die by the hand of Austria, or else by that of his own people!

The Italians awaited him at the issue. The armistice could not last for ever. Some even murmured at the delay; they would give the King no quarter; they insisted that that fatal truce was merely a feint, a diabolical stratagem, to wear out the ardour of enterprising patriots, and hinder them from some decisive, desperate course.

The retired life of the King, both in the camp and at Court, his apparent sullenness and utter uncommunicativeness, nay, his pale, cadaverous face, his melancholy look and gaunt figure, so to speak, were also greatly to his disparagement. His words were those of an upright and generous man, but so cold,—as it were, so reluctantly spoken! Men gave him credit for profound dissimulation, which was, in fact, chiefly attributable to native dulness and embarrassment of manners.

Nor was the King alone set up as a mark to the envenomed shafts of suspicion; but his gallant, and most undoubtedly inoffensive sons,—his courtiers, many of whom were indeed not free from blame, and his generals, the whole bulk of his nobility,—all who clung to him, came in for their share of popular ill-will.

The sober, modest, and hardy population of Piedmont seemed almost to have lost its original character. The Lombard and other emigrants, from Casati and Litta and other members of the Provisional Government, down to the wretches who had attempted the King's life at Milan, were now masters of the country. They mustered strong in Parliament; they held important offices in the Ministry; they had nearly the whole press in their hands. The quiet-loving Turinese, the least inflammable of all European peoples—("*Il Piemonte non è materia entusiasmabile*," as Sclopis has it,*)—sank back into comparative insignificance, and left the field free for the fiery demagogues of the East and South. The reports of the daring deeds of Rome and Florence were bewildering; the rabble of Leghorn, headed by Guerrazzi and Montanelli, had taken the supreme power into their own hands in Tuscany, and the Grand Duke was meditating an ignominious flight (October 5th). All the efforts of Pellegrino Rossi—futile efforts!—to reconcile the Papacy with the principles of representative institutions, failed to bring some order into the chaos of the Roman Go-

* Brofferio, v. 40.

vernment, and only led to that minister's death by the hand of an assassin, on the 15th of November, and to the Pope's clandestine escape on the 24th. These horrid deeds disheartened honest men, it is true; but both Montanelli in Tuscany and Sterbini at Rome had put forth a cry for a "National Constituent Assembly," the only means, as they contended, by which Italy could be brought with one mind to the resumption of the War of Independence. Even the brains of moderate men in Piedmont were haunted by this chimera of a "Costituente;" and, as it had been conjured up by men who styled themselves democrats, so even in Piedmont there was a call for a "Democratic Ministry."

Who knows not how apt misfortune is to pervert men's judgments? The same drunken fanatics, the same evil-minded slanderers, who had deprived Rome and Tuscany of the services of such men as Mamiani, Capponi, Ridolfi, and so many others,—did not in Piedmont spare the Balbos, D'Azeglios, Perrones, hardly any of the most upright and generous. In a few weeks the revolution had "devoured its children," and there was hardly one name in all Italy untraduced, hardly one character sound and whole.

One idol alone stood yet unbroken on the altar, and that was the Abate Gioberti. And it was precisely this man's unimpaired popularity that short-sighted enthusiasts made subservient to their crazy designs.

So long as Charles Albert did not actually resign the championship of Italy, he was inviolable. His

throne might be deeply undermined, but continued unshaken. Democracy could make no way in Piedmont, even by confession of the most ardent republicans,* except in the name of nationality; except by flattering the too natural impatience of the war party, and engaging to cut with the sword the Gordian knot of the armistice.

Gioberti had always been a moderate man amongst the moderates. He had written books to prove that Italy was still unfit even for an experiment of transalpine constitutionalism. All he ever advocated was careful and gradual concession; for the rest, he wished the national cause to triumph by the means of the Pope and Princes. Nothing he abhorred so much as radical and violent reform. He had indeed been dragged along by the sweeping tide of events—as indeed who was not?—so far as to make himself the most ardent promoter of the *Fusion;* but he was still, by profession and conviction, a Constitutionalist. Only, of late, out of a personal pique against his old friend Pinelli, and other men in power,—a difference for which he might have the weightiest reasons, but in which, most decidedly, a spice of wounded vanity entered also,—he had thrown himself into the ranks of the opposition, to which the immense popularity of his name gave the upper hand; he spouted at the Democratic Club, democratized the Federative Society, and most imprudently prated about the *Costituente* and a *Ministero Democratico.*

* Brofferio, v. 79.

At the head of the opposition, and pledged to the Constituent Assembly and the Democratic Ministry, Gioberti easily upset the Pinelli or Perrone Cabinet, and came into power on the 26th of November.

But Gioberti could not be in his senses, and have faith in his own words. Democracy would have implicated him with Guerrazzi, Sterbini, and all the maniacs of Central Italy, whose sayings and doings the philosopher had always made the theme of his unsparing denunciations.

His party however drew him on in spite of himself. The House of Deputies, which Valerio and his other agents had filled with hare-brained, uncompromising demagogues, allowed the Minister no rest. He gave in to their wishes so far as to lay down the ministerial title of "Excellency," to reduce the King's expenditure, and to remove aristocratic favourites from Court; but when he undertook to carry analogous reforms into the army or the diplomatic body, he met with difficulties which he had been unable to foresee, which he was equally at a loss how to overcome.

In the south, in the meanwhile, the situation was fraught with great difficulty and danger. Rome and Tuscany had not yet reached downright republicanism, but they had plunged into hopeless anarchy. Political murder stalked abroad with impunity. The agitators Montanelli, Guerrazzi, Sterbini, could come to no plausible understanding, to no clear definition of the sources, powers, and aims of the national assembly or assemblies, on which so much stress was laid.

Gioberti, who was bound to them by his imprudent cry, added to their perplexity by new schemes of a *Costituente* of his own, in which the sovereignty of the people should be made, at least in Piedmont and North Italy, consistent with the inalienable rights of the House of Savoy, and the "accomplished fact," as he called it, of the *Fusione;* in which, at the same time, he seemed to admit a combination of Piedmontese royalty with Roman and Tuscan republicanism, and of a common effort for national emancipation.

He shifted and shuffled, he wriggled about with all the dexterity of an old priest. His agents and under-agents were moving to and fro, from Florence to Rome, from Naples to Gaeta, where the fugitive Pope and, at a later period, the Grand Duke, betook themselves. But the Italian princes had for ever broken with revolutions; their jealousy of Piedmont made them deaf to the most reasonable proposals. The Grand Duke of Tuscany was reminded, in good time, that he was an Austrian Archduke; the Pope repeated with complacency that the Holy See reckoned on the support of two hundred millions of Catholics.* All their hopes rested on foreign aid; all the good offices of France and England, which acted at this juncture with great disinterestedness, failed to reconcile them with Sardinia. They had little faith in her good intentions, none in her power to aid them. On the other hand, Florence and Rome were raving for a republic. All the efforts of the revolutionary agents were bent on the

* Farini, iii. 221.

disorganization of Piedmont, even whilst they treated with its government. They expected Piedmont to follow, not to thwart or guide, their movements.

Gioberti perceived, rather too late, that tergiversation was of no avail. He boldly deserted the democratic party, disavowed Rome and Tuscany, undid his own work with great eagerness, and went so far into the ways of reaction as to propose an alliance with the King of Naples, by means of which he offered to put down republicanism in Central Italy, to restore the Pope and Grand Duke, to bring together the scattered links of the long-projected Italian Confederacy, previous to the renewal of a deadly struggle with Austria.

With that view, he actually sent a division, under La Marmora, to Sarzana, where it was to be in readiness for the projected intervention.*

It was a high scheme and daring, and, as we said, France and England seconded it by all their influence. But, alas! Gioberti could not make his voice heard in the councils of Naples and Gaeta; on the other hand, it is difficult to say to what extent he could rely on the spirit of the Sardinian army for a work of counter-revolution, and how much fraternal blood might have to be spilt before every throne in Central Italy was restored, before faction was so thoroughly subdued as to allow the renewal of a great national attempt. The men of the moderate party were supine and disheartened, and the republican fever was now at too

* Farini, iii. 295.

great a heat to be cured by any but the most violent means.

At any rate Gioberti was not destined to carry his magnanimous but arduous plan into operation. He stood too far committed both with friends and enemies. The democrats, who had never been anything in Piedmont without him, were now too strong for him. Like many a conjuror before him, Gioberti was torn to pieces by the very spirits he had had the imprudence to evoke. He was left alone in his Utopian schemes. He resigned his office on the 18th of February, 1849, upon which the reign of democracy began in good earnest.

But that much-abused name of democracy, be it remembered, was only another word in Piedmont for immediate war. Gioberti's successors, Rattazzi, Cadorna, Tecchio, etc., were honest, well-meaning men. None amongst them would have wished for the success of the Italian cause except with and by the House of Savoy. Only, with the whole of Piedmont and Italy, they were weary of the endless shifts of diplomacy; they saw the State plunged into difficulties from which war alone could extricate it. There had been, they said, a fatal necessity driving Piedmont throughout all the different stages of unforeseen, irresistible events: the final catastrophe was also inevitable, and it was the part of wisdom to consummate, to hasten it.

To war they must. Their army was quartered at random; it was hastily gathered together, newly

armed and equipped, raised to more than 100,000 combatants, but it was in a hopeless state of demoralization. Base, heartless demagogues had been busy amongst its ranks, at the very opening of the first campaign; it had re-entered its own territory soured by reverses, disenchanted about Italian fraternity, revolted at the outrageous conduct of the Milanese. As its ranks swelled, so the bonds of discipline loosened. Raw recruits, married men, had been enlisted, men who made no mystery of their reluctance to join the standards, who vowed they would run away at the first shot,—a vow a soldier is seldom inclined to break. On the borders of the Ticino, on the steamers on Lake Maggiore, at the very end of February, the eve of that second war, the soldiers of the Savona brigade cried out, loud enough to be heard at the Austrian outposts, that they "would not fight." The Pinelli ministry was well aware of this deplorable state of things, and had, in the previous autumn, frankly acknowledged before Parliament the utter impossibility of going to war with such means.* Since then disorder had been on the increase. Numberless exiles bore arms in the Sardinian army, amongst them many cracked fanatics, not a few malignant scoundrels. One by one the most distinguished officers were held up to public animosity, as incorrigible aristocrats—Austrian partisans. All the calamities of the previous campaign were put down, not only to their incapacity—a charge for which there was sufficient ground, but also to

* Brofferio, v. 25.

their culpable indolence and wilful treachery. Between the extreme parties there could be no compromise; mistrust, exasperation, blind animosity, existed almost between every soldier and his commanding officer. The solicitations of Charles Albert's ministers to France for the loan of one of her experienced generals were resisted by Cavaignac, who was bent upon forcing Sardinia to keep the peace. The command of the army was therefore given to Chrzanowsky, and a division even entrusted to Ramorino, the leader of the Savoy expedition of 1833. The first unknown adventurer who threw himself on their way, and even a more than suspected traitor, seemed to those imprudent democratic statesmen preferable to the Bavas, the Broglias, the La Marmoras, against whom the stolid popular outcry had been raised.

Thus, without funds, without friends, in or out of Italy,—before Valerio, whom they had sent to the south to solicit from Rome and Tuscany the respective contingents of 20,000 and 10,000 men, had time to acquit himself of his mission, and to acquaint them with its results,—notwithstanding the warnings and almost the protests and threats of France and England,—only twenty-two days after they had risen to power, the democratic ministers denounced the armistice. The Gordian knot must be cut, even though the sword should strike into the very vitals of Piedmont!

Under such auspices opened the campaign of Novara (March 20th). It barely lasted four days. The general-in-chief had made his preparations for aggres-

sive war. The Duke of Genoa crossed the Ticino and led the vanguard to Magenta. Radetzky effected the passage of the same river opposite to Pavia. Perhaps perseverance in the original plan, and a bold push into Lombardy, might have been the best course; but Chrzanowsky immediately fell back to the defence of the Piedmontese soil, and he never recovered the confusion consequent upon this sudden change in his operations. The position of La Cava was abandoned by Ramorino, who was covering it with the Lombard division. (He was shot for insubordination or treason after the war.) The Piedmontese, suddenly exposed to the assault of widely superior forces, showed a good countenance at La Sforzesca, but they succumbed at Mortara, and fell back for a last effort under the walls of Novara—ominous Novara, the scene of so many Italian disasters (March 23rd).

Charles Albert, the worn-out King, turned out. Perrone, Passalacqua, and others of the so-called aristocratic generals, ranged themselves by the King's side. With the best of their blood they redeemed their pledge to King and country. Their cry as they fell was, "One more for the honour of old Piedmont!" Some of the foot regiments, the horse, and the artillery, preferred death to disgrace. But the democratic battalions were "as good as their word." They cried "Treason!" and turned their dastardly back upon the enemy!

Those words that are said* to have been wrung

* Brofferio, v. 100.

from Charles Albert on that fatal day, "All is lost, *even* honour!" were, if truly reported, not just. Those of his Piedmontese who *would* fight, still showed they knew how; the rest only *longed* to be beaten; the cowardly fugitives filled the measure of their baseness by plunder and the most dreadful outrages, both at Novara and in the surrounding country to which defeat scattered them.

The King and his sons had been lavish of their lives. Indeed the ill-starred Charles Albert had been heard to exclaim, with a voice of anguish, "Let me die; this is my last day!" and again, with greater bitterness, "Is there not a cannon-ball for us today?"* And he deserved the soldier's death which was denied him. But all was no less over. In the evening, he abdicated the crown in favour of his son, the Duke of Savoy; he then disappeared from the field, hurried to hide his grief and disgrace in a distant land, and died, on the 29th of July, at Oporto.

Peace be to his memory! He who so signally proved himself unable to conquer, knew at least how to die. It is not given to every man, by one hour of sublime sorrow, thus to redeem the errors of a whole life. There are no suspicions which such an agony had not power to allay, no prejudices which that lonely death-bed could not remove, no enemies that would not be reconciled on that grave.

The first act of the reign of his son, Victor Emanuel II., was to sign with Radetzky, on the evening

* Cibrario, Missione a Carlo Alberto, pp. 240, 245.

of the same 23rd of March, an armistice, by which he consented to the invasion of all his lands as far as the Sesia, and even to the partial occupation of the citadel of Alessandria by an Austrian garrison. England and France however stepped in between Piedmont and the conqueror, freed the country from the presence of the hated foreigner, and obtained for the new King burdensome, yet fair and honourable, conditions (August 6th, 1849).

The people of Piedmont received the cruel tidings of Novara with speechless resignation, yet almost with a sense of unspeakable relief. The worst was now over. Piedmont had twice paid her debt to the national cause; by a double baptism of blood she had won her titles to Italian naturalization.

She now withdrew within herself; she asked a few moments, a few years, to meditate past events, to repair her losses.

But in the midst of this silence a jarring note was heard. Genoa had her own day of madness. On the first news of the armistice, the people flew to arms (March 28th), overpowered the feeble garrison within the walls, created a provisional government, and hoisted a revolutionary standard (March 31st).

Most happily General La Marmora,—the same who had been instrumental in saving Charles Albert's life at Milan, whose division had taken no part in the campaigns of Novara, and continued unbroken,—was at hand; by swiftness of march and promptness of resolution, he stifled the movement at its first out-

break, and forced its authors to capitulate, on the 6th of April.

Certainly no man ever conferred a more essential or lasting benefit upon his country than Alfonso La Marmora did then, not only on the Sardinian dynasty, but upon Piedmont and Italy, and upon Genoa itself. Had he been slower or less firm, a spark would have blazed out into a conflagration; a few ill-advised rioters would have overruled the sense of a whole population, the mad scenes of Rome and Leghorn would have been perpetrated, and order would have to be restored by the Austrians, by the French, by the English,—and the monarchy of Savoy, like that of Rome or Tuscany, would be forced to rely on foreign aid for existence.

But it was not destined that Italy should be, as Mazzini would have it, "since it cannot be all free—all slave."

That partial and passing exception only showed forth the strength of Piedmontese cohesion; it proved on what slender chances the success of the so-called democrats depended, even in those towns which they looked upon as their head-quarters.

Genoa, only annexed since 1814, had had but little time to become Piedmontese. The generation now living could not divest itself of the fond remembrances of their glorious independence. Yet, even there, disaffection was neither wide-spread nor deep-seated. A moment of wrath and despair for the lost cause of Italian freedom, was turned by incorrigible demagogues to a most suicidal purpose. That stupid cry

of "Treason!" sounded aloft; a cry than which nothing could be more senseless, since there was treason, too truly! but it was the whole nation that played false to its destinies. However, as we stated, but few gave in to the snare in the city itself, and not one man in either *Riviera.** General Fanti, on whose democratized Lombard legions the insurgents relied, was too wise to afford them an aid which would only have prolonged a hopeless struggle. Struggle there was thus hardly any; repentance rather than force brought back the erring city to allegiance.

Meanwhile Mazzini, omnipotent at Rome since March 6th, had been once more preparing the "War of the Peoples." All his efforts to bring about a union between Rome and Tuscany exploded against the stubbornness of Guerrazzi's ambition. The two states fell into as rapid a dissolution as the civilized world ever witnessed. The murder of Rossi, the insane exultation at that dastardly deed in the streets of Rome itself, of Leghorn and other towns, had brought irreparable disgrace on the cause of Italy, and hallowed the arms of any power that could—no matter with what means or on what principle—put an end to the "Reign of the Dagger."

There was, however, inconsiderate haste and disregard of all right and reason, in the interference of foreign powers in the affairs of Italy.

Oh! why did they not have a few weeks' more patience, and leave Italian democracy to die by its own hand?

* Brofferio, v. 118.

Did not mere common sense suffice to shame it out of Florence, and that without any appeal to violence, without one drop of bloodshed? Common sense, the necessity of providing for personal security, would equally have put an end to misrule in Rome. The same burst of generous indignation which armed the peaceful and by no means too daring burghers of Florence to rid themselves of the pickpockets whom Guerrazzi had summoned around him, as a body-guard, from Leghorn, would equally have aroused the more manly spirit of the inhabitants of the Legations and the Marches against the cut-throats of Bologna and Ancona, who threatened to lay all the Roman States under the sway of the knife.

Common sense must in the end have gained the victory in Rome itself, or there must have been more in that democracy than men were aware of, or something worse than even that democracy in the only alternative left to the Romans.

The Romans had to choose between Mazzini and the Pope! The French must needs force the Pope down their throats. Thus it was that they hallowed republicanism and made a demigod of Mazzini! The Grand Duke, for whose return his loyal Tuscans had paved the way, chose to make his solemn entrance into Florence in an Austrian uniform, at the head of Austrian bayonets. The two hundred millions of Catholics on whom Pius IX. had built his hopes, decreed that the Roman people were the property of a priest, and could have no voice on their own destiny. The French

republicans took upon themselves the execution of the outrageous sentence: no wonder the very stones of the old city rose against them!

For the hundredth time Europe conspired to the destruction of Italy. Italy was resolved not to fall without a generous armed protest.

The iniquity of the attack called forth the resistance of despair. The defence of Rome, the no less glorious but more stainless deeds of Venice, the self-immolation of Brescia, the struggle in Sicily, ennobled in the eyes of Europe a cause which grievous errors and revolting crimes had, otherwise, irreparably condemned.

Who will venture to calculate the effects of dear-bought experience, of heart-burning disenchantment, the remorse of a people forcibly sobered down by the cruel downfall of their hopes? Who will despair of the future?

How many towns were taken by siege and storm, burnt and levelled to the ground, during the thirty years' struggle from the Diet of Roncaglia to the Peace of Constance, in the days of the Lombard League of old? How many times did the Italians fly before the iron-cased warriors of the north, how deplorably did they waste their strength in base municipal jealousies, how many of them did, in blind perversity of heart, swell the ranks of their common enemy, and lead the way in his work of destruction? But common evils at last brought the erring ones to their senses. The harshness of that common enemy taught them union in spite of themselves, and with

union came confidence in their own forces; self-reliance made them irresistible.

That victory led to no lasting results, it is true; but even from that imperfect assertion of independent existence, the Italians derived sufficient vigour to be enabled for centuries to lead the van of European civilization, and to confer on the sister-nations benefits which will not allow these latter, even at the present day, to look upon their fate with indifference, which must needs qualify the contempt with which their oppressors affect to treat them.

Italy was no worse off at the capitulation of Milan, in 1848, than she was at the burning of the same town in 1162. Yet from the latter catastrophe to the decisive battle of Legnano only fourteen years elapsed.

From the desolation of utter despair to the most signal triumph, fourteen years only!

And who shall wish to hurry God's work? Who shall despair of the future?

CHAPTER VII.

THE CONSTITUTION OF PIEDMONT.

At the time of Charles Albert's abdication, in 1849, Piedmont was of age, and the Princes of Savoy, its guardians, had acquitted themselves of their mission.

The mission of Absolutism is, at the utmost, to form a state. Freedom is the Promethean spark which animates it. The very best of kings are "royalists by trade." They only *grant* liberal institutions to people who are willing and able to *take* them. The Piedmontese belong to those nations who are free-made, not free-born. In 1848, as in 1821, they asked for a Constitution, merely as a means; it was to be a symbol, a pledge, a standard. They entered Lombardy as liberators, and wanted liberty to give dignity to their movement. They called on their brethren to rally under the Cross of Savoy, and mounted the old Savoy shield on the Italian tricolour. But the national cause succumbed, and that banner, with their "Statute," was all they had left.

Their Constitution was therefore cherished as an

emblem and a token. It was accepted as a hope; it remained a remembrance.

It was only after the war that Piedmont began the real conquest of Italy. The advantage of solid organization had given that country, during the contest, an immense preponderance. Prince and people had come into the field with one mind and one will,—one body under the impulse of one soul. The outbreak of the war of Lombardy was hailed as a signal for mutual amnesty. The eagerness for a great national effort blotted out all recollections of local disagreement, and, pleasing to say, those whom the hope of victory had united no force of adversity could put asunder.

Elsewhere the reconciliation had been hollow. Romans and Tuscans brought their evil passions into the battle-field of their fatherland. Prostrated under the heel of Austria, they still indulged their ill-timed, although not unreasonable, ill-will against their rulers. Faction would stop short of nothing but sheer anarchy, utter ruin, degradation, foreign enslavement. Nothing would satisfy the Tuscans but the Austrians; the Romans could only be brought to reason by the French.

The same evil spirit of mistrust and hatred directed its shafts against Charles Albert. Up to the supreme moment, demagogy allowed that King no rest. His precedents made him too fair a scope for the malevolence which pursued him to his grave. He was still branded a "traitor," on the eve of being worshiped as a "martyr." Piedmont had, owing to this feeling,

been greatly impeded in its march—an all but assured victory had been wrenched from its grasp; but its unity was never shaken, the country was never divided against itself. The mere nucleus of a state, limited in aspiration no less than in size, it was at least capable of singleness of purpose. The Piedmontese might have stabbed ministers, or spirited princes away, as easily as their southern brethren have done; but they knew how to stop on the brink of a precipice. With the passing exception of Genoa, they were one in the attack, one in the retreat. Harmony, mutual good faith and confidence, spared the country the horrors of senseless reaction, the disgrace of foreign occupation.

So much for 1848–9. From that epoch the position of the country was totally changed. Piedmont was launched by Charles Albert on a course from which his successors could not recede. Savoy had taken up the championship of Italy: Savoy was Italy: the Alpine State was all of Italy which could not die. It behoved that State to remodel, to regenerate itself. Its material advantages should be enhanced by moral ascendency.

Victor Emanuel II. re-entered Turin on the 26th of March, at night; two days after Novara. But little was known about the young King; that little by no means to his advantage. He had proved himself a daring, dashing soldier, but, for the rest, his manners were described as harsh and haughty; he was the son and husband of Austrian princesses, the pupil of Jesuits. When he joined his father in pledging his

royal faith to the Constitution, on the 1st of February, 1849, his huskiness of voice and sourness of mien had been the theme of ungenerous comments. The "democratic" ministry had resigned on the first tidings of the fatal issue of the war, and a new cabinet had been formed, under the presidency of General De Launay, one of the well-known reactionary councillors of Charles Albert. The appointment had caused the greatest uneasiness; for days and months Piedmont was kept in a state of breathless suspense.

Nevertheless the proclamations by the Duke of Genoa, on the 26th of March, and by the King himself on the following day, reassured the country as to the "preservation and consolidation of its constitutional franchises." But the Parliament had hitherto been little more than a spouting war committee. As it had mismanaged the war, so it now threw obstacles in the way of peace. The King was twice obliged to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies (March 29th, November 20th, 1849).* As in Naples, in Tuscany, and in so many German States, these frequent dissolutions were supposed to be only a prelude to a final dismissal.

Such were however by no means the views of Victor Emanuel. Undoubtedly his situation was beset with mortal dangers, and with more fatal temptations. As a patriot King, he knew he had to contend with two great enemies—Austria and France,—each of them ten times a match for his unaided strength; both of them with great forces concentrated

* Nuovo Codice ad uso del Cittadino delli Stati Sardi, p. 60

upon his defenceless frontiers; two enemies which he could no longer hope to pit one against another. He had at the same time to parry the blows of a third, more wily, more unsparing foe—Rome, whose advanced posts were already not only in the heart of the country, but in his council and cabinet, in his very household.

At the same time he was aware that from all these adversaries he had nothing to fear for himself; that they were actuated by no jealousy of his material power, by no ambitious designs upon his territories. Radetzky, who perhaps wished to compromise him in the eyes of his subjects, after refusing to treat with Charles Albert at Novara, affected great regard for the "husband of an Imperial archduchess." It was only the national champion, the wearer of the "Sword of Italy," they dreaded and hated. All their animosity was aimed against that lofty position which honesty, consistency, and fidelity to his engagements would give him above the crowd of perjured sovereigns. Had he condescended to become one of them, to stoop to the level of their political profligacy, it was always in his power to turn the bitterest foes into potent auxiliaries, to run with them the gauntlet against nations, to take even such chances as that desperate game offered to the strongest of them.

But his choice was made: he would be an "honest man," a constitutional king. Only he found it difficult at first to convince his people of the rectitude of his intentions; for his reign must needs commence

with a peace which was tantamount to a temporary desertion of the national cause. The new Chamber, assembled on the 30th of July, 1849, evinced the same repugnance to submit to the decrees of fate, and to sanction a treaty which the wisdom of necessity had dictated. This led to a new dissolution (November 20th), and to a royal proclamation,* in which an appeal was made to the good sense, the loyalty, the confidence of the nation, and an intimation was conveyed to the electors that peace *must needs* be accepted. The manifesto was countersigned by Massimo d'Azeglio. The sacred name of that noblest and purest of Italian patriots, who had superseded the obnoxious De Launay, at the head of a new ministry, on the 7th of May, was a soother to the minds of reasonable men, and from that moment all disquietude was laid at rest. It was understood that Piedmont, by main force, and for an indefinite time, withdrew from the Italian contest, and the peace was sanctioned by a law of the 22nd of January, 1850. At the same time the country preserved the national standard, a patriot King and minister, and a Constitution.

This was almost the first moment that the "Statuto" was taken into leisurely examination, and may be said to have come into virtual operation. During the two unhappy campaigns, and in the still more sorrowful intervening period, the war, the *Fusione*, the *Costituente*, the armistice, the peace, had, too natu-

* Brofferio, v. 180.

rally, engrossed all the attention of the Chambers. It was now time that they should proceed to the discharge of their legislative duties,—that the Constitution should be maturely read and interpreted.

The Statute had been promised by Charles Albert on the 8th of February, 1848; it was published on the 4th of the ensuing March; it was followed by an electoral law on the 7th of the same month. The first elections took place on the 27th of April, and Parliament was opened on the 8th of May.

The "Statuto" was, as the preamble signified, "dictated" by the loyalty of a King and the affection of a parent," but hardly, we should think, with the wisdom of a legislator. A constitution in Piedmont was, at the time it came out, neither the result of the King's wish, nor of the advice of the steadiest patriots, nor of the very urgent demands of the people. The Italian Princes were hurried on by a desperate shift of the King of Naples at the very moment when some of them mildly deprecated, others sternly denounced, the mere mention of constitutional franchises. We are not of those who would wish to put off the grant of free institutions until the people for whom they are intended are "ripe" for them; on the contrary, we maintain that freedom is the only school of freemen. A constitution however, where it is not, as in England, the growth of ages, should be the work of calm and mature deliberation; opportunity and fitness should be consulted; and if it must needs be the result of indiscriminate hurry, it should, at least as far as possible

be based on few general principles, allowing ample latitude for future legislation, lest the constitution be found to bind where it should loose, or *vice versâ*.

Charles Albert was not, like Ferdinand of Naples, under the pressure of open revolt. He might have held his throne without giving in to the outcry for a constitution; he might have solemnly engaged his word to grant a constitution, yet surely have asked for sufficient time and the best advice to frame it; and as war with Austria was imminent, and actually broke out a fortnight later, he might have asked his people to leave the "Statuto" in abeyance, till the great contest had been brought to a decisive issue.

Instead of which, the compilation of the Statute was hastily proceeded with; it was, in the main, but a copy of the French charter of 1830; and, by a strange coincidence, it came out hardly a score of days after its prototype had been torn to pieces, like an old rag, by a Parisian mob; it came into operation in the midst of all the throes of the Lombard war; its Upper Chamber—the list of Senators—was drawn up by the King when plunged into the gravest difficulties of the first campaign.

Nevertheless the Piedmontese were too wise to quarrel with their *improvised* statute, or to wish for the immediate modification of its provisions. All they asked for was a certain amount of orderly, rational freedom; the equality of all subjects before the law; uniformity of taxation; inviolability of person and property; the right of petition and association; and

freedom of the press. All this was secured by the fourteen preliminary or fundamental Articles published on the 8th of February; confirmed in the statute of March 4th. By the electoral law a share in the Government was allowed to every man paying taxes to the amount of forty *lire*, or francs, in Piedmont, and twenty in Savoy, Nice, Genoa, etc.; and also to members of academies, professors of colleges, and other men of education and intelligence, irrespective of mere property qualification.

The first application of their newly-gotten freedom was made by the Piedmontese to their ecclesiastical institutions. With the instinct of real sufferers, they immediately laid their fingers on the sore place; they declared war against their priests.

The evils of priestly tyranny had, under Charles Albert, reached their utmost limit. By a mere stroke of the pen Victor Emanuel I. had, in 1814, brought back the barbarism of 1770. Bigotry had acquired new intensity after the events of 1821 and 1833, and the penal codes of Sardinia, in religious matters, were an outrage on civilization. Heresy and blasphemy—that is, any *direct or indirect* attack against the doctrines of the Church, its miracles, its precepts; any profane expression against the Virgin or the Saints—were punishable with hard imprisonment; sacrilege—that is, any voluntary or involuntary disrespect to a consecrated wafer—punishable with death.* The Jesuits, the priests, and—in their name and interest—

* Codice Penale, art. 161, 162, 169.

the police, exercised the most intolerable control over the conscience of the citizens. Not to conform, at least externally, with the precepts of the Church, was a crime visited by the State with a hundred, legal or illegal, means of punishment, for, harsh and inhuman as the laws were, their severity was greatly aggravated by arbitrariness of application.

Now the Revolution of 1848 was undertaken under the auspices of Pius IX.; it was prompted by a conviction of the compatibility of social progress with the Papacy, of the necessity of a reconciliation between Catholicism and Liberalism, of a new covenant between Church and State. The constitutions of that epoch were compiled under the influence of strong Papist feelings. Charles Albert is said* to have, on the 5th of February, presented to his councillors a paper, on which he had written the first article of the Statuto:—"The Roman Catholic Apostolical is the only religion of the State: other forms of worship, now extant, are tolerated in conformity with the laws." The paper was otherwise blank, and the King intimated that, provided the religion of the country was safe, they might otherwise draw up the Constitution to their own satisfaction.

In order however that the first provision of the Statute might be found to answer the wants and tendencies of a free community, it was necessary that existing laws should undergo such alterations as would remove all restrictions and disabilities of the sects already in

* Boggio, La Chiesa e lo Stato in Piemonte, i. 267.

being, since the Statute seems to refuse its countenance to the rise or spread of any new religious persuasion. Charles Albert himself, in fact, moved by a petition, signed by thousands of the most influential persons, at the head of whom was the Marquis Robert d'Azeglio, issued, on the 17th of February, 1848, an edict admitting the Waldenses to the enjoyment of all civil rights,* a measure subsequently extended by Parliament to the Jews and all other dissenters (*Acattolici*), June 19th, 1848.

Still the principle of a State religion and church was established. The first article of the Constitution was literally quoted from the Civil Code, and, although the clause that the King "glories in his office as Protector of the Church and promoter of the observance of its laws," etc., was wisely omitted in the Statute, still it was extremely difficult to settle by law to what extent the State, as "defender of the faith," should consider itself bound to oppose the spread of heterodox tenets, and set limits to proselytism. Splendid churches, or "temples," were thrown open at Turin, Genoa, Pinerolo, and elsewhere, for the preaching of the Gospel to the Italians in their own language. Tracts and journals are published by the Waldenses, and even by a rival sect, headed by Albarella and De Sanctis, an advocate and an ex-priest, originally members of, now seceders from, the Waldensian *Mensa* (table, or board), founders of a so-called "Italian Free Church" at Turin, and of a journal, 'La

* Bert, I Valdesi, p. 336.

Luce Evangelica,' published in opposition to the 'Buona Novella,' the organ of M. Meille and his Waldensian brethren.

All this can hardly be considered strictly legal, for the twenty-eighth article of the Statuto, whilst establishing the freedom of the press, still submits the "printing of Bibles, Catechisms, Liturgic and Prayer-books" to the control of the bishops; nor is it settled whether or not the publication of Protestant ideas may be looked upon as an attack on the orthodox creed, or the "diffusion of Christian knowledge" is to be designated as proselytism. It is difficult to define, for instance, to what extent a professed disbelief of the new dogma of the Immaculate Conception (the *sine labe*), or of the miracle of the Winking Madonna, may be accounted heresy, or a refusal to take off one's hat before a procession or to kneel to the sacrament may be construed into contempt for the established form of worship. The Sardinian Government has hitherto given the freest interpretation to the spirit of the Statuto, and suffers the most obnoxious laws, which it has no leisure or no power to abolish, to fall into desuetude. Real freedom of conscience is however by no means legally admitted; and it is always in the power of a fanatic priest to refuse a Protestant burial in consecrated ground, or of a custom-house officer to stop the delivery of Bibles, or to exact from the Waldensian pastor who claims them a solemn promise that they shall be reserved for the exclusive use of his flock; and the exemption from the duty of hearing

mass, or from the performance of other Catholic rites, which is allowed to *born* Protestants in the army, is denied to their *converts;* for by a most untenable fiction, tolerance is restricted not merely to the extant sects, but even to the existing members of their communities: as if it were possible to allow freedom of opinion, and yet check its influence or disavow its effects.

These are however mere matters of form; practically the Waldenses print, sell, and freely advertise Bibles and Prayer-books; and never apply to Government or appeal to public opinion without obtaining immediate redress of their grievances.

Nevertheless the Church was still, in 1848, and still is in 1855, an immense power in the State; and no Constitution will be able to attain its development till the Church has ceased to rely on the protection of the State,—till men "leave God to take care of His own Truth," and place it beyond the thrall of priestly tyranny.

Now priestly tyranny has struck in Piedmont deeper roots than in almost any other Catholic community.

It results from the latest returns* that the kingdom of Sardinia numbers 23,000 ecclesiastics, exclusive of pupils in seminaries, novices, and others not in orders, —a number allowing one clergyman for every 214 inhabitants. The proportion in Belgium is one for 600, in Austria one for 610. It is also by no means

* Cadorna, Discorso alla Camera Elettiva, Feb. 20, 21, 1855, p. 62.

the same in the various parts of the Sardinian states, for in Savoy it is one for 420, in Piedmont one for 227, in the island of Sardinia one for 127; so that, by reducing the whole country to the ratio of Savoy, the number of ecclesiastics would be diminished by 10,000; by adopting the measure of Belgium or Austria, by 14,000.

The Church revenue in Piedmont amounts to more than seventeen millions of francs: it is four times larger than the sum allowed by Belgium for public worship,—little less than half the sum allowed by France, though Belgium has nearly the same population as Piedmont, France eight times the population of Piedmont.

Piedmont has seven archbishops, thirty-four bishops, seventeen abbeys and priories, 1417 canonries. Its forty-one prelates enjoy a revenue of 1,012,742 francs, nearly equal to the stipend of all the prelacy of France; ten times as large as that of all the Belgian prelacy. There are Piedmontese bishops whose revenue is above 100,000 francs; that is, double the stipend allowed to the French or Belgian primate, and equal to that of all the Belgian prelates put together. The revenue of cathedral and collegiate chapters in Piedmont is 1,692,155 francs; it exceeds nearly by one-half that of France, and is sixteen times larger than that of all the chapters of Belgium. Piedmont has, besides, 71 monastic orders, 604 religious houses, 8563 monks and nuns, with an acknowledged revenue of 2,282,851 francs.

The Piedmontese parishes are 4431; their income 4,888,347 francs; considerably larger, in proportion, than that of France. Some of the parish priests have a revenue above 12,000 francs,—larger, that is, than the stipend of a French bishop; whilst however there are in Piedmont 2540 parish priests with a revenue below 500 francs.

Such formidable numbers and such exorbitant wealth must, under all circumstances, have made Piedmont a very "Paradise of Priests." It must have given the clergy an influence which, backed by all the exertions of the lay authorities in its behalf, had evidently the means, as it was its interest, to crush all public spirit. Yet the public spirit was by no means utterly subdued. On the very first awakening of national feelings, in 1848, the whole of Piedmont, no less than the whole of Italy, rose against those "priests of priests," the Jesuits, with a burst of hatred and revenge, to which absolute as well as constitutional princes, and the Pope himself, were compelled to give way.

At the time of the French occupation of 1796, the disciples of Loyola, who had no other home in Europe, and had ceased to be in Rome itself, found a shelter in the island of Sardinia, at the Court of the pious Princes of Savoy,* one of whom, as we have seen, Charles Emanuel IV., died in their convent and wearing their habit. With those princes, the Jesuits came back to Piedmont at the Restoration, and were in-

* Martini, Storia di Sardegna, p. 94.

vested with irresponsible powers at the universities, schools, and colleges. A whole generation was thus brought up, shaped and fashioned, by those brethren; yet the pressure of an iron rule was hardly removed when, on the 4th of January, 1848, their own pupils at Genoa raised the first cry against them. That cry, "Out with the Jesuits!" was echoed at Cagliari and Sassari, and presently at Turin and Novara. The Jesuits, the monks of the "Company of St. Paul" (a charitable educational brotherhood, established in 1663), the nuns of the Sacré Cœur—all who were supposed to have any direct or indirect connection with the detested Jesuitical sect;—were hunted down by the populace in every town, till that act of blind popular instinct was sanctioned by a royal decree of the 25th of August, 1848, which not only expelled those orders, but appropriated their property to educational purposes.*

This was sheer indulgence to the passions of the multitude; but much more was required by the new franchises sanctioned by the Statute.

The equality of all subjects before the law, determined by the 24th article, demanded the abolition of all special jurisdiction of the Episcopal courts in civil and criminal matters; the suppression of the right of asylum; the cessation of the concurrence of the "lay arm," or secular power, in the enforcement of ecclesiastical precepts; and finally pointed to the establishment of a "Civil State," by which marriage, the ob-

* Atti del Governo, 1848, p. 594.

servance of holidays, and other matters of *spiritual* discipline, should be withdrawn from the *temporal* control of the Church.

All these measures were brought forward in 1848; at a time, that is, in which the Pope himself, and nearly all his clergy, were, by a strange hallucination, looked upon as the best friends of progress; and the Sardinian Government, anxious to go hand in hand with the Pontiff, applied for a spontaneous abdication of those temporal powers which the Church possessed in no country beyond the Alps, and even in no country in Italy, with the exception of the Ecclesiastical States. The moderation and longanimity of the Sardinian Government, both before the promulgation of the Statute and during the calamitous times which drove the Papal Court into captivity at Gaeta, exceed all credibility.* The noblest patriots no less than the most conscientious Catholics — the Abate Rosmini, Count Balbo, Siccardi, Pinelli — were successively charged with conciliatory missions, both for political and ecclesiastical purposes, to the Pontiff. All in vain! Pius IX. had placed himself in the hands of Austrian and Neapolitan advisers. He reckoned on foreign aid for his restoration; he set his heart against all concessions; he bade the Piedmontese choose between old Concordats and new Statutes. Their choice could not be doubtful.

Hopeless of a compromise, the Government proceeded with its indispensable reforms, and, on the 9th

* Boggio, La Chiesa e lo Stato, i. 296–304.

of April, 1850, by the so-called Siccardi law, the Ecclesiastical Courts (*Foro*) and immunities were finally abrogated: by another law (June 5th), ecclesiastical as well as lay corporations were forbidden the purchase of landed property, or the acceptance of donations or legacies, without the authorization of a royal decree.

The Archbishop of Turin, Fransoni, an intemperate man, who had already made himself obnoxious both to the people and their sovereign, now ventured on open rebellion, and by a circular of the 20th of April he called upon his clergy to resist any summons of the "incompetent" lay tribunals. He was prosecuted for a seditious libel, and shut up for one month in the citadel of Turin.

In the meanwhile Count Santa Rosa, one of the ministers, was brought to his death-bed in August of the same year. A man of deep religious feelings, and surrounded by an anxious, pious family, he asked for the last sacraments of the Church. The parish priest of St. Carlo denied him, as one of the framers of the Siccardi law, unless he cleared himself by recantation of all participation in that act. Notwithstanding great spiritual perturbation and the desolation of his loving family, the Minister abided by his own deeds, and died "impenitent;" so that even Christian burial would have been refused to him; but public exasperation became so threatening, that Government, availing itself of that supreme arbitration even in spiritual matters, which had always been exercised by the

Princes of Savoy as a check on all abuse of power on the part of the clergy (*Appello per Abuso*), removed from Turin not only the parish priest of St. Carlo, but also the whole order of the Servites to which he belonged; and saved Monsignor Fransoni from popular indignation by sending him to the fortress of Fenestrelles, and commencing an action against him, which ended in his expulsion from his diocese and the State.* Similar reasons equally led to the arrest of the Archbishops of Sassari and Cagliari, in Sardinia, the latter of whom was banished.

The people exulted at these first triumphs over clerical tyranny. The burial of Santa Rosa was the occasion for the most touching and imposing demonstration; and in honour of the Siccardi law a granite obelisk was erected in Piazza Susina, at Turin, by a subscription, to which nearly every *comune*, or township, in the kingdom eagerly contributed.

The measures hitherto brought forward and carried were matters of mere justice; they were only of a nature to show the deplorable state of backwardness in which Piedmont had been left; so that indeed the very Milan Gazette† goaded on the Piedmontese, by taunts and sneers on the "great fuss" that was made about the removal of abuses, "the very memory of which had been lost for a whole century in the happy Austrian dominions."

* Allocuzione di Pio IX. del 22 Gen. 1855, p. 101.—Boggio, i. 321–335, ii. 73.

† Gazzetta Officiale di Milano, March 11th, 1850.

Nevertheless the resentment of the priesthood was deep and general. Fransoni's spirit seemed to have descended into the heart of the meanest priestling. The whole hierarchy promptly abjured the liberal ideas which many had sincerely embraced, all at least affected, in the palmy days of Pius IX. Open war broke out. The clerical papers 'L'Armonia,' 'La Campana,' etc., fought their battles with a virulence which allowed them no reason to complain of the evils of a free press; whilst, on the other hand, the liberal papers, especially the 'Gazzetta del Popolo,' a halfpenny journal, the oracle of the lower classes, outstepped all limits of moderation. They adopted the tactics of the French press in the early years of Louis Philippe's reign; they picked up with unwearied industry all the petty gossip and scandal against individual priests, and used it indiscriminately against the whole priestly trade, or "shop," as they called it; whence satire and ridicule was easily cast upon the religion itself of which the priests were the teachers. The work of demolition went on at a dangerous rate, so that it was no easy matter in Piedmont for a *reader* to profess himself a *believer*.

Such extremes however seldom fail to bring their own remedy. The Government was either unwilling or unable to save religion as it was, and left it to save by reforming itself. The modifications of creed and worship do not, of course, lie within the attributes of the secular power; but religion should, at any rate, be put to the test of unbounded freedom of in-

quiry, and that freedom should be made safe against all encroachments of the clergy, by the total demolition of their direct or indirect temporal power. If man would but provide for his own freedom, God, we repeat it, would know how to cause His truth to prevail.

By the abolition of their special jurisdiction, of their immunities, of their exemption from military duties—at least previous to ordination—priests had been reduced to the common rank of citizens. It remained now to emancipate the citizens themselves, to form a "Civil State," that is, to disengage the civil law from all ecclesiastical interference; that the subject who complied with the common laws of the country might suffer no penalty, and incur no disability, on account of any breach of mere ecclesiastical discipline.

It is needless to say, in England, that real freedom of conscience can be grounded on no other principles; that it is impossible "for the Earth to undertake the punishment of transgressions solely committed against Heaven;" that nothing has a more baneful effect on the interests of true religion than to base it upon civil no less than upon penal constraint. Unless the State alone has the power to bind and unbind here below, unless it exercises undivided authority over all worldly matters, the priest will always have the means of turning the most natural inclinations, the holiest affections, into an instrument of religious coercion. No freedom of conscience, for instance, can be said to exist where mixed marriages are not allowed on the most equal

terms. On the same principle, a monk who breaks his vow, a nun who runs away from the cloister, may be guilty of the greatest sacrilege; still for their sin they are accountable to God alone, or, at the utmost, only amenable to the spiritual discipline of the Church; but with man they have contracted no obligation; and human law, whether penal or civil, should only take cognizance of offences by which human interests are affected.

These common truisms, radiant with meridian light in more favoured countries, began now to dawn upon Italy; and the Sardinian Government, by way of experiment, put forth their "Civil Marriage Bill." That bill, merely intended to separate the legal contract from the "sacrament" of matrimony, leaving the performance of the latter ceremony to the option of the contracting parties, was first conceived by the minister Siccardi in 1850; but it received such vital modifications under his successors, De Foresta, Galvagno, and Buoncompagni, as to dwindle down to the meekest, and, in our opinion, most imperfect and unsatisfactory measure, which would have left Piedmont, in these matters, had it been adopted, far behind Belgium, France, and other Catholic lands,—far behind the condition in which Piedmont itself was during the French occupation from 1798 to 1814;* still the whole hierarchy was on the alert. The moderation of the Government, construed into weakness and timidity, emboldened factious opposition. All means, fair or foul, even

* Allocuzione di Pio IX., p. 162.

secret letters by the Pope to King Victor Emanuel,* were resorted to. The bill, presented on the 9th of June, 1852, passed through the Chamber of Deputies, but was rejected by the Senate.

The Government had therefore to change its line of attack. To bring the priesthood to reason, it conceived it necessary to get at their wealth.

Narrow apostolical views have long since been laid aside; it is now universally admitted that sordid poverty is as injurious to the dignity of the clergy, as exorbitant riches are fatal to their morality. Now the two evils were found to exist side by side in Piedmont. We have seen that the Church in that country ordained four times the number of priests that are deemed necessary in other Catholic communities, and enjoyed a revenue eight times larger. The reduction, however gradual, of these monstrous proportions, became now the topic of men's discourse.

For the mere thinning of the priestly ranks lawful means were at hand.

Agreeably to ancient compacts between the Holy See and the Court of Savoy, the appointment of bishops to Piedmontese dioceses belonged to the Pope, but merely on presentation by the Sardinian Government; at every new vacancy a breach is made in the episcopate by the mere fact that no candidate is presented. So long as the contest between the two powers continues, the Piedmontese Sees will be widowed of their pastors; seven or eight dioceses have already

* Boggio, ii. 65.—Allocuzione, p. 192.

been vacated by death; Turin and Cagliari by criminal prosecution: in any future arrangement, a reduction of that intolerable number of forty-one prelates will be amongst the first stipulations. Meanwhile the notion that the priestly trade—the *bottega*, or shop, as the 'People's Gazette' has it—is no longer so lucrative as it used to be, scares less zealous candidates for ordination. The "seminaries," or clerical colleges, are comparatively deserted. Piedmont is in a fair way of having fewer priests, at least, if not more orderly.

In order that these "few" priests should also be "quiet," agreeably to Alfieri's recommendation,* it was necessary to lay hands on their property; and, since 1851, agitation has begun in favour of the *Incameramento*,—plainly, confiscation of the goods of the clergy.

By a sweeping measure it was proposed to bring the whole bulk of ecclesiastical property into the hands of the Government, and to substitute, as is done in France and Belgium, a *salaried* instead of a *beneficed* clergy.

This proposal however was deemed, even by many liberals, as unconstitutional as it was injudicious,—as injurious to the real interests of the State as it was to the decorum and independence of the Church. Real social freedom, it was urged, demands no less the emancipation of the clerical body from the civil

* "Sia pace ai Frati
Purchè sfrattati,
E pace ai Preti,
Ma pochi e queti," etc.

power, than the establishment of civil rights, independent of all priestly thraldom; the solution of all Church questions, it was added, will be found in the total separation of the two powers.* A salaried clergy is necessarily a blind instrument in the hands of Government; the latter, by keeping the hierarchy in its pay, lends faith a support which should be left to persuasion exclusively.

The seizure of Church property, and the appropriation of the whole or part of it to even the most laudable secular purposes, was not to be thought of. The Sardinian Government nevertheless determined to have a hand in it, to regulate its administration, its equitable distribution.

It was impossible to lose sight of the great fact that 2540 Piedmontese parish priests had an income of less than 500 francs: in order to provide them with a bare subsistence, by means of supplementary pensions (*congrue*), the State had to bear the burden of 928,412 francs yearly; and it was charged besides with other purely ecclesiastical expenses. Adding other burdens which fell on the provinces and *Comuni* for the support of the Church, it appears that the nation bore the charge of above five millions for mere ecclesiastical purposes.†

All this for the benefit of a Church whose revenue exceeded one-tenth of that of the whole landed property in the kingdom;‡ a Church whose bishops,

* Boggio, i. 443, ii. 101. † Codice del Cittadino Sardo, p. 159.
‡ Cadorna, Discorso, p. 64.

canons, etc., revelled in a wealth vastly above that which is deemed a competency for similar dignitaries in other Catholic communities!

It was resolved that the Church should at least maintain itself,—that it should supply the wants of its poorer pastors: such was the main aim of the Bill presented to the Chambers by the Cavour-Rattazzi Ministry, on the 28th of November, 1854.

The object of the law was twofold. Directly, it was meant to tax the wealthier clergy for the support of the more needy.

From archbishops, bishops, abbots, canons, and the best-endowed parish priests whose revenue was above a certain specified amount, one-third of the surplus was to be taken yearly; but as the produce of this tax, or *quota*, was deemed insufficient for the exigencies of the Church, Government proposed—it was its indirect object, avowedly—the suppression of some of the convents, and the confiscation of their goods.

At the time of the expulsion of the Jesuits, in 1848, the question of the general abolition of monastic orders was mooted in Parliament;* but at that epoch, a breach with the Church was deemed unadvisable, and the idea prevailed that nothing should be done upon the mere impulse of revolutionary passions. Monks were however decidedly out of date, and the abolition of their orders was calmly and deliberately discussed. The difficulty arose from the necessity or justice of allowing pensions to the members of the suppressed

* Brofferio, iv. 130.

communities, for even at 500 francs per head it would occasion an outlay of 4,281,500 francs yearly, an expense doubling the present income of all their property.

The Government therefore only contemplated the suppression of "such convents as were deemed of no practical advantage to the civil society;" they asked for discretionary powers to deal with the monastic body as circumstances permitted; to put an end to the legal existence of a certain number and category of religious communities, as "moral beings" (*enti morali*); confiscating their property, but, in return, suffering their members to abide in their cloisters, and even to enjoy a pension—average 500 francs—during their lifetime, so as, in short, to bring about their suppression by gradual extinction. Analogous dispositions decreed the abolition of a great number of collegiate chapters and sinecure benefices.

All the money resulting from the sale of confiscated property, as well as from the tax levied on the opulent clergy, was destined to the formation of a Church-fund, which, under the administration of a mixed board, but decidedly under Government influence, should be applied to the relief of the poorer parish priests, and to other exclusively ecclesiastical purposes.

Such is in the main the measure which, under the name of "Convent-law," was finally adopted by the Sardinian Parliament on the 29th of May, 1855. It was grounded on strict legality, or at least on well-established legal precedents; it was very far from giv-

ing full satisfaction even to the most moderate liberals; and it was only accepted by the majority of the Chamber of Deputies, on account of the principle it settled beyond all future dispute—"that the State does possess and exercise the right to extinguish religious communities, as also to lay hands on a part at least of the property of the Church, provided it be done in the interest of the Church itself." As yet the State in Piedmont has striven rather for the vindication than for the exercise of its powers. By its successful operation the Government acquired little more than liberty for future action.

The struggle nevertheless was severe, and all Europe rang with its din and clamour.

The Court of Rome sent forth its protest, or Monitory, on the 22nd of January, in which it not only annulled the Siccardi Law, and all other subsequent acts of a similar nature, it not only forced Piedmont back to its condition anterior to 1847, but even demanded the abolition of the *Exequatur* (by which papal bulls could not be published in the country without previous royal authorization), of the *Appello per abuso* (or interference of the King's Government, in case of any abuse of power on the part of the clergy), and other rights and privileges inseparable from royal authority, enjoyed by the House of Savoy for centuries, and indeed common to nearly all Catholic communities: it claimed absolute supremacy over all matters, even those most remotely connected with temporal Church interests, and very plainly intimated

the utter incompatibility of the Catholic religion with equality before the law, a free press, and any scheme of secular education: it invited the clergy to open resistance, and set before them the "illustrious examples" of Fransoni, Marongiu, and other refractory prelates.*

The extravagance no less than absurdity of such pretensions—for even the conferring of the chivalrous order of St. Maurice on a Protestant was denounced as an invasion of sacred rights†—indisposed those very men who had hitherto shown the most uncompromising zeal in the cause of the Papacy. The priestly press, and the whole clerical body, however, responded to the Pontiff's call, and did not hesitate to point to the cholera, the disease of the grape, and other public calamities, as clear evidences of heavenly displeasure; they even affected to trace the "Finger of God" in the domestic afflictions of the royal family, plainly intimating that divine justice visited on the King—who in little more than a month lost his mother, wife, and brother—the sins of a reprobate Ministry and a godless Parliament.

There was enough, truly, in the singular coincidence of those strokes of fate with the various stages through which the Convent Bill passed (the discussion was twice interrupted by official mourning) not only to stagger and bewilder timid, superstitious minds,

* Allocuzione, pp. 7–35.—Cadorna, Discorso, p. 34–40.—Quarterly Review for June, 1855, p. 60.

† Allocuzione, p. 19.

but even, it was feared, to shake the resolution of the well-meaning Victor Emanuel himself.

There were those, both among the higher clergy and among the most intimate officers of the royal household, who thought the mental cultivation of the King by no means equal to his moral elevation, and his firmness in the council not so unshaken as his intrepidity in the field. These beset the King in the blindness of his bereavement, and induced him to a course which looked very much like interference with the regular proceedings of parliamentary legislation.

The Convent Bill had, as we have seen, been merely presented as an economical or financial measure, the aim of which was to relieve the budget of the sum of 928,412 francs, by which the State supplied the yearly wants of the Church. A proposal was now made to the King by the bishops to defray this expense at their own cost, on condition of the abandonment of the obnoxious measure. The offer of the bishops was too late, and ungraciously made, and subject to exemptions and restrictions which rendered it nugatory: it was however sufficiently specious and subdolous to arrest the attention of the King, who communicated it to his ministers. These saw too clearly through the astuteness of that priestly device, and were besides too far engaged in the furtherance of their own scheme to give their support to the episcopal proposal. The proposal of the bishops was nevertheless brought before the Senate by one of the prelates, a member of that body, with so little regard for constitutional forms,

that the country was for a few days under apprehension of a *coup d'état.* The King however had no other wish than to give the episcopal project a fair trial. His ministers had resigned their office, and General Durando, the former Minister of War, by the King's desire, conferred with liberal statesmen of every shade, to see if any could be found to whom the bishops' proposition might seem admissible. Not one man would accept office upon condition of giving that proposition his support; and, as the true-hearted King would have nothing to do with the reactionary party, he dropped the bishops' memorandum, recalled the Cavour Cabinet, bade the discussion of the Bill to be proceeded with, and no sooner had it passed both Houses, than he gave it by his signature the force of a law.

All these priestly manœuvres, and the great length to which the discussion was dragged, caused not a little alarm in the country, and even some dangerous ferment in the capital; but the uprightness of the King, the consistency of public men, and the admirable temper of the people, precluded the possibility of any serious outbreak.

Unimportant and incomplete as the success of the liberal party may seem, it must nevertheless have not a little damped the spirits of the Roman Court, otherwise too much inflated with its victorious career in France, in Austria, in Germany, in England itself. The sweeping resolutions France and Spain have repeatedly come to on ecclesiastical matters, their usur-

pation of Church property, their suppression of convents and monasteries, were almost invariably the result of revolutionary outbreaks, and a corresponding violence of reaction might be confidently looked forward to. The philosophical enactments of a Joseph of Austria or a Leopold of Tuscany sprang from the arbitrary will of an autocrat; and where the people's inclinations are not consulted, a sovereign's whim may be set aside by the whim of another sovereign. So it is that in France Jesuits have been repeatedly expelled and recalled; in Spain, again and again monasteries were pulled down and rebuilt; and in Austria the Pope is rapidly regaining the ground he had lost.

But in Piedmont reform is brought about by a national impulse, with the co-operation of all the powers of the State; Piedmont drunk with revolutionary excitement in 1848, has referred the Church questions to Piedmont sober in 1855,—the cessation of superannuated abuses is the work of calm, mature, overscrupulous deliberation: the progress is slow, there is consequently no apprehension as to its sureness. The Church—at least, what is hopelessly rotten in it—is falling, falling, in Piedmont; Rome can hear its crash near home, on that very Italian soil which has hitherto been its tower of strength. By this we do not mean that either Piedmont or Italy are in any great hurry to throw themselves into the hands of the Protestants; but those reforming measures adopted by a Catholic State "between the Alps and the sea," is a deathknell to the temporal power of Rome. Either con-

stitutional freedom must be utterly trodden down in Piedmont, or religious truth must be brought to stand upon mere conviction in all Italy, and at Rome itself. Well may the Pope in his impotent wrath—or, as he describes it in the canting Latin of his bulls, "sore affliction and unspeakable sorrow,"—hurl against the temperate Rattazzi law heavier thunder than the decree of wholesale church spoliation by the Spanish Cortes has called forth. An inch of ground lost in Italy is more to him than the secession of a whole distant continent. Every victory of the Piedmontese Parliament is a triumph of the cause of freedom of conscience no less than of religious truth all the world over.

Whilst however the rulers of Piedmont engaged in these ecclesiastical contests, which may be prolonged to infinity, they had no lack of other vital questions claiming their incessant attention. It was necessary to arm the country; to heal the wounds inflicted by the loss of two successive campaigns; to reorganize the Army, restore its confidence, renovate its spirit.

The position of Piedmont since 1848 was something entirely new. It could no longer as an intermediate State depend for its safety on the *mutual*, eternal, inevitable jealousy of those two Powers, France and Austria; their *hostile interests* might still—as they did after Custoza and Novara—guarantee its territorial integrity; but an independent course of policy imposes on a nation the duty of complete self-reliance. Freedom must consider itself isolated; it must be ever ready to give battle to the whole world, sure that

energy and resolution cannot fail ultimately to command the respect and sympathy—to enlist the very interests of the world itself in its cause.

The treaties of 1814 bound Savoy to the Holy Alliance, and engaged her therefore to the pursuance of their hostile views to France. The military task imposed upon Sardinia was merely the defence of its western frontier—its old task as guardian of the Alps. Its own share of the war contributions exacted from France at the Peace (10,000,000 francs) was to be exclusively employed in works of fortification against that Power; consequently, instead of the demolished Brunetta di Susa, which barred both the roads of Mont Genèvre and Mont Cenis, Victor Emanuel I. restored the Fort d'Exilles on the road to the former Pass, and reared L'Esseillon, near the summit of the latter, on the Savoy side.* Charles Albert completed the "armour of Piedmont" by his works at Vinadio, in Val di Stura, by additions to Bard, in Val d'Aosta, and by formidable bastions at Ventimiglia, in the Western Riviera.† By this arrangement Savoy and Nice are left entirely defenceless; though part of Savoy, Chablais, Faucigny, etc., are protected by the compacts of 1814, which extend to them the neutrality of the Swiss Cantons.‡

Under the reign of the same King, the great question of the importance of the Alpine chain—now ren-

* Brofferio, i. 77.

† Cibrario, Misione a Carlo Alberto, p. 207.

‡ Treaty of Vienna, art. 92.

dered complete by the addition of the Genoese Apennines—for the defence of Piedmont and Italy, was long and eagerly discussed. It has been found that the Western Alps, from the Great St. Bernard to the Apennines, have on sixty-six different occasions been made the theatre of great warlike exploits, from the crossing of the Mont Genèvre (or Mont Cenis) by Hannibal to the passage of the Great St. Bernard by Napoleon; that in thirty-two instances the passage was effected either without resistance, or even with the consent and favour of the inhabitants; that in eighteen cases a feeble opposition was easily overcome; but that only in seven occurrences the mountains were forced against great deliberate efforts on the part of their defenders; whilst, on the other hand, the invaders' attacks have been nine times strenuously repulsed.* If we consider that, up to 1713, part of the upper mountain crest was still in possession of the French, who had a free entrance into the valleys of Cesanne, Oulx, Vraita, etc., and that, up to 1814, Genoa had it always in her power to open a passage into Italy through her own territory, south of the whole Alpine chain, there is reason to believe that the attacks of France could at the present day be met on the Alps and Apennines with a political understanding and military co-operation which might lead to greater success than in former wars. No great stress may be laid on the importance of any single point, consequently no great reliance on the strength of any sepa-

* Morelli, Dei Diversi Passaggi delle Alpi, pp. 17–52.

rate fort; still there is no doubt that a well-organized army, seconded by the hardy population of those mountain defiles, would at all times retard, and might even altogether hinder and defeat, the invasion of widely superior forces.

But Piedmont was not, and could not, at the Peace of 1814, be intended to be equally safe on its eastern, or Lombard frontier. The line of the Ticino is too long and weak for defence, and an Austrian army can meet with no material obstruction on its way to Turin, if it be sufficiently strong to tread on the breasts of the Piedmontese soldiery. South of the Po however the country is better protected by the citadel of Alessandria, and, since 1852, by a *tête-de-pont* which has been constructed at Casale. In case of any great reverse in the plain, the defenders of Piedmont have, besides the Alpine valleys, no other line to fall back upon than Casale, Alessandria, the Apennines, and Genoa.

The genius of one man, Alfonso La Marmora, however, has done more for the security of his country than could have been achieved by the construction of any number of impregnable bastions. La Marmora has regenerated the army of Piedmont. Appointed to the Ministry of War since November, 1849, he brought into every branch of his administration an energy and activity equally characteristic of himself, and of every member of his brave family. He reformed the staff by the wholesale dismissal of disabled, disaffected, or incapable officers, utterly regardless of personal favour

or courtly patronage, perfectly unmoved by senseless popular outcry. By the enforcement of a strict, impartial rule, by a thorough reform of the educational system in military colleges, by a constant call upon the mental and bodily exertions both of soldiers and officers, he produced, in less than six years, the most civilized as well as the best-disciplined army that ever could be organized out of Italian elements.* That

* The Sardinian army in time of peace should consist of 47,000 men, with 6700 horses,—about one man per 100 inhabitants. The ordinary expense is fixed at twenty-nine millions of francs. The actual army however exceeds 54,000 men and 8920 horses: the expenditure is seldom below thirty-two millions. In time of war the army may be easily raised to twice its number: it rose to 132,089 in 1849. Since then the infantry of the line has been of course greatly reduced; but the cavalry and artillery are kept up to very considerable efficiency, and the *Bersaglieri* (Riflemen) and Carabineers have been even further augmented. The *Bersaglieri* were 538 in 1847; 2941 in 1849; and 4077 in 1852. The navy is by no means in the same flourishing condition: there are 11 men-of-war, mounting 311 guns, besides 9 war-steamers of 1780-horse power. The navy expenditure amounts to five millions. (*Codice del Cittadino Sardo*, pp. 339–355.) The National Guard constituted in 1852 a force of 639,103 men, armed with 161,863 muskets. The province of Turin mustered 47,793 men and 18,392 muskets; that of Genoa only 14,506 men, 3880 muskets; a proof of greater disinclination on the part of the Ligurian population to avail themselves of the greatest privilege, and to perform the most sacred duty of a freeman,—that of bearing arms. The militia of the city of Turin, amounting to more than 8000 well-armed, dressed and equipped men, exhibits perhaps the most imposing and truly martial array of a civic force in the world. Great efforts are also made throughout Piedmont to organize rifle companies after the Swiss model; and the result is so far greatly encouraging. The national guard, that it may be turned to any useful purpose besides the preservation of internal order, must be differently organized; and volunteer companies of riflemen and artillerymen will be found of great help to the regular army, in

army—or part of it, though by no means, as it was supposed, the *élite* of it, for it was drafted by battalions or companies out of every corps—he has now taken under his guidance to the Crimea; and a first encounter on the banks of the Tchernaya (August 16th, 1855) seems to have justified the most sanguine expectations, both of the Minister himself and of the country. It is truly auspicious, no less than remarkable, that the same La Marmora who had the good fortune to save his King's life in the midst of the turmoil of Milan in 1848, who preserved the integrity of the Monarchy by stifling the insurrectionary movement at Genoa in 1849, should be charged with the honour of the national arms in 1855.

For the rest, the treaty of alliance with the Western Powers, by which that expedition was determined, was a measure fraught with incalculable consequences for the future welfare of Piedmont. We have seen that an instinctive dread of Russia, and more especially of that power acting in combination with Austria, haunted Sardinian statesmen as early as 1783; and that even at that time they urged the necessity of a great European League, of which Savoy was to be a member; against the ambitious views of those two grasping empires, and for the protection of Turkey. The present treaty was proposed under an erroneous but widely-prevalent conviction, of the reality of the compact of December, 1854, and of the sincerity of the intentions of Austria toward

case of any outbreak of foreign war.—*Stefani, Annuario Storico-Statistico*, pp. 249-251.

the Anglo-French allies; and the chance, however remote, of the Italian tricolour appearing on the field by the side of the Austrian eagles caused great repugnance to the military convention contemplated by the Sardinian Government. But the sagacity of the great majority in Parliament, and the good sense of the moderate press, placed the question in its true light, and the opinion gained ground that an alliance with England and France, under all possible circumstances, best provided for the interest of Piedmont,—possibly, also, for the future happiness of Italy. Even at the present day the fortunes of the Eastern war hang in painful suspense, and the Turco-Russian question may perhaps be complicated with other difficulties, leading to the most unlooked-for solution. Diplomacy is evidently at fault, and the policy of "nationality" may, in the end, prove the wisest, as it is the most generous.

At all events Piedmont will be found to have taken from the very outset the safest course. The alliance has already had its signal advantages, even if only in silencing the eternal remonstrances of France against the excessive freedom of the Piedmontese press, and her endless "good offices" in behalf of the Pope. Raised by her new position to a level with the great Powers, Sardinia will come out of this struggle as a really free agent; she will have the material support of England and France no less than the moral interest of all enlightened Europe, in the further development and consolidation of her free institutions.

Happen what may, in short, the Piedmontese are

masters of their own destinies; no harm can come to them except from their own want of steadiness or unanimity. Truly their loyalty and patriotism, their good sense and patience, have been, and are now, sorely tried. There is no lack of what mischief-makers call "opportunities" for the people to follow the bent of perverse inclinations. Two successive reverses in the battle-field; the costs of war paid both for themselves and for their brethren of Lombardy (calculated at 225,000,000*); unbounded hospitality, pensions, and important, even the highest offices, to thousands of houseless exiles; an immense outlay of money in railways, telegraphs, roads, harbours, canals, and other necessary or greatly useful public works, which absolutism had left in arrear; grievous financial difficulties, and a consequent increase in all branches of taxation, scanty harvests, and the almost total failure of the vintage for several years,—a variety of distressing circumstances, having a tendency to create, to maintain, to aggravate factious agitation. Ungenerous appeals to provincial animosities, perfidious suggestions of a demagogy run mad, the treacherous plots of men who have nothing to lose, have not been wanting,—and not merely with a view to create internal disturbance, which even the most desperate agitator would give up as a hopeless undertaking, but for the more specious purpose of making the Piedmontese territory the head-quarters of revolutionary propaganda,

* Codice del Cittadino Sardo, p. 120.—Stefani, Annuario Storico-Statistico, p. 437.

the starting-point for the most insane insurrectionary attempts against the smaller Italian states, so as to involve Sardinia in difficulties with her neighbours.

At the same time it must not be denied that whatever trouble the country may have in resisting the fretful, improvident haste too natural in men who live by hope only, Piedmont has been handsomely rewarded for her frank hospitality to Lombard, Tuscan, and other Italian exiles. Turin has become the Athens of Italy. The *élite* of Italian genius and valour from east and south have taken shelter there; the soul of the Italian nation is stirring in its bosom. Cialdini, Cucchiari, Fanti, all natives of Modena, are at the head of Sardinian brigades in the Crimea. Montevecchio, who fell mortally wounded at the Traktir, was born at Fano, in Romagna. Farini, a Roman; Correnti, a Milanese; Tecchio, of Vicenza, with more than twenty other exiles, are among the most distinguished members of the Lower House. Gioia and Pallavicino, from the duchy of Parma, with several others, rank high amongst the senators. Paleocapa, a Venetian, the minister for public works, has been, since October, 1849, one of the indispensable members of every cabinet. Colleges, schools, academies, harbour not a few scholars, literary men, artists, from all parts of Italy. The press employs many more. The 'Piemonte,' 'Opinione,' 'Unione,' and several other newspapers and reviews in Turin and Genoa, are almost exclusively in the hands of refugees. If they brought nothing with them but a somewhat purer language than the uncouth

Subalpine and Ligurian dialects, they would confer no slight benefit upon their adopted country. The obstinacy with which the people of Turin and Genoa, no less indeed than of all northern Italy—even those belonging to the educated classes—cling to their barbarous *patois,* is one of the most repulsive features of modern Italian society. The gathering together of men from the various parts of the Peninsula has had, and will have, the effect of causing the written tongue to be adopted as a means of general social intercourse, and language will become a bond of national union. Nor are all these exiles at the charge of the land which has given them shelter; some of the wealthiest Milanese nobles and landed proprietors have become permanent residents, and the sequestration of their property by the Austrian Government has not so utterly drained their resources but that a considerable revenue still follows them across the Ticino. They contribute in no slight degree to the animation of the otherwise dull Subalpine communities. Those who remember Turin under the gloomy reign of Charles Albert, can hardly recognize it in the gay, bustling, fast-spreading capital of Victor Emanuel II.* Scarcely anywhere out of London do streets and squares and rows of stately buildings rise, as if at a wave of the magician's wand, as they do now in the *Borgo Nuovo,* about the railway station, and all round the western and northern side

* Turin had, in 1851, 259 *isole,* or blocks of buildings, 1701 houses, yielding a revenue above twelve millions of francs. The population, which was 117,072 in 1838, was reckoned 136,849 in 1848.—*Stefani, Annuario Storico-Statistico,* pp. 371–384.

of Turin. In no European state have railroads, electric telegraphs, etc., marked so rapid an advance as they have done in so short a lapse of years in Piedmont. The first five miles of railway, between Turin and Moncalieri, was only opened on the 24th of September, 1848;* now, the lines between Turin and Genoa, between Genoa and Arona, on the Lake Maggiore (270 chilometers), constructed at the expense of the State, for a sum of one hundred and thirty-three millions of francs, have been completed. Private speculation has added lines from Turin to Savigliano and Cuneo, with branches to Fossano and Bra; from Turin to Pinerolo, from Turin to Susa, besides the main line between Turin and Novara, the direct road to Milan. Other lines, to Ivrea, Biella, etc., will unite the capital with all the principal towns at the foot of the mountains. Across the Alps, the lines of Mont Cenis and the Luckmanier have for several years been engaging the attention of able engineers. Across the Apennines, besides the road already achieved above Genoa, another line, connecting Savona with Ceva, is in contemplation. From Genoa, along the Riviera, a railway

* As a proof of the influence of free institutions on the progress of works of a similar nature, it may be stated that railways were projected in Piedmont as early as in 1834: the projects were utterly barren of results till 1848. On the contrary, electric telegraphs, which were only projected in 1848, were already in operation in 1850; they are now established throughout the country, and a submarine cable already connects the island of Sardinia with the mainland. The Cavalier Bonelli, director of these works, has also submitted his plans for the continuation of the submarine telegraph to Malta, Africa, and Candia.

has been constructed as far as Voltri; a line between Mortara and Vigevano already reaches the Lombard frontier; a prolongation of the existing lines, from Novara to Buffalora, and from Alessandria to Stradella, will tend to unite Piedmont with Lombardy and the Duchies. The progress of these latter works is only impeded by the jealousy of Austria. In Savoy, a line will be directed from Chambéry upon Geneva; another from Chambéry up the Mont Cenis road as far at least as Modane or Lanslebourg. The jealousy of France has again interfered here to prevent the construction of a line between Chambéry and Lyons.

The harbour and city of Genoa exhibit an unprecedented activity.* Indeed, speculation has only taken too bold a flight, and the operations of the Transatlantic Steam Navigation Company have not met with a success commensurate with the expectations of its projectors.

The symptoms of a new life, in short, are every-

* The city of Genoa had, in 1849, 4490 houses, with a population of 100,966 inhabitants (*Stefani, Annuario,* p. 334). New quarters are rising, however, in every direction, and the population, notwithstanding the ravages of the cholera, must have received considerable additions. In 1845 the mainland (Genoa and Nice) employed about 20,000 sailors; in 1850, according to official statements, the sailors for the whole State—that is, with the island of Sardinia—were reckoned at 25,661. The merchant shipping, in 1850, consisted of 3,467 vessels with 159,307 tons; the arrivals at the various ports of the State were, vessels 6241, tonnage 704,511; the departures, 6220 vessels with 701,855 tons. (*Stefani,* pp. 117–121.) The fisheries, somewhat on the decline, employed, in 1845, 327 boats, 1049 tons, 1838 sailors; in 1850, 288 boats, 1050 tons, 1643 sailors.—(*Stefani,* p. 117.)

where apparent. Seven years of free life have rejuvenized Piedmont; and it is important to see how far all this brilliant success will bear close critical investigation.

The kingdom of Sardinia has (it is to be regretted that our statistical accounts date from the last census of 1848) a population of 4,916,084 inhabitants.* It is within two thousand the same as that of the Austrian provinces of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, little more than half that of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and about one-fifth of the population of the whole Italian peninsula. Of the nearly five millions which inhabit the Sardinian territory, 583,812 belong to Savoy, and are strangers to Italy by nationality, and 547,112 inhabit the island of Sardinia, and are hardly to be reckoned amongst the people of civilized Europe. The former by extreme poverty, the latter by want of cultivation, in no way contribute to the prosperity of the State, and constitute, in fact, its passivity. The Division of Genoa, 545,179, and that of Nice, 242,990, though naturally barren, are how-

* The population was, in 1838, 4,650,375, giving an increase, in ten years, of 265,709. The ratio of 61 inhabitants for the square chilometer has risen to 67, giving an increase of 6·18 per chilometer; the only province in which there was no increase, but rather a slight decrease of 0·54 per chilometer, is that of Tarentaise, in Savoy. The province of Genoa has 307 inhabitants per chilometer, with an increase in ten years of 20; that of Turin, 141 inhabitants per chilometer, increase 10 per chilometer; the continental states have 93 inhabitants per chilometer, increase 13; the island of Sardinia, 22 inhabitants per chilometer, increase 0·47.—*Stefani, Annuario*, pp. 3–5.

ever far from unthrifty, but they cause the State constant anxiety, by their insubordinate, discordant spirit; so that the real strength and soundness of the country lies simply in those three millions of genuine Piedmontese. The finances of the kingdom are, as yet, in considerable disorder. The public accounts present a yearly deficit of eight to ten millions of francs, and the debt amounts to more than five hundred millions. As however four millions at least are employed in railways and other works of public utility, from which ample returns are expected, not merely for the general prosperity of the country, but also for the actual benefit of the public treasury, the passivity of the State may be looked upon as merely apparent. A glance at the budgets of 1851–2, and a comparison with those of 1855–6, already show great improvement in the financial condition of the country;* and Count Cavour, who, since April, 1850, has undertaken the management of that department, may deserve the credit of having, to a great extent, relieved the country from the embarrassment into which the calamities of previous years had plunged it.

* * The deficit for the years 1846–7 was 2,813,029 francs. The budget for

1847	was, Revenue,	101,407,988;	Expense,	119,982,049 fr.
1851	,,	94,515,567	,,	162,076,736
1852	,,	—	,,	144,870,995
1855	,,	128,000,000	,,	138,852,000
1856	,,	130,000,000	,,	139,000,000

The public debt amounted, in 1852, to 527,917,014 francs; burdening the State with a yearly expense of 33,073,649 francs.—*Codice del Cittadino Sardo*, pp. 119, 150, 363.

It is important to observe that, notwithstanding the strict economy observed by Charles Albert during the earliest years of his reign, when he was anxious to prepare for that national struggle to which he ultimately fell a victim, a deficit of about one million and a half already occurred, in the years 1846–7, independently of the expenses for the construction of railways, for which a Reserve Fund supplied the means. The pecuniary difficulties of the country were further increased and complicated by the wars, by public works of great magnitude, to which allusion has already been made, and by the financial union, or *fusion*, of the island of Sardinia with the mainland, by which the liabilities of that poor country have fallen upon the whole State; by the diminution of some obnoxious taxes, especially on salt, tobacco, etc.; by a reduction in the postage of letters, and finally by the outlays inseparable from the first establishment of a representative government, the official and printing expenses of Parliament, the arming of national guards, the festivities of Constitution-day (*Festa dello Statuto*), etc.

Cavour, a man of bold, enlarged views, conceived that the safety of Piedmont depended less on paltry, niggardly savings, than on a more judicious and provident administration and a development of the resources of the country. Wedded to the views of the most enlightened partisans of free trade, he gave a new extension to maritime and commercial operations abroad, whilst at home he laboured at the encouragement of industry, and at the combination of individual

exertions to great general results. We have said that the spirit of association in Piedmont and Genoa already exceeds the limits of discretion; but truly so vast and unexhausted are especially the agricultural and mineral treasures of Old-Piedmont, that they may afford full scope for the safest and most extensive operations for centuries to come. Some of the minister's dearest trading schemes have turned out signal failures, it is true; the abolition of protective duties, and the imposition of some new taxes have proved rather unpopular; but a statesman is surely entitled to ask time for the working out of his system; and in the meanwhile, when the minister comes in his bustling way to the House of Deputies, and, rubbing his hands with glee, announces that the people even of Genoa and Sardinia, however they may grumble, yet actually *pay* their taxes, we can easily understand his feelings of exultation, springing from a conviction that he has laid on the country no burden which a corresponding increase of public welfare has not enabled it to bear.

Truly Piedmont has been fortunate in the choice of her first constitutional ministers.

We have seen that, in the hour of the greatest danger and distress, the name of one man—Massimo d'Azeglio—saved the State. It is impossible to mention a person entitled to feelings of deeper veneration or warmer affection. A poet, an artist, a musician, a nobleman of refined tastes and pleasures, proud to have earned—to earn even now—his bread by his pen and pencil, D'Azeglio has been for many years,

when that title might cost a man his head, *the* patriot of Italy *par excellence*. He never for one moment forfeited the esteem of his countrymen, yet always equally commanded the respect of the loathsome tyrants who oppressed them. From Milan to Florence, from Rome to Naples, in the worst times, he travelled, seldom molested, never actually proscribed or banished. He conspired with an up-raised vizor; he taught the Italians to have "the courage of their own convictions," to give free vent to their hopes and aspirations. He directed, organized, created public opinion in Italy; that opinion which was wrought into action in 1848. At that juncture D'Azeglio bore arms, and gave his blood at Vicenza. He came back, after the downfall of Italian hopes, to see what could be done, at least for the preservation of his native State. Disabled by wounds and infirmities, and still more unfitted for great exertions by leisurely, indolent, somewhat epicurean, artistic habits, he took but little share in public business except by fits and starts: but under the pressure of difficulties he rose sublime. His voice in the Chamber, his presence in the Cabinet, was again and again the safeguard of the nation. His easy, graceful, amiable manners, his cool common sense, his playful wit, gave him great ascendency over the excellent but unstable character of the King, and counteracted the evil counsels of his domestic and courtly *entourage*. The pliant mould of the King's nature admirably yielded to the plastic genius of the artist-minister. The stern voice of exalted virtue spoke

through the apparent levity of the shrewd veteran patriot. Since 1853, untoward events, and—why should we not avow it?—his own errors have removed D'Azeglio from the government. He withdrew, nothing loath, into private life, giving his rival and successor all the benefit of his support. So long as he lives, his indirect influence at least, as *magni nominis umbra*, will always be indispensable to any liberal cabinet,—without it no government could inspire either respect or confidence. Even in 1855, during his doubts and perplexities respecting the Convent-law, Victor Emanuel would take no man's advice but that of his own Massimo,—the man who knew at all times how to persuade him that "the most honest course was also the easiest."

The times nevertheless required the help of a more active spirit, and Count Cavour came into power, not exactly in opposition to D'Azeglio, but, as it were, by abdication of the latter. The State of Piedmont, from centuries of abuse, was a downright Augean stable, and the Count was the very Hercules for its purification. Freedom in that country, public prosperity and reasonable progress were strangled by courtly favouritism and insolent aristocratic nepotism. D'Azeglio, though himself a contemner of all but personal distinction, seemed not to have strength of mind enough to tear himself loose from all connections of family and caste. He exaggerated the danger to be apprehended by too open a war with the old nobility, which was, however, as a body, impotent for evil or

good. He talked of reform, of promotion of true merit, of "the right man in the right place," but shrank from the conflict inevitably arising from the dispossession of those who looked on the State as a farm, to be turned into account for their own, their friends' and kinsmen's benefit.

Cavour, on the contrary, was at heart an aristocrat, a hater *profani vulgi*, one of the wealthiest men in Piedmont, connected with one-half of its proudest families. He began his public career as a journalist, in 1847, editing the 'Risorgimento,' the most ably conducted but most conservative of the constitutional papers. At that time, and during the crisis of 1848–9, he made himself—merely on account of rather imperious, absolute manners—somewhat obnoxious as a *Codino* (pig-tailed retrogradist); but he had sense enough to perceive that a free state must needs be ruled by its true aristocracy; that is, that either the nobility must put forth new abilities, and strive, as it always will do, to keep its place by real merit, or must acquiesce and see the power pass into the hands of "better men." The army, the court, and diplomacy had always been matters of strict monopoly. This evil Cavour attempted to remedy, by adopting the revolutionary maxim, "to new measures new men." The aristocracy, we repeat,—that is, the class born with the advantages of rank and wealth,—is always sure in the end to rule in every state; but what it hitherto obtained from mere favour, it will now have to gain, in Piedmont, by sheer exertion. The most honourable career must equally be open to all talent.

Already, in 1852, Cavour had attempted to form a government by the combination of his immediate friends, the semi-conservatives of the Right Centre, with the semi-radicals of the Left, at the head of whom were Rattazzi, Cadorna, and other members of the "Democratic" ministry of 1849. Foiled at that epoch, the Count was more successful a twelvemonth later; ever since, the government has been in the hands of the massy-headed, hundred-handed, sleepless, indefatigable financier, and its policy such as might be expected from a coalition (*Connubio* they called it) of all but the very extreme parties. The towering ambition of the Prime Minister, fully commensurate with his rare energy and unequalled ability, brooks not only no rival, but even no sharer of authority, in those departments at least which he takes immediately into his own hands. With the exception of La Marmora for War, and Paleocapa for Public Works, Cavour will hardly admit any but men of mediocrity into his council.

There is however no lack of really superior men in both Houses of Parliament, as well as in the country, to take the helm of public affairs, should it ever slip from the mighty grasp of its present holder. Nor are talents and abilities the greatest recommendation of public men in Piedmont. That country is in the keeping of thoroughly "honest men and true." The examples of the utmost disinterestedness, devotion, self-denial, and sacrifice are so frequent as scarcely to deserve attention, unless it be as a contrast with

the profligacy of political men in other countries, especially in France. Senators like Alfieri di Sostegno, Giacinto Collegno, Giulio, Plezza, Desambrois, and many others, make the Sardinian Upper House an "Assembly of Kings;" whilst in the Chamber of Deputies, Moffa di Lisio, Galvagno, Maurizio Farina, Bezzi, Mautino, Cornero, and a hundred other unambitious, unpretending patriots, may be taken as real representatives of the sterling Piedmontese character, and by their moral worth luminously set forth the more brilliant qualities of such orators as Brofferio, De Pretis, Cabella, etc. The mutual reliance, the thorough fairness and straightforwardness of even extreme hostile parties, in any matter of great national interest, is truly admirable. The ambition of a Valerio, the vanity of a Brofferio, are completely harmless; there has been no instance yet in which both they and all other party leaders have not waived their pretensions, and even immolated their fondest convictions, when the sorest need of the country inexorably demanded such sacrifices. Nay, honour and faith are even to be found, if not amongst the priests and Jesuits, at least amongst their lay partisans. The word of the Marquis of Birago, the most uncompromising *obscurantist* in Piedmont, the editor or patron of the 'Armonia' and other savage clerical papers, is accepted with deference by his liberal opponents; nor is less regard shown to the loyalty and patriotism of a nobler character, the Marquis Costa de Beauregard, notwithstanding his decided retrogradist tendencies. As yet

there is no man in Piedmont, with the exception of the priests and a very few red republicans, even suspected of a wish to secure the triumph of their interests or of their principles at the expense of the country, its sovereign, its liberties.

A nation so guided and so represented must needs be thoroughly healthy and sound at the core; and the phenomenon at which the whole world wonders, of a people for the last seven years insisting on progress, against the tide that forces nearly all other nations backwards, admits of but one explanation, and that is, the transcendent goodness of the people itself.

Yet good, and modest, and sober, and long-enduring as the Piedmontese really are, we would hardly attach great importance to their attainment of free institutions the principal aim of which should not be to make them better. All reforms in the Church and State must begin and end with the general improvement of the mental and moral condition of the masses. There is as yet but too much and too little of the Italian in the Piedmontese character,—too much of the lazy, indolent, profligate habits of city life, too fond a love of enervating pleasures, of frivolous amusements; too much of the old-fashioned, idle, carnival life, or waste of life, the life of a nation brutified by long enslavement: on the other hand, too great a readiness on the part of the Piedmontese to betray—to acknowledge his national inferiority to other Italian tribes in every branch of literature and art; too

great a Macedonian supineness, if not downright Bœotian obtuseness, in the Subalpine mind, in its appreciation and love of the beautiful. The Piedmontese must learn that cultivation is stronger than nature; that nine-tenths of man's genius resides in his power of volition; that success, even in works of imagination, can always be commanded by unswerving energy and unwearied industry; he must know that freedom not only allows, but demands, unceasing, unlimited action, —that it countenances no indulgence, but rather enjoins at the same time that it ennobles sacrifice.

The very first use to which an Italian people should put their free institutions is the improvement of its systems of moral and physical education. There is nothing in Italy that does not require instant and entire regeneration; and whoever opens a school confers on the country a greater benefit than he who calls together a Parliament. Now the Ministry of Public Instruction in Piedmont has not been in the hands of a Cavour or a La Marmora. Buoncompagni, Farini, Cibrario, men of considerable literary attainments, have not however developed the necessary energy and determination for the Atlantean task which was laid upon their shoulders. In June, 1855, that portfolio, after passing through too many hands, was entrusted to Lanza—not perhaps so great a scholar as his predecessors, but a man of more stern, resolute temper, and far greater practical abilities,—a man to do his duty and to exact it from others. The sudden secularization of many colleges, consequent upon the

expulsion of the Jesuits and other monks in 1848, and the indiscriminate appointment to the place of professors and schoolmasters of candidates rather recommended by "democratic" principles than either by literary merit or even moral character, has caused the dawn of liberty to prove anything but beneficial to the educational institutions of the country. There are therefore new no less than old evils to cure in the department of public instruction, and the necessity of giving in to the spirit of the age by its further secularization, in a country where lay schoolmasters sufficiently able and worthy are hardly to be found at any price, will task the ingenuity of the most contriving statesman. A bill for the reform of popular education has been for several years before the Cabinet and Parliament; it will probably come into discussion during the session of 1856.

Yet, though hardly anything can be imagined more deplorable than the present state of education in Piedmont,* where there are 2,599,203 persons, that is,

* The statistics of education in Piedmont give the following results:—The University of Turin numbered, in 1851, 1925 students with 79 professors; that of Genoa 556 students, 46 professors; Cagliari, 325 students, 34 professors; Sassari, 245 students, 29 professors: altogether 3052 students, 198 professors. Divinity students, 209; medicine, 1038; law, 1458; literature and philosophy, 336.

The secondary instruction comprehended 66, between royal, national, and municipal colleges, and 231 minor institutions. The students were 11,714, the teachers 888; 314 laymen, 574 ecclesiastics, 44 foreigners, 844 natives of the State.

For primary or elementary instruction there were altogether 6737 schools, with 261,118 pupils,—about 5·60 per 100 inhabitants. In

two-thirds of the whole population of the mainland (4,368,975), who can neither read nor write, and 512,440, that is, fourteen-fifteenths of the population (547,112) of the island of Sardinia.

Although such facts cry vengeance against the clergy (respectively 1 in 227, and 1 in 127 souls), by whom the most sacred of their duties were so shamefully betrayed, yet there is no doubt that the nation has, by the changes of 1848, put itself in possession of the best means of education, and has largely availed itself of them. The freedom of the press is no fiction in Piedmont. One fair morning the Sardinian subject awoke, and found himself under the restraint of no other censorship than his own sense and discretion. By the

1848, the boys' schools on the mainland were 3829; in 1850 they had risen to 4242, besides 491 private schools. Out of 4000 teachers, 2000 were ecclesiastics,—1550 priests, 450 monks. The female schools between public and private, were 1886.

The first infant asylum in Piedmont was opened by the Marquis of Borolo, in 1825. They were however discountenanced by the Government and clergy till 1839, when a society was instituted for their promotion. There were, in 1849, 61 infant asylums; in 1851, 67, with about 9000 pupils; of these establishments 60 belonged to the Piedmontese divisions, 5 to the division of Genoa, 2 to Nice. The same proportions are very nearly observable in all other branches of popular education arising from private exertion. Piedmont is considerably in advance of the Ligurian provinces, infinitely in advance of the island of Sardinia.

Notwithstanding all the above institutions, and the model schools, technic schools, "adult" schools, etc., out of a population of nearly five millions, only 1,060,123 can read and write, and 419,393 can only read; in Sardinia 27,721 can read and write, 7010 can only read.—*Codice del Cittadino Sardo*, pp. 291–337.—*Stefani, Annuario* pp. 245–257.

original statute all suits for libel were to be tried by a jury—an institution introduced into the State only for political offences; but by a bill brought forward by the Government in February, 1852, that part of the law was modified, and these suits have been referred to the ordinary magistrates. It was a measure of cruel necessity, adopted at the suggestion, or rather upon the demand, of arrogant neighbours, especially of France, and we may feel all the pain and humiliation it must have brought upon its originators. To screen the country from all quarrels with the same overbearing Powers, undignified, and, if not arbitrary, at least vexatious, measures have been occasionally, and are still, deemed unavoidable. The meek and tolerant D'Azeglio himself was, in 1853, compelled to avail himself of his discretionary powers as a minister towards aliens, to banish a Russian democrat, Golovine, guilty of no other crime than the reproduction, in the 'Journal de Turin,' of a letter by the minister himself, published in 1848, and containing some severe strictures upon the Austrian Government.

The new position of Piedmont, after its alliance with the Western Powers, will better enable its rulers to allow public opinion a free utterance, even on foreign topics, that is, especially on that sore Italian question by which legal Piedmont is so often in danger of being put out of the pale of international laws. For the rest, on mere matters of domestic policy, no unreasonable control has ever been exercised. Mazzini in his 'Italia del Popolo,' the Pope in his 'Armo-

nia' and 'Campanone,' the 'Fischietto' in his caricature sheet, can, with almost British impunity, make free with the King, his dynasty, his family, his ministers, the parliament, the laws, the religious and civil institutions, nay the very honour of the country. Hitherto there has been no reason to complain of any flagrant abuse of this so sudden and so unlimited emancipation of the press; with the exception of some occasional virulence on the part of the clerical and republican party (the black and the red), licentiousness has everywhere exhibited a tendency to cure itself; indeed, the press in Piedmont is very far, as yet, from feeling or from exercising its strength. No less than eight or ten daily papers are published in Turin, besides monthly and semi-monthly reviews. Genoa keeps up a lively competition with the capital, at least in the number of its periodicals, and every provincial town has its local organ.* But no very transcendent merit or ca-

* The 'Risorgimento,' through its successors, the 'Parlamento' and the 'Piemonte,' now under the editorship of Farini, maintains its position at the head of the Piedmontese press. That and the 'Opinione,' edited by the Lombard refugees, and the 'Espero,' an evening halfpenny publication, are wedded to the interests and policy of the Cavour Ministry. The opposition is headed by the 'Diritto,' edited by Valerio; the 'Voce della Libertà,' Brofferio's organ; and the 'Unione,' the journal of Bianchi-Giovini, the best newspaper writer in Italy, a Lombard exile, of great ability, a Radical in politics, but no Republican, and a bitter foe to Mazzini. The clerical papers, the 'Armonia,' the 'Campanone,' etc., have been repeatedly mentioned. The Extreme Right party of Revel, Sclopis, etc., have twice set up 'La Patria,' under the editorship of Giorgio Briano, but with indifferent success. But the most powerful of all Turin periodicals is 'La Gazzetta del Popolo,' which has sold as many as fourteen

pacity has hitherto been displayed, either in the political writing or in the editorial arrangement of any of these periodicals. Their inquiries and arguments are limited to a few general political subjects. They have not as yet dived into any of the great civil and moral questions; they are blind to the very first wants, to the vital interests, of the people they profess to enlighten. There is also, even amongst the boldest of them all, a certain *reticence*, a certain exaggerated cautiousness, which makes them forbear from the most important topics, lest they should tread on forbidden ground. Disciples of the Jesuits, the Italians are too deeply penetrated with the maxim that "*Toute vérité n'est pas bonne à dire.*" They must learn to substitute for that the wholesome Anglo-Saxon saying,

thousand copies daily. It is now somewhat on the decline: it is almost the only paper exclusively edited by natives of the State,—Govean, Chiaves, Bersezio,—and its leading principle seems to be "Piedmont for the Piedmontese:" it is distinguished by great ability, a manly style, and uncompromising audacity. The 'Fischietto,' or Turin 'Punch,' is also the production of native talent,—Cesana, Piacentini, and others—and is most deservedly popular. Turin publishes also three reviews: the 'Cimento,' 'Rivista Contemporanea,' 'Rivista Enciclopedica.' None of them can afford any remuneration either to editors or contributors; none has attained the literary merit of the 'Antologia di Firenze,' in its best days.

The best newspaper in Genoa is the 'Corriere Mercantile,' ministerial: the 'Italia del Popolo' costs Mazzini and the London Friends of Italy forty thousand francs: the 'Maga,' a satirical paper, is the only publication in the State objectionable for low scurrility.

The most popular provincial papers are the 'Vessillo Vercellese,' 'Iride Novarese,' 'Gazzetta delle Alpi,' etc. The 'Gazette de Savoie,' ministerial, the 'Écho du Mont Blanc,' clerical, are the best in Savoy.

that "we owe our fellow-beings the truth,—the whole truth, nothing but the truth."

The circulation of Piedmontese papers is, by the jealousy of the Austrian and other Italian Governments, strictly limited to the few readers out of little more than four millions of people; they have necessarily proved unprofitable as mere commercial speculations, and are therefore destitute of means for the encouragement of talent. They are mostly party organs; none of them have risen, or are likely to rise, to the universal importance of the 'Times' or 'Augsburg Gazette.'

Hitherto Piedmont, in short, has not got beyond the mere attainment of freedom; the comprehension of all its deep and vast meaning, the development of its inexhaustible means, the pursuance of its various purposes—the fulfilment of its great mission, will be the work of ages. We have said, and repeat it—the emancipation of an Italian community implies its total regeneration. The degradation of the national character dates, to say the least, from the year 1530. Shall it be charged with excessive despondency, if we think that its complete redemption may not be looked forward to before 1900? There is a "bend in the neck" of the long down-bowed race it will take two or three generations to outgrow.

In the meanwhile the legislation, it is to be deeply lamented, has too exclusively busied itself with mere political enactments. The abolition of the public lottery has been repeatedly mooted in the Chambers;

but the measure has been abandoned from the sheer impossibility of meeting the exigencies of the Treasury. The bill on popular education has been suffered to slumber through two or three sessions, and both Parliament and the Executive have been remiss in the repression of that license in the public morality which was inseparable from too sudden a relaxation of the old iron rule.

The mind of Count Cavour gives the tone to all the proceedings in the State, and that mind is strictly practical, essentially utilitarian. Bills have passed for the reorganization of the national bank, for an establishment of a *Cadastre*, for the classification or extension and improvement of the roads, etc. etc. The Minister thinks perhaps too much more of the well-being than of the well-doing of the people.

Even in mere administrative matters however Piedmont requires a thorough reform. The labours of the last three centuries only aimed at equalization, centralization. The political synthesis could go no further; absolutism has done its work. The time has come, not indeed for decomposition, but for a wise distribution, for the partial *localization* of government. Piedmont has for centuries been under the blind control of French ideas. Even at the present day, a precedent in France is brought forward as an unanswerable argument in the Sardinian Chambers. The whole provincial organization, by *Intendenti Generali* and *Intendenti Provinciali*, corresponds to the system of French *Préfectures* and *Sous-Préfectures*. Under these de-

spotic pashas, the very last remnants of Italian municipalism had been utterly crushed. Soon after the publication of the Statuto, on the 7th October, 1848, a municipal law was drawn up, in great haste and amidst general confusion, by the advisers of Charles Albert. All such provisions however must be merely looked upon as transitional. The institutions of a country are not to be improvised in one day. The whole municipal organization, the *Communal, Provincial,* and *Divisional* Councils, or Assemblies, nay, the very divisions and subdivisions of the State, are matters to be submitted to long and careful revision.*

* By an oversight, we have given, at the end of the first chapter of the first volume of this work, the last-but-one political division of the country. By a law of the 30th of October, 1847, the compartments of the mainland underwent important modifications. Another law, of August 12th, 1848, extended the same measures to the island of Sardinia. The Divisions for the whole State are now 14; the Provinces, 50; the *Mandamenti* (districts or *arrondissements*), 506; the *Communes*, 3099.

1st Division, Turin with three provinces: Turin, Pinerolo, Susa.
2. Genoa, four provinces: Genoa, Chiavari, Spezia, Novi.
3. Chambéry, four: Chambéry, Upper Savoy, Maurienne, Tarentaise.
4. Annecy, three: Annecy, Faucigny, Chablais.
5. Alessandria, five: Alessandria, Asti, Voghera, Tortona, Bobbio.
6. Cuneo, four: Cuneo, Saluzzo, Mondovì, Alba.
7. Novara, five: Novara, Lomellina, Ossola, Pallanza, Valsesia.
8. Nice, three: Nice, Oneglia, San Remo.
9. Ivrea, two: Ivrea and Aosta.
10. Vercelli, three: Vercelli, Biella, Casale.
11. Savona, three: Savona, Acqui, Albenga.
12. Cagliari, four: Cagliari, Iglesias, Isili, Oristano.
13. Sassari, four: Sassari, Alghero, Ozieri, Tempio.
14. Nuoro, three: Nuoro, Cuglieri, Lanusei.

Hitherto little more has been done in Piedmont than merely to assert the power, evince the goodwill, and develope a certain extent of capacity for action.

No trifling achievement is that,—indeed an unprecedented prodigy in the annals of Italy! A country comes of a sudden, and without struggle, into the way of progress, and checks its own ardour, moderates its hurry, so that every step may be the result of rational, and, above all things, of unanimous deliberation. It is the first time that liberty has had a tendency to unite in Italy rather than to sunder.

At the time that Maurienne and Susa first acknowledged the rule of one Count in the north of Italy, in 1044, Naples and Sicily were also brought under the sceptre of one King in the south. Yet, mark the contrast. That southern State, inhabited by one race, bound to the same destinies, has not only submitted for centuries to a foreign yoke, has not only seldom or never manfully stood up in its own defence, or upheld its right to self-existence, but has eternally been tending to separation: remove the crushing force, and immediate dissolution ensues. The same may be said of Tuscany, the Roman States, the Austrian provinces.

Honour, eternal honour, to those who knew how to bring two or three Italian tribes to pull together! We will take the result as it is, without reference to

With a view to simplify and *decentralize* the Administration, and to reduce the outrageous number of *employés*, it is now proposed to suppress the Divisions, and to organize the State into fewer Provinces, subdivided into *Communes*.

the causes which led to it, or to the means which achieved it. To the shame of the human race be it said, it was everywhere tyranny—tyranny alone—that gave union and stability to great national aggregates. What Henry VII. did for England, or Louis XI. for France, the House of Savoy achieved for Italy; and to the mere talent of constructiveness the Savoy Princes added peculiar virtues of their own, and exemption from many of the vices which degraded the generality of despots. Amadeus VIII. was a more honest subduer of feudalism than Louis XI., whom he preceded. Emanuel Philibert was a master no less than a precursor to Henry IV., and Victor Amadeus II., both as a conqueror and a legislator, was a far greater prince than the *Grand Monarch*, his contemporary.

Shall the House of Savoy reap the benefit of this indubitable, inestimable good, which God was pleased to work through its agency? Shall a descendant of the Counts of Maurienne ever clutch the sceptre of Lombardy?—that sceptre which complaisant genealogists suppose may be claimed as the heritage of Beranger II. of Ivrea, which, at any rate, hovered dim and faint in the air before the eager glance of so many of the princes of this no less wary and persevering than bold, aspiring race?

There are those who delight in fortuitous analogies, and derive their prognostics from vague coincidences of names and dates. For them the fall of the Roman Empire was bodied forth in the reproduction

of the names both of the builder of the city and of the founder of the Imperial Power, in the person of the last wearer of the purple in the West. We leave these superstitious triflers to speculate on the probable career of the young heir of Sardinia, who happens to bear the very name of the White-handed Founder of the dynasty,—a name, too, revived now, after an interval of above six centuries. Is the reigning line to end as it began, with a Humbert? or shall the work of the first Humbert be completed under the auspices of the fourth?

Last King of Sardinia—or first King of Italy?

We raise not the curtain of future events. We have merely been investigating the memorials of bygone ages, and would not even vouch for the accuracy of the saying, that "the Past is parent to the Future."

There are great facts, slowly and silently ripening in the womb of fate, with utter unconsciousness of the men that are mainly instrumental in their consummation. The race of Humbert only aimed at the increment of the State of Savoy; the result was the formation of the people of Piedmont. That people has, for the last seven years, been redeeming the Italian character, giving the lie to the ungenerous men who cried down a whole nation as hopelessly sunk and degenerate.

Piedmont is rehabilitating Italy, achieving a moral conquest a thousand times more glorious than any armed subjugation. Friends and foes will be equally convinced that either all Italy is to be raised to the

level of Piedmont, or men must despair of God's justice upon earth.

In his bold, confident youth, an Italian patriot may have rejoiced in the firm belief that his age was destined to witness the rearing up of the whole edifice of Italian nationality. He must now be thankful to Heaven, if, dying, he can carry with him the conviction that the first stone—the corner-stone—is at least laid.

Italy may yet be a dream—but Piedmont is a reality.

Blackpool, September 11th, 1855.

THE END.

JOHN EDWARD TAYLOR, PRINTER,
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